Case Information
*2 Before: REINHARDT, KOZINSKI, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Antonio Ambrosio-Rubira appeals the sentence imposed after he pled guilty to one count of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The district court determined that Ambrosio-Rubira’s prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon in violation of California Penal Code § 245 qualified as a “crime of violence” within the meaning of United States Sentencing Guideline § 2L1.2 and therefore applied a 12-level upward adjustment. After calculating the Guidelines range as 30 to 37 months, the district court sentenced Ambrosio-Rubira to 30 months. Because the illegal reentry also violated the terms of Ambrosio-Rubira’s supervised release, imposed following a 2010 conviction, the district court sentenced him to an additional eight months, with six months running concurrent to the § 1326 sentence. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §1291, and we affirm.
1. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Descamps v. United States , 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) and Mathis v. United States , 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) are not “clearly irreconcilable” with our decision in United States v. Grajeda , 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2009). Miller v. Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003). In Grajeda , we applied the elements-based categorical approach the Supreme Court established in Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and concluded that California Penal Code § 245 is “categorically a crime of violence.” , 581 F.3d at 1197. *3 Neither Descamps nor Mathis altered Taylor ’s holding setting forth the pure categorical approach; rather, those decisions clarified when the modified categorical approach applies. See Mathis , 136 S. Ct. at 2251–54; Descamps , 133 S. Ct. at 2283–86. Because —like this case—involves only the pure categorical approach, it remains good law. See Grajeda , 581 F.3d at 1189.
2. The district court adequately explained the basis for the sentence imposed for Ambrosio-Rubira’s supervised release violation. At sentencing, the district court reviewed the § 3553(a) factors, listened to defense counsel’s argument, concisely explained its reasoning, and imposed a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range with all but two months running concurrent to the § 1326 sentence. Nothing more was required. See United States v. Laurienti , 731 F.3d 967, 975 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Vasquez-Cruz , 692 F.3d 1001, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Valencia-Barragan , 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010).
AFFIRMED.