Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge MOTZ and Judge GOODWIN joined.
OPINION
Van Cleve Ashley was indicted on three federal charges in connection with his efforts to have a government informant and witness murdered. A jury convicted him on all three counts and he now appeals from two of those convictions. Because each of Ashley’s claims on appeal is without merit, we affirm his convictions.
I.
Ashley’s convictions arise out of the attempted murder of one Thomas Dixon, a drug dealer turned government informant. Ashley’s role was essentially that of a broker, orchestrating a deal between Frank Caruso, a drug dealer whose arrest Dixon had facilitated, and Ramaine “Ra-Ra” York, who was hired to kill Dixon.
The story begins on November 14, 2000, with the arrest of Dixon by members of a federal drug task force working in the Baltimore area. Dixon was carrying more than a million dollars’ worth of ecstasy pills. Faced with serious penalties, he immediately agreed to cooperate with federal investigators. The very day of his arrest, Dixon let the government record telephone conversations between him and Caruso, his supplier. Caruso later testified that he came to suspect Dixon was working with investigators during the calls and that his suspicions were confirmed the next day when he learned of Dixon’s arrest. His intuitions notwithstanding, Caruso was arrested on federal drug charges in June 2001.
*138 Caruso thereafter hired an attorney who, as it happened, also represented Ashley. Caruso would later testify that he met Ashley for the first time at their attorney’s office when Ashley overheard Caruso complaining about Dixon. Ashley approached Caruso, saying that he might know someone with connections to Dixon. Caruso responded that he “would love to be able to discredit, you know, dismantle a witness against me. He’s out there selling drugs and living a normal life.” Ashley reiterated that he might know someone who could help. Following this initial encounter, Caruso and Ashley had several subsequent discussions and became, as Caruso put it, “friendly.”
At some point during a meeting at their attorney’s office, Caruso provided Ashley the file kept on his case. It is unclear whether this occurred before or after Caruso had received discovery from the government, which definitively revealed Dixon’s role in bringing about his arrest. Caruso also gave Ashley a picture of Dixon, directions to Dixon’s home, and a Glock 9mm semiautomatic handgun. In early 2002, Ashley met with York, a longtime associate, telling him that Caruso “had a problem down in Baltimore.” On February 24, 2002, York travelled to Baltimore, found Dixon in front of his home, and shot him about six times. Dixon was hospitalized for several months and underwent more than sixty operations but miraculously survived the attack, albeit with permanently debilitating injuries. For these efforts, Caruso paid Ashley $10,000, half of which Ashley passed on to York.
The scheme eventually came to light, and Caruso was charged with retaliating against a federal informant under 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1), while York was charged with conspiracy to retaliate. Both pled guilty. In January 2006, a federal grand jury indicted Ashley on three counts. Count One charged Ashley with conspiring to kill a witness in order to prevent his attendance in court proceedings, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(1)(A) and (k). Count Two charged Ashley with conspiring to kill an informant in retaliation for providing information to a law enforcement officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513(a)(1)(B) and (e). Count Three charged Ashley with the firearms offense set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Ashley was convicted on all three counts. He does not appeal his witness tampering conviction, but he does appeal his conviction on the retaliation and firearms charges, claiming insufficient evidence on Count Two and a constructive amendment of the indictment on Count Three.
II.
We begin with Ashley’s sufficiency of the evidence claim on Count Two. His task here is a daunting one. In assessing a sufficiency challenge, a reviewing court must uphold a jury’s verdict “if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it.”
United States v. Burgos,
Count Two charged Ashley with conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B), which punishes anyone who “kills or attempts to kill another person with intent to retaliate against any person for ... providing to a law enforcement officer any information relating to the commission ... of a Federal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B). The term “law enforcement officer” refers to federal officers. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(4). Ashley argues that the government failed to produce evidence that he had the requisite state of mind to sustain a conviction under the provision.
See United States v. Feola,
Ashley makes much of the fact that the government failed to establish whether Caruso had already received discovery from the government at the time he gave Ashley his case file. But this is a red herring. There was ample evidence that Caruso knew Dixon had provided information to federal agents even before discovery took place. Caruso testified that he “had a very good feeling” that Dixon had been cooperating within a day of Dixon’s having been arrested. According to Caruso, after Dixon’s arrest “there were several phone calls made to me from Tom Dixon from a, I guess it would be, an FBI phone, and he tried to draw me out to say certain things on the phone.”
