We must decide whether the government withheld Brady infоrmation from a defendant in a wire fraud prosecution arising out of an electric power sales scheme in the deregulated California market. 1
I
In 1998, California deregulated its electricity industry, which, at the time, consisted of three major companies: Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison, and San Diego Gas & Electric. Although these utilities continuеd to transmit and to distribute electricity, after deregulation California customers could choose to buy their power from the regional supplier, or they could select a different electric service provider (“ESP”).
A
Attracted by the business opportunity presented by deregulation, Defendanb-Ap-pеllant Bond bought an inactive shell company in 1998 that had previously been involved in providing electricity and formed PowerSource Corporation (“Pow-erSource”). Bond was its chief executive officer, and marketed the company as an ESP that would provide residential and commercial elеctricity throughout the state. PowerSource did not operate its own power stations. Rather, the company purchased electricity from other sources and then sold it to its customers at a slight mark-up.
PowerSource divided California into 39 districts in which it would sell power. It planned to have each district financed by a partnership that would contribute capital in return for a percentage of Power-Source’s profits from that district. Power-Source hired Power Capital Funding Group (“PowerCapFunding”) to sell the partnerships. PowerCapFunding was run by Ronald Johnson and James Miles.
PowerCapFunding, in turn, hired various telеmarketing “boiler rooms” to sell units in the partnerships to investors. The boiler rooms (euphemistically called “independent selling organizations”) then called individuals, in hope that they would be interested in buying into one of the partnerships. Interested individuals were sent further information by mail.
The telemarketing entities sold рartnership units from late 1998 through summer 2001. Each partnership unit cost $10,000, and the investment plan anticipated that each partnership would encompass 60 partnership units. Once sixty 709 units had been sold, the partnership was closed and another partnership was opened.
The financing scheme was a scаm. Numerous material misrepresentations and omissions were made to the potential investors by the telemarketers and in the printed marketing materials. PowerCap-Funding, with input from Bond, created Partnership Memoranda that detailed the purpose and terms of the partnership offering. These memoranda stated that sales commissions on each investment unit *1094 would be between 15 and 45 percent. In fact, however, PowerCapFunding retained a 61 percent sales commission. The mem-oranda also contained misleading biographical information on Bond and other significant PowerSouree figures. The mеmoranda further identified several individuals as serving in consulting or executive capacities who had never done so and had not given permission for their personal information to be included in the partnership marketing materials.
Also significant, the Partnership Memo-randa included partnership income forecasts based on the number of customers PowerSouree projected gaining in each particular district. These, too, relied on information Bond had provided. The first partnership memorandum, dated October 1, 1998, projected a $1.6 million profit in one of the districts. And even though PowerSouree was nоt meeting its market penetration targets, the projections increased with each new partnership marketed to the investors.
PowerSouree and PowerCapFunding also conducted conference calls with investors in each partnership. The purpose of these calls was to soliсit additional investments and to reassure investors. Bond told the investors that after a year, they could convert their partnership units into PowerSouree stock worth $12,500. In reality, the units were converted into worthless PowerSouree Class B preferred stock. The investors were also erroneously told that PowerSouree was successfully acquiring customers, that it had a state-of-the-art computer system that could handle up to two million customers, and that its financial situation remained viable.
In the end, PowerSouree never had more than 6,885 customers, and it struggled to perform the most basic business functions, like customer billing. In Marсh 2001, PowerSouree decided to return all of its customers to the three major electricity companies, and after July 2001, it had zero customers. Ultimately, the investors lost nearly $2.5 million, recouping at most $80 on each $10,000 investment.
B
In November 2002, FBI agents interviewed Bond, who stated that he had worked for PowerSoureе only from 1997-1999 and only as a consultant. He identified E. Douglas Mitchell as the CEO of PowerSouree. Apparently, Bond’s attempt to minimize his involvement with PowerSouree was initially successful. In 2003, seven individuals connected to Pow-erSource, including Mitchell and Johnson, were indicted in the Southern District of Florida. Bond, however, wаs not among them. Six of these individuals pled guilty. 2 Mitchell, however, went to trial and was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Several of the individuals who pled guilty, including Johnson, testified at Mitchell’s trial. Bond was, of course, aware of the Florida proceedings and that various individuаls with whom he had worked were testifying. In early 2005, the government specifically gave Bond’s attorney the contact information for the court reporter transcribing the Florida trial.
