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United States v. Anthony Gadson
763 F.3d 1189
9th Cir.
2014
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*1 ruling encompassed properly applied the law of Judge Rothstein’s the case doc- trine.” facts: following pro- filed an initial 1. The Four Tribes I prior continue the belief that our ceeding seeking to exclude wa- correct, conclusion is and that the law of Whidbey ters west of Island from precludes the case doctrine expan- further the Lummi U & A. id. at 2. See Lummi I sion U & A. would affirm the district court. Coyle summary Judge granted judg- 2. Tribes, the Four

ment favor of to judg-

but never reduced his order

ment. See id. subsequently

3. The Lummi filed a

“Cross-Request For Determination”

seeking to include within its U & A Whidbey the waters west of Island. America, UNITED STATES of See id. Plaintiff-Appellee, Judge 4. Rothstein viewed the initial v. proceeding filed the Four Tribes seeking to exclude the waters west Anthony GADSON, Anthony aka Whidbey Island and the cross- Gadsen, Defendant- request determination filed Appellant. Lummi seeking to include the America, United States Whidbey

waters west of Island as Plaintiff-Appellee, request the one and the same —to if determine the waters west of Whidbey Island were included Wilson, Defendant-Appellant. Willie Lummi U & A. See id. at 6. 12-30007, Nos. 12-30047. Judge 5. interpreted Judge Rothstein Coyle’s decision as law of the case Appeals, United States Court of areas, disputed including Ninth Circuit. Island, Whidbey the waters west of Argued Aug. and Submitted 2013. were not within the Lummi & A. U Lummi, See 447. Aug. Filed appeal Judge ruling, On Rothstein’s only

we reversed to the extent that her

ruling Admiralty excluded Inlet from the so, doing

Lummi U & A. In we described

Admiralty “consisting] Inlet as of the wa- Island, Whidbey

ters to the west of sepa-

rating that island from the Olympic Penin-

sula. ...” Id. at 452. It stands to reason any portion other of the waters west Whidbey Island that were included description our remain excluded from Lummi,

the Lummi U & A. In we had no

difficulty “concluding Judge Rothstein *7 evidentiary rulings, challenge various

they instruc- of certain the correctness as to evidence sufficiency of the tions, the counts, sentencing determinations. and two convictions. affirm the We CA, Sacramento, De- for Balazs, John I Anthony Gadson. fendant-Appellant March from During period CA, Sacramento, Defen- for Hart, Krista at 2010, a residence February through Wilson. dant-Appellant Willie Alaska, Fairbanks, Fouts Avenue Ra- Mythili (argued), A. Heller Kirby trafficking opera- drug hub of a was General, Attorney Assistant man, Acting brothers, and Joshua Brandon Two tion. Acting Deputy Assis- Mclnerney, Denis J. Edwards, lived Donte along with Haynes, Division, General, Criminal Attorney tant Gadson, a brother Fouts house.1 at the Justice, Department States United Haynes, visited Joshua Brandon and Loeffler, D.C.; L. Karen Washington, time, he lived though from time house F. Attorney, Elizabeth States United Wilson, cousin Anchorage. At- States United Crail, Assistant Special Gadson, joined Haynes brothers United Assistant Cooper, Stephen torney, Powell 2009. Joe group November AK, for Plain- Anchorage, Attorney, and would group with involved also tiff-Appellee.' behalf complete transactions sometimes Haynes. Brandon trial, Joshua testimony at According at crack cocaine regularly sold Haynes ten Joshua made house. near the Fouts dur- to Joshua of cocaine Voaklander sales half and summer spring ing KOZINSKI, Chief ALEX Before: During by Gadson. were which witnessed S. BERZON MARSHA Judge, and Gadson which one of transactions Judges. IKUTA, Circuit S. SANDRA an assault displayed Joshua present, his couch cushions under hidden rifle OPINION “for Voaklander, said was which Joshua through the somebody comes when Judge: IKUTA, Circuit door.” front ap- Wilson Willie Anthony Gadson the cocaine was conspiracy to dis- for of the sources One convictions peal their “Transporter” code name cocaine, with the person grams more than tribute Anchorage up from drugs brought con- who distribute intent possession the two On in Fairbanks. Fouts house of fire- substances, possession trolled *8 Fouts trips Gadson’s occasions conspiracy of their arms in furtherance Transporter’s trips, coincided house substances. controlled and possession $40,000 containing up bags picked re- Gadson his conviction appeals also Wilson Haynes. Brandon $50,000 cash from in appeal, On a witness. against taliation Haynes by confusion. and Joshua refer to 1. We Brandon necessary to avoid where first names their room, point, Transporter At one was-arrested for cocaine, the officers powder found crack, license, heroin, driving marijuana, without a and Gadson com- 156 tabs of ecsta- sy, $13,000 and approximately that his arrest could have in plained “messed cash. A handgun nearby loaded everything up,” meaning “everybody go on the floor. jail.” police While the were searching the house, Fouts Wilson had reached his Avery Thompson, a member of

Officer house, friend’s and informed Edwards Drug the Alaska Statewide Enforcement (who house) also the friend’s about Unit, began investigating drug con- the raid. Edwards and Wilson'drove to early By 2010, in spiracy February Gadson’s house Anchorage in and decided suspected that the Fouts house atwas to stay there until things cooled off in drug operation. the center of a A confi- Haynes Fairbanks. Brandon was also in working dential informant with the investi- Anchorage at the time. After two about gation buys two executed controlled of cot weeks, Fairbanks, Edwards returned to Edwards, caine from one of which took began buying and drugs from Gadson for place driveway in the of the Fouts house. sale. But when Haynes Brandon returned Following buy, Thompson Officer to Fairbanks at the May, end of and re- other members of the police Fairbanks sumed drug location, activities in a new department obtained search warrant for Edwards Haynes switched back to as a the Fouts Although house. no one was in supplier. search, at the time they house saw footprints leading snow point new At some in November away open from the kitchen window. police Sub- used a confidential informant named sequent investigation Donny these Pitka to make a buy revealed controlled Wilson, footprints belonged to from Haynes. and that Brandon Pitka asked Bran- arrived, police when the don to deliver the escaped drugs Wilson to undercover police out the in a window his bare feet and scram- vehicle near Brandon’s new apartment on bled over to a Adams Drive. Brandon friend’s house. had cocaine, Powell deliver police and the Inside, Thompson Officer and the other arrested approached Powell when he police investigators found a shoe box on vehicle. police then in on closed top of the living containing room couch Adams apartment, Drive arrested Bran- approximately cocaine, a kilogram an- don, cocaine, marijuana, discovered ec- containing other shoe box another kilo- $14,000 stasy, oxycontin, and in cash inside gram $29,000 of cocaine and some in cash apartment. drugs. behind the fingerprints Gadson’s Haynes police With Brandon custody, were identified on the second living room began buying again Edwards from Gadson. shoe box. A shotgun loaded and ballistic January In Gadson sold Edwards vests were found near the shoe boxes. of, seven or more ounces By cocaine. cocaine, cocaine, Powder ecstasy, crack March Gadson up moved from An- marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and more chorage Way to 2805 Gillam in Fairbanks. cash money orders were found in vari- April grand jury On a federal indicted ous dining locations the kitchen and Gadson, Wilson, Haynes, Brandon Ed- room. The bedrooms contained more wards, Powell, others. Arrest warrants bedroom, drugs. police one found were issued for the defendants. possessions, including Wilson’s prescrip- pill tion bottles in Wilson’s name and a Officer Thompson picked up Gadson’s ring with Wilson’s initials. Inside that trail at April. conducting the end of After *9 scratches, abrasions, of a number fered at Gadson’s of surveillance days

