MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Defendants Erik Donaire Constanza Bran (“Constanza Bran”), Juan Daniel Del Cid Morales (“Del Cid Morales”), and Alvaro Augustin Mejia (“Mejia”) are Guatemalan nationals who have each been charged with conspiracy to import five kilograms or more of cocaine into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 960, 963 (2000), and aiding and abetting such a conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Defendants were arrested in El Salvador on September 27, 2006, and flown to the United States in the custody of agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). Presently before the Court are defendants’ motions to suppress statements made to DEA agents on September 27 and 28, 2006, as well as defendants’ motions for a bill of particulars and for severance of counts. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on these motions on February 28, 2007, at which it heard testimony from defendant Del Cid Morales and two DEA special agents, Stephen Fraga and Jason Sandoval. For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion, the Court will deny defendants’ motions to suppress and motions for a bill of particulars, and will defer resolution of defendants’ motions for severance of counts.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND & FINDINGS
On August 17, 2006, a grand jury sitting in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia indicted defendants *169 Constanza Bran, Del Cid Morales, and Mejia (then known only as “Juan Doe”), on one count of conspiracy, and aiding and abetting a conspiracy, to import five or more kilograms of cocaine into the United States. Two other defendants, Jorge Ricardo Bardales Bourdet and Edgar Antonio Chiu Serrano, were charged in the same indictment on two counts: the importation conspiracy and a second conspiracy to manufacture and distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine intending and knowing that the cocaine would be imported into the United States. Arrest warrants were issued for all five defendants on the same day. The circumstances of the September 27, 2006, arrests of defendants Constanza Bran, Del Cid Morales, and Mejia will be explored in some detail below. Neither Bourdet nor Serrano are in the custody of the United States; the Government now believes that Bourdet is dead.
I. The September 27, 2006, Arrests
According to testimony by Special Agent Fraga, the lead DEA case agent for this matter, the DEA began an investigation into an alleged drug trafficking conspiracy involving defendants in the spring of 2006. Tr. 145^46, 169. Based on this investigation, DEA believed at the time of the arrests that defendants had traveled from their home country of Guatemala to El Salvador on at least two previous occasions to discuss with a confidential DEA informant the importation of drugs into the United States. Tr. 157, 170-71; Gov’t’s Suppl. Opp’n to Mots, to Suppress at 1. DEA was also aware prior to the arrests that defendants would be traveling to San Salvador, El Salvador on September 27, 2006, to discuss the conspiracy at a meeting arranged by defendant Bardales Bour-det. Tr. 171. At some point prior to September 26, 2006, DEA officials informed Salvadoran law enforcement officials of defendants’ plans to meet in El Salvador and of the outstanding arrest warrants. Tr. 144-45,171.
On September 26, 2006, Salvadoran law enforcement officials met with DEA agents at the DEA’s El Salvador office to discuss defendants’ arrests. Tr. 45-46, 111, 142-44. Special Agents Fraga and Sandoval, who were both present at this meeting, testified that the purpose of the meeting was for DEA to share information about defendants with Salvadoran officials. Tr. 45, 111, 141^42. DEA and Salvadoran officials also discussed the manner in which defendants would be arrested. Tr. 115. The agents further testified that the decision to arrest defendants, as well as the tactical and administrative details of the arrests, were deferred to and made by the Salvadoran officials. Tr. 46, 142-43, 171.
At approximately 1:30 p.m. the next day, defendants were arrested at a restaurant in San Salvador. Tr. 126. Defendants were seized by an indeterminate number of ' armed Salvadoran police officers dressed in black tactical gear and hoods. Tr. 102. Defendant Del Cid Morales testified that men in black told him and the other defendants to throw themselves on the floor, and that after he was pushed onto the floor, someone placed a foot on his back. Tr. 180. Del Cid Morales also testified that after about ten or fifteen minutes he was handcuffed, placed in a pickup truck with several Salvadoran officers, and driven to an airport, although at the time he did not know who the officers were or where they were taking him. Tr. 180-81. According to Special Agents Fraga and Sandoval, although DEA agents from the El Salvador country office were present at the arrest, they were not directly involved in any tactical aspects of the operation. Tr. 39, 158. Special Agents Fraga and Sandoval were among those present, but they remained in a vehicle about 1000 to 2000 feet from the restaurant. Tr. 39- *170 40, 158, 171-72. From this location, neither agent could see the restaurant or otherwise witness the arrests. Tr. 40, 171-72. The defendants were first transferred to United States custody on the tarmac of an airport in El Salvador. Tr. 17.
