United States v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc.United States v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc.
Case Information
*1 Before TJOFLAT and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and SMITH [*] , Senior Circuit Judge.
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
Frаnk E. Body appeals the district court's dismissal of his claim against Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Alabama ("BCBSA") for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Body, a former employee of
BCBSA, brought suit as a
qui tam
relator under the False Claims Act ("FCA"),
In part I, we describe the factual and procedural background of Body's case. In part II, we explain why we disagree with the district court's interpretation of subsection 405(h), analyzing both the context within which the subsection is made applicable to the Medicare Act, and the Supreme Court cases that have construed it. In part III, we discuss the meaning and applicability of subsection 1395h(i)(3), and explain why it shields BCBSA from liability to the United States in the current action.
I.
Frank E. Body was an employee of appellee Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama from 1973 to 1989. In addition to its traditional role as a provider of medical insurance, BCBSA serves as a fiscal intermediary for Medicare Part A in Alabama. In its role as a fiscal intermediary, BCBSA processes and audits cost reports from hospitals in Alabama, adjudicates disputed claims for benefits from these health service providers, and issues reimbursement payments to these hospitals for costs appropriately incurred in the treatment of Medicare patients. BCBSA applies provisions from a number of different sources to its administration of Medicare Part A, including: *3 1) portions of Title VIII of the Social Security Act governing Medicare; 2) regulations contained in Title 42, Part 405 of the Code of Federal Regulations; 3) provisions contained in the Provider Reimbursement Manual (the "Manual") issued by the HCFA; 4) periodic "policy statements" from the HCFA; and 5) additional guidance from BCA to its subcontractors, issued in the form of Administrative Bulletins.
Body was employed as a senior auditor by BCBSA in 1984, and was assigned to audit the 1983 cost reports of, among others, Baptist Medical Centers ("Baptist") and Carraway Methodist Medical Center ("Carraway"). In the course of auditing the cost reports of Baptist and Carraway, Body proposed a number of adjustments to the hospitals' reports based on his application of Medicare regulations, provisions of the Manual, and guidelines from BCA. In general, Body's adjustments related to interest expenses claimed on refunded capital debt (i.e., interest on bonds issued, at least in part, to pay off an older bond issue) and to interest earned on funded depreciation accounts (i.e., accounts containing funds set aside for future capital expenses). BCBSA disagreed with a number of Body's recommendations, and, despite his protest, reversed his proposed adjustments.
Body contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation in January 1989 to report BCBSA's reimbursements to Alabama hospitals оf interest costs that he felt were not authorized under Medicare regulations. The FBI referred Body to the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") of HHS, which initiated an investigation of the allegations. The OIG investigated fourteen adjustments proposed by Body and reversed by BCBSA. In its report, dated September 1994, the OIG concluded that four of the fourteen adjustments were "immaterial," six were properly handled by BCBSA, two of the adjustments had been reinstated by BCBSA upon HCFA instruction, and the final two adjustments were determined to be correctly handled by BCBSA after the HCFA issued a policy *4 clarification.
In August 1993, prior to the issuance of the OIG's final report, Body instituted this lawsuit
for the United States as a
qui tam
relator
[4]
under the False Claims Act. Body alleges that BCBSA has
been reimbursing Alabama hospitals, in particular Baptist and Carraway, for interest costs that are
not chargeable to Medicare. His complaint essentially reiterated the information that he provided
to the OIG regarding BCBSA's handling of the 1983 cost reports of Baptist and Carraway, and
claimed that BCBSA continues to allow Medicare to be charged unallowable interest expеnses.
[5]
Body asserted that the district court had jurisdiction over his action pursuant to
BCBSA moved the district court,
inter alia,
for summary judgment on the ground that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Body's complaint. BCBSA argued that subsection
3732(a) was simply a venue provision, and as a result, Body's claim depended upon general
federal-question subject matter jurisdiction under
No action against the United States, the [Secretary], or any officer or employee thereof shall
be brought under
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal of the district court's final decision pursuant
to
II.