This statement would have allowed the jury to conclude not only that Caruso suspected Dixon was cooperating but that Caruso suspected he was cooperating in a federal investigation, especially since Caruso was later arrested on federal charges. Nor was there anything unreasonable in inferring that Caruso’s file, assembled in connection with his upcoming federal prosecution, reflected his view of the sources and origins of his predicament, including its federal aspects. We also reject Ashley’s claim that the government was required to offer direct evidence that Ashley read the file. It seems entirely reasonable to suppose that he was given the file so that he could read it and that he naturally did so. After all, Ashley was provided the case file after he had volunteered to Caruso that he could help.
If the case file weren’t enough, these inferences find support from other evidence in the record. Both Caruso and York testified that they had pled guilty to federal retaliation charges. Since Ashley was the link between them, the jury could reason that he shared their state of mind. Caruso told Ashley he wanted to “dismantle a witness against me. He’s out there selling drugs and living a normal life.” A jury could infer that Caruso was upset that Dixon was “leading a normal life” because Dixon had traded information in exchange for his liberty. Caruso also testified that he had not one, but a number of conversations with Ashley about the matter and that “we became friendly,” making it all the more likely Ashley understood exactly what the planned assassination of Dixon was all about. Moreover, Caruso did not *140 give Ashley a picture of Dixon, directions to his home, and a semiautomatic handgun in order to foster amicable relations between the two. As Caruso testified, he gave Ashley the gun “[t]o do whatever he had to do to help me with my case.”
We note too that the district court clearly pointed out the difference between tampering with witnesses and retaliation against informants in its instructions to the jury, telling it that “in the one case, the allegation is the intent of the conspiracy was to prevent testimony,” while in the other, “the intent of the conspiracy is to retaliate for having provided information.” The district court also drew attention to the federal dimension of the charge, instructing the jury that to find Ashley guilty, it must determine that Ashley acted “with specific intent to retaliate against Mr. Dixon for providing to law enforcement officers information about the criminal activities of Fred Caruso in the case of U.S. v. Fred Caruso,” which it had described a moment earlier as “an official federal proceeding.”
We are mindful that retaliation against informants and witness tampering are distinct offenses. While the difference between them should not be blurred, the two offenses are often related. Providing information and serving as a witness often go hand-in-hand, and the proof used to support a conviction on one offense will frequently underlie a conviction on another, notwithstanding the differences between the two statutes. In
United States v. Brown,
In short, the evidence here satisfied constitutional requirements. Ashley’s argument seems premised on the view that juries cannot draw reasonable inferences, but that is precisely what juries are empanelled to do. Though a jury may not convict on the basis of “rank speculation,” it is entitled to deduce and to infer.
Goldsmith v. Witkowski,
Here the “fabric of the evidence” supports the jury’s decision. Given the contacts between Caruso and Ashley, it seems entirely reasonable to posit that Ashley knew exactly what Caruso was willing to pay for and precisely what Caruso wanted done. Retaliation against informants, like witness tampering, strikes at the heart of our criminal justice system. It not only disrupts the peace of the community but threatens the very instruments by which that peace is maintained. Direct evidence of retaliatory intent is “usually unavailable” to prosecuting attorneys.
Id.
But “[i]n a case of witness retaliation, the government need not adduce direct evidence of Appellant’s knowledge of a witness’s informant status in order for the jury to infer his intent to retaliate.”
Brown,
III.
We turn now to Ashley’s contention that the grand jury’s charge on Count Three, which charged Ashley with violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), was constructively amended. 2 The indictment alleged that Ashley:
during and in relation to crimes of violence for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, to wit: Conspiracy to Tamper With A Witness and Conspiracy To Retaliate Against A Witness, as set forth in Counts One and Two of this Indictment, which are incorporated herein by reference, did knowingly possess and discharge a firearm in furtherance of said crimes of violence.
It also cited 18 U.S.C. § 2, which provides generally for aiding and abetting liability.
