This case presents a novel question regarding whether feigning mental illness is an appropriate basis for an obstruction of justice enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We hold that it is.
After pleading guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute 150 grams or more of crack cocaine, Braulio Antonio Batista was sentenced to a 188-month term of impris
I.
Batista was arrested on September 19, 2002, for his involvement in the sale of approximately 450 grams of crack cocaine. 1 Batista had served as the middle-man during the sale between a confidential informant and the seller, Liroy Batista-Avila. Batista was assisted by Antonio Arias-Campos, who had a minimal role in the sale.
Not long after an unsuccessful proffer session with the government, Batista’s attorney requested an evaluation of Batista to determine if he was competent to stand trial. Over the course of the next two years, Batista was evaluated on at least five occasions.
Batista was initially evaluated by Dr. Susan Barber, who found that Batista was likely not competent to stand trial, and Dr. William Ryan, who initially agreed with Dr. Barber, but suggested that such a finding was possibly the result of malingering by Batista. Dr. Ryan’s report indicated that Batista had bеen administered a test that examined a patient’s memory. Patients suffering from severe brain damage could generally answer at least six of the fifteen questions included on the test. Batista answered only two correctly, indicating malingering of memory problems.
Following this report by Dr. Ryan, the government requested further testing to determine if Batista was feigning his symptoms. Dr. Steven Simring interviewed Batista and concluded that Batista was simulating mental illness. His report stated that Batista was “faking or exaggerating psychiatric symptoms in order to avoid going to trial.” Dr. Ryan also interviewed Batista again. Based on this second interview, Dr. Ryan concluded that Batista was probably malingering and was competent to stand trial. Dr. Ryan’s report nоted that Batista “attempted to feign mental illness by refusing to sit in a chair which he claimed was occupied by his imaginary friend, by claiming that he was in his home with his mother waiting upstairs, and by miming the retrieval of an imaginary beverage from an imaginary refrigerator,” and then offering Dr. Ryan a sip.
By court order, a final examination was performed by Dr. Joel Morgan, a neuroр-sychologist who was chosen by Batista. Following his interview with Batista, Dr. Morgan agreed with the previous doctors’ conclusions, finding that he was malingering. Dr. Morgan found that the evaluation presented “significant, incontrovertible and overwhelming evidence regarding the presence of suboptimal effort and malingering in the part of the examinee ... consistent with а picture of what might be phrased as ‘unsophisticated malingering.’ ” Based on all of these examinations, the District Court found Batista competent to stand trial. Following this determination, Batista pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute 150 grams or more of crack cocaine.
Based on this evidence, the District Court expressly found that Batista had feigned mental illness to avoid trial, had transmitted his plan to feign mental incompetence to Arias-Campos, and had chosen to not take his medication so as to increase his chances of being found incompetent. In addition, while the District Court found that Batista hаd shown some acceptance of responsibility by admitting his guilt and initially trying to cooperate with the authorities, this was counteracted by Batista’s later attempts to avoid trial by feigning mental incompetence. Based on these findings, the District Court granted the government’s motion for a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice and denied Bаtista’s motion for a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 2
The District Court also denied Batista’s motion for a downward departure based on significantly reduced mental capacity, finding that any mental problems Batista may have had did not affect his culpability in the cocaine conspiracy. Therefore, the District Court found that Batista had a base offense level of 36, placing his advisory Guidelines range between 188 and 235 months. The District Court then allowed counsel for both sides to argue for the appropriate sentence based on the § 3553(a) factors. During that time, Batista’s counsel focused heavily on the fact that Batista’s co-conspirators had received sentences of 63 and 27 months respectively. In its final decision, the District Court found that the disparity between Batista’s sentence and those of his co-conspirators was warranted and that a sentence of 188 months was appropriate under the circumstances.
Batista timely filed this appeal.
II.
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We exercise plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines, reviewing its factual determinations for clear error.
United States v. Grier,
III.
Batista’s primary contentions on appeal center on the District Court’s determination of his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. We will address each alleged error individually.
Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a district court may enhance a defendant’s base offense level by two levels if it determines that the defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the аdministration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.... ” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1. On appeal, Batista argues that the District Court improperly applied this enhancement because Batista was merely “exploring a potential defense or mitigation” when he was being еvaluated. However, the District Court found otherwise, indicating that Batista knowingly feigned mental illness and shared his intent to use this plan with Arias-Campos. We review such factual findings for clear error,
Grier,
While we have not previously so held, several of our sister circuits have found that a defendant’s feigning of mental illness is sufficient grounds for the imposition of the obstruction of justice enhancement pursuant to § 3C1.1.