several day the encounter. The good from observing and bites and Way house Gillam assault, indicative of called Gabriella traffic” Wilson after of “short-term deal hit warrant a search told her dealing, Haynes again he obtained and drug shit,” garage. and Officers and “Donny,” the residence who had “started beginning of at the buy warrant be- controlled executed referenced earlier vest and around a ballistic May and found Haynes. Pitka and Brandon tween They discovered $3,950 in the cash house. 23, 2011, government June On in the unlocked $38,430 bag ain another Gadson, Wilson, with and others charged any recover did not The officers garage. distribute, and conspiracy crimes: five co- amount of appreciable or an firearms distribute, more intent to with possession Way house. Later from the Gillam caine con- cocaine and other grams of than in his vehi- was arrested day, Gadson substances, in violation of U.S.C. trolled $1,300 person. on his another cle with (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C), 841(a)(1), 846, §§ days in a later himself few turned Wilson (Count (b)(1)(D) 1); intent possession with outstanding warrant. learning of the after substances, in vio- controlled to distribute items investigation obtained of Further (b)(1)(B), 841(a)(1), § of 21 lation U.S.C. suggested they Way house from the Gillam (Count (b)(1)(D) 2); (b)(1)(C), possession transactions. A drug had been used of and in furtherance Counts of firearms Marley gave positive named dog drug 924(c)(1)(A)© § of 18 U.S.C. violation narcotics when of presence for the alerts (Count 3); retaliate conspiracy to and found Gadson’s with cash presented witness, in violation of 18 against a U.S.C. person. his and on house 5). 1513(e) (Count also government § Gadson, arrests, Ed- their Following kill a attempting to charged Wilson Wilson, were all de- wards, and Powell witness, of 18 in violation U.S.C. wing of Fairbanks in the same tained (a)(2)(B) (Count 6), 1513(a)(1)(B), and § Pitka, had been who Center. Correctional witness, of against a violation retaliation buy that led controlled involved in the 7). 1513(b)(2)(Count § 18 U.S.C. arrest, in the Haynes’s same Brandon After Powell charges. unrelated prison on Gad- found On October attor- role from his about Pitka’s learned conspiracy to guilty of son and Wilson co-eonspira- other spread word ney, distribute, drugs with intent possession of phone of recorded calls In a series tors. distribute, fire- of three possession cousin, Gabriella between Wilson conspiracy arms in furtherance of re- police Haynes, Wilson discussed 3). (Counts 1, 2 also Wilson was mentioning and told Gabriella ports Pitka a wit- against retaliation guilty found here,” using the Haynes that “the Cl’s 7). (Count guilty found Neither was ness in- for a confidential abbreviation standard against witness conspiring retaliate later, days told A few Wilson formant. (Count 5), acquitted and Wilson into go can’t “[s]nitches Gabriella 6). (Count a witness attempting to kill May after the call hallways.” On soon 29, 2011, Gadson received December On Pit- Haynes, assaulted to Gabriella Wilson sentence of 300 months a below-Guidelines hallway. down the walking ka as he was years super- eight imprisonment minutes and was The assault lasted two 10,- attributed court release. The vised the details of Although on video. captured 521,103 drugs to Gadson on grams disputed, recording the video fight are in the Pitka, conspiracy, of his involvement who suf- basis punching shows Wilson *10 included, among the sentence police other that helpful were to Gadson. things, Specifically, a three-level enhancement for hav- Brandon said that it was he $38,000 ing managerial January put who had role. On in cash into Gad- garage son’s at the Way the court sentenced Gillam Wilson house. Brandon also denied that imprisonment given he had years months and five $40,000 Gadson release, bags $50,000, which supervised that sentence also fell contradicted Edwards’s testimony that range. below Guideline The court de- had witnessed those transactions. In addi- give adjust- clined to Wilson a minor role tion, jail Brandon told in Wilson ment, conver- noting that he had been entrusted to “[y]ou sation that and I both know [Gad- guard drugs in and cash the Fouts it,” should not possibly son] be referring house, and that he drugs had sold to Pitka arising case out drug opera- and later assaulted him. tion at the Fouts house. appeal, On Gadson challenge and Wilson subpoenaed Gadson testify Brandon to certain of the district evidentiary court’s trial, at his but Brandon invoked his Fifth rulings They instructions. also right trial, Amendment not testify. At contest the sufficiency of the evidence as Gadson moved to admit Brandon’s state- Finally, they to two counts. challenge the 804(b)(3) ments under Rule of the Federal district court’s sentencing determinations. Rules of Evidence. The district court de- challenges We consider each these motion, ruling nied the that Brandon had turn. given testimony, inconsistent evidence suspect” was “so that “it would II justice be a miscarriage of to permit it.” begin by We addressing Gadson argues Gadson the district court and Wilson’s challenges to the district erroneously interpreted hearsay rules court’s evidentiary rulings. Where those and that the district court thereby abused challenges preserved, have been we review its discretion disallowing the evidence. rulings the district court’s for an abuse of Gadson, According although Brandon’s discretion, uphold they them unless statements were hearsay, they were ad- “illogical, implausible, are sup or without against missible as statements un- interest port in may inferences that be drawn from 804(b)(3) der Rule of the Federal Rules of the record.” United States v. the facts Evidence. Even if those statements did Hinkson, (9th 585 Cir. interest, not qualify against as statements 2009) (en banc). de We review novo the Gadson contends their exclusion district interpretations court’s legal robbed him of his- right constitutional standard for its decision. United States v. present a complete defense. Waters, 351-52 Cir. 804(b)(3) provides Rule that out-of-court 2010). by statements are not excluded the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavail- A witness, (1) able aas and the statement First, we consider argument Gadson’s “truly self-inculpatory,” meaning it was that the district court abused its discretion “sufficiently against penal the declarant’s admitting certain out-of-court state- person interest that a in the reasonable brother, ments Haynes. Brandon position declarant’s would have made trial, In preparing for learned believing Gadson statement unless it to be States, true,” Brandon had made two statements to v. United Williamson *11 (9th Cir.1997), 928, 933 2431, 114 F.3d guio, 129 603-04, 114 S.Ct. U.S. relationship be- (internal family the close (1994) quotation therefore 476 L.Ed.2d the (2) by supports Gadson supported Brandon and omitted), “is tween marks clearly that Bran- that court’s circumstances district determination corroborating trustworthiness,” trustworthy. Fed.R.Evid. not were its don’s statements indicate 804(b)(3)(B).2 Further, court’s determination the district “suspect” or testimony was that Brandon’s misinter did not court The district testimony by supported unreliable was not abuse and did hearsay rules pret contradictory statements that he had made Bran declining to admit its discretion co-conspirators. and his police to the 804(b)(3). As Rule under statements don’s that matter, agree parties an initial was sufficient argues that there Gadson mean within the unavailable was Brandon state- corroborating Brandon’s evidence 804(b) his invocation of due to Rule ing of $38,000 put ment that had against privilege Amendment his Fifth he cites Way garage. Specifically, Gillam Nevertheless, Bran self-incrimination. to tenant a downstairs from not “should that Gadson statements don’s named “Brandon” that the effect someone given had not it,” that Brandon be apartment, in the previously lived had cash, “truly are not bags of two Gadson usually unlocked. garage that of Rule purposes self-inculpatory” does not make slight This evidence 804(b)(3)(A) expose not they do because Bran- to disallow court’s decision district liability. criminal to himself Brandon implausible, or “illogical, don’s statement (or “curry favor or deflect Statements may be inferences that support without share) scope not fall within blame” do Hinkson, record,” in the from drawn facts Small, 804(b)(3)(A). v. Hernandez of Rule Accordingly, the district at 1251. Cir.2002). (9th 1132, 1141 n. 8 F.3d to admit the three decision not court’s Further, state Brandon’s was not abuse while at issue statements put who had the person ment that he was discretion. Way at the Gillam garage in the

money the exclusion of Brandon’s did self-inculpatory, Nor might have been house of his constitu deprive Gadson statements reasonably have court could the district The to a defense. right present tional by supported it not concluded that “[a] has held defen Supreme Court indicating its corroborating circumstances is relevant evidence right present dant’s exculpa general, trustworthiness. subject rea unlimited, is rather not but family members “are tory statements restrictions,” and the exclusion reliable,” sonable LaG highly considered be it (9th “only where is unconstitutional Stewart, evidence v. rand weighty interest infringed upon v. Pa- has Cir.1998); see also United pecuniary interest or so proprietary or had 804(b)(3) full: slates in 2. Rule tendency great to invalidate declar- following (b) Exceptions. are The or to ex- against else claim someone ant's hearsay against if the rule excluded liabil- to civil or criminal pose the declarant as a witness: declarant is unavailable ity; and (3) Against A state- Interest. Statement corroborating (B) supported circum- ment that: clearly its trustworthi- indicate stances (A) person in the declarant’s a reasonable ness, case as in a criminal is offered per- if it only made if the position would have because, expose the declarant one tends it to true when son believed be liability. made, criminal contrary to the declarant’s was so it Moore, Scheffer, the accused.” United States v. dog Marley whose gave positive 303, 308, 523 U.S. 118 S.Ct. 140 alerts for presence of narcotics when (1998). L.Ed.2d 413 When excluded presented with several bundles of cash “persuasive evidence does not bear assur found at Gadson’s house person. and on his ances trustworthiness” and is not “criti Before testifying jury, Investiga- defense,” Cambra, cal to the Chía tor Moore extensively testified during voir Cir.2004), its exclusion *12 dire experience about his and his dog’s process does not violate a defendant’s due training reliability and in the field. Inves- Fowlie, rights, see United States v. tigator Moore Marley and were certified (9th Cir.1994) 1059, 1069 (rejecting a due as a K-9 team in June Investigator 2010. process challenge to evidence un excluded Moore testified he had that been canine 804(b)(3) der Fed.R.Evid. because the handler May since 2010 and had received any statement lacked “significant indicia of four-and-a-half training. weeks of Marley best”); reliability” “tangential and was had been trained another officer to 284, Mississippi Chambers v. 410 U.S. cf. heroin, detect marijuana, cocaine, and (1973) 93 S.Ct. 35 L.Ed.2d 297 methamphetamine. According to Investi- (holding application unconstitutional an Moore, gator Marley had practiced in a evidentiary precluded rule that the admis variety of training scenarios to ensure that sion of a confession of guilt by a third he reliably detecting presence party, testimony directly where the various odors rather than simply associat- exculpatory “persuasive and bore assur ing them with one specific set of circum- trustworthiness”). ances of stances. police department The logs case, In this Brandon’s three statements Marley showed that had a reliability rating any “persuasive do not have assurances of percent 100 in the field and had made trustworthiness” and do not constitute only potential one positive false alert. In- evidence, critical exculpatory such as vestigator Moore also noted the limits to “someone else’s guilt.” admissions of Marley’s abilities: while he could detect Fowlie, 24 F.3d at 1069. Given Brandon presence of four drugs, different Haynes’s unreliability and the substantial was unable distinguish between individ- evidence that establishing Gadson was in- ual drugs, and so an alert pile as to a volved in the drug transactions at only cash would indicate that it had at houses, Way Fouts and Gillam exclusion of point some been near one or more of those Brandon’s three statements did not violate drugs. four process Gadson’s due rights. dire, At the conclusion of the voir B court Investigator ruled that Moore and We next turn argument to Gadson’s that Marley “adequately were trained and ex- the district court in admitting erred perienced testify, give opinion an government’s dog sniff expert testimony possibly could way” assist the in some holding without hearing.3 a Daubert objection and overruled Wilson’s that the trial, government At sought to intro- canine evidence was inadmissible without a duce Investigator from hearing. Joshua Daubert Although join plain Gadson did not Wilson’s ob- than error "because the matter was jection at trial sufficiently brought to the admission of this testi- to the attention of the mony hearing, without a Hieng, Daubert we review district court.” United States v. 679 (9th Cir.2012). Gadson's claim for abuse of discretion rather F.3d must court Although the district dog claims Gadson appeal, On function, trial gatekeeping perform inherently unreliable is evidence sniff in deter latitude only has broad “not court making this science. junk based testimony is expert’s whether mining studies on various relies Gadson argument, to deter reliable, deciding how also in but errors dog sniff indicating reports reliability.” Mukh testimony’s mine the cueing and er by handler may caused be into inquiry tar, at 1064. dogs alert drug rors, may arise because sufficiently reli testimony is whether the compounds odors to residual United States flexible one.” able “a See, e.g., contraband. unique to are not 1098, 1102 Cir. Alatorre, 222 F.3d II, Dogs and Detector Myers E. Richard on reli 2000). pretrial hearing separate A Cause, L.Rev. Mason Geo. Probable dire a voir required, ability is Lit, B. (2006); Julie Lisa 14-16, 21-24 at 1102- Id. can sufficient. be procedure Oberbauer, Handler Schweitzer, and Anita *13 Dog Out Detection Scent Affect Beliefs (2011). disposed largely Court has Cognition Supreme 3 87 comes, 14 Animal evi Gadson, dog that sniff by argument a cited of Gadson’s expert According to one Florida In inherently unreliable. is proba dence to establish insufficient dog alert is that Harris, held Court Supreme high a v. case due in a criminal ble cause by im Court erred Supreme Florida 14-16. at Myers, supra, rate. error unnecessarily standard strict posing an evidence, that argues Gadson light of drug a alert of whether the evaluating testimony Moore’s Investigator cause probable dog provided detection reliability, and to demonstrate enough — U.S. -, S.Ct. a search vehicle. a full have conducted should court district (2013). Ac 1050, 1056-57, 185 L.Ed.2d dire) (as on the to a voir opposed hearing Harris, can conclude court a cording to dog sniff evidence. reliability of the detecting reliably in “dog performs a that training, test dog’s on the drugs” based deci the district court’s review We case-specif results, other history, and field testimony for abuse of expert admit sion to example, For at 1057-58. ic facts. Id. Univ., v. Cal. State Mukhtar discretion. satisfactory dog’s perform aof “evidence (9th 1058, 1063 Cir. Hayward, 299 F.3d training program or ance in certification (9th Cir. 2002), as amended to trust reason provide itself sufficient can part nonrelevant 2003), overruled must be alert,” defendant although a Inc., AstenJohnson, v. Barabin Estate of challenge such “opportunity given the banc). Cir.2014) (en (9th 457, 467 at reliability.” Id. dog’s of a evidence Rules of of the Federal Rule 702 Under of Gad- disposes conclusion 1057. This Evidence, qualified is who witness “[a] per se evidence dog sniff son’s claim skill, experience, knowledge, expert “junk is based on because it unreliable testify in may or education training, science.” the testimo provided opinion,” of an form that a Moreover, suggest 702 also Harris did criteria. Rule certain ny meets full-fledged had to judge perform ensure that [to] district court requires “the trial whether hearing to testimony or evidence determine Daubert any all scientific sufficiently reli- relevant, dog reliable.” sniff only but is not admitted Id. Inc., cause. Pharms., probable 509 able establish Dow Daubert v. Merrell held both Rather, the Court 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 1056-58. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. U.S. proffer can and the defendant (1993). state relating dog’s reliability, evidence to the Gadson and parties Wilson to third be- and the court can “then evaluate the cause prof- tapes had not been properly fered evidence to decide what all the cir- authenticated in violation of Rule 901 of cumstances demonstrate. If the Federal the State has Rules of Evidence. Wilson produced proof from further claims that settings controlled Officer Thompson’s tes- timony dog reliably that a was insufficient performs detecting support a find- ing that drugs, tapes and the defendant has not the voices on the belonged contested showing, then court defendants. should find probable cause.” Id. at 1058. A district Because neither Gadson nor Wil considering court whether evidence of a son challenged the authentication of the dog alert is admissible under Rule 702 can tapes trial, themselves at we review this Here, undertake a similar evaluation. plain claim for error. See United ample Gadson had opportunity to cross- Lindsey, 684 F.3d 550-51 Cir. Moore, examine adequacy “contest the aof 2011). “(1) (2) error, Plain error is that is certification training program,” or raise (3) plain, rights,” affect[s] substantial surrounding particular “circumstances “(4) the error seriously affect[s] alert” that Marley’s reliability. undercut fairness, integrity, or public reputation of Id. at 1057. This was sufficient to satisfy judicial proceedings.” United States v. function, the district court’s gatekeeping Cotton, 625, 631, 535 U.S. 122 S.Ct. and the court did not abuse its discretion (2002) (alteration 152 L.Ed.2d 860 origi *14 in declining to do more. nal, internal citations and quotations omitted). marks Given challenge Harris’s determination that a Wilson did the district dog’s court’s decision that reliability govern alert that meets certain the put ment forth requirements sufficient evidence that may be sufficient to the “make a voices on the tapes belonged to reasonably prudent person think Gadson that a Wilson, and so we review that deter search would reveal contraband or evi- mination for abuse of crime,” 1058, discretion. See dence of a at id. we conclude Yin, 990, United States v. 994 dog’s a alert that require- meets such (9th Cir.1991). sufficiently ments is also reliable to be admissible under Rule 702.. Under the 901(a) Under Rule of the Fed Harris, in standard enunciated the evi- Evidence, eral Rules of in order “[t]o satis regarding reliability dence the Marley’s fy requirement the authenticating or adequate. alert was more than Investiga- evidence, identifying an item of propo the gave tor Moore testimony extensive re- produce nent must evidence sufficient to garding Marley’s training and cer- support a finding that the item is what the tification. He regarding also testified proponent words, claims it is.” In other Marley’s reliability rating percent of 100 in party the offering the evidence must make the field. The defendants did not proffer prima a showing authenticity facie “so evidence to contrary. Accordingly, the that a juror reasonable could find favor district court did not abuse its discretion Yin, authenticity or identification.” 935 admitting Marley’s evidence of alert. (internal quotation F.2d at 996 marks omitted). may The item be authenticated