Body raises three issues in this appeal. First, he claims that subsection 3732(a) of the False
Claims Act contains an independent grant of subject matter jurisdiction, and that therefore his claim
does not rely on either of the jurisdictional provisions negated by subsection 405(h). Second, Body
claims that an action brought by a
qui tam
relator under the False Claims Act qualifies as a
*6
"proceeding[ ] commenced by the United States" within the meaning of
The third sentence of subsection 405(h) clearly revokes federal-question jurisdiction in the
district courts under
Subsection 405(h) has been interpreted in many cases and by many courts—in the context of its application both to actions arising under Social Security, for which it was originally drafted, and to actions arising under Medicare. In fact, the Supreme Court has discussed the scope of the subsection's jurisdictional preclusion in several significant opinions. All of these cases, however, involved suits brought by beneficiaries [8] against the United States or against a fiscal intermediary [9] *7 to recover benefits not previously paid. As best as we can tell, the application of subsection 405(h) to a False Claims Act action, brought by or for the United States against a fiscal intermediary, to recover money improperly paid to Medicare beneficiaries is a matter of first impression in the federal courts. The relevance of this distinction to determining whether a particular action "arises under" the Medicare Act becomes apparent when one analyzes the role the subsection plays in the broader context of administrative and judicial challenges to Medicare determinations, as well as the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the scope and application of subsection 405(h). In part II.A, therefore, we describe the larger system for administrative and judicial appeals of Medicare claims. In part II.B, we discuss the Supreme Court's decisions defining the applicability of subsection 405(h) to actions "arising under" both the Medicare Act and the Social Security Act. Finally, in part II.C, we conclude that Body's FCA claims do not "arise under" the Medicare Act for purposes of subsection 405(h).
A.
On its face, the third sentence of subsection 405(h) plainly reads as a broad exclusion of
federal-question jurisdiction over matters "arising under" the Medicare Act. That sentence, however,
neither exists nor operates in isolation. To understand the actual scope of the subsection's exclusive
effect, therefore, we must view the third sentence of subsection 405(h) both within the context of
the entire section 405—most of which is made applicable to Medicare by sections 1395ff and 1395ii,
see
subsection's application to appeals under the Medicare Act in general.
Subsection 405(h), which immediately follows subsection 405(g), channels all challenges to eligibility and amount determinations through the administrative and appeals process provided in subsections 405(b) and 405(g). The full subsection 405(h) states:
The findings and decision of the [Secretary] after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the [Secretary] shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the [Secretary], or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought undersection 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.
Tаken alone, the third sentence of the subsection appears to be a plenary revocation of federal-question jurisdiction for Medicare-related cases. Taken in context, however, it is quite clear that the provision is intended to prevent circumvention of the administrative process provided for the adjudication of disputes between Medicare beneficiaries and the government (or agents of the government such as fiscal intermediaries). The provision takes away general federal-question jurisdiction over claims by Medicare beneficiaries, forcing them to pursue their claims in a hearing under subsection 405(b) and then, if necessary, in an appeal under the specific grant of jurisdiction contained in subsection 405(g). Thus, the third sentence is the final piece in an administrative scheme designed to give the administrative process the first opportunity to resolve disputes over eligibility or the amount of benefits awarded under the Act.
Nothing in subsection 405(h), however, or in the rest of
As we illustrate in part II.B, the Supreme Court's cases involving subsection 405(h) further confirm our interpretation of its purpose.
B.
that if administrative and judicial review is unavailable under
bringing actions for declaratory and injunctive relief—prior to filing for reimbursement for a
health service, or even prior to receiving a health service at all—that would direct the Secretary
to provide reimbursement for that particular health service.
See Ringer,
there any mention of congressional intent to preclude federal-question jurisdiction over claims
other than thоse brought by beneficiaries challenging the denial of benefits or eligibility for
benefits.
See
S.Rep. No. 89-404 (1965),
reprinted in
1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1995 (describing
appeals under the Medicare Act and noting, in apparent reference to subsection 405(h), that "the
remedies provided by these review procedures shall be exclusive");
see also
discussion of
Bowen v. Michigan Academy,
The Supreme Court has analyzed the breadth and effect of subsection 405(h) in its
application to both the Social Security Act and to Parts A and B of the Medicare Act. Generally, the
Court has given the provision a very broad reading, in an attempt to reflect the intent of the drafters.