The Court credits Special Agents Fraga and Sandoval’s description of defendants’ arrests. It finds that the police action in which defendants were arrested was carried out by Salvadoran officials who were acting upon their own authority. Although there was coordination between Salvadoran officials and the DEA, there is no indication that United States officials directed the Salvadoran activities or otherwise controlled the arrests. The Court also finds that, while DEA agents were present at or near the arrest site, they did not directly effect the arrests.
II. The Transfer of Defendants to the United States
Special Agents Fraga and Sandoval first saw the defendants at approximately 3:00 p.m. at an airport in El Salvador, where a DEA airplane was waiting to fly them to the United States. Tr. 17, 167. All three defendants were wearing civilian clothing, Tr. 20, and had their hands cuffed in front of their bodies with chains around their waist, Tr. 49. Special Agent Fraga introduced himself to defendants on the tarmac, Tr. 167, but the agents did not engage defendants in any substantive conversation prior to boarding the airplane, Tr. 53.
According to Special Agent Sandoval, however, defendant Constanza Bran made one voluntary and spontaneous statement immediately prior to boarding the aircraft; specifically, Constanza Bran commented in Spanish that he knew he was going to the United States because that is where they send corrupt Guatemalan officials. Tr. 52. Special Agent Sandoval, who speaks Spanish, translated this statement into English for Special Agent Fraga and then told Constanza Bran in Spanish that they could not talk further until they were in the air and he had been advised of his rights under the United States Constitution. Tr. 53. Defendants were then escorted onto the airplane by the pilots, who were also trained DEA agents. Tr. 50-51.
The airplane, a small turboprop, was equipped with seats for two pilots and six passengers. Tr. 19, 55. In addition to two pilots, the only people on the aircraft were the three defendants and Special Agents Fraga and Sandoval. Tr. 20. The passenger seats were arrayed in three rows of two, with the first two rows of seats facing each other and the last row of seats facing the back of the airplane. Tr. 55-56. At the beginning of the flight, Special Agent Sandoval sat in the second row next to Constanza Bran and across from Special Agent Fraga. Tr. 57. At that time, defendants Del Cid Morales and Mejia were seated in the last row of the plane and wore noise-reducing headphones. Tr. 56.
Approximately forty-five minutes after take-off, Special Agents Fraga and Sandoval administered
Miranda
warnings to Constanza Bran. Tr. 19;
see Miranda v. Arizona,
After Constanza Bran signed the Miranda waiver, Special Agent Fraga, using Special Agent Sandoval as an interpreter, proceeded to ask Constanza Bran about his involvement in the alleged conspiracy. Tr. 25; Gov’t Ex. 1. This conversation lasted approximately two to two-and-a-half hours. Tr. 85. The agents testified that defendant Constanza Bran appeared nervous at first and at one point became emotional about the impact of the arrest on his family; he had to be told to relax, at times firmly. Tr. 86, 151-52. Constanza Bran requested and was provided water at that time. Tr. 86. About thirty minutes into the questioning, Special Agent Fraga told Special Agent Sandoval that Constan-za Bran’s statements were inconsistent with previously gathered intelligence. Tr. 81, 150. According to the agents’ testimony, although Special Agent Fraga may have appeared animated as he conveyed this information to Special Agent Sandoval, he did not raise his voice or otherwise threaten or gesture toward defendant. Tr. 82-83, 151-52. At this point in the conversation, which was described as an “impasse,” Special Agent Sandoval told Constanza Bran that his answers were inconsistent with known evidence and asked him to speak truthfully. Tr. 97-98. Eventually, Constanza Bran began providing answers more in line with previously known information, and he appeared to relax. Tr. 98.
At some point during the impasse with Constanza Bran, the pilots announced that the plane was flying over Guantanamo Bay. Tr. 85, 122. Agent Sandoval testified that he relayed this information to Bran, who then nervously asked if he was going to be taken there. Tr. 85. Sandoval testified that he answered with a jocular “yeah, right,” before telling Bran that they were actually going to Florida. Id.