C evidence, by extrinsic id. at such as We now consider claim through testimony Wilson’s that the knowledgeable of a wit by ness, 901(b)(1). district court admitting Thus, erred the re- Fed.R.Evid. where cordings prison phone of the by government calls made audiotape, offers an a wit-

1204 and Wilson. were those of Gadson testify tapes that the may knowledge ness the meth- testified as to be, Thompson a or is Officer purports it is what recording speak- identify odology he had used original. of the copy and accurate true of all Panaro, recordings F.3d first listened 266 ers. He v. States See United wing in the the cell (9th Cir.2001); v. Mou- calls made from phone States United Cir.1980). (9th held were where the defendants ton, prison 1383-84 F.2d re- tape period offers a time during applicable government Where voice, sug- it must clues calls for context the defendant’s scanned those cording of that the voice Offi- identity speaker. facie case prima gesting make also defendant’s, fact voice on tape Thompson cer identified Gadson’s on recog- who of a witness factors: he recording whether means based several extrinsic evi- other with his familiar nizes voice Gadson and was had met Torres, F.2d v. voice, States dence. United he determined “very unique” Cir.1990). the offer- Once to Ga- calls were all of Gadson’s almost burden, proba- “the ing party meets conver- in at least one Haynes, and briella the evidence is matter value of tive sation, Thompson heard Gadson Officer Workinger, jury.” United had which talking about a list items (9th Cir.1996). The dis- 1409, 1415 during from his house been seized abuse its discretion does not trict court only a search, accessible to information mini- that meets the admitting evidence people time. handful Id. for authentication. requirements mum Wilson’s Thompson identified Officer at 1416. ex- recording on other in the based voice Here, Thompson First, testified Thompson Officer trinsic evidence. Officer prison with the tele prisoner that he was familiar heard the voice of different gave detailed system Haynes shortly after Wil- phone calling Gabriella all system regarding recorded the other de- how Because son was admitted. calls, jail log detained, call could be how the been Of- previously had fendants *15 date, bank, phone and on searched based reasonably inferred Thompson ficer number, run how he had and telephone Wilson, the last belonged voice this new times. He testified many such searches ar- drug operation to be of the member than 100 hours of more he reviewed Second, during the time Wilson rested. relating to Gadson prison phone calls unit, he had to segregation the was in Thompson did Although Officer Wilson. tele- requests to use the make written trial at testify the calls introduced not requests timing and the phone, Wilson’s copies prison of the record were accurate calls to the voice’s new corresponded challenged the re ings, neither defendant caller dis- Haynes. Finally, the Gabriella Thomp basis. Officer cordings on this case. Wilson’s particular cussed facts support was “sufficient to testimony son’s sufficiently narrowed Thompson Officer propo that the item is what the finding callers so as possible the universe 901(a), is,” claims it Fed.R.Evid. nent speakers in the support an inference that failing not err in did the district court Gadson and Wilson. these were calls Cf. sponte. this issue sua raise Torres, 996; F.2d at Yin, at 908 F.2d 935 admis- district court’s 1425. Because the abuse Nor the district court did “illogical, not was concluding gov that the sion of discretion in its in infer- support making implausible, or without its burden ernment had carried from facts the may drawn the ences be that the prima facie case voices

1205 Hinkson, record,” calls, 585 F.3d at it did Thompson’s Officer testimony, it. were the evidence. admitting not abuse its discretion See id. Nor did Wilson establish that

Ill the plainly district court in admitting erred tapes the on audibility grounds. “A re multiple next consider ar- We Wilson’s corded generally conversation is admissi guments regarding the district court’s ad- ble unless the unintelligible portions are so Thompson’s testimony mission of Officer substantial that recording as a whole is regarding phone the recorded calls. untrustworthy.” Lane, United States v. (9th Cir.1975). has Wilson A tapes shown that the were so uniform quality Because the sound of the ly unintelligible that recordings should recordings poor, tape Wilson claims not presented have been jury. to the No Thompson acting that Officer as a objection was made at trial on this basis. government-produced transcript of the re Nor was there persons evidence “that cordings, and the court did not take the the courtroom were to hear unable sub necessary steps accuracy to ensure the portions stantial of the conversations re transcript interpretation. or Because corded tapes, on the or that the words trial, neither defendant claim raised this at were unintelligible.” United States v. Ti it plain Lindsey, we review for error. See sor, Cir.1996). Fur Applying F.3d 550-51. this stan ther, Wilson waived or forfeited this argu dard, we conclude the district court did not by opposing ment to provide efforts plainly err. Thompson’s testimony Officer original recordings jury during their regarding phone the context of the calls deliberations. jury requested When the interpretation ambiguous vague (rather original telephone recordings statements was not akin to a verbatim than the courtroom recordings clips calls, transcript of the and thus the district they trial), played during were Wil court plain did not commit error in not objected son to giving jury original considering sua sponte whether sufficient clips. Although government proposed steps were taken to ensure the statements’ give jury “the possible clearest ver accuracy. Armijo, United States v. trial, sion” of the clips played at Wilson Cf. (9th Cir.1993) (considering argued against approaches sug various regarding accuracy that, various factors of a gested by government would have transcription translating recorded tele enabled the to hear originals, *16 phone Spanish English). calls from to contended that the should be limited Moreover, even under the ap recording standard to the played of what was in plied transcripts, to written Consequently, there were court.4 the district court’s ample accuracy, given indicia of failure to sponte tapes de sua exclude the was plain fense counsel had the not error. opportunity to chal lenge accuracy of Thompson’s Officer B testimony and to introduce alternative ver sions, and the Second, district court informed the Wilson asserts that the district jury on at least three occasions that the court in allowing Thompson erred Officer Accordingly, asserting jury's the dissent errs in district to court's chosen solution” response jury's request in to the for the request tapes. for the & Dissent n.3. tapes, merely defendants to the "consented] ” that “[wit- a ‘fact’ and by rule what is content concerning the testify

to difficulty expressing in find nesses often type this of claims Wilson calls. telephone not that which is language themselves because it does testimony is inadmissible conclusion”); see also or opinion of an testi- lay opinion criteria meet the 173, Pierson, 503 F.2d States United Rules the Federal 701 of under Rule mony (D.C.Cir.1974) “so- (stating that Wilson, According to Officer of Evidence. strictly fol- “not rule” was opinion called inadmissible testimony was Thompson’s difficulty large part lowed—due Thompson Officer this rule because under fact between drawing a fine distinction conver- witness to the percipient not a Indeed, Cir- as the D.C. opinion”). and on the testimony was based sations, his “[tjhere is no conceivable explained, cuit whole, interpretation investigation as detailed specific, however statement jury’s role usurped testimony vague ‘factual,’ measure some that is fact, interpretation and his trier of as well and reflection of inference product hearsay. on one call relied phone Pierson, memory.” as observation arguments of Wilson’s Our consideration on (quoting at 176 McCormick Rule scope examine us to requires (1972)). The drafters § 11 Evidence to offer laya witness 701 allows 701. Rule the concern rejected also Rule 701 (a) “rationally based opinions are ju- mislead testimony lay opinion would (b) “helpful” perception,” the witness’s that “the 701 assumes instead ries. Rule scientific, (e) “not based on jury, adversary characteristics of natural knowledge technical, specialized other accept- to an generally lead system will testimony. expert scope of’ within the lay result,” in the and weaknesses able 1975, rep- rule promulgated When testimony emphasized be can witness’s then-pre- from a departure resented argu- “cross-examination through lay governing evidentiary principles vailing advisory commit- ment.” Fed.R.Evid. re- generally testimony, which witness notes; States v. see also United tee’s “to limit their quired witnesses (9th Cir.2005) Beck, 418 F.3d avoid they perceived and just to the facts and cross-examination that “direct (noting on those based or inferences opinions to his or her lay testifying as of a witness & Wright Alan Victor facts.” 29 Charles verify the accu- upon relied opinion is Gold, Procedure Practice & Federal James testimony”). racy (1997). justified this Courts § at 105 lay opinion Rule 701 applying “lay-witness grounds that approach on the officers, we testimony of law enforcement jury, whose the role of opinion usurps interpretation of that an have held officer’s as to job conclusions it is draw Rule may meet intercepted phone calls evidence,” and because meaning of the it when “perception” requirement 701’s perceived facts “testimony limited conversa- ambiguous “of interpretation opin- than mere reliable considered more direct officer’s] upon [the tions based ion, misleading.” Id. be which could investigation.” United knowledge of the § at 109. (Kevin Freeman), 498 v. Freeman (9th Cir.2007); rejected see also Rule 701 both 904-05 *17 The drafters of F.3d Simas, 459, 464- First, F.2d the distinction States v. 937 United these distinctions. Cir.1991) (9th of dis- to no abuse proved (finding be 65 “opinion” “fact” and between testimony lay admitting in officers’ in Fed.R.Evid. cretion practice. See unworkable understanding of what “concerning their (noting advisory 701 committee’s note convey by vague his meant determining [defendant] impossibility of practical “the

