United States v. BenbrookUnited States v. Benbrook
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Wiener
Plaintiff-Appellant James Robert Ben-brook, Jr. appeals his resentencing by the district court following a successful challenge to his
I.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A jury convicted Benbrook of unlawful possession of phenylaeetic acid, in violation of
After the United States Supreme Court decided
Bailey v. United
States,
3
Benbrook filed a habeas corpus petition, pursuant to
Benbrook appealed, asserting that the district court had no jurisdiction to resentence him on the unchallenged, underlying drug conviction. He contends that the resentencing violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
II.
ANALYSIS
When a defendant is sentenced under § 924(c), however, the sentencing guidelines expressly prohibit application of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) two-level increase, as the level enhancement under those circumstances would result in an impermissible double counting of the firearm offense — once under § 924(c) and again under § 2D1.1(b)(1). 4 Consequently, at the time of the original sentencing under § 924(c), the two-level enhancement of § 2D1.1(b)(1) is not available.
Benbrook argues that the district court had no jurisdiction to resentence him on his unchallenged, underlying drug conviction or to apply the two-level enhancement. Thus Benbrook would handcuff the district court by restricting resentencing to that complained of in his petition and prohibiting reconsideration of the entire sentence. We disagree.
We have recently held that § 2255 vests the district court with the power to resentence a defendant who successfully ehal
Neither does the district court’s re-sentencing violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 6 That constitutional protection prohibits resentencing only when a defendant has developed a legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence. 7 When a defendant challenges one of interdependent convictions, however, he has no expectation of finality in his original sentence, having put at issue the vahdity of the entire sentence. 8 In seeking relief from his § 924(c) conviction and the consecutive sixty months portion of his sentence attributable to that conviction, Benbrook opened the door for the district court to revisit the entire sentence — not just to vacate that conviction but also to resentence him on the unchallenged, underlying drug conviction.
Benbrook insists that he had a legitimate expectation of finality in his drug-sentence, as he had completed the term of imprisonment originally allocated to that offense. Benbrook’s argument, however, rests on the erroneous assumption that he received separate and distinct sentences for his drug and firearm convictions. To the contrary, he received one aggregate sentence for those interdependent offenses. When Benbrook attacked part of that aggregate sentence — his § 924(c) conviction, he necessarily attacked the whole. Thus, he could have had no legitimate expectation of finality in any portion of the original aggregate sentence.
9
Moreover, assuming that Benbrook has served the term of imprisonment originally allocated to his drug conviction, he has not completed, much less begun, the mandatory three-year period of
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court did not err generally in resentencing Benbrook on his unchallenged, underlying drug conviction, nor specifically in applying the two-level enhancement of § 2Dl.l(b)(l). It follows that the district court’s resentencing of Benbrook should be and therefore is
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. During trial, the district court granted Ben-brook’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the “carry” prong of § 924(c).
. United States v. Benbrook, 40 F.3d 88 (5th Cir.1994).
. - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995).
. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 Commentary Background (1995).
. United States v. Rodriguez, 114 F.3d 46, 47-8 (5th Cir.1997); United States v. Hernandez, 116 F.3d 725, 727 (5th Cir.1997).
. Rodriguez, 114 F.3d at 48; Hernandez, 116 F.3d 725, 727.
. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139, 101 S.Ct. 426, 438, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980).
. See Rodriguez, 114 F.3d at 48 (quoting United States v. Colunga, 812 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 857, 108 S.Ct. 165, 98 L.Ed.2d 120 (1987)); Hernandez, 116 F.3d 725, 727.
. See United States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065, 1068 (2d Cir.1990)(defendant had not completed service of full sentence, as she still faced five-year term of supervised release; therefore, district court could correct sentence to conform to plea agreement without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause); Woodhouse v. United States, 934 F.Supp. 1008, 1014 (C.D.Ill.1996)(defendant who challenges his § 924(c) conviction has no legitimate expectation of finality in any portion of original aggregate sentence, even if he has already served the term of imprisonment allocated to the underlying drug conviction); Merritt v. United States, 930 F.Supp. 1109, 1114 (E.D.N.C.1996)(after overturning § 924(c) conviction, district court could resentence defendant who had served term of imprisonment allocated to drug conviction, as original sentence was an aggregate one, service of which had not been completed); and United States v. Acosta, 1996 WL 445351 at *4 (E.D.Pa. Aug.5, 1996)(unpub-lished opinion) (sentence not fully served where defendant had not completed term of imprisonment imposed for interdependent convictions or four-year term of supervised release). But see United States v. Daddino, 5 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir.1993)(defendant, who was convicted of conspiracy and attempted extortion and who had served term of imprisonment and paid fines, but had not completed period of supervised release, had a legitimate expectation of finality in the completed part of the sentence); Warner v. United States, 926 F.Supp. 1387, 1392 (E.D.Ark.1996)(defendant enjoys legitimate expectation of finality in completed term of lawful incarceration for underlying drug conviction; thus, district court‘s resentencing following defendant’s successful challenge to his § 924(c) conviction would violate Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses; no mention of supervised release); and United States v. Pecina, 952 F.Supp. 409, 412 n. 2 (N.D.Tex.1996)(court need not address the situation in which sentence on underlying drug convictions has been completed prior to vacation of § 924(c) conviction, “a situation in which the constitutionality of resentencing would be far more questionable“).
. A period of supervised release is part of the defendant‘s sentence.
See