The plane landed in Fort Lauderdale, Florida at 10:00 p.m. Tr. 87. Defendants were processed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement and given water and food out of vending machines. Tr. 32, 133. This was the first time while in United States custody that the defendants had access to food, and Agent Sandoval testified that given the late hour, vending machines were the best they could do. Tr. 133. At 11:30 p.m., the plane left Florida for Washington, D.C. Tr. 87.
Defendant Del Cid Morales was questioned during this second leg of the flight. Tr. 30. Special Agent Sandoval testified that he followed the same procedure for advising defendant Del Cid Morales of his Miranda rights that he had used with Constanza Bran. Special Agent Sandoval read the Department of Justice waiver form to Del Cid Morales line by line in Spanish, allowed Del Cid Morales to review each line himself, asked Del Cid Morales if he understood, had him initial the form in the margin next to each line, and then watched him sign the voluntary waiver statement at the bottom of the form. Tr. 26, 29, 120-22. Del Cid Morales completed the waiver of his rights at 12:09 a.m. on September 28, 2006. Tr. 118; Gov’t Ex. 2. Special Agent Sandoval testified that during this process Del Cid Morales appeared relaxed, and he did not ask for a lawyer or for any food, water, or the use of a bathroom. Tr. 27. Del Cid Morales made incriminating statements to the DEA agents during an interview that lasted approximately sixty to ninety minutes. Tr. 28,105.
*172 Defendant Del Cid Morales testified during the suppression hearing, and his testimony directly conflicts with the testimony of Agents Sandoval and Fraga in several respects. Upon direct examination, defendant Del Cid Morales stated that he was only shown the Miranda waiver form after he was interrogated, and that while he was being interrogated he did not understand that he had a right to remain silent. Tr. 185. He also testified that, although his initials appear on the waiver form, they are not written in his handwriting. Tr. 190. Defendant further stated that Agent Sandoval told him that if he did not tell the truth he would be taken to Guantanamo Bay, although at the time he did not know what Guantanamo Bay was. Tr. 184, 191. Agent Sandoval explicitly denied talking to Del Cid Morales about Guantanamo Bay. Tr. 122. During cross-examination, Del Cid Morales acknowledged that Special Agent Sandoval spoke to him politely and respectfully in Spanish. Tr. 189.
Faced with this conflicting testimony, the Court has assessed the credibility of each witness and concludes that, although Del Cid Morales had a confident and seemingly forthright demeanor on the witness stand, it cannot credit his account with respect to the timing of the Miranda warnings, the handwritten initials, or the Guantanamo Bay remark. The evidence is undisputed that: Del Cid Morales was the first defendant questioned during the flight from Fort Lauderdale to D.C.; he was only questioned on this second flight; the plane left Florida at 11:30 p.m.; Del Cid Morales signed the bottom of the waiver form at 12:09 a.m.; Del Cid Morales’s interview lasted between sixty and ninety minutes; and; as explained below, Mejia waived his Miranda rights at 1:53 a.m. Given these undisputed facts, it would have been impossible for the agents to conduct even a sixty minute interview between the time the plane left Florida and the time Del Cid Morales was fully advised of his rights. Instead, these undisputed facts fully support the agents’ testimony that Del Cid Morales was interviewed after he signed the waiver form. Furthermore, it is difficult for the Court to believe that Special Agents Fraga and Sandoval, both of whom have extensive training and experience in interrogation techniques, including giving Miranda warnings, Tr. 106, 146-47, would properly advise defendants Constanza Bran and Mejia of their Miranda rights but neglect to do so for defendant Del Cid Morales. As to Del Cid Morales’s comment regarding the initials in the margins of the form, the Court notes that it was stated rather unconvincingly, almost in the manner of an afterthought. The Court also believes Agent Sandoval’s testimony that he only mentioned Guantanamo Bay to Constanza Bran, who was being interviewed when the plane actually flew over Cuba on the leg from El Salvador to Florida. The alleged threatening comment is further at odds with Del Cid Morales’s description of Special Agent Sandoval’s tone as respectful and polite, and with the overall impression gleaned from both parties that the conversation was impasse-free.
