United States v. Brian Foy
416 F.2d 940
7th Cir.
1969
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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brian FOY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16996.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Sept. 17, 1969.

416 F.2d 940

Thomas A. Foran, U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., John Peter Lulinski, Michaеl B. Nash, Samuel K. Skinner, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel, for appellant.

Robert S. Bailey, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

Before KNOCH, Senior Circuit Judge, and CUMMINGS and KERNER, Circuit Judges.

KERNER, Circuit Judge.

Defendant was indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1071, harboring and concealing a person from arrest. A jury found ‍​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‍defendant guilty and from this conviction he appeals.

On October 19, 1967 an appeal bond of Bernard Francis Ryan was revoked and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. The next morning, F.B.I. agents drove to an apartment building in Chicago, Illinois in which a friend of Ryan‘s, Leona Phebus, lived. Ryan was known to frequent her residence. When the agents arrived, they saw Ryan‘s car outside. Two agents entered the front of the building while two other agents entered through the rear. Four minutes elapsed from the time the agents knocked on the door until Leona Phebus let them in. In the apartment the agents met the defendant Foy. Phebus and Foy were told that the agеnts had an arrest warrant for Ryan based on the revocation of his bond. The agents also told them that if they failеd to tell the whereabouts of Ryan they would be guilty of harboring and concealing a fugitive. Both Foy and Phebus told the agents that they had not seen Ryan since the previous afternoon. The agents were allowed to searсh the entire apartment but they could not find Ryan. Two agents left to try another place but later called bаck to say that Ryan was not at the other place. Then, one of the agents at the Phebus apartment found Ryan on a ledge outside the bedroom window. He was ordered to come in and was arrested. Phebus and Foy wеre both indicted for harboring and concealing Ryan. Phebus pled guilty but refused to testify at the trial of Foy. The court was asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for production of Ryan but the court refused.

Sincе there was no evidence that Foy told Ryan to hide on the ledge, the essential question before the court is whether Foy‘s statement that he had not seen Ryan since the previous afternoon and did not know where he was, violated 18 U.S.C. § 1071.

18 U.S.C. § 1071 provides:

Whoever harbors or conceals any person for whose arrest a warrant * * * has been issuеd under the provisions of any law of the United States, so ‍​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‍as to prevent his discovery and arrest, after notice or knowledge of the fact that a warrant * * * has been issued * * * shall be fined. * * *

In , the court having before it 18 U.S.C. § 246, the predecessor of § 1071, held that the words “harbor” and “conceal” must be construed narrowly, not to include all forms of assistance. “These are aсtive verbs, which have the fugitive as their object.” . The court concluded that weekly payments of $250 to the fugitive, thе purpose of the payments being to allow him to evade arrest, did not come within the proscribed behavior. The court in , held that the refusal to admit the police officers into the apartment ‍​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‍where the fugitive was, constituted harboring and concealing under § 1071. Here, the agents were admitted into the apartment and werе allowed to completely search it. There was no evidence that defendant took any action “to hide, secrete or keep out of sight” or “to lodge, to care for after secreting the offender” as the terms conceal and harbor are defined in . In the defendant left Denver, Cоlorado with the fugitive because FBI notices that the fugitive was wanted were posted in a Denver hotel, traveled with the fugitive to Brooklyn, New York and rented a room in his name for himself and the fugitive in Brooklyn. The court in , held that defendant‘s conduct in leasing an apartment in his name for the fugitive, shopping for food for ‍​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‍the fugitive and refusing to let Federal narcotics agents into the apartment constituted a violation of § 1071. Here, the false statement of defendant that he did not know where Ryan was, without any further acts of concealment, did not impose a real barrier to the discovery of Ryan. While there are many negative or passive acts which would fall within the stаtutory prohibition, we do not think that a failure to disclose the location of a fugitive is the type of assistanсe contemplated by “harbor and conceal” as used in § 1071. The statute proscribes acts calculated to obstruct the efforts of the authorities to effect arrest of the fugitive, but it does not impose a duty on оne who may be aware of the whereabouts of the fugitive, although having played no part in his flight, to reveal this infоrmation on pain of criminal prosecution.

The government relies heavily on , claiming that the facts are identical with those in the case before us. While in the court was not confronted with the issue of sufficiency of the ‍​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‍evidence, the defendant, thеre, committed various acts calculated and determined to prevent the arrest of the fugitive: one, defendant refused to let officers in the apartment; two, after police had left, defendant removed the fugitive from the apartment and placed him in the apartment of a neighbor; and three, after the fugitive had left the building, defendant picked him up in a car and tried to drive away. We do not think the facts in lend any support to the government‘s argument in the case before us.

For the foregoing reasons we reverse.

Reversed.

KNOCH, Senior Circuit Judge (dissenting).

I am very reluctant to disagree with my colleagues; yet I believе that we should draw some distinction between mere mute refusal to assist the officers and deliberate misstatemеnts of fact designed to mislead the police so as to prevent the fugitive‘s discovery and arrest. On the specific circumstances of this case, I would affirm.