See United States v. Greer,
Contrary to Batista’s contention, allowing an obstruction of justice enhancement based on feigned mental illness does not chill a defendant’s ability to not stand trial if he is mentally incompetent. It is clear that a sentencing enhancement cannot be appliеd in a way that violates a defendant’s constitutional rights. It is equally well-established that the Due Process Clause prevents a defendant from standing trial if that defendant is mentally incompetent. However, these two facts do not combine to prevent the imposition of an enhancement on a defendant who feigns mental illness in order to avoid going to triаl. In
United States v. Dunnigan,
Based in part on
Dunnigan,
the Fifth Circuit similarly rejected a defendant’s claim that allowing obstruction enhancements based on feigned mental incompetence would chill his right to have a competency hearing. “While a criminal defendant possesses a constitutional right to a compеtency hearing if a bona fide doubt exists as to his competency, he sure
B.
Batista next contends that the District Court improperly denied his motion for a reduction based on acceptance of responsibility. Section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides: “If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelinеs Manual § 3El.l(a).
3
When reviewing a district court’s denial of acceptance of responsibility, we afford the district court “great deference” because “ ‘the sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.’ ”
United States v. Boone,
Batista rightly argues that the fact that he was given a two-point increase for obstruction of justice did not,
per se,
require the District Court to refuse his acceptance of responsibility motion. As indicated in application note 4 to the acceptance of responsibility Guideline, “[cjonduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 ... ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply.”
Id.
at § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 1.
See also United States v. Jenkins,
The District Court appropriately found that Batista had shown some acceptance of responsibility by admitting his guilt and initially trying to cooperate with authorities. However, it also correctly found that this was counteracted by Batista’s later attempts to prove that he was not responsible for his actions based on mental incompetence. Batista’s actions went beyond the mere exploration or presentation of a defense of mental incompetence to the feigning of a mental illness in an attempt tо avoid facing trial or punishment for his crime. Batista’s false representation of mental illness was sufficient for the District Court to find that he had not accepted responsibility for his action. Batista’s initial admission of guilt is not sufficiently extraordinary to overcome the later behavior that led to the obstruction of justice enhancement. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 4;
United States v. McDowell,
As the District Court properly applied the obstruction enhancement and denied the acceptance of responsibility reduction, we find that it properly calculated Batista’s base offense level.
IV.
Batista next contends that the District Court erred in failing to grant him a downward departure for significantly reduced mental capacity pursuant to § 5K2.13. We have previously held that discretionary departures are not reviewable unless the District Court refused such a departure in violation of law.
United States v. McKnight,
V.
Finally, we reject Batista’s argument that his sentence was unreasonable. In order to determine whether a district court’s imposition of sentence was reasonable, we must first satisfy ourselves that the district court correctly calculated the defendant’s base offense level and ruled on any motions for departure.
Cooper,
Once we have satisfied ourselves that a district court has properly determined the advisory Guidelines range, we must next determine whether the district court considered the remaining § 3553(a) factors and applied them appropriately to the defendant’s case.
Id.
The question is not what sentence we would have imposed, but whether, under the circumstanсes cited by the District Court, the sentence imposed was logical and consistent with the § 3553(a) factors.
Id.
(quoting
United States v. Williams,
Upon review of the record, we are satisfied that the District Court appropriately considered the remaining § 3553(a) factors. Id. The District Court heard Batista’s argument that his sentence was inappropriate considering his co-conspiratоrs, Batista-Avila and Arias-Campos, had received sentences of 63 and 27 months respectively. The District Court found that the disparity was warranted as both Arias-Campos and Batista-Avila were operating under cooperation agreements and had benefited from reductions for substantial assistance and acceptance of responsibility. Bаtista, on the other hand, had attempted to avoid trial by feigning mental illness.
VI.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence.
Notes
. As indicated, Batista pled to possessing only 150 grams of crack cocaine.
. The District Court denied the government’s motion for an enhancemеnt based on an aggravating role, finding that Batista was not a leader or organizer. That determination has not been appealed.
. If the defendant's base level is 16 or greater and he has timely entered a guilty plea, the defendant may be eligible for an additional one-level reduction. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3 E1.1 (b).
. Batista’s claim that the District Court erred by not applying the "safety valve” provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5C1.2, is spurious. As an initial matter, Batista waived such an argument by conceding that it did not apply at his sentencing hearing. However, even if he had not waived the argument, § 5C1.2 only applies to defendants when their advisory Guidelines range is less than the mandatory minimum required by statute. Id. Because Batista's properly calculated Guidelines range was 188 to 235 months, well above the 120-month mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841, § 5Cl.2 does not apply.