Defendant Mejia was the last defendant to be questioned by Special Agents Fraga and Sandoval. During the final portion of the flight from Fort Lauderdale to Washington, Special Agent Sandoval read Mejia his Miranda rights from the Spanish-language waiver form, again stopping after each line to allow Mejia to read it for himself, acknowledge that he understood, and write his initials at the end of each sentence. Tr. 29-31; Gov’t Ex. 3. Mejia signed the form at 1:53 a.m. on September 28, 2006. Tr. 29, Gov’t Ex. 3. Agent Sandoval testified that Mejia looked healthy and relaxed during the reading of his *173 rights, and that he did not ask for an attorney or for anything to eat or drink or to use the bathroom. Tr. 31. Although all substantive conversation with Mejia took place after the Miranda advisement session, Tr. 31, Special Agent Sandoval asked Mejia for his name concurrent to advising him of his rights. Tr. 129.
Once defendants arrived in Washington, they were processed and brought before a magistrate judge of this Court. No further substantive questioning took place. Tr. 33.
ANALYSIS
I. Defendants’ Motions to Suppress
Defendants Del Cid Morales and Mejia have filed motions asking the Court to suppress any statements they may have made to DEA agents Fraga and Sandoval while en route to Washington, D.C. from El Salvador. Defendant Constanza Bran filed a separate motion requesting the suppression of the statement he made to Agent Sandoval immediately before boarding the DEA plane in addition to any statements he made during the flight. Although defendant Constanza Bran’s motion does not raise every argument made by the other defendants, the Court will treat all arguments as relating to all three defendants.
A. Mansfield Amendment
Defendants contend that their statements must be suppressed because they were the fruit of an arrest that violated the Mansfield Amendment, Pub.L. No. 94-329, § 504(b), 90 Stat. 729, 764 (1976) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c) (2000)). The Mansfield Amendment provides that “No officer or employee of the United States may directly effect an arrest in any foreign country as part of any foreign police action with respect to narcotics control efforts, notwithstanding any other provision of law.” § 2291(c)(1). As the D.C. Circuit has emphasized, the Mansfield Amendment only prohibits United States officers from “directly effect[ing]” an arrest.
United States v. Mejia,
Defendants concede that defendants’ arrests were carried out by Salvadoran officials, but they argue that the Mansfield Amendment was nonetheless violated in two ways. First, they contend that United States officers directly effected the arrest of defendants when they took custody of defendants at the airport in El Salvador. Defendants acknowledge that the logical result of their argument would require any transfer of custody to occur either in the United States or in international territory. Regardless, their argument is foreclosed by
Mejia,
in which the defendants were arrested in Panama by Panamanian authorities and then transferred into DEA custody at an airport in Panama City.
Second, defendants note that the Government has not presented evidence with respect to whether the United States ambassador to El Salvador approved DEA’s presence at the arrest. 1 They contend that such permission is required by paragraph two of the Amendment (herein referred to as the “presence safe harbor”), which clarifies that “Paragraph (1) does not prohibit an officer or employee of the United States, with the approval of the United States chief of mission, from being present when foreign officers are effecting an arrest or from assisting foreign officers who are effecting an arrest.” § 2291(c)(2).
The presence safe harbor is written in the form of a clarification. In explaining what the main text of the Amendment “does not prohibit,” the provision makes clear that presence and assistance with ambassadorial approval is acceptable. See H.RJtep. No. 101-342, pt. 1, at 23 (1989) (“Section 488 clarifies what has long been U.S. policy ...: that DEA agents ... may be present and assist at arrests carried out by their foreign counterparts if the U.S. ambassador approves .... ”). However, the presence safe harbor contains no independent prohibition of its own — it does not state that a failure to fulfill its terms (i.e., to secure approval of the ambassador) constitutes a violation of the statute. Therefore, defendants’ argument necessarily assumes that presence at or assistance with an arrest is otherwise encompassed within the definition of “directly effecting]” an arrest.
The Court does not read “directly effect” so broadly, as otherwise any participation in a foreign police action involving an arrest would be prohibited unless expressly approved. Yet in
Mejia,
“copies of the warrants were provided to Panamanian law enforcement officials” by their American counterparts prior to defendants’ arrests,
Even assuming
arguendo
that the arrests did violate the Mansfield Amendment, moreover, suppression of defendants’ subsequent statements is nonetheless unwarranted. The Mansfield Amendment is silent as to remedies for its breach, and no court has ever implied a remedy for a defendant alleging its violation.
