UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Bradley Thomas JACOBSEN and Donna Marie Jacobsen, Appellants.
No. 81-2158.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
July 27, 1982.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 14, 1982.
683 F.2d 296
Submitted May 20, 1982.
The district court indicated in its opinion that it would have directed a verdict for Kimberly-Clark at the close of the case, but reserved its ruling in accordance with the preferred practice of submitting such questions to the jury. See Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., supra, 518 F.Supp. at 695. Because the same standard applies to a motion for judgment n. o. v. as to a motion for a directed verdict, Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1235 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839, 101 S.Ct. 116, 66 L.Ed.2d 46 (1980); Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 401 F.2d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 1968), the court determined that Kimberly-Clark was entitled to a judgment n. o. v. as a matter of law.
After reviewing the record, we agree with the district court‘s conclusion that the facts presented at trial establish that Kimberly-Clark employed Halsell for an indefinite period of time. Thus, the employment was terminable at the will of either party. Having affirmed the district court‘s entry of judgment n. o. v. in favor of Kimberly-Clark, we need not review the district court‘s ruling on damages.
V. Conclusion.
We affirm the district court‘s rulings on all of Henry Halsell‘s claims against Kimberly-Clark. The district court properly entered summary judgment on Halsell‘s defamation claim. After reviewing the record in this case, we also believe the district court acted properly in directing a verdict in favor of Kimberly-Clark on Halsell‘s ADEA claim. Finally, we affirm the district court‘s entry of judgment n. o. v. on Halsell‘s contract claim.
Affirmed.
James M. Rosenbaum, U. S. Atty., Janice M. Symchych, Asst. U. S. Atty., D. Minn., Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.
Before LAY, Chief Judge, HEANEY, Circuit Judge, and BECKER,* Senior District Judge.
LAY, Chief Judge.
The fundamental issue in this appeal is whether federal drug agents’ warrantless search of a package damaged in transit and inspected by employees of a private carrier was a violation of the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. We find the search unconstitutional.
The facts may be briefly stated. A supervisor for Federal Express, a private freight carrier, discovered a damaged package. Pursuant to company policy, a manager examined the contents of the package. The package consisted of a cardboard box wrapped in brown paper. Inside the box was a tube of duct tape. Inside the tube were four clear plastic bags, one inside the next, the innermost containing white powder. Federal Express employees, thinking the powder might be a controlled substance, notified the Drug Enforcement Agency. The manager then placed the bags back in the tube, leaving them visible from the tube‘s end, and placed the tube back in the box.
When DEA Agent Jerry Kramer arrived, the manager gave him the box. Kramer removed the tube from the open box, took the bags out of the tube, and extracted a sample of the powder. He thereafter conducted a field test on the powder which indicated the powder was cocaine. A short time later another sample was removed for further testing. The package was then rewrapped and Federal Express was directed to deliver the package to the addressee shown on the label. The package was addressed to Mr. D. Jacobs, 7300 West 130th Street, Apple Valley, Minnesota.
Drug enforcement agents determined Bradley Jacobsen lived at this address. He was mentioned in at least two previous DEA investigative files relating to cocaine distribution. On the basis of this information and the field test, the drug enforcement agents obtained a warrant from a magistrate to search the defendants’ home.
Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized in their home as fruit of an illegal search of the package. Magistrate Floyd E. Boline recommended the motion be denied because the government‘s search did not exceed the scope of the private search. Over defendants’ objection, the district court, Judge Harry H. MacLaughlin presiding, refused to suppress the evidence.
Bradley and Donna Jacobsen were tried before a jury and convicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of
We find that the evidence should have been suppressed and thus reverse the defendants’ convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and for conspiracy. We find the evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that Bradley Jacobsen assaulted a federal officer and thus sustain his conviction on that count.1
Since Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1877), it has been the law that letters and sealed packages are protected from government inspection. The Jacobsens had a reasonable expectation that the contents of the package would remain private. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651-52, 654, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 2398-99, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980) (material carried by private carrier); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251-52, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 1031-32, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970). Contra United States v. Barry, 673 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1982) (Edwards, C. J., dissenting).2
The government argues that the fourth amendment does not forbid evidentiary use of the fruits of a private search conducted without government participation or encouragement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-90, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2048-50, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S.Ct. 574, 576, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921). Defendants do not ar-
In Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980), a private carrier delivered a number of sealed packages to the wrong company. Employees of the company opened the packages and found boxes of film. The boxes contained suggestive drawings and explicit descriptions of the films’ contents. An employee of the private carrier removed a reel of film and attempted to view it by holding it against a light, but he could not see its contents and no attempt was made to project the film. The employees contacted the FBI. Without obtaining a warrant, FBI agents took possession of the packages and screened the films.
