*3 GRUENDER, Before BYE and Circuit KAYS,1 Judge. Judges, District GRUENDER, Judge. Circuit police After officers found a Titan .25 handgun caliber semi-automatic during rental vehicle a consensual search following stop, Alphonso a traffic Barnum charged being with a felon in posses- firearm, sion of a a violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2). §§ 922(g)(1) and moved to the evidence that seized, challenging legality of the traf- fic alleging his consent to rental vehicle person search his and his voluntarily given. was not The district court2 denied Barnum’s motion. Barnum then guilty plea, entered conditional re- serving right appeal the denial of his suppression appeals, motion. Barnum now below, and for reasons discussed affirm. Gregory Kays, Jarvey,
1. The Honorable David The John A. United Honorable Judge Judge States District for the Western for the District District States District Southern Missouri, sitting by designation. of Iowa. passenger, Pugh. Michelle and his female I. BACKGROUND in- prior on Barnum revealed The check July Offi- the afternoon On a conviction for drugs with volvement Bettendorf, Iowa Hatler of Jerry cer by a felon. of a firearm possession through drove Department Police time, Colin arrived part At this Ward Traveler Motel as lot of the parking up Officer Hatler. Officer Hatler Traveler Motel to back patrol. routine of his ticket for the prepared warning among local law enforce- reputation has a returned to Barnum’s rental drug and infraction and site of frequent ment as warning give Barnum the Hatler cross- vehicle to activity. Officer prostitution agree- his license and rental of the vehicles return registrations referenced *4 Barnum Hatler asked ment. Officer against in lot a list outstand- parked complete step a out of the vehicle of these vehicles was One ing warrants. Stratus, Together they walked to warning ticket. Dodge registered silver vehicle, Bar- of the rental where City, repair an automobile the rear Kimberly Car warning signed and it. checking num reviewed the Iowa. After shop Davenport, in told Barnum that their vehicles, Hatler left the Officer Hatler then Officer all of the and continued business was done. parking Motel lot Traveler patrol activities. his normal to his rental Before Barnum returned vehicle, later, engaged Hatler Barnum in p.m., around 6:00 Officer A hours few in- concerning prior his driving on Brown a conversation Hatler was Officer drugs, his conviction for Dodge silver volvement with when he saw the same Street felon, by a firearm his possession Motel out of the Traveler pull Stratus business, During and his church. Officer current onto Brown Street. parking lot conversation, approxi- which occurred on Brown this the vehicle Hatler followed fifteen minutes after the mately for about twelve to then on 14th Street Street stop, initial traffic Officer Hatler asked he noticed that the twenty seconds before in anything illegal if there was failed to illumi- Barnum taillight middle vehicle’s driver, Barnum, if he could search it. Barnum applied the vehicle and nate when reasons, safety brakes, to the search. For thereby violating agreed Iowa vehicle’s (“All Barnum down for patted and Officer Hatler lamps § id. 321.387. See Code searching the vehicle. weapons prior manufac- originally lighting equipment weapons, and pat-down in revealed no kept shall be The on a motor vehicle tured condition....”). if he could search Hatler Hatler asked Officer Officer working gave per- Barnum his pockets. stop. a traffic then initiated mission, re- and Officer Hatter’s search stopped approached the Officer Hatler key. and a motel room pipe vealed a crack license, vehicle, his asked Barnum for Barnum under arrest