Eriс Bolden was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession with intent to distribute a mixture containing more than five grams of cocainе *205 base, and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. He moved to suppress certain evidence that he claimed was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court concluded that his rights were not violated. We affirm.
I.
Police officers Pat Siddons and Preston Moore were leaving an apartment when they heard nearby gunshots. Within seconds, a vehicle passed by, and the driver yelled to the officers that people were shooting guns around the cоrner; neither Simmons nor Moore stopped that vehicle to ask questions; instead they split up to find the shooters. Siddons drove his patrol car around the cоrner from which he believed the gunshots had come; he encountered a silver Jeep Cherokee that was “coming at [him]” at a “relatively fast pacе.” 1 He stopped the Jeep. Bolden was the driver. The time between the stop and the shots was less than one minute.
When Siddons exited his car, he observed four рeople in the Jeep. Not knowing whether they were the perpetrators, Siddons took a defensive position, drew his weapon, and ordered the occupants to hold their hands where he could see them. The occupants did not comply, so, unsure if they were hiding something or reaching for a weapоn, Siddons called for back-up.
Moore, during that time, had gone the other way around the block. Someone yelled to him that people were shooting оut of a green Jeep. Moore did not stop to ask questions. He turned the corner and observed Siddons’ position; saw that there were no vehicles but the Jеep in the area; exited his vehicle; drew his gun; and supported Siddons.
Additional officers arrived. Siddons and Moore approached the Jeep. Moоre repeatedly — he says eight times — told Bol-den to keep his hands on the steering wheel, but Bolden kept “dip[ping] his hands between his legs.” Moore believed that Bolden was “going for a gun.”
The Jeep’s passengers were ordered out of the vehicle. The officers observed a semi-automatic pistol on the driver’s sidе floorboard in plain view. Cocaine was also found on the driver’s side floorboard. Four pistols, at least three of which were loaded, were found. Contending that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights for Siddons to stop the Jeep, Bolden moved to suppress the evidence.
II.
A.
“When this court reviews a district court’s denial of a suppression motion, conclusions of law are reviewed
de novo
and findings of fact for clear error. The.court views the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to thе prevailing party.’ ”
United States v. Rojas Alvarez,
B.
The only question is whether Sid-dons, “in the context of the totality of circumstances confronting” him, had “a reasonable suspicion supported by articu-lable facts that criminal activity may be afoot” when he stopped the Jeep, or whether he merely had a “hunch or unpar-ticularized suspicion____”
United States v. Jaquez,
Bolden puts great weight on
Jaquez,
From this, Bolden contends thаt Siddons violated the Fourth Amendment, because Siddons “had even less information supporting a determination of reasonable suspicion than did the officer in Jaquez,” givеn that Siddons did not even know that a vehicle, much less a Jeep, was involved in the shooting, and the shooting was in the early evening, not late at night as in Ja-quez.
This reliance on Jaquez is misplaced. The key difference from this case is the amount of time between learning of the shootings and responding, coupled with the proximity between the stop and where the shootings occurred. In Jaquez, more than fifteen minutes had passed. In that amount of time, a car can take a shooter many miles away from the scene оf violence, so merely driving a red car in the relative vicinity of the shooting was not enough.
The situation is different where the amount of time is less than a minute. Then, it is reаsonable to believe that the shooters are close, maybe very close. And when an officer sees a solitary vehicle containing more than оne person leaving the precise spot where that officer has good reason 2 to believe that multiple persons were shooting less than a minute before, it is more than a “hunch” that those in the vehicle may be involved in the shooting. Granted, Siddons did not know that the shooters were in a Jeep or even a vehicle, but the law does not require that, before stopping the vehicle, Siddons knew with absolute certainty that those in the Jeep were involved in the shooting. His bеlief need be only “reasonable,” and it was.
Bolden argues that because the stop was justified, at least in part, as an attempt to identify witnesses, there was not a reasonable basis for stopping the Jeep. For this proposition he cites
Illinois v. Lidster,
Bolden misses the point. Even if Lid-ster stands for the proposition that Bolden ascribes to it — a question we need not answer — therе was sufficient “reasonable suspicion” to believe that those in the Jeep were actually the shooters, and thus Sid-dons was constitutionally authorized to stop the vehicle. 3 Just because it was also possible that the Jeep contained witnesses or victims does not negate the very real possibility that the lawbreakers were in the vehicle, especially given the timing and location and the Jeep’s, its “relatively fast pace,” and the nearly contempоraneous warning that Siddons received that the shooters were around the corner.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Siddons did not testify, however, that the Jeep was speeding.
. An anonymous tip, suсh as the driver's statement to the officers that people were shooting around the corner, can provide the reasonable suspicion necessary constitutionally to justify stopping a car, as long as it is reasonable in light of the “totality of the particular circumstances."
See United States v. Hernandez,
. Reasonableness for Fourth Amendment рurposes is analyzed under an objective standard.
See, e.g., Whren v. United States,