See United States v. Zabaneh,
Moreover, lower courts should be hesitant to apply the exclusionary remedy in novel contexts. The Supreme Court has “cautio[ned] against expanding” the exclusionary rule because of its “substantial social costs.”
Hudson v. Michigan,
— U.S. -, -,
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sanchez-Llamas is particularly instructive. There, the Court held that suppression of a confession is an inappropriate remedy for the Government’s failure to inform a defendant of his consular-notification rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (‘Vienna Convention”). Id. at 2682. The Court explained that the violation of the right to consular notification “is at best remotely connected to the gathering of evidence” and “unlikely, with any frequency, to produce unreliable confessions.” Id. at 2681. Additionally, the interests that defendants claimed were served by the consular-notification provision, i.e., a defendant’s understanding of his legal options, are also protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id. at 2681-82. Given the relatively meager incentives for authorities to violate the Vienna Convention, the Court believed that the exclusionary rule would be a “vastly disproportionate remedy.” Id. at 2681.
*176
Even more so than the consular-notification requirement, the Mansfield Amendment is far removed from the concerns of a defendant’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The Amendment speaks to the proper role of American officials in foreign police actions; it was originally intended “to ‘insure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in sensitive, internal law enforcement operations which could adversely affect U.S. relations with that country.’ ”
United States v. Green,
B. Joint-venture Doctrine
Defendants argue, without citation to any legal authority, that because their arrests were the product of a joint venture between Salvadoran and American forces, any violations of Salvadoran law that occurred during the arrest would therefore also violate the Fourth Amendment. Defendants apparently refer to the joint-venture doctrine, which is an exception to the general principle that “the exclusionary rule does not normally apply to foreign searches conducted by foreign officials.”
United States v. Mount,
The incantation of the words “joint venture” cannot confer upon defendants Fourth Amendment rights that they do not otherwise possess. Before a court can apply the joint-venture doctrine, which “is based solely on the Fourth Amendment, [defendants] must first show that they are among the class of persons that the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect.”
Id.
at 1093. And the Supreme Court has firmly held that non-resident aliens who have no voluntary connection to the United States cannot invoke the Fourth Amendment with
*177
respect to foreign actions by federal officials.
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
C. Forcible Rendition
Defendants argue that the manner in which they were brought from El Salvador to the United States violated international treaties and United States law. The United States and El Salvador are parties to a bilateral extradition treaty, see Treaty between the United States and Salvador for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, Apr. 18, 1911, 87 Stat. 1516 (“U.S.-E1 Salvador Treaty”), as well as a United Nations Convention that makes the distribution of cocaine an extraditable offense, see United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, art. 6 para. 2, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 101^4 (1990). In the words of the Government, however, “defendants were not extradited from El Salvador; rather, their presence in the United States was acquired outside the terms of the treaty between the United States and El Salvador.” Gov’t’s Suppl. Opp’n to Mots, to Suppress at 1. The thrust of defendants’ argument, then, is that they could have been extradited from El Salvador, and thus they should have been; the use of other methods of rendition, they say, violated the extradition treaty. Rather than attack this Court’s jurisdiction, however, defendants frame the issue as a deprivation of their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights and ask for suppression of the fruits of the seizure.
For better or worse, defendants are not the first to challenge a rendition that took place outside the terms of an extradition treaty. In
United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
[O]ur first inquiry must be whether the abduction of respondent from Mexico violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico. If we conclude that the Treaty does not prohibit respondent’s abduction, the rule in Ker applies, and the court need not inquire as to how respondent came before it.
that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’ ... [D]ue process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been *178 fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will.
Alvarez-Machain,
In assessing whether the Government’s actions violated the extradition treaty between the United States and El Salvador, defendants’ case is indistinguishable from
Mejia,
which in turn was controlled by
Alvarez-Machain.
In
Alvarez-Machain,
the Supreme Court determined that the defendant’s forcible abduction did not violate the United States-Mexico extradition treaty, the terms of which “say[ ] nothing about the obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people from the territory of the other nation, or the consequences under the Treaty if such an abduction occurs.”