placed Officer malfunctioning him of the vehicle’s notified per- search of Barnum’s and finished his was explained Barnum that he taillight. son, finding in his shoe. $305 out be- not aware vehicle; Hatler held Barnum the back it was Officer not own the cause he did cruiser and asked a repair patrol of his by him an automobile loaned to a female officer to con- to send being dispatcher re- shop while his automobile After Officer Pugh. pat-down Hatler his duct gave Barnum Officer paired. scene, Barnum vol- Guffey arrived on agreement, vehicle rental license and the rent- gun there was a unteered that patrol returned to his and Officer Hatler given to that Barnum’s wife had Barnum al vehicle the records of cruiser to check sufficiently purged a cocked and that his consent Pugh. Officer Ward retrieved any potential Titan .25 caliber semi-automatic taint of Fourth Amendment loaded handgun the vehicle’s center console. arising allegedly from from the discovery, Following this Officer Hatler stop. traffic Because Barnum’s rights, Barnum his Miranda3 read provided independent justifica- an Pugh. arrested searches, Officer Ward tion for the the district court deciding refrained from whether there was jury A grand federal returned indict- stop. cause for the The being Barnum with a felon charging ment district court also found that Barnum’s possession of a firearm in violation of post-arrest, pre-Miranda statement to Of- 924(a)(2). 922(g)(1) §§ 18 U.S.C. concerning handgun ficer Hatler trial, pled guilty. not Before product interrogation. not the Follow- Barnum filed a motion to ing ruling the court’s adverse on sup- post-arrest, pre-Miranda statement con- motion, Barnum pression entered condi- cerning handgun and the evidence guilty plea pursuant tional to Federal Rule person seized from his and his rental vehi- 11(a)(2). Procedure Criminal dis- cle, claiming that Hatler did *5 trict sentenced Barnum to 36 have cause for the traffic imprisonment. months’ and that Barnum’s to the voluntarily given. searches was not At
the motion II. hearing, pre- the Government DISCUSSION sented the testimonies of Officers Hatler appeals the district court’s and concerning Ward the circumstances of motion, suppression arguing denial of his stop, Barnum’s consent clearly finding that the court erred in search, person and the searches of his and voluntarily he consented the search of his rental attorney vehicle. Barnum’s person his and his rental vehicle and that cross-examined Officers Hatler and Ward the court erred in that his consent concerning the circumstances under which purged taint any potential Fourth Officer Hatler secured Barnum’s consent arising Amendment violation from al search, police department’s practice legedly illegal stop.4 appeal traffic “In an checking vehicles in the Traveler Motel denial of a motion to evi lot, parking explanations and the officers’ dence, the district court’s factual determi patrol-cruiser for the failure of their video error, nations are reviewed for clear cameras to stop. record the traffic Bar- we review de novo its conclusions as num presented testimony also that Kim- to whether the Fourth Amendment has berly City’s Car maintenance records re- been violated.” Esquivel, United States v. reported problems flected no with the (8th Cir.2007). 507 F.3d Dodge Stratus’s center either be- fore or after the rental. applicable, judicially- Where exclusionary
The district court
created
sup-
denied Barnum’s
rule to the Fourth
motion,
pression
finding that Barnum vol- Amendment “forbids the use of improperly
untarily consented to the searches and
obtained evidence at trial.” Herring v.
Arizona,
3.
gue
opening
Miranda v.
384 U.S.
86 S.Ct.
the issue in his
brief to this
(1966).