1207 statements”).5 ambiguous In Kevin Lay testimony witness regarding the Freeman, instance, for we that once held meaning ambiguous conversations based foundation, government established a a on the witness’s direct perceptions and provide could police lay officer witness experience may prove also “helpful to the opinion testimony regarding the meaning jury” purposes of Rule 701. See Kevin intercept of statements the defendant’s Freeman, (agent’s 498 F.3d 904-05 “un- phone testimony ed calls because the derstanding ambiguous phrases” based based on the officer’s “direct perception of on the “direct perception of several hours intercepted several hours of conversa of intercepted along conversations” tions—in some instances coupled with di “direct observation” of defendants and rect observation of [the defendants] “other during —and facts he learned the investi- other facts he learned during the investi gation” testimony resulted in that “proved 904-05; gation.” 498 F.3d at see also helpful jury determining what the El-Mezain, 467, v. United States 664 F.3d [co-conspirators] were communicating dur- (5th Cir.2011) (allowing lay opinion 513-14 calls”); ing telephone the recorded see also testimony interpreting telephone calls Rollins, 544 F.3d at (agent’s 832-33 testi- agents’ opinions when “the were limited mony based on listening every inter- personal perceptions their in from their conversation, cepted “personal and other case”); vestigation of this United States v. observations perceptions” related to Rollins, 820, 544 F.3d 830-33 Cir. specific jury case at issue “assisted the 2008) (finding no error in the district issue”). determining several facts in agent’s court’s decision to allow the testi

mony regarding “impressions” hand, of re On the other an officer’s testimony testimony corded conversations when the interpreting recorded conversa agent’s perceptions was “based on the may de tions fall outside the scope of Rule investigation rived from the particu of this 701 if it is not based the witness’s (for lar conspiracy”). testimony Such is admis perception example, if it is based on sible even if the testifying speculation hearsay) officer was not a or not helpful participant Freeman, jury. the recorded conversation. Kevin 498 F.3d at Freeman, 904; Kevin Lay testimony 498 F.3d at see also is not helpful to the “ 1085, v. Jayyousi, merely provides United States 657 F.3d if it ‘interpretation ” (11th Cir.2011) lay 1102 that a (holding of dear statements’ that are within the witness’s was admissible even knowledge jury. (quot common of the Id. Dicker, though personally 1103, “he did not ing observe or United States v. 853 F.2d (3d Cir.1988)). Dicker, participate in the defendants’ conversa 1109 for in tions”); Garcia, stance, government agent United States v. 994 F.2d testified about (10th Cir.1993) 1499, conversations, (admitting an the meaning recorded opinion only officer’s listening explained parties based “on that the to the con conversations coconspira- discussing between versation were for ob means tors”). taining F.2d at “phony paperwork.” 853 1085, majority 5. The Jayyousi, of the circuits allow officers to States v. 657 F.3d 1102-03 provide interpretations Rollins, (11th Cir.2011); of recorded conversa- United States v. knowledge tions based on their 820, investi- (7th Cir.2008); F.3d 830-33 United gation, subject safeguards. to various See Garcia, States v. 1506-07 Albertelli, United States v. 444- F.3d Peri, (10th Cir.1993); De United States v. (1st Cir.2012); El-Mezain, United (3d Cir.1985). 977-78 (5th Cir.2011); 513-14 United *18 an personal involvement recordings and conversations recorded But the 1106. in United States investigation. Thus any discussion include not did themselves (D.C.Cir.2013),the no Hampton, there was and paperwork, phony of a be ob district determined the documents D.C. Circuit “that indication allowing an genuine.” Id. at Rule 701 had violated were not be court tained circumstances, Dicker intercepted testify regarding these agent FBI 1105. Under conversations, govern- mischaracterization though the officer’s held that even in the conversation used had plain agent words FBI that the ment established jury, and thus to the helpful was not moni- investigation, charge been 1108-10; at see 701. Id. by Rule barred physical surveil- wiretaps, performed tored (Marcus v. Freeman also United lance, agents who moni- other supervised Freeman), Cir. 730 F.3d each had reviewed wiretaps, and tored 2013) 701 barred an (holding that Rule 20,000 intercepted of the conversations essentially testimony which officer’s According to at wiretaps. Id. 981-83. phone interpretations “spoon-fed his a Circuit, testimony raised such the D.C. theory of the government’s and the calls testifying “was based agent that the risk even ordi jury, interpreting to the case jury” not before upon information Rollins, 544 language”); nary English his infer- way verifying jury “had no agent’s “impres an (admitting F.3d at 833 own reaching its independently ences or intercepted conversa an regarding sions” (internal quo- at 983 interpretations.” Id. merely not agent “was tion because omitted); see also United marks tation reach as to jury what result to telling the (2d 746, 750-51 Grinage, 390 F.3d States v. As the culpability”). defendants’ Cir.2004) (same). noted, “meaningless drafters of Rule 701 approach, which disagree We little amount more which assertions evidentiary policies harkens back up should be excluded choosing than sides” Rule rejected by the drafters of that were Fed.R.Evid. 701 helpfulness. lack of testimony lay opinion A 701. witness’s addition, advisory committee’s note. own necessarily draws on the witness’s conveys hear testimony that relies per- understanding, including wealth evidence, an officer re say as when such information, and edu- experience, sonal state party’s truth of third lies on the cation, placed that cannot be before of a interpretation basis for ment as the their cannot draw on jury. If witnesses call, intercepted phone in an statement knowledge, they are effec- experience inadmissible, it because would also both factual infor- tively presenting limited to percep own on the be based officer’s echoes approach mation. Such an tions, helpful. would not be Kevin between allow- now-abandoned distinction Freeman, Any error in at “facts” testimony regarding but ing testimony under admitting lay opinion policy the historical “opinions,” revives however, harmless if in could be Rule admitting lay opinion whole, there light of the evidence as jury, a view that was the role of the usurps was not a “fair assurance that See rejected by the Rule 701 drafters. by the error.” Id. substantially swayed 983; id. at 986 Hampton, omitted). (internal quotation marks (Brown, J., Grinage, 390 F.3d concurring); minority A circuits have construed at 749-51. narrowly and barred Rule 701 much more such a limita- impose 701 does not Rule intercepted com- interpreting officers from Rule while district tion. Under their review of the munications based on

1209 Yazzie, wisely court must exercise its discretion to United 976 F.2d (9th Cir.1992)). may in ad problems minimize arise 1255 Because Wilson did lay testimony, mitting opinion challenge see Albertel Officer Thompson’s testimo- li, at 447 (listing dangers ny trial, under Rule 701 at we review for safeguards), guiding policy of the Rule plain Lindsey, error. See 634 F.3d at 550- jury identify is to trust unreliable

opinion testimony help with the

adversary process, see 701 ad Fed.R.Evid. visory committee’s note. regularly Courts First, argues Wilson that Officer lay opinion testimony regarding admit the Thompson could not interpreta- offer his see, identity person photograph, of a in a tions of the phone recorded conversations Beck, 1014-15, e.g., 418 F.3d at and voice under Rule lay opinion because testi- see, testimony, e.g., identification United mony is only admissible when a witness Thomas, States v. 133 n. 23 was a party the conversation himself or (9th Cir.1978), though even the witness was a percipient witness. Because we re- provides past such identification based on jected precise argument this in Kevin pertinent contacts with the individual that Freeman, 904-05, 498 F.3d at the district jury’s knowledge. are outside the Similar plainly court did not in striking err ly, investigator an who has accumulated Officer Thompson’s testimony on this years months or even of experience with ground. events, places, and individuals involved in an investigation necessarily draws on indeed, that knowledge testifying; when it Next, Wilson claims that Officer experiences is those out-of-court that make Thompson’s interpretation was inadmissi testimony helpful jury. the witness’s ble it investiga because was based on the Contrary Hampton to the rationale of whole, tion as a including police report Grinage, application “the of Rule 701 and information contributed other offi should not be influenced concern that cers, merely personal rather than ob opinion testimony usurps the role of the The district servations. court did not factual is more reli plainly failing in err to strike Officer opinion testimony.”6 able than Wright, testimony on Thompson’s ground. § supra, at 112. According testimony, to his Officer argu

We now consider Wilson’s Thompson had been involved the inves light principles. tigation drug early ments of these “The conspiracy since admissibility lay opinion testimony un spanned 2010. His involvement house, multi-day der Rule is committed to the sound searches of the Fouts house, discretion of the trial judge Way and his deci surveillance of the Gillam house, sion will be if only Way overturned it consti search of the Gillam tutes a clear abuse of prison discretion.” Nation review of around 100 hours of Inc., Transp. Sys., wide Fin. v. Cass phone light calls. of our decision Info. (9th Cir.2008) Freeman, (quoting F.3d 1051 Kevin where testi- we admitted put jury. 6. We therefore decline the dissent’s invitation bul have not been before the Dis- (or adopt lay 1224-25, a rule that a witness at least sent at 1227. Such a rule would officer) provide lay opinion cannot testi- plain language not be consistent with the mony experiences based information and Rule 701 or our decision Kevin Freeman. lay knowledge, that are within the witness’s Freeman, Free- Marcus lacking in Marcus experiences, on similar mony based *20 claims. bearing to con- little on Wilson’s ample grounds man has had district court in- based his Thompson clude that Officer knowledge of personal on his