So, too, here. Defendants have not suggested, and this Court has not found, any basis upon which to distinguish the United States’s extradition treaty with El Salvador from its treaties with Mexico and Panama. Compare U.S.-El Salvador Treaty, with Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Mex., May 4,1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059, and Treaty Providing for the Extradition of Criminals, U.S.Panama, May 25, 1904, 34 Stat. 2851. Nothing in the U.S.-E1 Salvador Treaty prohibits or otherwise speaks to the procurement of an individual outside the terms of the treaty, and this Court sees no reason to infer such a prohibition. Accordingly, the Court finds that defendants’ renditions did not violate the applicable extradition treaty, and therefore that defendants’ due process rights were not compromised by the renditions.
D. Fifth Amendment Due Process
As an alternative basis for suppression, defendants argue that their statements were made involuntarily in contravention of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Due process is violated by the use in court of statements made in response to custodial interrogation by an individual whose “will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.”
Culombe v. Connecticut,
1. Constanza Bran
Turning first to defendant Con-stanza Bran, the circumstances of his interrogation and defendant’s personal characteristics suggest that his statements were made voluntarily. The actual interview was not overly lengthy, and the agents provided defendant with a water bottle from their own supply. Although the airplane in which the questioning took place was small, there was no evidence to indicate that it was uncomfortable, and defendant wore noise-reducing headphones to dampen the sound of the propellers when he was not being questioned. Nor was there undue coercion on the part of the DEA agents. Special Agent Sandoval conducted the interview in Spanish at a conversational tone, after advising defendant of his rights. With respect to the “impasse” that occurred during the interrogation, the Court credits the agents’ testimony that they did not raise their voices or make threats or gestures toward defendant. The Court also credits Special Agent Sandoval’s testimony that the conversation regarding Guantanamo Bay ended with defendant being reassured that he was en route to the United States. Furthermore, Constanza Bran’s behavior did not suggest that his will had been overborne. Although he appeared nervous and at one point became emotional during the first part of the interview, he was not overly so. Constanza Bran is an educated adult, and he has not challenged the agents’ testimony that he completely understood the Miranda warnings as they were explained to him.
Defendant highlights several facts that he argues cut against the voluntary nature of his statements. First, Del Cid Morales testified that Constanza Bran was pushed to the floor by Salvadoran police during his arrest; defendant also points to a lack of evidence concerning his treatment by Salvadoran authorities before being transferred to United States custody. Even accepting that Constanza Bran was pushed to the floor by the Salvadoran police, a not-unusual occurrence during arrests even in this country, suggestions that he was mistreated before arriving at the airport are contradicted by his appearance of good health when the DEA agents first saw him on the tarmac. Second, defendant attacks the reliability of his statements as they are recorded in Agent Fraga’s report because the report omits certain exchanges that occurred during the interview. The Court does not agree that the omissions necessarily imply the inaccuracy of information that
is
contained in the report; notably, defendants
*180
have not claimed that the report’s actual contents are inaccurate. Moreover, “there is no constitutional requirement that confessions be recorded by any particular means.”
United States v. Yunis,
2. Del Cid Morales
The Court also finds that the Government has met its burden with respect to the voluntary nature of Del Cid Morales’s statements. Although he had been in custody for more than ten hours by the time of his interview, Del Cid Morales was provided with food and water in Fort Lauderdale and had been allowed to sleep. The actual interrogation lasted only sixty to ninety minutes, and was conducted in a respectful manner. Defendant was properly informed of his rights under the United States Constitution, although not under the Vienna Convention. Despite defendant’s attempts to portray himself as an uneducated pig farmer who could not understand his rights, defendant’s demeanor on the witness stand was entirely the opposite. Del Cid Morales, a former Guatemalan police officer, was calm and composed, and he responded quickly and easily to the questions posed to him. Furthermore, although he testified that he was in pain because of recent spinal surgery, Tr. 183, he was sufficiently comfortable to sleep during the flight, Tr. 190, and the DEA agents testified that he looked relaxed during his interview.