Fischer,
969 States, -, that the defendant behaved such 129 S.Ct. show 555 U.S. (2009).5 reasonably a manner that the officer Howev 695, 699, L.Ed.2d 496 that the search was consensual. exclusionary believed er, subject to the evidence of the evaluating In the reasonableness if it is obtained still admissible rule is belief, the charac- by officer’s we consider free will unaffected “an act of through Illinois, consenting, in- person teristics of the Brown v. illegality.” initial cluding party’s age, intelligence 95 S.Ct. U.S. (1975). education, Here, whether he was under the the Govern- L.Ed.2d alcohol, drugs or whether he voluntary con- influence argues that Barnum’s ment right of his to withhold his rental was informed person sent to search consent, aware of and whether he was act of free will that was an vehicle rights suspects. afforded criminal We any alleged Fourth Amend- taint of the environment in which stop. also consider arising from the ment violation alleged place, specifi- consent took act of free will is purported Because (1) search, cally length of time he was de- the Gov- consent to the defendant’s (2) tained; police whether the threat- by preponderance prove must ernment ened, intimidated, punished physically con- evidence that the defendant’s (3) him; prom- made whether sent to search (4) misrepresentations; whether act of free will ises or consent was an defendant’s custody or under arrest when of the Fourth he was purge the taint sufficient (5) given; whether the the consent Esquivel, violation. 603-04, Brown, public in a or a seclud- consent occurred (citing U.S. at 1160 *6 (6) by whether he stood 2254); place; v. ed see also United States 95 S.Ct. Cir.2000). (8th occurred. Kreisel, 868, silently as search 869 as- inquiry, of this purposes For (8th Cir.2005) (internal Hatler violated the that Officer sume citations, and alterations omit- quotations by effecting the Amendment Fourth ted). vehicle without stop of Barnum’s rental court Barnum contends that the district v. cause. States See United clearly in that his consent to erred (8th Cir.2007) 879, Grajeda, 497 F.3d 882 voluntary for two rea- the searches was of a Fourth (assuming the existence (1) Hatler was unreasonable sons: Officer considering in person in his belief that reasonable voluntary consent whether a defendant’s disregard have felt free to Officer would violation). alleged the taint of the request presence based on the Hatler’s (2) scene; police officers at the three Voluntary to Search A. Consent Bar- request Hatler’s search Officer Esquivias, In States v. was “loaded” in the num’s rental vehicle deciding wheth our standard for described compound question was a sense that it to search is volun er a defendant’s consent guarantee in a manner calculated asked tary: disagree. consent. We consent is A determines whether First, argu contrary to Barnum’s totality cir- voluntary under the ment, only that two offi- the record shows ... must cumstances. The Government occurred ... Amendment violation deciding appeal, that Fourth this we will assume In necessarily Herring, mean that the exclusion- does not exclusionary applies. See rule applies”). ary (noting that a rule ''[t]he at 700 fact 129 S.Ct. 970 Ward,
cers, pres- allegedly Officers Hatler and were swer “no” Officer Hatler’s question ent when Barnum consented “loaded” would have denied con- Guffey presumably Officer did not arrive on the search searches. sent to termi- until after Barnum consented to the scene nated the encounter. Florida v. Bos- Cf. tick, that the mere the searches. We have held 501 U.S. 111 115 S.Ct. (1991) (“[A] being three presence cooper- of “two to officers L.Ed.2d 389 refusal to firearms,” ate, more, armed with holstered the ab- without does not furnish the intimi- objective justification sence of evidence threats or minimal level of seizure.”). dation, negate does not defendant’s con- needed for a detention or Lerie, v. 424 sent. United States Va F.3d (8th Cir.2005); any event, In see also United Barnum’s second con Vera, tention allegedly
States
also fails because the
Cir.2006) (holding
compound question
that a police
pertained
officer’s
to the
vehicle,
presence
mere
search of
“physical
without some
Barnum’s rental
not to
authority”
person.
force or
does not
the search of
show
estab-
After Barnum
person
voluntarily
lish that a reasonable
would not
consented to the search of his
disregard
person,
have felt free to
pipe
officer’s
which revealed a crack
found,
cash,
request).
search
The district court
Officer
placed
Bar
$305
result,
dispute,
and Barnum
not
num
does
“he was
under arrest. As a
threatened, physically
properly
intimidated or Hatler could have
Bar
searched
punished by
vehicle,
consent,
police.”
Because there is num’s rental
without his
showing
no evidence in the record
for further evidence relevant to the drug
Officer Hatler or Officer Ward intimidat-
offense for which Barnum had been arrest
ed, threatened,
Gant,
U.S.-,
way
other
com- ed. See Arizona v.
pelled
1710,-,
Barnum to consent to the
searches
S.Ct.