The Court, in a five to four decision,3 found the agents’ actions violated the fourth amendment. The plurality held that the agents were lawfully in possession of the films, but should have obtained a warrant authorizing them to view the films. The screening of the films was an investigation which yielded incriminating evidence not disclosed on the films’ containers. The viewing was deemed a search. Id. at 653-54, 100 S.Ct. at 2399-2400.
In Walter, the private search exposed the boxes to government scrutiny. The plurality held, however, that government scrutiny must be strictly confined to what is exposed by the private search. Id. at 656-57, 100 S.Ct. at 2401-02 (comparing limitation to that imposed by terms of warrant). Justice Stevens concluded:
Prior to the Government screening, one could only draw inferences about what was on the films. The projection of the films was a significant expansion of the search that had been conducted previously by a private party and therefore must be characterized as a separate search. That separate search was not supported by any exigency, or by a warrant even though one could have easily been obtained.
Id. at 657, 100 S.Ct. at 2402 (footnotes omitted).
See also United States v. Haes, 551 F.2d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 1977).
In this case, the Federal Express employees removed the plastic bags from the tube, but did not remove or in any way analyze any of the powder; they subsequently replaced the bags back in the tube. The DEA agents removed the bags, took several samples of the powder, and subjected the samples to tests in order to determine their composition.
The private search in this case exposed bags of powder, but the Jacobsens’ initial reasonable expectation that the package‘s contents would remain private was not entirely frustrated by the private search. In Walter, Justice Stevens wrote:
The fact that the cartons were unexpectedly opened by a third party before the shipment was delivered to its intended consignee does not alter the consignor‘s legitimate expectation of privacy. The private search merely frustrated that expectation in part. It did not simply strip the remaining unfrustrated portion of that expectation of all Fourth Amendment protection.
Id. at 658-59, 100 S.Ct. at 2402-03 (footnotes omitted).
The DEA agents’ extension of the private search precisely parallels that in Walter. In both cases, viewing the objects with unaided vision produced only an inference of criminal activity. In both cases, government agents went beyond the scope of the private search by using mechanical or chemical means to discover the hidden nature of the objects. The governmental activity represents a significant extension of the private searches because it revealed the content of the films in Walter and, here, the composition of the powder. In the ab-
In this case, the government does not assert and we do not perceive any circumstances justifying the agents’ failure to obtain a warrant authorizing examination of the contents of the package. Cf. United States v. Ross, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (automobile exception). As the Supreme Court stated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971):
The warrant requirement has been a valued part of our constitutional law for decades, and it has determined the result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this country. It is not an inconvenience to be somehow “weighed” against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the “well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers” who are a part of any system of law enforcement.
Id. at 481, 91 S.Ct. at 2045 (footnote omitted).
See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). We find that the agents’ removal of the plastic bags, the taking of samples, and the chemical analysis of these samples constituted a violation of defendants’ fourth amendment rights.
The fruits of this illegal search should have been suppressed. The finding of cocaine in a package being sent to the Jacobsens’ home was the core of the affidavit which justified the issuance of the warrant to search the Jacobsens’ home. The only other allegation contained in the affidavit is that Bradley Jacobsen is “mentioned in at least two investigative files for cocaine distribution.” Without the statement that a test indicated the presence of cocaine in the powder, the affidavit does not provide probable cause to believe the Jacobsens possessed cocaine in their home. The search produced traces of cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and remnants of burned tape which matched that used to wrap the package. This evidence was improperly admitted. On this basis, we reverse the defendants’ convictions on the drug related counts.
Bradley Jacobsen also appeals from his conviction for assaulting a federal officer, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. He alleges he did not have the requisite specific intent to assault the officer. Viewing the evidence in the light most supportive of the verdict, we find reasonable minds could have concluded without a reasonable doubt that Bradley Jacobsen intended to assault the federal officer. Cf. United States v. Manelli, 667 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1981).
We reverse both defendants’ convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. We affirm Bradley Jacobsen‘s conviction for assault on a federal officer.
I concur in the opinion in this case, with serious reservations for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun of the Supreme Court of the United States in Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980), because I believe it is more than possible that the rule enunciated in that opinion will become the majority rule in the future. The federal law in the field of unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional searches and seizures is being reexamined by the Supreme Court of the United States in a movement toward reexamination and restriction of the outer limits of the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Ross, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). Even the author of the plurality opinion in Walter v. United States, supra, acknowledged in Part V of United States v. Ross, supra, that: “Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare decisis . . .” does not preclude a change in the law governing warrantless searches. Because the result of the majority opinion follows an interpretation of the current law in this field of constitutional law in this Court and of the current opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States, I concur with the reservations expressed above.