In instructing the jury on Count Three, the district court omitted any reference to the indictment’s “during and in relation to” language, telling the jury it could convict Ashley for “possessing a firearm in furtherance of’ a crime of violence, which meant having “held a pistol and intentionally shot” Dixon “to carry out the objectives” of the crimes charged in the other counts of the indictment. It also instructed that if York violated Section 924(c), the jury could convict Ashley of that offense either under an aiding and abetting theory or under the doctrine of vicarious co-conspirator liability established in
Pinkerton v. United States,
A.
Ashley first argues that his indictment was constructively amended when, in describing Count Three to the jury, the district court and the government omitted the indictment’s “during and in relation to” language. “When the government, through its presentation of evidence or its argument, or the district court, through its instructions to the jury, or both, broadens the bases for conviction beyond those charged in the indictment, a constructive amendment — sometimes referred to as a fatal variance — occurs.”
United States v. Malloy,
As Ashley acknowledges, Section 924(c) has two separate prongs: a defendant can be convicted if he “uses or carries” a firearm “during and in relation to” a crime of violence or if he “possesses” a firearm “in furtherance of’ a crime of violence. Either one is sufficient to allow a conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Since “during and in relation to” is not an element of the
*142
“possesses” version of the offense with which Ashley was charged, it was simply surplusage and could be omitted by the district court in its instructions.
See Malloy,
Ashley argues, however, that presence of the word “discharge” in the indictment indicates he was charged with violating the “uses-or-carries” version of the offense as well as the “possesses” version. It seems more likely, however, that the indictment was simply referring to the enhanced sentence provided under the statute in cases where a firearm is “discharged.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). At any rate, Ashley’s claim would fail even if he were correct that the indictment charged both versions of Section 924(c). “Where an indictment charges several offenses, or the commission of one offense in several ways, the withdrawal from the jury’s consideration of one offense or one alleged method of committing it does not constitute a forbidden amendment of the indictment.”
United States v. Miller,
Ashley’s argument is evidently based on the idea that leaving out the “during and. in relation to” language “broaden[ed]” the bases upon which the jury could convict him,
Malloy,
Nor can we perceive any problem of fair notice. The distinction between “during and in relation to” and “in furtherance of’ is “a subtle one,” to say the least. H.R.Rep. No. 105-344, at 11 (1997);
see also United States v. Avery,
B.
Ashley also objects to the jury’s being told it could find Ashley guilty on Count Three not only if he aided and abetted York’s violation of Section 924(c), but also by virtue of the doctrine of vicarious liability set forth in
Pinkerton v. United States,
It is settled that vicarious liability predicated on having aided or abetted the crimes of another need not be charged in an indictment.
See United States v. Wills,
These same principles hold true in the ease of vicarious coconspirator liability. The
Pinkerton
doctrine is distinct from the substantive offense of conspiracy, which makes the very act of conspiring criminal.
See
18 U.S.C. § 371. Instead, the
Pinkerton
doctrine is a means of apportioning criminal responsibility for the commission of substantive offenses.
Pinkerton,
Since the same reasons that make it unnecessary to charge aiding and abetting liability in an indictment underlie vicarious co-conspirator liability, we hold that a district court does not constructively amend an indictment by giving a
Pinkerton
instruction when
Pinkerton
liability has not been charged by the grand jury. This has been the unanimous view of the circuit courts which have addressed this issue.
See United States v. Zackery,
Nor was this instruction in any way prejudicial. Ashley argues that, since conspiracy liability was explicitly set forth in the other counts of his indictment, the
*144
government was obliged to charge it in Count Three. This is backwards at best. The very fact that Counts One and Two charged Ashley with conspiracy offenses should have made it the more obvious that co-conspirator liability was a possibility, especially when the conspiracy charges served as the predicate offenses in Count Three and were incorporated by reference. Certainly there could be no danger of unfair surprise.
Malloy,
TV.
For the foregoing reasons, we reject each of Ashley’s claims. The judgment is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. We shall assume for purposes of argument that Ashley is correct that Section 1513 requires that a defendant know that the officer with whom an informant is communicating is a federal one.
See United States v. Denham,
. Section 924(c) punishes “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). It includes a minimum sentence of five years, which increases to ten years “if the firearm is discharged.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(l)(A)(i), (iii).