terpretations investigation. during the he learned facts lines, argues that Wilson Along the same conclusion, Wil- against this arguing sponte erred not sua the district court Freeman, in which on Marcus son relies interpretation Thompson’s striking Officer testi- agent’s that an held the Sixth Circuit to “Powell” to mean reference of Wilson’s Rule 701 under mony was not admissible Powell,” interpretation of Wil- and his “Joe solely agent’s on the it was based because “they have to “Donte” son’s references conversations, rath- 23,000 phone of review had Donte tape” police to mean the him on in the agent’s involvement than on the er argues that this tape. Wilson Edwards F.3d at 596-99. investigation. 730 testimony usurps interpretation vague quite Freeman are differ- of Marcus facts disagree. Officer jury’s function. We the case, In Marcus however. ent from our testimony based on his Thompson’s was Freeman, government the conceded the investigation the knowledge of “lacked the first-hand testifying agent involved, that was also evidence persons required lay a sufficient knowledge may jury. Because a be- before the testimony under Rule for his foundation by vague pronouns such as come confused 701(a).” agent Because the Id. at 597. “that,” “him,” Thomp- “who,” Officer involved in the surveillance not been had helpful con- testimony provide would son’s defendant, and had not observed of the Freeman, 498 F.3d at Kevin text. See activity interpreting “any relevant interpre- an officer’s (holding calls,” solely gen- on “the agent relied consisting “ambiguous tation of statements knowledge of the FBI and the investi- eral terms,” like “that” was admis- ordinary Nor did as a whole.” Id. at 596. gation testimony). lay opinion sible as light meaning on the agent shed con- highlights particular The dissent personal statements based on ambiguous “ versation, ‘You where Wilson stated regarding investigation; knowledge know, to the referring he’s the one’ ‘— essentially “spoon-fed his agent rather the informant this shit.’ Pitka —’ ‘that started calls and the interpretations phone of the Batman, ... ‘That time with was to the government’s theory of the case ” trial, at 1231. At Officer him.’ Dissent ordinary English even jury, interpreting explained that “Batman” refers Thompson at 597. these cir- language.” Id. Under Haynes, state- Brandon and Wilson’s cumstances, agent’s the No- “that time” refers back to ment “rationally per- on his own concrete based” (in which Officer vember 2010 incident regarding investigation and ceptions involved) Pitka exe- Thompson was where helpful jury, required buy Brandon a controlled from cuted Here, contrast, Rule 701. Officer Brandon’s eventual arrest. which led to expe- Thompson requisite personal had the id., Officer recognizes, dissent As the knowledge investigation, rience and of the testimony that “Batman” was Thompson’s phone calls in the context had reviewed precisely type nickname is Brandon’s merely knowledge, of that and did not opinion testimony investigation-specific theory of the regurgitate government’s But con- Freeman authorizes. that Kevin government Because the established case. id., dissent, Thomp- Officer trary to the testi- Thompson’s a foundation for Officer of “that time” is likewise fatally explanation mony, a foundation was son’s while such admissible, per- During Thompson’s testimony because Kevin Freeman Officer ambiguous prison calls, conver- about one of the “interpretations phone mits upon direct [the officer’s] sations based noted Wilson was investigation,” knowledge of reading portion [police] off of a instance, at 904-05. For Kevin Freeman report that we made after interviewing approved interpretation of the officer’s Haynes. Brandon You hear Brandon statement, “Man, already” it’s done ... Haynes background [say] ... given mean “he’s the cocaine Kevin “Hell, no.” thing One we learned *21 money Freeman and that he’s received his throughout investigation this is that in According for it.” Id. at 902. to Kevin phone Haynes] different calls [Brandon Freeman, interpretations such “did noth- everyone, made numerous denials to ing possible more than offer one frame- video-recorded, though even we had a understanding work for the conversation.” audio-recorded interview with Mr. Thompson’s testimony regard- Id. Officer Haynes where he made these admissions ing interpretation of “that time” falls to us. in- comfortably range within the same objection hearsay Gadson’s counsel made a least, testimony. very At the it terpretive purported to “the of Brandon admissions court to plain was not error for the district Haynes,” but the district court implicitly Indeed, testimony. allow the the dissent objection. denied why no the district court’s advances reason Thompson’s cut off testi- failure to Officer Gadson, According to Officer mony sponte sua was “clear” or “obvious” Thompson’s statement that Brandon Olano, error, States v. 507 U.S. United hearsay “made these admissions to us” is 734, 1770, 113 S.Ct. 123 L.Ed.2d 508 any that exception. is not admissible under (1993) (internal omitted), quotation marks disagree. Thompson’s We Officer state light allowing of our settled law this ment that Brandon “made these admis type testimony.7 sions to us” does meet the definition of hearsay: a that statement is offered “to 4 truth prove the of the matter asserted 801(c)(2). hearsay We next turn to Gadson’s the statement.” Fed.R.Evid. challenge admissibility Thompson testify to the of Officer Officer did not as to the admissions,” testimony characterizing repeat any Thompson’s nature of “these Brandon, by Haynes.8 by suggest statements Brandon assertion made or made any explained, lay opinion As we have testimo that the should consider admis truthful. ny may convey rely hearsay, sion made Brandon to be Rather, helpful jury. Thompson because it is not to the Kev Officer mentioned Freeman, police at Brandon’s as con- 905. admissions carefully reject- testimony 7. We have considered—and that the admission of such prejudicial. Wilson never raised Because challenges specific ed—each of Wilson’s to arguments, government such and the has not Thompson. statements Officer The dis- respond, opportunity we decline had an sent, however, points to several additional FAA, here. See Greenwoodv. address them parts transcript, of the trial where the dissent (9th Cir.1994) (stating we F.3d Thompson repeated claims Officer clear ap- arguments "will not manufacture for an meaning. speculated words or as their pellant”). Dissent at 1230-31. Wilson himself did not statements, brief, argue joins cite these let alone that the that he 8. In his Wilson states 28(i). R.App. failing argument. Fed. P. district court erred in to strike them or call, testimony regarding drug terms related phone text for the recorded investigation may expert opinion jurors would hear Bran- an be explain why the “Hell, testimony, A background. testimony, lay opinion in the or both. no” don state provide Although clar- we have noted the difficulties making statements to witness may agent qualified arise when an context for other statements ification and expert provided lay testimony, truth of the see evidence for the also offering is not Freeman, 903-04, asserted, testimony such does Kevin 498 F.3d at we matter any hearsay prohibition. nevertheless held that such dual use not run afoul of have Collicott, lay agents expert v. of “case as both States See United (9th Cir.1996); inherently suspect is not so n. 7 see also United witnesses Whitman, categorically prohibited.” 1352 it should be Id. Cir.1985) (no informant’s error where “to only offered recorded statements were regarding Our concerns a witness made,” they put were and to show qualifies expert giving lay opin as an who context, rather than for their statements directly applicable ion are not *22 truth). court did Accordingly, the district agent providing lay an testi when who is declining its discretion in to not abuse mony interprets drug also a few terms testimony. strike discussing personal the context of observa testify tions. While witnesses who as expert may credibility” receive “unmerited Finally, argues Wilson the district lay testimony, expert for their because tes Thompson in allowing court erred Officer timony “likely carry special weight interpretation drug jar provide his (internal jury,” quota with the id. at 903 (crack gon such as “nine of leaded” co omitted), tion marks the converse is not caine), (firearm), “a he strap” or because lay testimony true: a witness’s carries no as an witn qualified expert had been lay if special weight, points even at ess.9 Because-neither Gadson nor Wilson has back witness recourse relevant objected at trial to drug jargon testi Similarly, ground training. and there is testimony, mony impermissible expert special lay testimony regard no risk that claim plain we review this error. See ing merely firsthand observations would be Pino-Noriega, United States v. 189 F.3d speculative. at 904. have also id. We Cf. (9th Cir.1999). 1089, 1097 expressed expert concern that wit because enforcement “[L]aw may opine nesses on matters about which meaning drug jargon may about the be they personal knowledge, they have no expert lay testimony, depending both rely may hearsay also on inadmissible on the circumstances.” United States providing lay testimony. when Id. Such a (9th Cir.2009). Reed, 575 F.3d danger necessarily lay does not arise when witness, lay Unlike a a witness who is an testifying witnesses are about matters expert drug jargon may interpret on en they which were involved. coded terms if the had drug even witness Here, particular Thompson not been involved in that investi testified Officer his gation. police primarily lay providing See id. And so officers’ as a witness suggests Thompson phone 9. The at None of the dissent that Officer calls. Dissent 1227. objected Thompson's qualified expert parties should have to Officer testi- been as an be- trial, offering opinions mony has any fore of his on this basis at and Wilson because "specialized equipment” argument appeal. used to listen the not raised this on case; bring position he refer- our own knowledge of the and biases with firsthand training police us. enced his reliance (as familiarity opposed to

experience I Thompson]: agree. [Officer would through specific investi- the individuals Attorney]: Right. you [Wilson’s So single term gation) only defining when have tendency project po- would instance “nine of leaded.” This isolated lice interpretation things? officer’s onto does not raise the concerns identified I Thompson]: [Officer would—I would Further, Freeman. the district Kevin yes, I I put a—good state think a— reasonably could conclude that Offi- court together, case and I’m confident of the Thompson encountered the two terms cer people charged guilty in the case are investigation in the context his at issue the crimes. through training experi- as well as objected Gadson’s counsel to Officer Reed, at 922. “Be- ence. See Thompson’s ground answer on the that it lay cause the distinction between and ex- vouching. constituted The district court one, testimony in this context is fine pert answer, did not strike the but stated be- failing not fault district court for we do jury: fore the “[ultimately up it’s sponte.”10 to intervene sua Kevin Free- innocence, jury guilt to determine man, so the should consider all the evidence reject argument also We Wilson’s presented regard.” in that Thompson’s police reference to re- Officer appeal, On argument Gadson renews his special equipment or to his use of ports, Thompson’s that Officer statement consti- tapes, gave review the him an unwarranted impermissible tuted vouching because it *23 not special knowledge. aura of Wilson did Thompson’s personal was Officer opinion trial, argument raise this at and the dis- guilt. joins of the defendants’ Wilson this plainly did not err in not ad- trict court argument, argues and also that Officer sponte concern. dressing sua this Thompson’s opinion improper because

it went to the ultimate issue of the defen- C 704(b) guilt, in dants’ violation Rule the Federal Rules of Evidence. object spe Both defendants to a portion Thompson’s cific of Officer testi may place not Prosecutors by in mony response questioning to Wil prestige government “the of the behind a attorney. Thompson son’s After Officer through personal witness assurances regarding prison had the recorded testified veracity, suggesting that in witness’s or calls, phone attorney engaged him Wilson’s presented jury sup not to the formation in following colloquy: ports testimony.” the witness’s United [Nonetheless, Necoechea, 1273, attorney]: States v. 986 F.2d 1276 [Wilson’s (9th Cir.1993). By putting when we come into life or come into an unwarrant courtroom, credibility authority go, imprimatur wherever we we ed or Further, Thomp- drug-related investigations) quali- the admission of Officer would have 10. give expert testimony son's definition of these terms did not affect fied him to on this sub- rights, ject. Figueroa-Lopez, v. 125 the defendants’ substantial because the See United States 1241, Cir.1997) (9th (holding regarding Thompson's evidence Officer back- F.3d (he ground experience assigned lay testimony about counter- had been the admission of drug operations to the statewide enforcement unit for the surveillance was harmless because previous qualified give expert years three and a half was indeed had re- witness subject). training opinion testimony ceived several hundred hours of on witness, opinion “a direct on the defen- prosecutor may offering testifying

