We consider the conditions under which federal criminal law prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm if he is the subject of a state domestic violence restraining order.
I
City of Union Gap, Washington, police arrested Brad Young, the defendant-appellee, on December 29, 2004, based on his violation of a Washington state Domestic Violence No Contact (“DVNC”) order. Police searched Young and located a .22 caliber pistol in his pocket. After having been read his Miranda rights, Young admitted that the gun was his. 1
It is a federal offense for those against whom a domestic violence restraining order has been issued “after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate,” to possess a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A). Young was indicted by an Eastern District of Washington federal grand jury two weeks after his Union Gap arrest and was later tried for possessing a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(8). 2
A
Because § 922(g)(8) only applies to certain restraining orders and significant interplay between state and federal court proceedings is involved, we review the facts relating to the issuance in state court of the predicate DVNC order, which stems from an arrest earlier in December 2004 for Young’s violation of a protective order and for felony harassment under Washington state law. 3 As a result of the earlier *1001 arrest, a Washington state court issued two separate DVNC orders against Young.
1
The first DVNC order was issued at Young’s December 6, 2004, preliminary hearing. Yakima County Superior Court Judge Michael Schwab concluded that there was “probable cause to believe that [Young] may have been involved in the offense of felony violation of a no contact order.” Judge Schwab explained to Young, “This does not mean that you’re guilty of anything. On Wednesday morning [December 8, 2004] you’ll be advised officially of any charges.” Judge Schwab appointed Young counsel and issued a DVNC order (“the December 6 DVNC order”): “I’m going to issue a domestic violence no contact order which requires you to stay away from Lena [sic 4 ] Emily Perez, whether she wants you to have contact with her or not. We’ll give you a copy of this and you need to read it carefully.” At the close of the hearing, Judge Schwab stated that he might reconsider the bail amount at the December 8 arraignment, but he did not indicate whether he would reconsider the DVNC order.
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the prosecuting attorney handed Young a copy of the December 6 DVNC order and a copy of the court order containing the contact information for Young’s court-appointed attorney. The DVNC order further stated: “This order is entered together with the order setting conditions of release in this case. ([Rev.Code Wash.] 10.99.040; 10.99.045.) It shall remain in effect until further order by this Court.” 5 '
2
The second DVNC order — identical to the first, and the predicate order for the federal offense — was ’issued on December 8, two days after Young’s preliminary hearing, when Judge Schwab began the formal arraignment under the state felony harassment charge by again advising Young of his rights, including his right to counsel. 6
Susan Arb — a Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney with the Yakima County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office recognized as an expert in preliminary hearings and arraignments in Yakima County Superior Court — later related in Young’s federal trial that “during the arraignment the Court will consider conditions of release.... One of the conditions of release is often a No Contact Order. And that’s always considered in domestic violence cases, even if other conditions of release are not.” 7 Arb also explained that “Any time [the state prosecutors] file a domestic violence charge, ... the prosecutors also request a No Contact Order, ask the judge to issue that No Contact Order.”
Young’s counsel was not present at the December 8 state court hearing, but an attorney from the county prosecutor’s office gave Young a copy of the criminal information and Judge Schwab explained the charges to him. After reducing the bail amount to $5,000, Judge Schwab is *1002 sued a new DVNC order (“the December 8 DVNC order”):
Court: I’m also issuing a new domestic violence no contact order which requires you to stay away from Lena [sic] Perez whether she wants to have contact with you or not; do you understand that? Young: No problem.
Court: This is a very serious matter. We expect people to obey these orders. We hope you’ll read this carefully. It contains very specific warnings. 8
Young then expressed some confusion as to the nature of the charges against him. Judge Schwab explained:
Count one is a charge of assault in violation of a protection order. The allegation is that you assaulted Lena [sic] Perez. That doesn’t mean that you’re guilty of it. That’s what they’re saying happened. It remains to be seen whether or not you did it. So the purpose of this is just to advise you about what they’re claiming. The mere fact that they say it doesn’t make it so.
The prosecuting attorney then explained the terms of the new DVNC order to Young and gave him a copy. Like the prior order, the December 8 order indicated that it would remain in effect until lifted by the court and specifically noted that federal law prohibited Young from possessing a firearm. The DVNC order stated that “[t]he court finds probable cause to believe that this case involves a threat of domestic violence, the defendant is a credible threat to the physical safety of the victim, and that the following order is necessary to protect the victim.”
At the conclusion of the December 8 hearing, Judge Schwab set a date for trial, as well as a date for a pre-trial omnibus hearing.