C
In July 2005, Bond himself was indicted in the Central District of California for his role in the PowerSouree/ PowerCapFund investment scheme. Specifically, he was charged with one count of conspiracy to *1095 commit mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371, seven counts of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, three counts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one count of making a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Shortly thereafter, the government again gave Bond’s counsel the contact information for the Florida court rеporter. During the pretrial proceedings in Bond’s case, one of Bond’s trial counsel also represented that he had, in fact, been in contact with the Florida court reporter and he had obtained at least some transcripts from the Florida proceedings.
In conversations with defense counsel, the government repeatedly referred to Johnson and some of the other individuals indicted in Florida as possible witnesses against Bond and specifically listed Johnson on the witness list it filed with the district court. Additionally, the government provided Bond’s counsel with two agent interview summaries from when they had questioned Johnson, as well as agents’ notes from several other meetings involving Johnson. However, the government ultimately decided not to call Johnson as a witness, and Bond failed to make any effort to subpoena him as a witness for the defense. Thus, Johnson never testified at Bond’s trial.
The jury convicted Bond on all chargеs. The Pre-Sentencing Report (“PSR”) submitted to the court concluded that Bond had a category three criminal history and that his base offense level was six. Among other sentencing enhancements, the report recommended a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 for amount of loss between $1.0 and $2.5 million.
At the sentencing hearing, Bond raised numerous objections to the PSR, but he did not challenge the amount-of-loss enhancement. In fact, Bond’s counsel agreed that the “probation officer correctly analyzed and applied the guidelines.” The district court, considering the relevant sentencing factors, sentenced Bond to the statutory maximum of 60 months’ imprisonment on each of the 12 counts of conviction to be served partially concurrently and partially consecutively, for a total of 96 months’ imprisonment. The district court further ordered Bond to pay $2,435,441 in restitution. Bond timely appealed.
II
On appeal, Bond argues that Johnson’s testimony would have been favorable to him and that the government “suppressed” such evidence in violation of
Brady v. Maryland,
Relying on
United States v. Aichele,
the government responds that where the “defendant has enough information to be able to ascertain the supposed
Brady
material on his own, there is no suppression.”
A
The passage in
Aichele
relied on by the government is dictum.
Benn v. Lambert,
*1096
Our conclusion is buttressed by the Court’s decision in
United States v. Du-puy,
which also involved a witness statement for a trial of a multi-defendant drug conspiracy.
On appeal, we held that such action would have been appropriate had the defendant sought the co-defendants’
statements,
because “where a witness is involved’[t]he government is not required to make a[his] statement known to a defendant who is on notice of the essential facts which would enable him to call the witness and thus take advantage of any exculpatory testimony that he might furnish.’ ”
4
Id.
at 1502 (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Brown,
B
Nor is Bond’s position aided by our decision in
Benn.
There, the government cre
*1097
ated a report concluding that arson had been committed, but did not disclose the opinions of certain of its experts that the fire was accidental. While the government produced the names of the experts, it “not only
failed to disclose
the crucial information about the accidental nature of the fire, but ...
actually misled the defense
by disclosing a part of the experts’ findings that, read alone, would lead to a conclusion directly opposite to the one they reached.”
Bern,
C
Here, there was no concealment of information at all. There was no material favorable to Bond that the government failed to produce. Nor did the government selectively disclose items to mislead thе defense. Instead, it provided Bond with the information needed to acquire all trial testimony, and provided him with the essential factual data to determine whether the witness’ testimony might be helpful.
See Dupuy,
Here, Bond essentially argues that Johnson’s testimony would have been favorable to him and that the government “suppressed” such evidence in violation of
Brady
by failing to call Johnson as a witness after indicating that it would. However, it is elementary that litigants are not
required
to call every witness identified on their witness lists. The witness list simply provides notice to the court and to opposing counsel of the witnesses who
may
be presented at trial.
See generally United States v. Schwartz,
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. In a concurrently filed memorandum disрosition, we address Bond's additional challenges to the district court’s decision.
See United States v. Bond,
No. 06-50628,-Fed.
*1094
Appx. -,
. Three defendants pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Two defendants pleaded guilty to both a § 371 violation and substantive wire fraud counts. The final defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States.
. The case at bár is readily distinguishable from our recent decision in
Tennison v. City and County of San Francisco,
. In a footnote, the
Dupuy
court further stated: "Since suppression by the Government is a necessary element of a
Brady
claim, if the means of obtaining the exculpatory evidencе has been provided to the defense, the
Brady
claim fails.”
. Nor is Bond aided by our decision in
Paradis v. Arave,
