UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANTHONY BRICEST, JR.
No. 4:25-cr-00010-TWP-VTW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA NEW ALBANY DIVISION
June 30, 2025
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Anthony Bricest Jr.‘s (“Bricest“) Motion to Dismiss Indictment as to Count I (Filing No. 16) and Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Indictment (Filing No. 18). A federal grand jury indicted Bricest with Count I: Possession of Firearms by a Felon in violation of
I. BACKGROUND
The Indictment charges in Count One that on November 12, 2024, Bricest, knowing that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, to wit: Felony Possessiоn of an Altered Firearm on or about October 24, 2023; did knowingly possess a firearm in violation of
II. LEGAL STANDARD
III. DISCUSSION
Bricest asserts the same arguments for both of his Motions stating he “incorporates by reference the legal arguments and memorandum previously submitted in support of the dismissal of Count 1, as the reasoning therein applies equally to Count 2.” (Filing No. 18 at 2). Both Counts
The Second Amendment reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
In Heller, the Supreme Court began its analysis of the right with the “constitutional text and history.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 22. “In Bruen, [the Supreme Court] directed courts to examine our ‘historical tradition of firearm regulation’ to help delinеate the contours of the right.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17). The Supreme Court further explained that “if a challenged regulation fits within that tradition, it is lawful under the Second Amendment.” Id. Though, the Government “bears the burden to ‘justify its regulation.‘” Id. (quoting Bruen 597 U.S. at 24).
The Supreme Court clarified in Rahimi that its recent Second Amendment cases such as Heller and Bruen, were misunderstood by some courts stating, “[t]hese precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in аmber.” Id. Instead, “the Second Amendment permits more than just
“[T]he appropriate analysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our rеgulatory tradition.” Id. at 692. “A court must ascertain whether the new law is ‘relatively similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to permit, ‘apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances.‘” Id. (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29) (alteration in original).
“Why and how the regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry.” Id. Even “when a challenged regulation doеs not precisely match its historical precursors, ‘it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.’ The law must comport with the principles underlying the Second Amendment, but it need not be a ‘dead ringer’ or a ‘historical twin.‘” Id. (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30).
Assessing Bricest‘s challenge with these principles in mind, the Court concludes that Section 922(g)(1) survives Bricest‘s challenge both facially and as applied.2
A. Section 922(g)(1) is Constitutional on its face
For Bricest‘s facial challenge to succeed, he must “establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Accordingly, the Government need only demonstrate that Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional in some of its applications. The Court finds that the Government has satisfied this burden.
The Court‘s analysis begins with the binding precedent from the Seventh Circuit‘s decision in United States v. Gay, 98 F.4th 843 (7th Cir. 2024) (Filing No 81. At 3). In Gay, the Seventh
Bricest argues that pursuant to Bruen, Section 922(g)(1) is not historically justified (Filing No. 16 at 7). Bricest further сontends that the Government cannot satisfy its burden of showing that laws such as Section 922(g)(1) comply with American legal tradition. Id. The Court disagrees.
As discussed above, Rahimi states that the test is “whether the new law is ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to permit, ‘apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances.‘” 602 U.S. at 692 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29) (аlteration in original). The law must comport with the principles underlying the Second Amendment, but it need not be a ‘dead ringer’ or a ‘historical twin.‘” Id. (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30). However, the Court need not delve too deep into the historical arguments as the Seventh
Given the Seventh Circuit‘s holding in Gay, a historical review seems unnecessary. However, in the interest of thoroughness, the Court finds that the Government has presеnted sufficient evidence that Section 922(g)(1) is relevantly similar to laws our tradition is understood to permit as required by Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692.
The Government points the Court to Kanter v. Barr, (Filing No. 25 at 10), where the Seventh Circuit stated that it has “suggested that felons were not historically understood to have Second Amendment rights.” 919 F.3d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 2019). In Kanter, the Seventh Circuit, when reviewing the history of the Second Amendment, stated thаt “most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could disarm unvirtuous citizens, including felons.” Id. at 446 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Government also points the Court to United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (Filing No. 25 at 10). In Skoien, the Seventh Circuit cited Heller‘s identification of the “highly influential” precursor to the Second Amendment the Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. Id. at 640 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 604). “The [Dissent] asserted that citizens have a personal right to bear arms unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury.” Id. The Seventh Circuit in Skoien also observed that “[m]any of the states, whose
Finally, the Government points the Court to three other circuits who have upheld Section 922(g)(1) in lawsuits challenging its constitutionality (Filing No. 25 at 9 (citing Vincent v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1197, 1199 (10th Cir. 2023) vacated by Vincent v. Garland, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2931 (2024); United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2024) vacated by Dubois v. United States, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 277 (2025)3; and United States v. Jackson, 69 F.4th 495, 505-06 (8th Cir. 2023) vacated by Jackson v. United States, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2904 (2024)). In Vincent, the Tenth Circuit held that Section 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to a nonviolent felon convicted of bank fraud. Vincent, 80 F.4th at 1202. While Vincent was vacated in light of Rahimi, the Tenth Circuit on remand upheld this decision. See Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025).