on the right defendant’s be Free- “jeopardize guilt or innocence.” Kevin dant’s the evidence 704(b) the basis of solely man, tried But Rule jury.” States v. to the United presented Thomp- inapplicable by its terms. Officer (9th 1142, F.3d 1146-48 Weatherspoon, 410 testifying expert not as an witness son was omitted). (internal Cir.2005) citations The defendants have cited no cases here. case, however, did not government 704(b) witness, laya applying Rule testimony, nor Thompson’s elicit Officer doing no for so under the there is basis credibility “either it for his did vouch Accordingly, the district text of the rule. the wit prestige own behind putting its striking did not err in not the testi- court ness, infor by indicating that extrinsic 704(b) mony grounds.11 on Rule presented supports court mation not testimony.” United States witnesses] IY Garcia-Guizar, Cir. challenges two re Gadson raises omitted). 1998) (internal quotation marks lating government’s reliance on Rather, Thompson only testified Officer States, Pinkerton v. United 328 U.S. about his testi that he was confident own (1946), 66 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed. 1489 mony after defense counsel attacked his possessing fire obtain his conviction for credibility. The defendants have not drug trafficking arms in furtherance of any that such pointed suggesting case 924(c)(1).12 § At offenses under 18 U.S.C. impermissible constitutes vouch Pinkerton, trial, government relied on Accordingly, the district court did not ing. co-conspirators which “renders all crimi testimony on declining err in to strike the nally reasonably foreseeable liable ground. overt acts committed others further n argues that the district court Wilson joined, conspiracy they ance of the have striking Thompson’s erred Officer they whether were aware of them or not.” opinion because it was an on the response Hernandez-Orellana, States v. United guilt ultimate issue of or innocence. Un- (9th Cir.2008). 704(b), expert an in a der Rule witness guilty respect found to a shot Gadson opinion criminal case “must state *24 gun handgun found inside the Fouts about whether the defendant did or did not house, a guilty respect but not to rifle a mental state or that con- have condition found outside. charged stitutes an element of the crime or challenges Gadson the instruction on interpreted of a defense.” We have this precluding expert liability given jury, argu- rule as an witness from Pinkerton to the Indeed, innocence, Thompson jury even if Officer had tes- or and so the should consider witness, expert any failing tified presented regard.” as an error in all the in that evidence remark would have been harm- strike his circumstances, analogous we have less. who, provides "any person 12. The statute that single held that a failure to strike a comment during any crime of vio- and in relation to lengthy over the course of a trial was not drug trafficking lence or crime ... uses or plain government rely error when the did not firearm, who, a in furtherance of carries arguments jury. on the comment in its to the crime, firearm, shall, any possesses a such Gomez-Osorio, United States v. Cf. punishment provided addition to the for such Cir.1992). government 642 did The drug trafficking crime of violence or crime— Thompson’s cite Officer at all. not Moreover, comment (i) imprisonment a be sentenced to term of of gave the court an immediate cura- years.” than 18 U.S.C. not less jury, stating tive instruction to the that: "[u]l- 924(c)(1)(A). § timately up guilt jury it’s to the to determine to be a reasonably have been foreseen him be convicted allowed it ing consequence of the necessary or natural coconspirators’ that the showing a without According to Gad- agreement.” reasonably fore- unlawful was the firearms of use son, convey the instruction failed challenges the He to him. also seeable it that the offense him had find to convict sufficiency of the evidence Gadson, reasonably foreseeable was a Pinkerton theory. under reasonably foreseeable to a objectively just A coconspirator. the district by considering begin We nor Wilson raised Neither Gadson Pinkerton liability: instruction on

court’s to the Pinkerton objection particular of guilty the may find defendant [Y]ou instruction, plain our is for and so review in further- of a firearm possession ... Kessi, See United States error. 3, if trafficking, Count drug ... ance of (9th Cir.1989) (one of type each of the proved has government the does not neces objection to an instruction a reasonable beyond following elements objection if there sarily preserve another doubt: the district court no reason to believe was First, respective in the person named objection). We fully aware of that was indictment superseding first count of the court did not the district conclude in the alleged committed crime its Pinkerton formulating err plainly Second, was a mem- the person count. directly instruction instruction. charged in Count conspiracy ber of Pinkerton, which language of tracks Third, indictment. superseding of the liability would coconspirator held in fur- the crime committed person to a case where extend Fourth, conspiracy.... therance committed the substantive offense a member of the the defendant not in fact conspirators was one of the at time the offense conspiracy same conspiracy, in furtherance of the done fifth, And, offense committed. un- scope of the not fall within the did the unlawful scope fell within merely part or was project, lawful reasonably have and could agreement could plan which ramifications of the necessary or natu- to be foreseen been as a neces- reasonably not be foreseen agree- unlawful consequence ral un- consequence of the natural sary or ment. agreement. lawful mis- instruction claims that this Gadson 647-48, More- 66 S.Ct. 1180. portion 328 U.S. He the law. focuses stated instruc- over, identical upheld we have stated that which the court’s instruction ap- “an accurate statement tion as guilty find jury could Gadson *25 v. Alvarez- law.” United coconspir- plicable a offense committed firearm (9th Valenzuela, 1202-03 231 F.3d beyond proved only government if the ator Cir.2000).13 Indeed, Circuit the Ninth “could that the offense doubt reasonable members conspiracy, the other the upheld anee of in The instruction Alvarez-Valen- law, also, that committed under the have was as follows: zuela Therefore, you may a defen- find crime. conspiracy responsible a is Each member of dur- possession of a firearm guilty of dant per- other members for the actions the trafficking drug to a ing in relation during and in further- the course formed crime, in Count 3 charged in Count 1 or conspiracy. If member of one ance of Indictment, has government if conspiracy a crime in further- commits Jury' however, Model Instruction 8.25 re- 768. We emphasized, Criminal the nar- only that “the offense fell within quires holding. rowness of this Id. agreement scope of the Unlawful and could process The 'due concerns identified in reasonably have been foreseen to abe nec- present Castaneda are not here. There essary consequence or natural of the un- was substantial evidence par- of Gadson’s In agreement.” light lawful of this author- ticipation drug conspiracy, and a ity, say we cannot the district court’s jury reasonable could conclude that Gad- jury formulation of the instruction was er- son could have foreseen the use of fire- instructions, plain, ror that is or that the drug arms connection with the traffick- whole, read as a “misleading were or inad- ing. Accordingly, application of a deliberation,” equate guide jury’s theory in Pinkerton this context does not Frega, United States precepts violate “fundamental pro- of due Cir.1999). (9th n. 16 cess.” Id. Gadson’s reliance on otherwise, United States v. In arguing Gadson relies on Green, (9th Cir.2010), 592 F.3d 1057 Castaneda, United States v. 9 F.3d 761 (9th misplaced. likewise analyzed Green Cir.1993), overruled in nonrelevant elements of liability vicarious for mail and part by Nordby, United States v. fraud, wire and determined as a matter of Cir.2000), which identified impression first the fraudulent acts process a due scope limitation on the parties committed third furtherance liability Pinkerton in certain circum- reasonably the scheme must be foresee- Castaneda, stances. Id. at 766. able to liability the defendant for to attach. major drug wife of a trafficker Id. at analysis, 1069-71. Based on 924(c) we a charged § with violation of under struck down a instruction that re- a theory. only Pinkerton evidence quired government prove only linking the wife conspiracy was her “defendant or a co-schemer knew or could marital relationship to her husband and reasonably have foreseen” that a fraudu- phone few calls in which relayed the wife lent communication would be emailed or information to members conspiracy of the part faxed as of the scheme. Id. Given at her request. husband’s Id. at 767-68. that Gadson charged was not with the process We held that “due constrains the specific Green, crime at issue in it does not application of Pinkerton where the rela- plain affect our analysis. error tionship between the defendant and the substantive offense is slight,” id. at B and concluded that a Pinkerton instruction would process violate due on the facts of challenges Gadson also sufficiency case, given slight connection be- the evidence support introduced at trial to tween the wife conspiracy, and the id. at his conviction under posses- Pinkerton for proven Fourth, following each of the elements be- the defendant was a member of the yond a reasonable doubt: conspiracy same at the time that the offense First, person involved conspiracy charged in the in either Count 1 or Count 3 was committed; knowingly Count 1 or possessed Count 3 Fifth, during drug firearm and in relation to a scope the offense fell within the crime; trafficking agreement unlawful reasonably and could *26 Second, person awas member of the necessary have been foreseen to be a or 3; conspiracy charged in consequence Count 1 or Count agree- natural of the unlawful

Third, person possessed the firearm in ment. conspiracy; furtherance of the 231 F.3d at 1202-03.

1217 — 2796, -, nied, 133 S.Ct. drug U.S. in furtherance of firearms sion of two (2013), are mind- although we L.Ed.2d 864 18 U.S.C. pursuant trafficking sufficiency a error review of 924(c)(1). plain ful that § “theoretically stringent more only claim is under a liability Gadson’s To establish claim,” preserved for a than the standard had to government theory, the Pinkerton 911, 917 Flyer, v. United “reasonably foreseen it could be prove that Cir.2011) (internal (9th quotation marks consequence natural necessary a or omitted). of Gad- that one agreement” unlawful a firearm” would use “coconspirators son’s review, this standard Under trafficking of- drug of the in furtherance Gad- to sustain the evidence was sufficient Carter, v. United States fenses. two possession of the for son’s conviction (internal Cir.2009) (9th quota- 1107, 1113 charged of the in furtherance firearms omitted). government tion marks trial The evidence at drug crimes. “actual that Gadson had prove need the Fouts frequented that Gadson showed used,” only be guns that would knowledge house, conspira of the core member was a and such plan in the he was involved primary supplier a cocaine cy, and was “from reasonably foreseeable use would be house. The out of the Fouts sold (internal quo- Id. plan.” of the the nature drug expert dealers heard omitted). tation marks at locations with commonly keep guns jury’s challenge Gadson does money or be quantities drugs large co-conspirators one of finding that they are concerned about raids cause traffick- drug in furtherance of gun used government and the competitors, police Rather, argues that the evidence ing. drugs, regarding the introduced evidence he could prove was insufficient cash, at the Fouts found and firearms co-con- reasonably foreseen that a have specific more was also the house. There possessed the Fouts house spirator at was present trial that Gadson testimony at of the in furtherance handgun shotgun Haynes showed Voaklander when Joshua drug conspiracy. under the couch rifle hidden an assault reviewing the constitutional to be that it explained cushions and a crimi support of evidence sufficiency through “somebody comes used case conviction, whether must nal we determine Taking this evidence the front door.” light in the evidence viewing “after prosecu favorable light most any ra prosecution, most favorable to Jackson, S.Ct. tion, 443 U.S. have found of fact could tional trier have concluded jury could a rational beyond a of the crime essential elements Gad- reasonably foreseeable to that it was Virginia, v. reasonable doubt.” Jackson would co-conspirators of his son one 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 443 U.S. drug in furtherance a firearm use (1979). Although Gadson L.Ed.2d trafficking offenses. under acquittal judgment moved for the Federal Rules Criminal Rule 29 of V govern close of after the

Procedure sufficiency of challenges the case, motion Wilson not renew his ment’s he did is that His claim at trial as well. Accord evidence the evidence. after the of all close insuf- trial introduced at plain for the evidence challenge ingly, we review that he finding assault- support 704 ficient error, Phillips, United States see infor- providing in retaliation Cir.2012), ed Pitka cert. de- *27 mation to a federal official in violation of son intended to retaliate because Pitka 1513(b)(2).14 § 18 U.S.C. Wilson did provided government. information to the trial, move for at the close of acquittal and Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence plain so error. we review support conviction Wilson’s under 18 1513(b)(2). § U.S.C. prove To a violation Because the 1513(b)(2), establishing evidence § government must show: “(1) (2) specific Wilson had the intent to retaliate knowing engagement in conduct against Pitka causing, cause, primarily either or was derived from threatening to (3) bodily injury calls, his recorded person telephone to another also Wilson for, alia,” argues the intent to retaliate inter pro jury rely could not on this viding relating information to a federal evidence because the calls constituted con offense to a law enforcement officer. fessions that had not adequately been cor Henderson, United States v. roborated. Lopez- See United States v. (6th Cir.2010) (internal quotation Alvarez, 589-90 Cir. omitted). marks argues Wilson that no 1992). disagree. Lopez-Alvarez We stat rational trier of fact could conclude that he ed the longstanding rule that under most requisite acted with the intent to retaliate circumstances, a confession made to the against Pitka. police “requires independent some corrob orating evidence in order to serve as the argument Wilson’s Taking fails. basis for a conviction.” Id. 589. We in the light evidence most favorable to explained purpose that the of this rule is to prosecution, the evidence showed “high address the incidence of false confes Wilson knew that Pitka was a confidential sions resulting and the prevent need to implicated informant who had Wilson and errors upon convictions based untrue other coconspirators police. Fur (internal confessions alone.” Id. quotation ther, a could have concluded that omitted). marks A secondary rationale is Wilson harm intended to Pitka because he preserve a justice robust criminal sys was a “snitch.” The evidence shows that premised tem on “extrinsic evidence inde Wilson assaulted Pitka in hallway pendently secured through skillful investi days few after telling Haynes Gabriella gation,” rather than heavily one that relies go “[s]nitches can’t into hallways,” on confessions. Id. at and later 589 n. 5. reported to Gabriella Wilson’s that he had hit statements “Donny,” to his cousin are and made other not confes statements suggesting police, sions to the thought private it but was Pitka’s in statements volvement in buy the controlled that were intercepted by that led to police. the unraveling Therefore, of the drug conspiracy. requirement corroboration Wilson offered no explanation Lopez-Alvarez alternative applicable. More evidence, for the assault. over, Based on this the policy rationales underlying Lo juror reasonable could pez-Alvarez conclude that Wil- are not present police when provides: 14. The statute pro- offense or a violation of conditions of (b) bation, release, knowingly engages supervised parole, Whoever any con- or re- thereby duct and bodily injury pending judicial causes proceedings given lease person damages another tangible or officer; person ato law enforcement property person, of another or threatens to so, attempts to do shall be fined under so, against do with intent any to retaliate imprisoned this title or not more than 20 person for— years, or both. (2) any relating information to the commis- 1513(b)(2). § 18 U.S.C. possible sion or commission of a Federal

