UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Booker Bernard PRESTON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 13-10110
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Nov. 6, 2013.
544 F. App‘x 527
Summary Calendar.
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Booker Bernard Preston appeals the sentence imposed following his jury conviction for one count of selling a firearm to a prohibited person in violation of
A panel of this court may not overrule another panel‘s decision without en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary Supreme Court decision. United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 313 n. 34 (5th Cir.2002). Apprendi and Blakely were decided prior to Booker. Moreover, we have repeatedly held that Watts remains valid after Booker, see United States v. Jackson, 596 F.3d 236, 243 n. 4 (5th Cir.2010); United States v. Farias, 469 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir.2006), and the Supreme Court has not held otherwise. See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 274-94.
To the extent Preston argues that the district court‘s consideration of acquitted conduct rendered his sentence substantively unreasonable, his argument is likewise unavailing. The record reflects that the district court considered Preston‘s arguments against the use of acquitted conduct, as well as the applicable guidelines range and
Preston also contends that the district court clearly erred when it enhanced his base offense level for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 because his testimony did not amount to perjury. Ac
The district court‘s determination that the obstruction of justice enhancement was warranted is plausible in light of the record as a whole. See United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 752 (5th Cir.1999). Special Agent Travis Riddle of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives testified that transaction logs found following a search of Preston‘s home showed that Preston purchased and sold 200 firearms over the course of 14 years. Forty-one of those firearms were purchased in 2009, and 90 were purchased between January and November of 2010. Based on entries which included the dates and prices of the various transactions, approximately 50% of the firearms were resold within 30 days of their purchase, and Preston made an average profit of 45% from each sale. Preston‘s profit during this 14-year period was approximately $3,000. Preston denied that he was buying and selling firearms to make a profit. Instead, he testified that he was doing so as a hobby and that he would use the money he made to buy ammunition and additional firearms. Although Preston‘s buying and selling of firearms may not have been as profitable as he would have liked, the record reflects that he was doing so to make a profit and that he testified falsely on this material issue. Further, although Preston admitted that the CI told him he was a convicted felon, Preston testified that he believed the CI was “BSing” him because “from [his] experience from being in collections and dealing with tow truck companies, [he] didn‘t think they could hire felons.” Preston‘s testimony on this issue was designed to influence or affect the jury‘s verdict on Count Two. See United States v. Como, 53 F.3d 87, 90 (5th Cir.1995). Finally, Preston‘s challenge to the sufficiency of the district court‘s factual findings on this issue is both inadequately briefed and belied by the record. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err when it enhanced Preston‘s offense level pursuant to § 3C1.1. See Powers, 168 F.3d at 752.
AFFIRMED.