Cf. Yunis,
3. Mejia
Many of the observations the Court has made with respect to the interrogations of defendants Constanza Bran and Del Cid Morales also apply to the questioning of defendant Mejia. DEA agents advised Mejia of his rights and provided him with food and water prior to the interrogation. Mejia, an apparently intelligent adult, has not suggested that he did not understand his rights. The interview was the shortest of the three, lasting only thirty minutes. Mejia argues that his statements were made involuntarily because he was woken up in the early morning hours in order to be questioned. On the other hand, these facts demonstrate that Mejia had been allowed to sleep and felt comfortable enough to do so. Although defendant was not advised of his consular rights, the Court finds that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Mejia’s statements were made voluntarily.
E. Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Defendant Constanza Bran moves for the suppression of the statement he made to Special Agent Sandoval while boarding the plane and prior to receiving Miranda warnings. Defendant Mejia, who was asked at the outset of his inflight interview to state his name before being advised of his rights, argues that *181 the statement of his name should also be suppressed.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no “person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const, amend. V. Statements made by a defendant during custodial interrogation therefore may not be introduced by the prosecution at trial “unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”
Miranda,
With respect to Constanza Bran’s comment to Special Agent Sandoval, the Court finds that the statement was not made in response to interrogation. Up to that point, the only words spoken and actions taken by Special Agents Sandoval and Fraga toward Constanza Bran were those normally attendant to custody. Con-stanza Bran’s statement was made voluntarily and spontaneously, and therefore is “admissible without
Miranda
warnings.”
United States v. Samuels,
Mejia’s statement requires a different analysis. Special Agent Sandoval testified that he asked Mejia his name concurrently to advising Mejia of his rights and before initialing the form. Tr. 129, 132. The Court therefore finds that Mejia stated his name before
Miranda
warnings were completed. In order to qualify for the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination that
Miranda
warnings are designed to protect, however, “a communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.”
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court,
The privilege against self-incrimination “not only extends ‘to answers that would in themselves support a conviction ... but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant.’ ”
Ohio v. Reiner,
This is not such a case. It is difficult to see how the revelation of Mejia’s true name furnished a link in the chain of evidence with respect to his involvement in the conspiracy with which he is charged. The August 17, 2006, indictment and arrest warrant both list defendant number five — the person now known to be Mejia— as “Juan Doe, a/k/a Edwin Renee Sapon Ruiz.” All of the evidence indicates that the name “Mejia” was unknown to DEA up to the time that defendants were rendered into United States custody. Special Agent Sandoval testified that Special Agent Fraga identified Mejia as John Doe prior to boarding the plane. Tr. 128. Thus, the fact that he was known to investigators and listed in the indictment only as a John (or Juan) Doe actually supports the conclusion that DEA’s ability to connect Mejia to, and charge him with, the conspiracy alleged in the indictment did not require knowledge of his true name.
Although Mejia has suggested that he might have been implicated in the conspiracy by name during the course of Constan-za Bran’s interview, the record before the Court shows only that Constanza Bran told the DEA agents Mejia’s name and how long he had known him. Tr. 132-33. Furthermore, Special Agent Fraga had already learned Mejia’s name prior to boarding the plane, Tr. 163, and thus prior to speaking with Constanza Bran. Hence, given the record at this time, Mejia has not made a “substantial allegation,”
see Hiibel,
*183 F. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Defendants argue that their statements “were seized in violation of the defendants’ post indictment right to counsel” and that any waiver of that right was involuntary and uninformed. Del Cid Morales’s Mot. to Suppress at 5. The Sixth Amendment prohibits the use at trial of statements that are deliberately elicited from a defendant in the absence of counsel after he has been indicted.
Massiah v. United States,
A defendant’s waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel is voluntary when, based on the totality of the circumstances, “it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception.”
Id.
at 961. And, “[s]o long as the accused is made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation during postin-dictment questioning, by use of the
Miranda
warnings, his waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at such questioning is knowing and intelligent.”
Patterson v. Illinois,
The totality of the circumstances surrounding defendants’ waivers of their right to counsel demonstrate that they were made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Defendants were not threatened, coerced, or otherwise placed in distress during the reading of their Miranda rights. Special Agent Sandoval carefully and patiently followed the advisement procedures that the D.C. Circuit found sufficient in Yunis: he read the warnings aloud in defendant’s native language and ascertained their comprehension of each line. Furthermore, defendants have not presented any evidence to contradict the agents’ testimony that they are reasonably intelligent adults who fully understood their rights. 8 Accordingly, the Court finds that defendants waived their Sixth Amendment rights prior to interrogation.