1219 involved, “all rea- directly and or admis- dant obtains statements investigation of acts and omissions sonably foreseeable to a third by the defendant made sions jointly under- in furtherance here. others the circumstances under person activity.” U.S.S.G. criminal taken lB1.3(a)(l)(B). calculating the § After VI level, must the district court offense base and Wil address Gadson nowWe the offense characteris- specific determine court commit the district son’s claims 2Dl.l(b), any ad- tics, § determine id. In sentencing. errors procedural ted victim, role, and ob- to related justments court the district determining whether lBl.l(a)(3), § and justice, id. of struction defendant’s of a in its calculation erred history criminal the defendant’s determine court’s sentence, the district we review lBl.l(a)(6). § category, id. novo, de of the Guidelines interpretation of making required the calculation In the Guidelines of application its adopted the district court discretion, drug quantities, its factual and of facts for abuse Investigation Report’s Presentenee roles quantity and including drug findings, (PSR) responsi- findings Gadson was offense, error. United for clear in an marijuana (9th 10,521,103 of 708, grams Staten, ble for 713 v. States in a base offense resulting equivalency, v. Gon Cir.2006); States also United see 2Dl.l(c)(2). Cir.2008) § (9th of 36. See U.S.S.G. level zalez, 1214 F.3d Rivera, adopted also two-level court a The district v. United States (drug quantity); (roles). “maintaining] premises Cir.2008) (9th adjustment for 891, 908 manufacturing or dis- of purpose

for the substance,” id. tributing A a controlled 2Dl.l(b)(12), adjustment a three-level § set Sentencing Guidelines (but manager supervisor or being “a for determining ap for procedure forth leader) the crimi- or organizer The district range. sentencing plicable partici- five or more activity nal involved correct of must first determine court extensive,” id. otherwise or was pants applicable guideline section fense for 3Bl.l(b), adjustment a two-level § conviction, then determine of offense § Ac- id. 3C1.1. justice, of obstruction United offense level. correct base assigned Gad- court the district cordingly, Rivera-Gomez, resulting level of a total offense son Cir.2011). guideline Here 510-11 of life. sentencing range a Guideline 21 U.S.C. convictions under for Gadson’s court A. The district pt. U.S.S.G. Ch. 841(a)(1) (conspiracy 1 and § for Counts to 300 Gadson ultimately sentenced of a controlled possession distribute and eight years imprisonment months distribute) is intent substance with release. supervised Guidelines. Sentencing § 2D1.1 of the district court argues 2Dl.l(a)(5) Gadson the district directs Section calculation ways its in two clearly erred drugs for which up add court to First, argues he range. the Guidelines then use responsible and defendant was calculating court erred that the district Quantity Table to Drug the Guidelines’ him. drugs attributable quantity offense base the defendant’s determine insuffi- there Second, argues that quantity determining level. three-level support evidence to cient responsible, a defendant drugs for which having managerial enhancement quanti all is to consider the district court supervisory role. the defen- with which ties of contraband Guidelines, tencing the PSR converted the quantity of each drug equivalent into an start with claim We Gadson’s quantity marijuana, 10,521,103 totalling that the district court’s calculation of-the *29 grams marijuana. of The con- PSR also drug quantity attributable to Gadson was verted the cash money orders seized clearly involving erroneous. cases ($51,455) at the Fouts Way and Gillam “jointly activity,” undertaken criminal ($43,020) equivalent houses into an amount base offense level is determined on the cocaine, powder $40,000 of using a ratio of reasonably basis of “all foreseeable acts per kilogram. The total powder amount of in omissions of others furtherance” of cocaine calculated this manner 2.27 lB1.3(a)(l)(B). activity. § U.S.S.G. kilograms. The district court expressly government prov bears the burden of adopted the PSR’s factual findings. ing drugs the amount of attributable to a by preponderance defendant of the evi argues Gadson the district court dence. United States v. Culps, 300 F.3d made three errors in calculating drug (9th 1069, Cir.2002). 1076 A district court First, quantity. he contends that the dis- may approximate the drugs amount of at trict court in failing erred to make an tributable defendant where the express finding factual that Gadson could drugs amount of by seized the officers reasonably foresee that all drugs at- “does not reflect the scale of the offense.” (aside him tributed to drugs from the § 2D1.1 U.S.S.G. cmt. 5. In making an house) Way seized from his Gillam were in estimate, may consider, the court among jointly furtherance of the undertaken crim- factors, price other “the generally obtained activity. inal disagree. We While the substance, for the controlled financial or “district court must make an express fac- records, other similar [and] transactions in tual finding regarding the amount drugs controlled substances the defendant.” that the defendant reasonably foresaw as Thus, may Id. a court convert cash into being part of the conspiracy,” the district drug quantities, provided there is some court “may satisfy the requirement that it evidence supporting a connection between make factual findings by specifically adopt- the money seized drug and the transac ing findings presentence re- Otis, tions. See United 127 F.3d port,” Whitecotton, United States v. 142 (9th Cir.1997) 836 (citing United (9th Cir.1998), 1198 so long Gonzalez-Sanchez, States v. 953 F.2d 1184 the PSR includes more than “conclusory (9th Cir.1992)). unsupported statements by the facts or the Guidelines,” United States v. Gamez-Or- case, In this the PSR attributed to duño, Cir.2000) Gadson all the drugs seized from the (internal omitted); quotation marks see (1,977.4 Fouts house grams of powder co Becerra, also United States v. caine, ecstasy pills, grams 31.5 of mari (9th Cir.1993). Gadsoris PSR juana, grams cocaine, 17.02 of crack contained detailed factual recitations con- grams heroin), 4.8 all drugs seized him necting drugs at issue and (.4 from the Way Gillam grams house establishing that they part were of the powder cocaine and grams 140.9 of mari conspiracy. Accordingly, the district court juana), purchases ten of nine-ounce .units adopting did not err in findings the PSR (2,551 of crack Voaklander grams), and as its own. 4,623.7 another grams of powder cocaine based on trial testimony. Using Second, the conver Gadson claims that the district 2Dl.l(c) sion § tables found at of the Sen- court by holding erred him accountable for powder kilograms to 1.2 equivalent cocaine was (2,551.5 of crack grams) ounces cocaine, seized from the and the cash Gil- purchased had testified that Voaklander equivalent to 1.07 Way Fouts house houses lam Haynes Joshua from argues gov- sales These Gadson period. kilograms. nine-month over a drugs that all of the prove the lion’s share failed to accounted ernment (converted court The district 2.27 currency to Gadson. kilo- attributable seized finding. cocaine) making clearly err was attributable powder did not grams that Gadson First, testified currency Voaklander that the him. He also claims approxi- and observed present had been been associated with sale have could Gadson the transactions. mately half of already included drugs that were rely- erred the district court claims that level, to double leading offense count- base *30 allegedly uncorrob- Voaklander’s ing on ing. testimony. untrustworthy and orated unavailing is because argument Gadson’s testified Nevertheless, because Voaklander attributing in the seized curren- any error full cross- oath, subject to and was

under (converted kilograms powder of cy to 2.27 counsel, the dis- by Gadson’s examination cocaine) would be to Gadson harmless. testi- could credit Voaklander’s trict court First, kilograms that the 2.27 it is not clear uncorroborated it though was mony even in included cocaine were powder of from his would benefit and Voaklander offense of base level. Gadson’s calculation See government. cooperation with marijuana equivalency of calculating the In Alvarez, United Gadson, to the PSR drugs attributable Cir.2004). Moreover, other evi- 6,601.5 powder of cocaine grams converted at trial established introduced dence marijuana. 1,320,300 of grams transactions in the was involved Gadson 6,601.5 to the amount grams equivalent present regularly house: he was the Fouts from the Fouts drugs of actual seized found house, were fingerprints his at the (.4 grams) (1,977.4 Way grams) and Gillam nearly a containing in the house on a box houses, at trial drugs described of cocaine, large sums he received kilo of explain not (4,623.7 does grams). Gadson from Joshua two cash on occasions kilograms powder of cocaine house and the 2.27 at the Fouts how Haynes, who lived Voaklander, of his base he com- in calculation included drugs to sold the were Transport- of But if we assume that how the level. even plained about arrest offense Anchorage to kilograms 2.27 er, drugs from who ferried had converted the PSR Fairbanks, everything 472,380 of grams could have “messed cocaine into powder of testimony, the district light (2,361.9 of this up.” grams marijuana equivalence finding in clearly not err court did 1: at a ratio of power cocaine converted crack from purchases Voaklander’s in the 200), included that amount total scope were within Haynes Gadson, Joshua drugs amount of attributable reasonably fore- joint undertaking affect his sen- such inclusion would to Gadson. seeable 472,380 grams would Removing the tence. drugs attribut- quantity total reduce it was im- Third, Gadson asserts 10,521,103 grams to Gadson from able to convert the the district court proper marijuana equivalence. 10,048,723grams of Way Fouts and Gillam found cash 48,723 than the greater grams This is still the mari- marijuana and include houses required drugs quantity minimum calculating amount juana equivalency level of 36 found offense the base support According level. offense base court. U.S.S.G. district Fouts house PSR, seized from the cash 2D1.1(c)(2). § nal, omitted). Because the base quotation offense internal marks level would be the same with or without The district court need not any spe- make the amounts attributable to the seized cur findings cific as to this long issue so rency, error was any harmless. United evidence in supports the record an infer- Garcia-Guizar, States v. 491 ence that the defendant req- exercised the (9th Cir.2000). degree uisite of control. United States v. (9th Cir.2012). Whitney, The district court clearly did not turn We now to Gadson’s claim that the err finding played that Gadson a mana district court in imposing erred a three- gerial role in the drug conspiracy. The sentencing level playing enhancement for record supports an that Gadson inference 3Bl.l(b). managerial § role. See U.S.S.G. “oversaw” a participant in the offense 3Bl.l(b), § Under an enhancement is re- the name “Transporter.” Transporter quired where a “manager defendant was a indictment, was not named but testi (but supervisor organizer or mony at trial established that he trans leader) and activity the criminal involved ported drugs on several occasions from five or participants.” more prove To that Anchorage, where Gadson maintained *31 played role, defendant such a the govern- residence, house, to the Fouts that his ment must demonstrate that the defendant visits to Fairbanks were coordinated with oversaw or more participants,” “one other Gadson’s, that complained and Gadson “ meaning persons who are ‘criminally re- Transporter could every have “messed sponsible the for of commission the of- thing up” if he were arrested. The district fense, but [who] need not have been con- conclude, court could based on this testi ” Smith, victed.’ United States v. 719 F.3d mony, that Transporter was a “partici (9th 1120, Cir.2013) 1125 (quoting U.S.S.G. pant” in offense, the criminal and that § 2); 3B1.1 cmt. see also United States v. Gadson directed him to drugs deliver Woods, (9th Cir.2003). F.3d 335 1001 Fairbanks from Anchorage. United Cf. (9th States v. Egge, 223 F.3d In 1132 determination, making this Cir.2000) 3Bl.l(b) § (finding district enhancement court should “the consider exercise warranted where participant, among of decision other making authority, the nature of things, accompanied defendant on participation trips in the commission of the of pick drugs); fense, up Franco, United v. the States recruitment of accomplices, the (9th Cir.1998) 136 F.3d (finding claimed to a right larger of share the fruits 3Bl.l(b) § crime, of enhancement warranted where degree participation in defendant participant asked run planning an er organizing offense, the na rand for him and to up set a drug ture and transac scope of the activity, illegal tion). facts, On imposition those degree of the of control authority exer managerial role was Rivera, cised over enhancement not an others.” 527 F.3d at abuse of discretion. 4). 908 (quoting § U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 cmt.

