221 F. 140 | E.D. Pa. | 1915
The indictment contains six counts under section 32 of the Criminal Code of March 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1088). At least two separate and distinct offenses are prohibited under the statute: (1) With intent to defraud any person, falsely assuming or pretending to be an officer or employé acting under the authority of the United States, and taking upon himself to act as such. (2) With intent to defraud any person, falsely assuming or pro-tending to be an officer or employé acting under the authority of the United States, and in such pretended character demanding or obtaining from any person any money or other' valuable thing. United States v. Taylor (D. C.) 108 Fed. 621; United States v. Farnham (D. C.) 127 Fed. 478.
The odd-numbered counts, 1, 3 and 5, are based upon the first, and the even-numbered counts, 2, 4 and 6, are based upon the second, of the above-named offenses. Beginning with the first and second, each pair of counts charges the respective offenses on different dates and with intent to defraud different persons. The odd-numbered counts charge that the defendant, with intent to defraud a certain person ..named, did falsely pretend to be an employe of the United States acting under the authority of the United States, to wit, an agent employed by the government to sell a certain set of books entitled “Messages and Papers of Presidents,” arid did then and there take upon himself to act as such agent, in this: That he then and there visited the person named and falsely pretended to him that he was such an employ é of the United States employed as aforesaid for the purpose aforesaid, contrary, etc.
False personation is the offense of falsely representing some other person and acting in the character thus unlawfully assumed in order to deceive others and thereby gain some profit or advantage. And under the construction of the act adopted in the Dittell Case and in
That Congress did not intend to broaden the scope of the act by extending it beyond the false personation of its officers or employés is apparent from an examination of its language. If the acts charged in the indictment were intended to be included, Congress could have used apt language to make it an offense to falsely assume or pretend to be employed in some pretended capacity and to pretend to be acting under pretended authority of the United States. As the offense is expressed in the act, it is directed against the false assumption or pretense to be one who is actually an officer or employé acting under the authority of the United States, and I think this is borne out by the following language:
“And shall take upon himself to act as such or shall in such pretended character demand or obtain,” etc.
It is apparent, therefore, that Congress intended to punish false impersonation of its officers or employés, and did not intend to include within federal offenses any mean and petty artifice used by salesmen, consisting merely of a false representation as to some supposititious employment by the government. The same reasoning applies to the charge in the even-numbered counts.
The demurrer to the indictment is sustained. '