B
In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) 9 makes it a federal crime for any person: who is subject to a court order that—
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner 10 of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and
(C)
(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or af *1003 fecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 11
1
At Young’s trial in federal district court, Judge Van Sickle instructed the jury on the elements of “actual notice” and “opportunity to participate.” The jury instructions, tracking the statutory text, stated that the statute required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that, “at the time the defendant possessed the firearm, the defendant was subject to a court order dated December 8, 2004, that: (A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate.” The district court further instructed the jury:
It can be legal for a court to issue a no-contact order against an individual in emergency circumstances, before allowing the individual notice and an opportunity to participate. However, the federal criminal law at issue in this case only applies to those no contact orders that have been issued after the individual who is subject to the order has been provided notice and an opportunity to participate.
2
The jury found Young guilty of violating § 922(g)(8), but the district court overturned the jury verdict based on Young’s Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion, concluding that the prosecution had presented insufficient evidence that Young’s December 8 DVNC order met the terms of § 922(g)(8)(A). The district court explained that “advance notice is an important component of due process.” (Citing
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
Similarly, the district court reasoned that an “opportunity to respond” requires “ ‘the opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken.’ ” (Quoting
United States v. Wilson,
The judge who presided over Mr. Young’s arraignment did not allow him to consult with his attorney before issuing the no-contact order. The judge did not ask Mr. Young whether he wanted to review the report upon which the judge relied to find probable cause. The judge did not advise Mr. Young he was entitled to challenge the contents of the report. The judge did not ask Mr. Young whether he objected to the entry of a no-contact order.... [HJaving examined the record as a whole, the Court concludes that the judge who presided over Mr. Young’s arraignment did not provide him with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.
*1004 (internal notes and citations omitted). The district court concluded that “the jury lacked evidence from which it could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Young received either actual notice of, or an opportunity to participate in, the hearing that led to the issuance of the no-contact order,” and it entered a judgment of acquittal.
Ruling in the alternative, the district court granted Young’s motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a). The court concluded that “the jury should have been instructed that actual notice means advance notice.” Further, “the jury should have been instructed more clearly concerning the factors it needed to consider in determining whether Mr. Young received a meaningful opportunity to participate.”
The United States timely appeals from both the grant of the Rule 29 judgment of acquittal and the alternative grant of the Rule 33 motion for a new trial. 12
II
The government contends that the district court wrongly expanded the requirements of § 922(g)(8) beyond the statutory text. Young, however, argues that the statute requires a state court hearing meeting the traditional requirements of due process. This case requires us only to construe § 922(g)(8); we do not consider whether the procedural protections in the underlying Washington DVNC statute satisfy due process. 13
A
First, we address Young’s argument that “Congress only attached a firearms disability to those individuals who ... have already had a due process hearing.” 14
In
Lewis v. United States,
Unlike the statutes identified in
Lewis
as allowing a challenge to a predicate offense, § 922(g)(8)—like the statute in Leiuis■—makes no such allowance. Rather, § 922(g)(8)’s only explicit requirement is that the defendant have received a hearing of which he had actual notice and an opportunity to participate. Thus, “a criminal proceeding may go forward, even if the predicate was in some way unconstitutional, so long as a sufficient opportunity for judicial review of the predicate [restraining order proceeding] exists,”
United States v. Afshari,
Simply, absent Congressional authorization, we will not entertain a collateral inquiry into the constitutionality of the state court restraining order proceedings which is immaterial except to the extent that the federal statute explicitly requires certain procedural protections.
Accord, United States v. Hicks,
B
Turning to the language of § 922(g)(8)(A), Young argues that the statute “provides no specific definition” for “hearing,” “actual notice,” and “opportunity to participate,” and that as a result, we must assume that Congress intended to require a full due process hearing. The government disagrees and contends that the language of the provision is “plain and clear,” and should be interpreted narrowly. We consider the statutory requirements in turn.
1
The government contends that the statute defines “hearing,” and thus the statutory definition should control. Young, in contrast, argues that “hearing” must be interpreted in the context of the larger universe of due process jurisprudence. Section 922(g)(8), however, explicitly defines the qualities a predicate hearing must have: for' the purposes of this provision, a hearing simply is a proceeding *1006 of which the defendant has “actual notice” and an “opportunity to participate.” Congress’s chosen definition of “hearing” apparently excludes certain types of restraining orders — such as those issued ex parte and without notice — however, we do not find any basis in the statute for requiring that the restraining order issue after a proceeding with all the due process protections of a criminal trial.