173 L.Ed2d
vehicle,
(2009)
person
*7,
of his
and his rental
slip op.
we WL
at 10
reject
(concluding
Barnum’s first contention.
that police may
a vehi-
“search
cle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest”
Second, even if we
*7
accept
were to
when “the arrestee is
with-
unsecured and
Barnum’s characterization of Officer Hat
in reaching
passenger
distance of the
com-
request
ler’s
to search Barnum’s rental
partment at the time of the search” or
vehicle, we still would not find that
the
when “it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence
question guaranteed Barnum’s consent.
relevant to the crime of
might
arrest
be
Barnum’s
question theory
“loaded”
”
found in the
(quoting
vehicle’
Thornton v.
premised
single piece
on a
of Officer Hat
States,
United
541
124
U.S.
S.Ct.
testimony concerning
request
ler’s
his
to
(2004)
2127,
(Scalia, J.,
971
action,
Cir.)
(8th
automatically purge
not
the
that the defendant’s sta
does
(noting
”
“adult,
average
apparently
Esquivel,
an
taint of an
detention.’
tus as
finding
Becker,
that his con
intelligence” favored
(quoting
“[A] (2002).6 In preceded by illegal reviewing an L.Ed.2d such an police “which 556 975, Instead, assertion, Contrary to court cor- 6. the dissent's the dis- 976-77. district rectly erroneously finding that a fact con- trict court never "concluded as a concluded probable unnecessary cerning law it whether Officer Hatler had [was] matter that ... stop any findings concerning cause the traffic was unneces- make factual the dis- to enact 974, stop.” post sary puted portions See if Barnum’s 972
implicit finding,7 “uphold purged); we will a district United States v. Palacios-Sua- (8th rez, 770, Cir.1998) (find- court’s on a decision motion to 773 if, despite findings lack of factual on ing period [a] that a nine-minute between the record, ‘any review of the find that [we] start of the violation sug- and the consent view of the supports gested reasonable evidence purged). that the taint was Conse- ” the district court’s decision.’ See quently, the first Brown factor favors the Bloomfield, 910, States v. 913-15 Government. (8th Cir.1994) (en banc) (alterations omit- factor, Under the second Brown ted) (quoting v. Harley, United States presence any circumstances, intervening (D.C.Cir.1993)); F.2d see also recognize intervening that an circum- Cortez-Palomino, United States v. stance between the Fourth Amendment Cir.2006) (per F.3d 912 n. 3 cu- violation and the defendant’s consent indi-
riam) (same).8 cates that the consent was made of the
In considering the first Brown
defendant’s free will and “that the [officer]
factor,
temporal proximity
between the
attempting
was not
exploit
illegal
Fourth Amendment
Grajeda,
violation and the
situation.”
With the officer’s flagrancy purpose competing view and Barnum’s tween this violation, recognize we Fourth fac- theory concerning third Brown fla- or purposeful a officer’s that tor,10 explicit we for an nor must remand a caus- may misconduct demonstrate grant at finding Bloomfield, of fact. See 40 F.3d and the between the violation al connection (holding unnecessary that remand Brown, 603-04, at See 422 U.S. consent. its the district court states where vio- A Fourth Amendment 2254. 95 S.Ct. denying motion to basis under may purposeful flagrant be or lation and a view of the on the record reasonable circumstances, including where the various decision). Thus, supports its evidence design investigatory “was factor favors the third Brown also Govern- hope ‘in the that and executed purpose ment. ” might up.’ turn Herrera- something a of the evi- Gonzalez, Because reasonable view (quoting at 496). Here, fac- a rea demonstrates that the Brown F.3d at dence Simpson, 439 Government, testimony find that view of Officer Hatler’s tors favor we sonable act that he did not court did in its conclu- supports not err initiating the flagrantly by consent to purposefully sion According to allegedly illegal stop. traffic the searches the taint testimony, Officer Hatler initiated Amendment violation. Fourth patrol, stop part as of his routine traffic only the rental doing so after he observed III. CONCLUSION taillight, malfunctioning center