In Jackson, the Eight Circuit nоted that early legislatures “authorized punishments that subsumed disarmament—death or forfeiture of a perpetrator‘s entire estate—for non-violent offenses involving deceit and wrongful taking of property.” Id. at 503 (citing
The historical record above indicates that legislatures had a tradition of possessing the ability to prevent categories of people from possessing firearms to address a danger of misuse. The Court is therefore satisfied that Section 922(g)(1) comports with our nаtion‘s history of firearm regulation. Due to this, along with the binding precedent in Gay, Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face.
B. Section 922(g)(1) is Constitutional as applied to Bricest
Bricest also challenges Section 922(g)(1) as applied (Filing No. 16 at 16). To succeed on an as applied challenge, Bricest must show that Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of his case. Phillips, 645 F.3d at 863. The Government therefore must provide the Court with a sufficient history of our nation preventing individuals like Bricest to possess firearms.
The Government states in its brief that Bricest “has only submitted a facial challenge in his filing.” (Filing No. 25 at 2). However, Bricest‘s brief clearly challenges Section 922(g)(1) аs applied to him (See Filing No. 16 at 16). Regardless, the Court is satisfied that the above historical analysis provided by the Government is sufficient to withstand Bricest‘s as-applied challenge.
Bricest asserts that the Third Circuit has held that Section 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to individuals whose past offenses arе nonviolent, recent, or otherwise not indicative of
First, in deciding that Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Bricest, the Court acknowledges that Gay left open the possibility that there is “some room for as-applied challenges” for individuals “whose most serious conviction is for a non-violent crime that did not lead to even one day in prison.” 98 F.4th at 847 (citing Range, 69 F.4th 96). However, contrary to Bricest‘s assertions, the evidence indicates that he is a great distance from being an individual whose most serious crime is a non-violent crime that did not lead to even one day in prison.
At the time of the instant offense, Bricest had a prior felony conviction for Possession of an Altered Firearm for removing the serial number from a gun he owned, which, while not specifically listed in
The probable cause affidavit of the state court offensе states that Bricest forced his way into a residence and struck his girlfriend in the face and arms and scratched the back of her thighs, struck two others in the face, and broke a window. Probable Cause Affidavit, State of Indiana v. Anthony Bricest, 10C04-2307-F5-000185 (Ind. Super. Oct. 24, 2023) (Filed July 18, 2023). Bricest was convicted of one count of Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury, and two counts of Battery. Judgmеnt of Conviction and Sentence, Bricest, 10C04-2307-F5-000185 (Filed October 24, 2023). Further, for his felony conviction, Bricest received a sentence of three years, 96 days executed,
Finally, Bricest‘s assertion that his “2023 Indiana conviction does not involve the use or threatenеd use of force, violence, or danger to others” is misguided (Filing No. 16 at 16). While the Court does not disagree that the specific charge of Possession of an Altered Firearm does not require violence as an element, Bricest‘s conviction for this charge was accompanied by multiple violеnt crimes including one count of Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury, and two counts of Battery. Bricest was convicted of these crimes because he forced his way into a residence and struck his girlfriend in the face and arms and left scratches on the back of her thighs, struck two others in the face, and broke a window as well. These circumstances clearly involve the use of force and violence to endanger others. Accordingly, the circumstances leading to Bricest‘s arrest indicate that he is a violent individual.
The Court finds that the Government has satisfied its burden and Section 922(g)(1) is therefore constitutional against Bricest. The Court‘s decision is furthered by the plethora of post-Bruen decisions from sister courts in this circuit finding Section 922(g)(1) constitutional, even if in varying forms. See United States v. Regalado, 709 F. Supp. 3d 619, 633-634 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2023) (collecting cases).
Whether Gay and Rahimi leave room for some as-applied challenges is an argument for another case with different facts. However, Gay and Rahimi make clear the Section 922(g)(1) is
IV. CONCLUSION
Under Rahimi, the Government bears the burden to show that Section 922(g)(1) is relevantly similar to laws our tradition is understood to permit. 602 U.S. at 692. Here, the Government has made such a showing. Section 922(g)(1) is consistent with our historical traditions. Section 922(g)(1) is therefore constitutionally valid on its face. It is also constitutional as applied to Bricest. For the reasons explained above, Bricest‘s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment as to Count I (Filing No. 16) and Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Indictment (Filing No. 18) are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 6/30/2025
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
Pamela S. Domash
DOJ-USAO
pamela.domash@usdoj.gov
James Adrian Earhart
attyearhart@aol.com