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have similarly resisted attempts to impose greater substantive content on the term “hearing.” The Sixth Circuit explained that while “hearing” has a variety of meanings in federal law, “the term is not ambiguous in this context.”
United States v. Calor,
We agree with the Eighth and Sixth Circuits that, in accordance .with the plain meaning of the statute, the term “hearing” refers to a proceeding of which the defendant has actual notice and an opportunity to participate. 16
2
But Young argues that he did not have “actual notice” of the hearing because his notice was not “meaningful,” as due process requires. The district court concluded that “actual notice” requires notice sufficient to satisfy due process, and therefore requires “advance notice.” The government contends that “actual notice” should be interpreted in light of its plain meaning.
Young argues that “actual notice” requires notice of the content of the hearing, rather than simply notice of the hearing itself. 17 In essence, Young reads the statute as requiring “actual notice that a restraining order might issue.” But that is emphatically not what the statute says. It expressly applies to any person “who is subject to a court order that ... was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice.” The statute does not require notice of the fact that a restraining order would issue, nor does it require any other form of “advance” notice. Indeed, Congress chose to modify “notice” with “actual” rather than “advance,” implying that it did not intend to require “advance” notice.
*1007 Further, this definition of notice tracks the everyday, common meaning of the term, see, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1544 (3d ed.1986) (defining “notice” as “formal or informal warning or intimation of something: announcement”), and the accepted legal definition of the term, see, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1090 (8th ed.2004) (stating that “[a] person has notice of a fact or condition if that person (1) has actual knowledge of it....”). Here, the restraining order issued after “a hearing of which [Young] received actual notice.” Nothing more is required. 18
Moreover, while Young argues that “actual notice” requires advance notice satisfying due process, Congress knows how to define terms when it wants to give them specific definitions at odds with everyday understanding. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 921, defines “person,” “indictment,” “school,” and “intimate partner,” each of which has a plain meaning which Congress rejected.
See
§§ 921(a)(1), (14), (26)
&
(32). We apply the presumption that terms not defined should be given their common, everyday meaning.
See, e.g., Chapman v. United States,
The district court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Wilson,
We agree with Young that some other Circuits have applied this provision to defendants who were both informed of the hearing
and
knew that the hearing would involve the restraining order.
See, e.g., Wilson,
A judgment of acquittal is improper if “
‘any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
Tisor,
3
Finally, Young argues that the term “opportunity to participate” requires actual participation sufficient to meet the requirements of due process. The government contends that the statute’s plain meaning controls, and the defendant must have only an opportunity to participate.
The district court concluded that Young did not have an “opportunity to participate” in the December 8 hearing, noting that Young did not have an opportunity to consult with his attorney during the December 8 hearing; that Young was not asked whether he wished to dispute the *1009 contents of the police report; that Young was not asked if he had evidence to present; and that Young was not asked if he objected to the issuance of the December 8 DVNC order. While the district court noted that none of these facts is dispositive, it concluded that “the judge’s principal concern was whether Mr. Young understood he was bound by the order. While significant, the inquiry prompted by this concern did not ■ satisfy § 922(g)(8)(A).”
We disagree. From the plain text of the statute “actual participation” is not necessary; the statute requires only the mere
“opportunity
to participate.” Other circuits — following the plain language of the statute — have reasoned that very little is required to satisfy the “opportunity to participate” prong. For example, in
Wilson
the Seventh Circuit found that the defendant — who represented himself
pro se
— had an opportunity to participate in the hearing.
Joining the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, we agree that the plain text of the statute indicates that the “opportunity to participate” requirement is a minimal one. The prosecution must only show an opportunity to participate; that is, a proceeding during which the defendant could have objected to the entry of the order or other: wise engaged with the court as to the merits of the restraining order.
Again, a judgment of acquittal is improper if “
‘any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
TiSor,
Ill
The government contends that the jury instructions were sufficient and that the district court’s alternative holding granting the motion for a new trial on such grounds was erroneous. 24 Young argues that the district court properly concluded that the jury should have been instructed on the due process meanings of “hearing,” “actual notice,” and “opportunity to participate.”
Jury instructions need not define common terms that are readily understandable by the jury.
See United States v. Dixon,
As discussed above, the terms “hearing,” “actual notice,” and “opportunity to participate,” should be given their ordinary meaning, and therefore did not require further elaboration. The meaning of “hearing” is provided by the statute and was given a parallel definition in the jury instructions. Similarly, unless “actual notice” means something other than “actual notice” — such as “advance notice” or “meaningful notice” — then this term would also be apparent to a jury. Finally, the statutory term “opportunity to participate” requires only an opportunity to participate; the term has no greater import than its plain meaning. We conclude that a jury instruction defining an “opportunity to participate” more specifically is unnecessary.
