*1 may not be deemed to have objec- waived their venue we held, tions. As have their In- co-defendant, Highway Underwriters, surance may not regarded be as a resident of the Eastern District of Louisiana in which suit was brought. follows, It therefore, that respondents’ objec- tions venue well taken, were that, sustaining objections, those District Court and the Circuit Court Appeals reached a result accord with the require- ments of the federal venue statutes as con- consistently strued by this Court. If requirements those are to be is a altered, task which be must undertaken Congress.
Affirmed. UNITED STATES v. BALTIMORE & OHIO et al.
RAILROAD CO. et al. Argued 3-4, February No. 223. 1948 . Decided March *2 for the argued the cause Bernays Wiener Frederick Commission, Interstate Commerce and the United States brief Solicitor General him the were appellants. With on Sonnett, Attorney Edward Perlman, General Assistant Reidy. M. Dumbauld, W. Knowlton and Edward Daniel Staley on P. submitted N. Strack John William appellant. & Co., brief for Swift Baltimore & argued the cause for the R. Pierce Robert al., appellees. With him on the Co. et Ohio Railroad P. McLean, Day, George Leo P. H. were Harold H. brief R. Pierson, and Francis John A. Duncan Lacey, Willis T. Cross. for the Cleveland the cause
Ashley argued Sellers him on the brief Co., appellee. With Stock Yards Union McFarland. Farmer and Carl Matthew S. were Mr. Justice Black opinion delivered the of the Court. This case is properly appeal, here on S.U. C. 345, from a district court decree enjoining enforcement of a cease and desist order of the Interstate Commerce Supp. Commission. F. enjoined 499. The order required the five appellees1 to abstain from re- fusing to deliver interstate of livestock to the sidetrack of Swift Company’s & packing plant at Cleve- land, Ohio, and to establish tariffs for such deliveries. sidetrack has one with a connection railroad. That connection with the main line the New York by way a spur track, “Spur known as 245,” operated by that railroad. One end spur of this *3 the New York Central connects with its main line; spur, other end of the also by railroad, owned connects with Swift’s sidetrack and private with other sidetracks. A segment 1619-foot middle of the spur, known as 1619,” “Track by the Cleveland Union Stock Company. Yards Under the terms of a trackage agree- Yards, ment with Stock New York Central uses Track 1619 for deliveries to Swift’s sidetrack and private other sidetracks Spur connected with No. 245. Thus all inter- state railroad to Swift’s and siding to others similarly located can be made over the segment by of track owned Stock Yards. Because of its interest 1619, in Track Stock Yards was made a party to the proceedings before the Commission and was included in its and cease desist order along with the railroads.2 appellees The railroad are Company, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, Wheeling the Erie Railroad & Lake Erie Railroad Company, Company, the New York Central Railroad and the Penn sylvania Company. Railroad 2Appellees argue improperly party Stock Yards was made a power and that the Commission was without to include Stock Yards in its Act, cease and desist order. think We the Elkins §2 1619, de- own Track Yards continues to long
So Stock York Central freight by New of livestock and other livery upon depends similarly located to Swift others grant will to what extent Stock whether and operate over right a New York Central granted question present case involves Track 1619. This Central, York New railroads, particularly whether Track 1619 to making in of livestock over deliveries comply sidetrack must with certain conditions with by present agreement Yards in imposed its York Central. in Stock Yards’ 1619 was constructed 1899 on prede- and New Central’s property Stock Yards agree- contemporaneous A written cessor interest. rail- by the 60-days’ on written notice ment, cancellable railroad the track for road, gave the railroad provided did interfere with purposes, the use not with the negotiations after Yards’ business. railroad ex- sidetrack, its railroad, Swift built its No. 245 a track which connected Track tended siding. trackage The 1899 written 1619 with Swift’s one superseded This was another agreement 30-days’ notice. party on written either cancellable provided It maintain the should granted to the railroad “the expense, at own *4 por- any of and all tracks or uninterrupted free and Industry to the and located on belonging tions thereof its siding From 1910, constructed, land.” when Swift’s was 848, 42, justified the action and find 49 U. S. C. Commission’s Stat. by interpretation restrict no merit to the contention we should parties language authorizing inclusion of “all broad section’s rate, regulation, practice persons or interested or affected the court, which the Commission or a and under consideration” may such provides that be made with reference to additional decrees though they were carriers. parties the extent as to same