See Heckler,
The first major Supreme Court case to analyze the operation of subsection 405(h) was
Weinberger v. Salfi,
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the three-judge district court had taken an "entirely too narrow" view of the scope of subsection 405(h). The Court stated:
That the third sentence of§ 405(h) is more than a codified requirement of administrative exhaustion is plain from its own language, which is sweeping and direct and which states that no action shall be brought undеr§ 1331 , not merely that only those actions shall be brought in which administrative remedies have been exhausted.
Id.
at 757,
The Supreme Court explained, however, that its ruling under subsection 405(h) did not bar
the appellees from bringing their constitutional challenges before a United States district court. In
fact, the Court noted that such a result would "raise[ ] a serious constitutional question of the
validity" of subsection 405(h).
Id.
at 762,
Body's claim is distinguishable from
Salfi
for several reasons. First, Body only has standing
to bring this suit through operation of the
qui tam
provisions of the False Claims Act.
See
The Court next analyzed the limited review provisions of the Medicare Act in
United States
v. Erika, Inc.,
Although the statute omitted any reference to judicial appeal of Part B amount
determinations, it did not specifically forbid judicial review of those determinations either. The
Erika
Court found, however, that thе legislative history demonstrated that the omission of a right
of individuals dissatisfied with their Part B amount determinations to judicial review was more than
just congressional oversight. The Court held that the history conclusively demonstrated that
Congress intended no judicial review for Part B amount determinations under 1395ff because the
amounts were expected to be much smaller than those under Part A, "quite minor matters" that
Congress feared might overload the courts.
See id.
at 208-11,
Despite the fact that the Court's decision in
Erika
was premised on
The Supreme Court analyzed the application of subsection 405(h) to the Medicare Act for
the first time in
Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U.S. 602, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984). In
Heckler,
four persons brought constitutional and statutory challenges against the policy of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services not to pay for a special type of surgery intended to relieve
respiratory distress, a type of surgery that had previously been covered under Medicare Part A.
See
id.
at 604-07,
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, finding that the plaintiffs' claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief were "inextricably intertwined" with their claims for benefits.
Id.
at 614,
The Supreme Court discerned a cleverly concealed claim for benefits behind the plaintiffs'
*17
constitutional and statutory challenges. As in
Salfi,
the Court found that
Although respondents would clearly prefer an immediate appeal to the District Court rather than the often lengthy administrative review process, exhaustion of administrative remedies is in no sense futile for these respondents, and they, therefore, must adhere to the administrative procedure which Congress has established for adjudicating their Medicare claims.
Id.
at 619,
In
Bowen v. Michigan Academy,
The Court began its analysis by noting the "strong presumption that Congress intends judicial
review of administrative action,"
Id.
at 670,
The reticulated statutory scheme, which carefully details the forum and limits of review of "any determination ... of ... the amount of benefits under part A,"42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(C) (1982 ed., Supp. II), and of the "amount of ... payment" of benefits under Part B,42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C) , simply does not speak to challenges mounted against the method by which such amounts are to be determined rather than the determinations themselves.
Id.
at 675,
The Court next addressed the contention that the third sentence of subsection 405(h) serves
as a bar to federal-question jurisdiction in the district courts over challenges to administrative
regulations governing Medicare Part B. First noting the implausibility of Congress' providing carrier
*19
review of "trivial" amounts determinations while simultaneously denying
any
review of "statutory
and constitutional challenges to regulations promulgated by the Secretary," the Court concluded
again that Congress only intended to foreclose judicial review of amount determinations when it
promulgated subsection 405(h).
Id.
at 678-80,
Perhaps most clearly of the four Supreme Court cases analyzing the jurisdictional limitations contained in the Medicare Act, Bowen demonstrates that subsection 405(h), viewed within the context in which it was drafted and made applicable to Medicare, simply seeks to preserve the integrity of the administrative process Congress designеd to deal with challenges to amounts determinations by dissatisfied beneficiaries, not to serve as a complete preclusion of all claims related to benefits determinations in general.