vehicle’s reasons, affirm foregoing For the § Iowa Assum violation of Code 321.387. conviction. then, observation Barnum’s ing, that Officer Hatler’s argues allegedly Hatler acted assumptions concerning that Officer Our 10. 9. neces- stop flagrantly by making are to those an ille- purposefully traffic limited viola- sary establish a Fourth Amendment subsequent stop hope gal traffic Here, Grajeda, at 882. tion. See activity. up illegal turn Bar- search would obser- assume that Hatler's need theory testi- bases his on Officer Hatler’s num taillight concerning the vehicle’s vation rental mony that he knew the Traveler Motel’s objectively to establish unreasonable illegal activity, reputation for that he knew Herrera- Amendment violation. See Fourth parked at rental vehicle had been Barnum's Gonzalez, We need not and Motel, initiated traffic the Traveler that he pur- acted assume that Officer Hatler do not pulled out of stop as soon as rental vehicle flagrantly he knew posefully —that lot, parking Motel and that the Traveler working any im- had or that he the traf- video camera failed to record cruiser initiating proper motive or malicious intent in stop. fic probable cause. See without id. *10 BYE, Judge, Circuit dissenting. we must next if determine the voluntary independent, consent was an lawful cause I dissent majority’s from the cavalier of discovery of the [incriminating evi- usurpation of the authority district court’s (internal quotation dence].” Id. marks to make evidentiary findings on contested omitted). To determine whether the con- issues of fact. Barnum specifically argued sent sufficiently was attenuated from the to the district court that there was no illegal detention, “(1) we consider: probable stop cause for his traffic because temporal proximity of his consent and the taillight his center functioning was proper- (2) prior Fourth violation; Amendment ly, and Officer Hatler knew it was working presence circumstances; of intervening properly yet stopped him anyway in the (3) and purpose and flagrancy of the hope uncovering activity. criminal official misconduct.” United States v. district court concluded as a matter law Becker, (8th Cir.2003). 333 F.3d “[subsequent events demonstrate these, Of purpose “the flagrancy of the in issues this case do depend official misconduct is ‘the important most any way upon factor it directly because tied to the Thus, cause to the vehicle.” the dis- purpose of the exclusionary rule-deterring trict court unnecessary found it to make ” police misconduct.’ United States v. findings factual concerning the disput- Herrera-Gonzalez, 474 portions ed stop. explained As be- (8th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. low, this conclusion of law is incorrect. Simpson, Cir.2006)). Instead correcting the district court’s conclusion, erroneous majority— We have “found purposeful and flagrant apparently recognizing it does in fact mat- (1) conduct where: impropriety ter whether Officer Hatler purposely fabri- official’s misconduct was obvious or the cated a reason for stopping Barnum —de- knew, time, official at the that his conduct that, termines if there was a Fourth likely unconstitutional but engaged in violation, it was because (2) nevertheless; it the misconduct Officer Hatler made a reasonable mistake was investigatory design purpose By so, of fact. doing majority assesses hope executed in the that something record, assumes the district court im- might turn up.” Simpson, 439 F.3d plicitly made a factual finding that it ex- (8th Cir.2006). The majority correctly pressly stated it was not making, and notes that presume we must makes factual determinations that should taillight center was functioning properly. have been by, made solely and are within If we assume the taillight was working, province of, the district court. there are possible two scenarios concern- agree ing
I stop: with majority’s either Officer conclusion mistakenly that Barnum’s concluded voluntary. taillight consent was was mal- Finding functioning, Barnum’s consent was or he in voluntary, fact knew it was however, “is working not the end I inquiry.” properly. agree of our major- with the Esquivel, ity States v. former, if it is the then Officer (8th Cir.2007). “Because Hatler’s unreasonable mistake of fact search, consent to which preceded by “does not constitute type of blatantly action, an illegal police does not automati- flagrant unconstitutional or behavior con- cally purge detention, the taint of demned Brown” Ante 973.11 how, 11. It noting is worth there is no explain evidence to if the functioning *11 Hat- however, aware a “reasonable view of Officer If, upon Hatler was Officer (or Ante at testimony.” ler’s 973. Even functioning properly taillight was the remarkable, the a foot- majority more taillight) look at the bothered to never —in entirely an and le- note—constructs new Barnum, pre- then this is stopping before unsupported rule in that our gally holding flagrant cisely type purposeful the of and assumptions limited to neces- “are those subse- that taints Barnum’s misconduct sary to establish a Fourth Amendment If search. Officer quent consent to such that we “need not and do violation” stopping a reason for simply fabricated pur- not assume that Officer Hatler acted Barnum, his