173 to 1924, and for thereafter, the con- many years tinued to deliver all kinds of to Swift and commodities to packers other way served only by likewise No. 245 and Track 1619. early the 1930’s Stock Yards concluded that it was
losing patronage and delivery fees because of of livestock to Swift A at siding. large part of Yards’ Stock income from comes it charges fees for and deliv- unloading ering interstate to pens livestock within its yard. Stock carried over Track to siding 1619 private and to sidings other are sidings; unloaded at those as a result Stock if it would loses fees receive consigned livestock to Swift and to other packers were at unloaded a Stock Yards. With view toward col- lecting unloading fees from Swift packers and other served by Spur with negotiations Yards'instituted Central which in 1935 resulted in a modifi- cation of their 1924 agreement. old 1924 agreement The had unconditionally “Railroad, granted (a) the free uninterrupted use of and all . . . .” any The granted modified agreement also New York Central “the uninterrupted tracks, free use” of Stock Yards’ but “except competitive added charge traffic for which subject use shall a separate agreement.” be After this restrictive modification Stock Yards de- adopt manded that the railroad one of two with courses regard livestock, parties agreed to which the was “competitive agreement designed traffic” the modified suppress. stop The railroad must either live- carrying packers stock over Track Swift and pay 1619 to other Yards, for use Track in carrying livestock an packers, equivalent these amount to fees Stock Yards consigned would have collected had the livestock them been yard. unloaded delivered This amount was considered exorbitant New York Central *5 174 performed New York Central for whom
other railroads pay to they therefore refused it. charges, and switching delivering- that in 1938 the railroads ceased The result was packers of served sidings Swift and other livestock to the agreement they have under by Spur 245,3 although spur delivery for to use the Yards continued with Stock commodity shipments to these sid- of all other kinds deliver livestock railroads Swift demanded ings. Inter- complaint a with the 1941 filed siding, to its make upon refusal to Commission their state Commerce deliveries. concluded hearing the Commission
After notice vio- carry livestock to Swift railroad’s refusal to that the Act. provisions of the Interstate Commerce several lated (1) discrimi- violate because § It was found to and because commodity, livestock, against single nation the side- of livestock to York Central’s deliveries New sid- nearby competitors, whose of some of Swift’s 1619, subjected using without were served ings competitors an prejudice gave those Swift to undue that the The Commission also found preference. undue awas under the circumstances shown failure to deliver practices (6)1 forbids unreasonable which § violation delivering freight, and method of affecting the manner (9) requires which railroads and also a violation of side tracks operate private to switch connections with carloads of ceased to switch livestock In 1938 New siding, it canceled No. 245 to Swift’s carriers over other specific no Since that time there been its tariffs for this service. siding authority when for movement of livestock to tariff New York Central. over lines other than the shipped to Cleveland its tariff livestock Although has never canceled York Central origin siding points on its from Swift’s Cleveland siding consigned lines, to Swift’s has delivered all livestock own charges pay has been forced to since 1938. Swift yards. unloaded at possession of livestock Yards to obtain
175 as Com- without discrimination under such conditions the found to exist here. mission findings challenged.