*184 II. Motion for a Bill of Particulars
Defendants ask for a bill of particulars that details any words, acts, or deeds by defendants that the Government believes support the conspiracy charge. A district court has the authority under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) to direct the government to file a bill of particulars. “A bill of particulars can be used to ensure that the charges brought against a defendant are stated with enough precision to allow the defendant to understand the charges, to prepare a defense, and perhaps also to be protected against retrial on the same charges.”
United States v. Butler,
The Government argues that its indictment is sufficiently specific. Count two of the indictment identifies a time period for the alleged conspiracy (April to August 2006) and at least three countries where the defendants acted in furtherance of the conspiracy (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Panama). It also specifies the object of the conspiracy, the statutes violated by the conspiracy, and the mens rea required by those statutes. Although the indictment in this case is relatively spare, it is nonetheless sufficient to enable defendants to understand the charges against them and to prepare a defense. Indeed, the court of appeals recently affirmed the denial of a bill of particulars in response to an indictment containing this exact type and amount of information.
See Mejia,
Defendants’ argument that the indictment must list overt acts in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy is unavailing. The D.C. Circuit rejected this very argument in Mejia: “Although the indictment did not allege any overt acts, the district court correctly found that the language of [§ ] 963 does not call for any to be set forth in an indictment, nor do any have to have been committed in order for a § 963 violation to be proven.’ ”
Id.
at 445 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted);
see also, e.g., United States v. Grammatikos,
III. Motion for Severance of Counts
Finally, defendants have asked this Court to sever the two counts of the indictment. Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “If the join-der of offenses or defendants in an indictment ... appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 14(a). “[A] district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”
Zafiro v. United States,
At this time, neither of the two defendants charged under count one of the indictment is in United States custody. The Government has represented to the Court that it believes one of those defendants (Bourdet) is dead and the other (Serrano) may never be captured. In other words, there is a significant likelihood *185 that the motion for severance will be moot at the time of trial. The Court will therefore defer ruling on the motion unless and until circumstances change with respect to defendant Serrano prior to trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court denies defendants’ motions to suppress and for a bill of particulars and defers ruling on defendants’ motion for severance.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the parties’ motions and supporting memoranda, evidence presented at the suppression hearing, and the entire record herein, it is this 14th day of March, 2007, hereby
ORDERED that defendant Constanza Bran’s motion to suppress is DENIED; it is further
ORDERED that defendants Del Cid Morales and Mejia’s motion to suppress is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants’ motion for a bill of particulars is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The Government apparently concedes that agents were present at the arrest for purposes of the Mansfield Amendment.
. Constanza Bran's spontaneous pre-flight comment to Agent Sandoval and Mejia’s pre-warning statement of his name are discussed further below.
. Although defendants argue that a violation of the Mansfield Amendment constitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment in its own right, the Supreme Court has suggested that the means by which a defendant is brought within the court's jurisdiction, even if by forcible abduction, does not preclude a defendant from receiving "due process of law."
Frisbie v. Collins,
. Defendants reliance on the Fourth Amendment in this context is unavailing because, as explained above, defendants do not possess Fourth Amendment rights with respect to their seizure on foreign soil.
. The Supreme Court has suggested, for example, that an individual’s name is often not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination because " ‘fact[s] the State could readily establish' may render 'any testimony regarding existence or authenticity [of them] insufficiently incriminating.’ ”
Hiibel,
. The Supreme Court was referring to an offense separate from the violation of a “stop and identify” law; the defendant in
Hiibel
refused to provide his name during a police stop and was thereafter convicted of violating Nevada's stop-and-identify statute.
Id.
at 181— 82,
.It is also doubtful that the request for Mejia’s name constitutes "interrogation” for purposes of
Miranda.
Not all express questioning meets the definition of interrogation; rather, "only questions that are reasonably likely to elicit incriminating information in the specific circumstances of the case constitute interrogation within the protections of
Miranda." United States v. Bogle,
. Del Cid Morales testified that he did not know about his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent until he received the Miranda warnings, and this Court has discounted his testimony with respect to the timing of the warnings.