C.
*20
In every case discussed in subpart B, the Supreme Court was faced with a suit by a
beneficiary—a person or an organization that wanted, ultimately, to receive money from the
government for health services. The Court scrutinized each plaintiff's claim to determine whether
the plaintiff was simply seeking benefits, a claim cognizable within the administrative scheme
designed by Congress, or was bringing a claim for which administrative review was unavailable.
Cleverly concealed claims for benefits, veiled attempts to evade the sometimes tedious
administrative process, were dismissed,
see Heckler,
In sum, the Supreme Court has sought to prevent claimants from circumventing the administrative framework designed by Congress to execute the Medicare Act by creatively styling their claims as collateral attacks not "arising under" Medicare and thus not subject to subsection 405(h). The Supreme Court has not sought, however, to extend the reach of subsection 405(h) to bar claims that, although they may implicate benefits determinations, are certainly not veiled claims for benefits by a disgruntled beneficiary that could have, and should have, been pursued *21 administratively in the first instance. [22]
*22
We are not faced with a claim for benefits from a dissatisfied Medicare beneficiary, nor are
we faced with a claim cognizable within the administrative framework provided in
Although a number of benefits determinations are at issue in this suit, and although treble
damages under the FCA bear a direct relation to the amount of overpayment of benefits, this claim
is simply not the type of claim that subsection 405(h) was intended to prevent. Hence, we conclude
that subsection 405(h) does not bar federal-question jurisdiction over a claim brought against a fiscal
intermediary under the False Claims Act. Such a claim, for purposes of subsеction 405(h), arises
under the False Claims Act, not the Medicare Act, and federal-question jurisdiction under
III.
Our inquiry does not end with our holding that subsection 405(h) is inapplicable to Body's We rely today on an entirely different distinction: the distinction between a case brought by a beneficiary, who ultimately wants funds from the government and may challenge adverse decisions through the administrative process, and a case brought by a qui tam relator under the False Claims Act, who seeks to recover money erroneously paid by the government, a claim not cognizable in the administrative scheme.
qui tam
suit against BCBSA. Notwithstanding the district court's subject matter jurisdiction over
the matter, BCBSA argues that it is immune from suits of this sort under
Subsection 1395h(i) has never been authoritatively construed by the federal courts. This case, therefore, presents a matter of first impression for this court. We do not interpret the subsection in the abstract, however: Like subsection 405(h) discussed in part II, subsection 1395h(i)(3) must be read and understood in context.
First and foremost, subsection 1395h(i)(3) appears as part of subsection 1395h(i), entitled "Liability of certifying and disbursing officers designated under agreement for negligent, etc. payments." Subsection 1395h(i) reads:
(1) No individual designated pursuant to an agreement under this section as a certifying officer shall, in the absence of gross negligence or intent to defraud the United States, be liable with respect to any payments certified by him under this section.
(2) No disbursing officer shall, in the absence of gross negligence or intent to defraud the United States, be liable with respect to any payment by him under this section if it was based upon a voucher signed by a certifying officer designated as provided in paragraph (1) of this *24 subsection.
(3) No such agency or organization [such as a fiscal intermediary] shall be liable to the United States fоr any payments referred to in paragraph (1) or (2).
In contrast to the limited immunity accorded to certifying and disbursing officers, subsection
1395h(i)(3) broadly states that the fiscal intermediaries themselves will not be liable to the
Government for
any
of the payments referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2)—that is, payments
certified by certifying officers and disbursed by disbursing officers. A clause limiting immunity to
payments not involving gross negligence or fraud is conspicuously absent. When the language of
a statute is unambiguous, we are bound to give it its plain meaning, absent "a clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary."