The Commission’s of fact are not There be no doubt those facts found would consti- can that if 245 tute a violation of the sections referred to by Ownership of Track wholly were the railroad. objection 1619 Stock Yards and its to livestock deliv- is, fact, reason railroads’ suggested eries the the they as failure to deliver of livestock to Swift provide failure to neighboring packers, do to for their shipments. for livestock From switching connections question what been said is this: Can the non- has our owner of a of railroad track who contracts segment carrier segment part for an railroad’s use of the as interstate regulate type of its line reserve a of commodi- transport segment, may ties that the railroad over a reservation be invalid under the Interstate would such Act? Commerce Act of the most com
The Interstate Commerce is one prehensive regulatory plans Congress ever Act, it, The first and all amendments to undertaken. types, all wiping aimed at out discriminations of have States, 284, 296, v. lan New York United 331 U. S. accomplish scope of the broadest has been used to guage purposes Pennsyl all of the Act. United States v. Co., strange R. U. S. It would be vania open whereby left a legislation way had this carriers could merely by entering in discriminations into con engage the use of this Court has trackage. tracts for fact prevent purpose Congress long recognized practices types prejudicial certain discriminations by contracts, though be frustrated even the con could not legislation. were executed before enactment tracts Schubert, 224 R. v. Philadelphia, Balt. & Wash. Co. See R. Co. v. Mott 603, 613-614; Louisville & Nashville U. S. ley, 467, 483, 219 U. 485-86. S. Commerce provisions think the of the Interstate
We this empowered to enter plainly Act Commission despite discriminatory practices found, against order (1)1 Yards. of Track 1619 Section ownership Act applicable Commerce (a) makes the Interstate (a) (3) railroad.” common Section “wholly carriers “all including the road term “railroad” defines the whether operating railroad, common any carrier *7 lease, a contract, agreement, under or operated owned or of spurs, . . . .” As one switches, also all intend many Congress the other indications that did not had provisions depend its to who regulatory railroad on (a) transportation (3) legal instrumentalities, § to title in that word as used provides “transportation” also the . all the include . . broadly Act “locomotives shall carriage, shipment and facilities of or instrumentalities express or irrespective ownership any contract, of or of true, appel- . . It as implied, for the thereof . .” is use 1 (3) the argue, language (a) lees that above of is defini- Comm’n, 237 tional Ellis v. only. Interstate Commerce by But it U. S. 434. is also true that these definitions trackage by “in unambiguous language their all make any subject regulatory provisions to common carrier” only Act, though by of the even not the carrier but by used Thus agreement. under contract by Yards, subject to the though owned under Act of its use the New because trackage agreements. prejudicial
It to just shippers public portion a railroad that uses a of track under lease or discriminate as it is contract to for the discrimination its to be inflicted a railroad that owns entire track. dis- justify to Practically only argument suggested criminatory practices under the here is that circumstances subject a right an has to let others use his land owner to whatsoever impose. conditions owner to chooses It is argued even to construe that the Interstate Com- merce as limiting right Act would result in depriving an owner his property process of without due law. Prop- But no broad generalization accepted. such can be erty can be used even its in owner accordance law, with its places conditions owner on its use subject another are to like Of limitations. course it does not an deprive owner his property process without due deny of law him upon enforce conditions power use which with Congress conflict to regulate railroads so as to equality secure of treatment of those whom railroads serve. Congress
Here under its constitutional authority provided that no shall types engage certain of discriminatory provisions conduct violation of three of the The Act. Commission found discriminatory conduct here. The excuse offered by the railroads is that the owner required of Track 1619 prohib- them do the ited things. Congress But the against command dis- *8 crimination cannot be subordinated command of a track owner that a railroad using practice the track discrimination. that
We hold the Commission’s order authorized deprive statute and that it does not Yards its property process without due of law. so we doing pass upon any do not questions relation to the dedi- cation 1619 to railroad Neither we use. do are decide what rights the relative financial of Stock Yards and New York Central under their nor contracts, whether cancel can the contract with New Central, York nor duty what would be attempt should Stock Yards to terminate its to use Track 1619. onlyWe hold Stock Yards’ own- ership power compel of Track does not vest it with violates way in a which operate
the railroads Act. Interstate Commerce enforced. and should be order valid
The Commission’s Reversed. Burton, dissenting. Mr. Justice the District opinion of in the For the reasons stated that the order 499,1 believe case, Supp. Court this F. exceeded Commerce Commission Interstate enjoining permanently judgment jurisdiction and should have been order of such the enforcement affirmed. GENERAL, READ v.
DONALDSON, POSTMASTER MAGAZINE, INC. et al. January Reargued 5, 24, 1948. Argued 1947.
No. 50. October March Decided