mis- impropriety then the of the posefully flagrantly he knew —that obvious, he would have been conduct working any or had taillight was that he un- have such conduct was would known intent in ini- improper motive malicious Moreover, there would constitutional. tiating stop without fabricating a purpose no for have been majority 9. cause.” Ante at 973 n. The hope stop Barnum other than to reason that, pre- claims when a district court up. turn To rule other- something might a Fourth Amendment violation but sumes fabricate police would allow officers to wise make any findings concerning fails to the long for so as stopping reasons motorists violation, nature of the this the Court—if suspects the the officers inform surrounding the are in specifics complete the is purpose stop fabricated of simply fact relevant—-will the least assume police If obtaining their consent. before culpable possible violating conduct the they stop motorists reasons officers constitution. false, be then officers are know to those majority relying If the state- on our they in to be un- engaging conduct know Bloomfield, ment in United States v. disregard a blatant constitutional. Such Cir.1994) (en banc), any subsequent taints rights constitutional express we will affirm in the absence of may the receive. search officers long “any so as findings factual reasonable Therefore, incorrectly court the district supports the district view of evidence as a matter law concluded decision,” subsequent court’s our cases stop immaterial circumstances of the were rejected majority’s application have suppress. To the to Barnum’s motion principle present this to the case. stop contrary, the circumstances of general- enunciated principle Bloomfield ruling on motion to were critical to ly applies correctly when a district court legal suppress. correcting Instead of articulates the law reaches result error, further recognizing need for factual are im- findings such that certain fact, findings remanding to the dis- plicit holding.12 in the lower court’s For court, majority engages correctly its example, trict when the district court govern- principle of the evidence based articulates that the own assessment findings could factual from which properly, Officer Hatler have mistaken- did make during twenty ly was broke concluded it presume any portion we can the court found following directly he was seconds which testimony credible. of Officer’s Hatler’s to be vehicle. behind Barnum's entirely possible the It is court found false, testimony denied Hatler’s to be but still Notably, the district court in Bloomfield the motion on its determination that based findings some in favor of made factual irrelevant; the circumstances of were government testi- based on officer’s explained, interpreta- previously as such mony, which indicated court treated wrong. of the law would be tion Bloomfield, testimony officer's as credible. case, this 915. In *12 is the District rather than of ing suppress motion to existence of Court the Court cause, and denies the motion to probable Appeals Murray to determine the facts.” making factual suppress findings, States, without v. United 487 U.S. implicit- can conclude the district court (1988). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 472 cause, and ly probable found we need not Because the was district court’s result express findings long remand for factual so premised an solely legal on erroneous con- any of as reasonable view the evidence clusion, not we should scour an undevel- finding probable of cause. supports oped any for the record reasonable view of If, however, the district court reaches an support evidence to the district court’s re- legal that it erroneous conclusion believes sult. is meant to apply when Bloomfield the need relevant factual obviates for de- “the a finding apparent trial court omits on terminations, correct legal we must the record, when, any the face of the under proceedings. error remand for further record, possible view of the cases, explicit In such the of an “absence court could reached but one have result.” finding precludes factual ... us from re- Bloomfield, 40 at 914 (quoting F.3d solving juncture.” appeal the at this Unit- Williams, v. States 1290-91 Khabeer, States ed 483 (D.C.Cir.1991)). Had the district court Cir.2005). majority The avoids this correctly that recognized Barnum’s motion by logic stating simply “reviewing it is the suppress granted to be should if Officer to record determine whether the district initiating a reason fabricated legal court’s conclusion-that Barnum’s con- stop, denied to but his motion purged any alleged sent the taint making any without con- findings supported Fourth Amendment violation-is cerning stop, then we presume