Arend Mathijssen pled guilty to the distribution of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1). At sentencing, the district court 1 applied an enhancement for the possession of a dangerous weapon and found that Mathijssen qualified as a career offender. United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § § 2Dl.l(b)(l) and 4B1.1 (2002). The district court also applied a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and sentenced Mathijssen to 188 months in prison, five years of supervised release, and the mandatory special assessment of $100. On appeal, Mathijssen argues that the knife he was carrying was not a dangerous weapon and that his prior convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence. We affirm.
I.
Mathijssen was arrested on May 8, 2003, after he completed a previously arranged purchase of methamphetamine with a confidential informant. He sold a bag containing 222.5 grams of methamphetamine to the informant and carried another bag containing 225.5 grams in his car. At the time of his arrest, officers found in Ma-thijssen’s glove a knife having a one-and-a-half inch blade. 2
In accordance with Mathijssen’s plea agreement, the probation office issued a subsequently revised presentence investigation report (PSR). After conducting an evidentiary hearing regarding the defendant’s objections to the enhancements recommended by the PSR, the district court adopted the factual findings in the PSR and applied both the enhancements and the downward departure for acceptance of responsibility. After finding a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category VI, resulting in a sentencing range of 188-235 months, the district court sentenced Mathijssen to 188 months.
*498 II.
Mathijssen makes two arguments in contesting his sentence: (1) that the district court should not have enhanced his sentence for possession of a dangerous weapon because the knife found in his possession was small, dull, and incapable of inflicting serious injury; and (2) that the district court improperly characterized him as a career offender and thus erroneously increased his sentence on that basis.
We review the application of the sentencing guidelines
de novo
and review the district court’s factual findings for clear error.
United States v. Sun Bear,
We conclude that the unreasonableness standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Booker
applies only to the district court’s determination of the appropriate ultimate sentence to impose based on all the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), not to the district court’s interpretation of the meaning and applicability of the guidelines themselves.
See
18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) (un-excised portion of section 3742 stating that courts of appeals “shall remand” for resentencing if “the sentence was imposed in violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines”);
see also United States v. Villegas,
The district court applied U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, finding that the knife that Mathijssen possessed during the drug *499 offense was a dangerous weapon. 4 The guidelines define a “dangerous weapon” as:
(i) an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) an object that is not an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury but (I) closely resembles such an instrument; or (II) the defendant used the object in a manner that created the impression that the object was such an instrument.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, application note 1(D). A knife is a dangerous weapon when used in connection with criminal conduct.
See, e.g., United States v. Scott,
The district court also properly applied the guidelines when it increased Ma-thijssen’s sentence based on its finding that he was a career offender. His prior felonies fall within the definition of crimes of violence under the sentencing guidelines. The guidelines indicate that a defendant is a career offender and should receive a higher offense level if he is over 18 years of age and both the instant offense and at least two prior offenses for which he was convicted are either felony crimes of violence or felony controlled substance offenses. U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.l(a);
see also Sun Bear,
... any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that -
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).
Mathijssen’s criminal history involves numerous convictions, including two felonies under California law for burglary in 1989 and carjacking in 1994. The district court correctly applied the career offender enhancement based on these convictions. Mathijssen argues that his burglary conviction did not involve a dwelling because he broke into detached garages at an apartment building complex. Our precedent makes clear, however, that burglary is categorically a crime of violence, whether or not it involved intent to harm or actual harm to individuals.
See United States v. Reynolds,
*500 The California crime of carjacking also qualifies as a crime of violence, as defined in the sentencing guidelines, as a matter of law, based on its statutory elements. California law defines carjacking, punishable by imprisonment for three, five or nine years, as:
the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, ... against his or her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means of force or fear.
CaLPenal Code § 215(a) (emphasis added). We have expressly stated that the federal offense of carjacking, involving the taking of a vehicle “from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation,” 18 U.S.C. § 2119, “is a crime of violence” within the meaning of the term in 18 U.S.C. § 924.
United States v. Jones,
The sentence is affirmed.
Notes
. The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.
. Prior to the arrest, the confidential informant advised the officers that he had observed a small knife in Mathijssen’s coat sleeve during an earlier interaction.
. If we were to reach the question of unreasonableness, however, we would nevertheless affirm Mathijssen's sentence as not unreasonable.
. Mathijssen has raised on appeal solely the question of whether the district court properly found that the sentencing guidelines definition of “dangerous weapon” applied to his knife, and has not raised any constitutional issues related to whether the district court found facts not established by the plea of guilty that increased his sentence.
See Booker,