Arguing that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights by denying him access to the legal material and facilities necessary for self-representаtion, the appellant in this case appeals the Judgment and Commitment Order entered after a jury verdict of guilty was returned against him on an escape charge. The issue in this case is whether a dеfendant who voluntarily waives his right to counsel, as well as standby counsel, is entitled to access to a law library pursuant to the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
At his arraignment on March 2, 1989, the appellant was offered both counsel and standby counsel. After being advised of the dangers of self-representation, the appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to both counsel and standby counsel. At this hearing, the defendant did complain that the library at the Fayette County Detention Center where he was incarcerated was inadequate because it consisted of only six outdated books.
On March 3, 1989, after reсeiving an undated handwritten letter from the defendant which was treated as a motion for access to law books, the trial court entered an order directing the U.S. Marshal to place the defеndant in an institution where he would have access to law books. The trial court concluded in this order that this action was appropriate based upon
Bounds v. Smith,
A hearing was held in regard to various pretrial motions before a United States Magistrate on March 10, 1989. The defendant again complained that he still had not received access to a legal library “with the minimum standards set forth by the American Bar Association, American Association for Legal Libraries, and the Supreme Court in
Bounds v. Smith
and
Gilmore v. Younger
[
On March 13, 1989, the appellant was again offered counsel and warned of the dangers of self-representation. No reference was made to standby counsel at this time. The appellant’s waiver of cоunsel at this hearing was also competent and intelligent. Addressing the sufficiency of the law library at the facility where the defen
The appellant came to trial on April 26, 1989. Although he was again offered standby counsel and appointed counsel, he persisted in his demands that he represent himself.
At every court appearance, the appellant repeatedly made demands that he be permitted access to legal materials and facilitiеs. Although the appellant was apparently given copies of some cases, he was never granted actual access to an adequate law library.
The appellant contends that the interplay between
Bounds v. Smith,
In Bounds, supra, the Court specifically states:
We hold, therefore, that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. Id.430 U.S. at 828 ,97 S.Ct. at 1498 . (emphasis added).
Clearly, then, the only application that Bounds has to pretrial detainees would be in civil matters because access to an adequate law library would nеver suffice as a constitutionally permissible replacement by the government for the right to the assistance of counsel in a criminal trial absent a voluntary waiver of counsel. The sixth amendment provides for an absolute right to the assistance of an attorney during the course of the pretrial detainee’s criminal trial, and does not permit alternate means to achieve that goal despite the fact that Bounds suggests that in a civil trial the right of meaningful access to the court may be fulfilled by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries.
Although the defendant in a criminal matter may choosе to waive his right to counsel, it would cut against the entire grain of our criminal justice system to suggest that in lieu of furnishing an indigent criminal defendant with appointed counsel, it would be constitutionally acceptаble merely to give that defendant access to an adequate law library. Not only do we find that Bounds is not controlling in the context of a criminal trial, but we conclude that Bounds is completely inappliсable. Therefore, contrary to the appellant’s contention, we find no interplay between Bounds and Faretta that would have required the trial court to permit the appellant to have access to a law library.
Faretta, supra, addresses the compact statement of rights necessary for a full defense as set out in the Sixth Amendment:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed оf the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. Id.422 U.S. at 818 ,95 S.Ct. at 2532 .
To satisfy due process requirements, these basic rights must be afforded to every criminal defendant.
Contrary to the appellant’s position,
Far-etta
does not address meaningful access to the courts. In fact,
Faretta
acknowledges
It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts. Id. at 834,95 S.Ct. at 2540 .
The Court in
Faretta, supra,
at n. 43, also cites Mr. Justice Sutherland in
Powell v. Alabama,
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both thе skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterаte, or those of feeble intellect.
In spite of the recognized inherent inability of the vast majority of defendants to adequately represent themselves in a meaningful manner, the Court in Faretta still upholds the рroposition that the accused has a right to represent himself when he competently and intelligently waives his right to assistance of counsel. Therefore, Faretta acknowledges that principles of due process are not violated when a defendant waives his right to counsel, even though by doing so he destroys any meaningful access to the court that he may have had.
In effect, the apрellant argues that he is entitled to the benefits that would have been afforded to him had he had counsel;
i.e.,
access to a law library. However, the Court in
Faretta, supra
When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, mаny of the benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forego those relinquished benefits.
In assessing whether or not a defendant has made a knowing exercise of the right to defend himself, the Court in
Faretta, supra
at 836,
It is undisputed that the appellant’s repeated waiver of counsel and/or standby counsel was intelligent and competent. We find that by knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel, the appellant also relinquished his access to a law library. Whatever issues may or may not be open to this appellant on appeal because he has waived his right to counsel, he cаnnot complain about the quality of his own defense by arguing that it amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Faretta, supra, at n. 46.
We also note that our holding today is in accord with the Fourth and Seventh Circuits who hаve reached the same conclusion that the state does not have to provide access to a law library to defendants in criminal trials who wish to represent themselves.
See United States v. Chatman,