could any by reasonable of the view evidence.” the court implicitly determined the facts (internal quotation Ante at 972 n. 8 marks government. favor of the omitted). citation The majority, how- case, however, In this the district court’s ever, makes no mention of the district legal precludes erroneous conclusion appli- preceding legal court’s conclusion that cation of requires a re- “[sjubsequent events demonstrate that the Bloomfield mand to logic the district court. It defies depend issues this case not in any do for the to majority assume the district way upon finding probable cause to court implicitly specific made a discussed, factual vehicle.” As this le- finding concerning Officer Hatler’s gal conclusion obser- majority is incorrect. The vations when district expressly ignores this statement erroneous law, legal stated' —because of incorrect con- presumes instead that un- clusion—that it not necessary making any made find- findings factual —those ings in regard. district court that It is to expressly thing stated it one making apply to implicitly not facts the court must determined —were Bloomfield so, made, government. doing implicitly favor of the In have it thing is another majority to Supreme entirely apply fails heed the Court’s to facts the Bloomfield admonition “it is the function of court expressly declined make. While majority simply this statement purged claims whether consent Barnum’s the taint of correctly dependent upon finding means district court concluded cause; probable probable cause was unneces- if Officer Flatler knew sary cause, purged if Barnum's taint of there was no then Barnum’s Fourth Amendment violation. Ante at consent could have constitu- course, ignores n. 6. Of this the fact that tional violation. findings pre- own factual relevant so a convenient method doing tending suppress, district court’s erroneous motion which can then *13 outcome, no on the had effect for error. conclusion review clear rigorous no for is substitute convenience with disagree majority’s I also the as- just analysis and result. temporal proximity sessment of the factor. Moreover, the majority, assessing the majority gave states that Barnum his evidence, incorrectly the- implies Barnum’s fifteen minutes consent search twelve to the record. ory support lacks allegedly the traffic In stop. after reflecting records maintenance presented so, doing majority calculating the the is taillight reported with the problems no when first time between Officer Hatler stop either after before traffic and when Barnum stop initiated the addition, the employees of question. In recognize, fails to gave consent. This prac- testified it is common service center however, that, stop if the un- was and note taillight the tice check constitutional, Fourth then the Amend- the necessary repairs on malfunction or the ment violation continued until non-con- Further- for that vehicle. service records ended, portion of the encounter sensual more, already come Officer Hatler had i.e., when Officer Hatler returned Bar- in the lot parking vehicle across Barnum’s paperwork num’s informed him that frequent site of of a hotel known as the If purpose stop complete. was activity, thereby increasing criminal assessing we are taint of the Fourth Barnum in the stopping for motivation violation, logic dictates that In uncovering activity. hope of criminal period should consider the time be- contrast, taillight evidence the Fourth Amendment viola- tween when time malfunctioning at the of the was ends when tion to search testimony. light In Hatler’s was Officer otherwise, By concluding given. courts evidence, the court could con- this district prolonging for reward officers unconstitu- working at taillight properly clude the Therefore, in assessing tional conduct. stop. If it determines the time temporal proximity between the working properly, light was con- Fourth Amendment violation conclude Officer Hatler court could also search, I sent believe should consid- malfunc- taillight never believed period from the er time end directly tioning. Officer Hatler followed violation, begin- not constitutional twenty sec- behind Barnum’s vehicle ning.14 onds, it is hard to see how Officer mistakenly have believed Hatler could I Accordingly, dissent. working properly. While majority may have such faith in the sanctity officers to find such law, I impossible as a matter of
scenario district court should resolve
believe the It our factual issue. is not
this contested interpre-
responsibility to determine which is more
tation of the evidence reasonable.
Rather, make its the district court should unsound, illogical, and should be reconsid- precedent other-
14. To the extent our states wise, a rule is ered. I believe such ante