See Wilson,
IV
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Young also admitted that he received the DVNC order by personal service, and that the DVNC order prohibited him from contacting the victim and from possessing firearms.
. The record indicates neither when nor why Young was transferred from state to federal custody.
.This portion of the opinion sets forth the evidence given at trial. In Part II, when evaluating the judgment of acquittal, we will draw all conclusions in favor of the government, as is required.
See Glasser v. United States,
. The court was referring to Laina’ Perez.
. The Revised Code of Washington 10.99.040(3) states: "At the time of arraignment the court shall determine whether a no-contact order shall be issued or extended....” (emphasis added). However, during the district court trial, the prosecution did not present the jury with the content of Rev.Code Wash. 10.99.040(3).
. The record does not disclose whether Young and his attorney had any contact between the December 6 and December 8 hearings.
. Indeed, as noted above, Rev.Code Wash. 10.99.040(3) requires the court to reconsider the DVNC order at the arraignment.
. Among the warnings, the DVNC stated: "Effective immediately, and continuing as long as this protection order is in effect, you may not possess a firearm or ammunition. 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(8). A violation of this federal firearms law carries a maximum possible penalty of 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine.”
. We have previously upheld § 922(g)(8) against a variety of challenges.
See United States v. Kafka,
- The parties stipulated that Laina Perez was 311 intimate partner of Young s.
. Young also stipulated that he knowingly possessed a firearm which had been shipped in interstate commerce.
. Double jeopardy is not a concern because the jury initially convicted Young.
See United States v. Foumai,
. We review de novo the grant of a judgment of acquittal.
United States v. Johnson,
. We note at the outset that there is a Circuit split as to whether § 922(g)(8) requires proof of a valid restraining order. The Fifth Circuit has squarely rejected the contention that a federal court should probe into state proceedings, noting that " ‘nothing in section 922(g)(8) suggests that the validity of the particular predicate court order may be inquired into in the section 922(g)(8) criminal prosecution.' ”
United States v. Hicks,
Young argues that the Sixth Circuit has also followed
Wilson
in
United States v. Calor,
. 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(2), for example, reads:
A person claiming that a conviction alleged in the information was obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States shall set forth his claim, and the factual basis therefor, with particularity in his response to the information. The person shall have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on any issue of fact raised by the response. Any challenge to a prior conviction, not raised by response to the information before an increased sentence is imposed in reliance thereon, shall be waived unless good cause be shown for failure to make a timely challenge.
(Emphasis added).
. Because the statute’s plain meaning controls, we may not consider the principle of lenity, whose "touchstone ... is statutory ambiguity.”
Lewis,
. We reject Young's argument, relying on
Dusenbery v. United States,
. Young argues that without "advance notice,” he could not effectively challenge theDVNC order. In some situations, of course, notice may be so deficient that it would deprive a defendant of any ability to challenge the restraining order. In such a case, however, the hearing would not qualify as a predicate under the statute because the defendant would lack an "opportunity to participate” in the hearing.
. Along similar lines, Young argues that "notice” must be "meaningful” in order to comport with due process. See
In re Gault,
Further, only terms with “established commonlaw meaning[s]” should be interpreted in the light of those meanings.
Chapman,
. As noted above, by entertaining a due process challenge to the state court proceedings, Wilson may be in tension with Lewis. See supra n. 14.
. One sentence in a Ninth Circuit opinion gives some support to Young's view. In
Kafka,
the court stated that § 922(g)(8) required only that "[a]n individual charged under this statute must have received
actual notice of the restraining order hearing
and must have had an opportunity to participate in the hearing.”
.Moreover, even if the statute did require advance notice of the content of the hearing, we still doubt that a judgment of acquittal would be proper. The jury heard evidence that Yakima County Superior Court judges always reconsider DVNC orders at an arraignment. The jury here could reasonably have inferred that Young and his attorney— who was surely aware that Judge Schwab would be required to reissue the DVNC order — discussed these matters between December 6 and December 8, thereby providing notice that a new restraining order would issue during the arraignment.
.
Banks
also distinguished and limited the earlier case of
United States v. Spruill,
. "In reviewing jury instructions, the relevant inquiry is whether the instructions as a whole are misleading or inadequate to guide the jury's deliberation.”
United States v. Frega, 179
F.3d 793, 806 n. 16 (9th Cir.1999) (citing
United States v. Moore,