United States v. Turkette,
Our reading of the subsection is consistent with the broader goals of
This system of allocating liability for erroneous Medicare payments does not leave the
government without any remedies for punishing Medicare fraud. Not only can the government
recoup incorrect payments, it can certainly bring an FCA action against the recipient of the funds
if that recipient participated in the scheme. The government could also bring an action against the
actual persons in the fiscаl intermediary organization who executed the fraudulent scheme—the
certifying officers and disbursing officers who paid out the government's money in knowing
contravention of Medicare guidelines. The government's inability to bring an FCA action against
the intermediary does not mean it will have no recourse to deep pockets either. By allowing the
government to require surety bonds for intermediary employees, subsection 1395h(h) implicitly
acknowledges that fiscal intermediary employees handling the government's cash will be in a
position to pilfer.
See
Fiscal intermediary immunity from liability to the United States for payments certified and
disbursed by its officers in the normal course of business also does not preclude the government
from seeking recourse against recalcitrant intermediaries. Most obviously, the government can
terminate the contract of an intermediary if "the continuation of some or all of the functions provided
for in the agreement with the [fiscal intermediary] is
disadvantageous,
"
Body's action under the False Claims Act is premised upon precisely the types of payments for which Congress provided the fiscal intermediaries with immunity. There is nothing in Body's complaint to suggest that the payments were not made in the normal course of reimbursing Alabama hospitals for costs attributable to Medicare patients, that is, payments certified and disbursed to the *28 providers. In fact, it appears that Body himself was the certifying officer. [27] Although Body could argue that he does not seek to impose liability for "payments" as meant in subsection 1395h(i)(3), but rather for statutory penalties and treble damages for violations of the FCA, that argument would be unavailing. We cannot ignore that Body's suit would be premised upon payments for which subsection 1395h(i)(3) provides BCBSA immunity. [28] Allowing Body to circumvent that immunity by appeal to the False Claims Act would destroy the integrity of the system that Congress designed. BCBSA, therefore, is immune from Body's suit.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court erred in dismissing Body's suit for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We also hold, however, that Body has not stated a claim for
which relief can be granted because, under
AFFIRMED.
Notes
[*] Honorable Edward S. Smith, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
[1]
[2]
[3] The Medicare program is administered by the Health Care Finance Administratiоn (the
"HCFA"), part of the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). The program is
authorized by Title VIII of the Social Security Act, and is divided into two parts. Part A of the
Medicare program deals primarily with the reimbursement of hospitals for costs that they incur
treating patients covered by Medicare, while Part B generally deals with the reimbursement of
providers for physicians' services. Under
[4] The
qui tam
provision of the FCA permits, in certain circumstances, suits by private parties
("relators") on behalf of the United States against anyone submitting a false claim to the
Government.
See
[5] Body's complaint asserted that BCBSA had improperly reimbursed other Alabama hospitals, in addition to Baptist and Carraway, for costs nоt properly certifiable to Medicare. These additional allegations are not discussed here, because they fail under the same legal conclusion that precludes Body's claims against Baptist and Carraway.
[6] Subsection 3732(a), entitled "False claims jurisdiction," states:
Actions Under
[7] BCBSA raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in a motion for summary judgment.
Subject matter jurisdiction is appropriately dealt with by means of a
[8] We use the term "beneficiaries" in this opinion to denote the broad range of individuals and organizations that either receive health services covered by Medicare or receive payments from Medicare for providing health services to covered persons; these include: physicians, physicians' associations, hospitals, nursing homes, and other health care providers. In addition, when discussing the subsection's application to actions brought under the Social Security Act, we use the term generically to refer to individuals receiving Social Security benefits from the government.
[9] We use this term here to include organizations that are the equivalent of fiscal intermediaries; i.e., the organization or agency responsible for determining eligibility for and amounts of benefits under either Medicare Part A or Part B, and under the Social Security Act.
[10] The decisions оf the Secretary will actually be made in the first instance by fiscal
intermediaries, followed by appeals to either an administrative law judge or a Departmental
Appeals Board, or both.
See
[11] Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the application of subsection 405(h) to a
claim that could not be brought administratively under
[14] Recall that subsection 405(h) is a provision of the Social Security Act made applicable to
Medicare by
[15] The three-judge district court held further that exhaustion in this case would be futile; thus
the exhaustion requirement, in its codified version at subsection 405(h), was waived by the court.
See Salfi v. Weinberger,
[16] The damages and penalties that Body seeks to recover are quite different from the "benefits" sought by the appellees in Salfi. Body seeks damages on behalf of the government calculated as a multiple of benefits improperly paid out of government funds because of BCBSA's alleged fraud, as well as the statutory penalties authorized by subsection 3729(a), rather than reimbursement from the government for health services authorized under Medicare.
[17] Until 1987, subsection 1395ff(b) only provided for review of Medicare Part B amount
determinations in a hearing by the carrier, the Part B equivalent of a fiscal intermediary. The
1986 amendments to the Medicare Act made Part B amount determinations subject to judicial
review, as provided by subsection 405(g), to the same extent as Part A amount determinations.
See
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-509, § 9341, 100 Stat. 1874,
2037 (1986) (amending
[18] Judicial review of Medicare Part A amount determinations was always available under
[19] Unlike the other thrеe, the fourth plaintiff had not yet had the surgery but challenged the
policy because, he claimed, its existence precluded his having the surgery.
Id.
at 620, 104 S.Ct.
at 2024. The Court dismissed the fourth plaintiff's claim as well because it, too, was "essentially
one requesting the payment of benefits for ... surgery, a claim cognizable only under
[20] The Court concluded that "[t]he presumption of judicial review is, after all, a presumption,
and like all presumptions used in interpreting statutes, may be overcome by,
inter alia,
specific
language or specific legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent, or a
specific congressional intent to preclude judicial review that is "fairly discernible in the detail of
the legislative scheme'."
Id.
at 673,
[21] Notably, the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed our view that subsection 405(h) is intended
to ensure that beneficiaries do not evade the administrative process described in
[22] The district court in this case relied primarily on its interpretation of the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in
Bodimetric Health Services, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty,
[23] To our knowledge, the subsection has only been cited by one court since it was first enacted
in 1965.
See Mount Sinai Hosp. of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Weinberger,
[24] We are mindful of the brief statement in the Conference Committee's report that subsection 1395h(i)(3) is intended to grant fiscal intermediaries "the same immunity from liability for incorrect payments as would be provided their certifying and disbursing officers." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 682 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2228, 2231. This brief and inconclusive statement is insufficient to overcome the clear language of the subsection.
[25] We would imagine that provider complicity would be evident in almost every instance where Medicare claims are fraudulently certified and paid to providers. Otherwise, the fiscal intermediary's agents certifying and disbursing United States Government funds are simply performing unacknowledged acts of charity, because they cannоt directly benefit from the payments they have fraudulently certified and disbursed to unwitting, albeit happily enriched, providers.
[26]
Cf. United States ex rel. Flynn v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan,
(D.Md.1995).
Flynn
involved a settlement agreement between the government and Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Michigan ("BCBSM"). Therefore, we do not cite the case for its legal conclusions about liability
under the FCA, because there are none. The case does describe, however, the type of fiscal
intermediary fraud for which we do not believe
[27] Body claims that his unnamed "superiors" ordered him to certify the payments to Baptist and Carraway. If he wеre actually coerced to certify the payments, and the payments were fraudulent, those superiors may be liable under the FCA, because they would have essentially usurped his certifying function. We express serious doubt, however, that Body (or the government) could succeed on such a claim. The payments made to Alabama hospitals were not concealed from the government; the Secretary of Health and Human Services could have pursued the recoupment of the money, but chose not to; and, even after the OIG investigation, almost all of BCBSA's determinations were upheld. Given these facts, it is highly unlikely that Body could succeed in proving that BCBSA, or any of its officers, defrauded the United States government.
[28] Body's suit seeks recovery for the United States under the qui tam provisions of the FCA, not recovery for Body personally. Thus any argument subsection 1395h(i)(3) does not apply because Body does not seek to impose liability "to the United States" would be similarly unavailing.
[29] We note briefly that given our holding that BCBSA is immune from liability under
subsection 1395h(i)(3), Body's suit is properly dismissed under