particular, “there must be evidence that B

the defendant exercised some control over others in involved commission the of We next address sentencing Wilson’s fense [or responsible was] organizing for claim. The district adopted court others for the purpose of carrying out the PSR’s assigned findings aWilson base crime.” Riley, United States v. offense level of 28 based on quantity (9th Cir.2003) (alteration in origi- drugs attributable to him. claims Wilson explaining any evidence provide failed denying erred court the district conspiracy). role his lesser under adjustment a downward him “substan- was he § 3B1.2 because U.S.S.G. n VII partici- other than the culpable” tially less cmt. id. See cumu- pants. that the claim Finally, defendants trial errors warrant of the impact lative adjustment downward A two-level error—and find no Because we reversal. the de when is role warranted minor for error—reversal prejudicial certainly not in any participant “minor was fendant unwarranted.' 3B1.2(b).15 The § activity.” Id. criminal AFFIRMED. partici a “minor commentary explains “sub who was abe defendant must pant” concurring BERZON, Judge, Circuit average culpable than stantially less dissenting: 3(A), but cmt. § 3B1.2 id. participant,” except majority opinion as min in the I concur not be described could role “whose Avery III(B), concerning Officer The defendant Part cmt. 5. § imal,” 3B1.2 id. content testimony was as to that he Thompson’s proving burden bears calls. telephone recorded preponderance by a the defendants’ participant minor holdings Rosas, 111(B), majority’s Part States As to United evidence. (Kevin Cir.2010). v. Freeman (9th on United 1058, 1067 rest Cir.2007). Freeman), concluded Here, court district view, much Freeman, goes my Kevin clearly although Wilson lay allowing officer far too operation, or leader organizer Other conversations. concerning recorded either, citing participant minor not a Kev- than considerably stricter are circuits *32 group, of the was one Wilson fact that view, my In regard. in this in Freeman and by Gadson enough trusted was correct, Kevin and circuits are other with the house alone at be left Haynes to Freeman wrong. Kevin is Freeman “aligned” was guns, and and the drugs court, by an en banc be revisited should demonstrated as co-conspirators case. in this perhaps testimony Pitka. on his assault by bind- Freeman as accepting Kevin Even extensively discussed evidence I I dissent. present, for ing precedent the dis support opinion throughout erred plainly court trial' hold would conclusion, means which court’s trict admitting some Freeman Kevin under Wilson’s that determination court’s district that testimony, and Thompson’s of Officer minor was not was not of involvement level prejudicial. was the error v. Day States United See error. clear (9th Cir. 1082, 1102-03 child, F.3d 357 I. defendant 2004) (no where error clear Thomp- challenge Officer Defendants act ain central directly involved Evi- Rule Federal testimony under son’s drugs for exchange of i.e., the conspiracy, lay witness 701, which allows dence Del v. United money); see also (a) “rationally only if it is (9th opinion offer Toro-Barboza, F.3d (b) perception,” witness’s based Cir.2012) (no where defendant error clear participant although a minimal categories, could be also maintains 15. Wilson lesser showing of his greater make múst participant “minimal” eligible a 4-level for § 3B1.2. U.S.S.G. complicity. for both analysis similar adjustment. The “helpful clearly understanding the wit- In Freeman, Kevin the officer “offered ness’s or to determining a fact interpretations of ambiguous conversations (c) issue,” “not scientific, based on that did not consist of coded terms all.” technical, specialized or other knowledge 498 F.3d at 902. For example, within the of’ scope expert testimony. [i]n several conversations, [the officer] Fed.R.Evid. 701. This Court broadly per- interpreted ambiguous phrases such as anmits officer “interpret[ ambigu- ] ... “that,” “they,” and them,” “one of ous upon conversations based his direct refer to money either or cocaine. knowledge of the investigation.” Kevin conversation, another interpreted [he] [a Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904. That aspect of eo-eonspirator]’s statement, “Man, it’s is, view, Kevin Freeman in my wrong, already” done to mean given “he’s is, it majority as the recognizes, inconsis- cocaine to Kevin Freeman and that he’s tent with the case law in several other money received his it.” See, circuits. e.g., United States v. Free- Id. Similarly, “during one recorded tele- (Marcus man Freeman), (6th 730 F.3d 590 phone call, [a co-conspirator] stated that Cir.2013); United States Hampton, 718 he ‘touched bases with two of those.’” (D.C.Cir.2013); F.3d 978 United States v. testified, [The officer] without offering an Johnson, (4th Cir.2010); explanation, this meant [the United States v. Grinage, (2d 390 F.3d 746 speaker] able to obtain two kilograms Cir.2004); United States v. Peoples, 250 of cocaine. Id. at 900. “During another Cir.2001); see also Maj. Op. recorded telephone call, Freeman informed at 1208-09. The holding should be revisit- co-conspirator] [a that he get wished to off ed an en banc court. of the telephone while driving.... [The officer] testified that Freeman’s desire to

A. get off of the telephone was motivated fear of pulled being over and arrested for Kevin Freeman addressed whether a possession of cocaine.” Id. police testify officer may both an expert concerning witness coded drug terms and The Court noted “in these instances as a lay witness concerning general [the officer] ceased to apply his specialized knowledge about the case. The Court ex- knowledge drug jargon and the drug pressed concern “that a ease agent who trade began to interpret ambiguous *33 testifies as an expert receives ‘unmerited statements based on general his knowl- credibility’ for lay testimony,” Kevin Free- of edge the investigation.” Id. at 902. man, (citation 498 F.3d at 903 omitted), Kevin Freeman nonetheless held that but held that “the use of agents case as most of the officer’s testimony met the both expert lay witnesses is so not requirements of Rule because his “un- inherently suspect that it should be cate- derstanding ambiguous of phrases was gorically prohibited,” id. at 904. In so based on ... several hours of intercepted holding, Kevin Freeman also discussed the ... conversations and other facts he scope permissible of lay opinion testimony learned during the investigation,” and the by an officer regarding the content of a testimony “proved to helpful jury in the defendant’s recorded conversations. It is determining what [the defendant and his that portion of Kevin Freeman which the co-conspirators] were communicating dur- majority reaffirms, and on which it relies the ing telephone recorded calls.” Id. at repeatedly in rejecting defendants’ chal- 904-05. In view, the Court’s the officer’s lenges to Officer Thompson’s testimony. testimony “did nothing more than offer of independent or inferences verifying his understanding framework possible one tak he had steps assessing logical the ly Court The at Id. 902. the conversation.” him benefit the “likely gave en,” id. at whether about any concern express did not situation,” at 596. id. in this doubt of the of the basis formed that information the rootless testi such held Freeman Marcus from came evidence the officer’s usurpation impermissible to be an mony jury. the to presented been had not that Id.1 function. jury’s the B. con a similar reached Circuit D.C. The an FBI holding that Hampton, clusion severely restricted have circuits Other under his about testified improperly agent basis testify the ability of officers the conver recorded of a defendant’s standing jury. In the not before information way no jury sations, the had where held Freeman, Circuit Sixth the Marcus indepen ... inferences “verify! his ] testimony regarding agent’s FBI an that interpretations.” its own dently reaeh[] recorded defendant’s meaning the case, that the In at 982-83. lay opinion improper conversations during open its acknowledged government F.3d at Rule testimony under telephone recorded that “the ing is a statement that “there noted court The 596-99. ” that very cryptic,’ ‘very, were interpreta- calls ‘provides agent when risk agent from the help need on the would based conversations of recorded tions at 981. The Id. them.” interpret “to investigation entire knowledge his had that “reviewed he then testified agent infor- upon testifying based he [is] ... 20,000 cap every hear- conversation—-some including jury, — not before mation 100 or just wiretaps, by the tured least, jury [c]ould at say, or evidence,” and into admitted recordings so beyond [is] what knowledge ha[s] he think understanding had a better First, result he as a (citing Id. them.’” before jury. than did the being said what opinions). Second, Circuit D.C. Rule that under noted The court Id. “re Freeman agent Marcus as independently too must “[j]urors responses and his substantiated peatedly and scrutinize opinion the basis sess information generic inferences But reasoning. ‘[w]hen witness’s as whole.” investigation references objective has not identified witness basis explain “failed to he But Id. opinion proffered opinion, for his bases he experience interpretations —what only tells it jury but help the ... does not did themselves jurors had ” find.’ it should what conclusory fashion lay founda failed therefore have—and Rea, United (quoting Id. Al at 597. Id. Rule 701.” under tion Cir.1992)). (2d 1206, 1216 had testified agent though the like- Circuit was the Second Grinage, 23,000 recorded approximately listened case that [the “the risk *34 troubled wise number a small heard calls, only jury the informa- upon based testifying was agent] was The court 597-99. Id. at at trial. F.3d at 750. jury.” 390 the not before tion dark in the jury, “left the that concerned Freeman, the Marcus Hampton As in infor agent’s] of [the source the regarding to listened he had that agent testified way of 596, and “no mation,” at with id. knowledge of the the officer's show, source the contrary to the quotes As these 1. 1209-10, have the did not account, investigation, not Op. at Maj. see majority’s was that knowledge. concern primary requisite Freeman’s Marcus toas information provided jury was the many more recorded conversations than Marcus as Freeman inconsistent with played would for jury, be the and “some Rule acceptance 701’s lay opinion testi- pertinent calls he listened to ‘upwards mony. Not so. ” plus times.’ Id. at 748. He also re- For one thing, although the majority peatedly “told the jury his interpreta- opinion professes confidence in jury’s the tions were ‘based on knowledge [his] of the ability “identify to [lay] unreliable opinion ” entire investigation.’ Id. at 748-49. testimony,” Maj. Op. at enabling case doing so, concluded, the court he “inter- agents opine on the basis of information preted both the calls that the jury heard not before jury, the without sharing that and the calls that the jury did not hear.” information, the majority deprives jury the at Moreover, Id. 750. agent “the pre- of the information it would per- need to jury sented aura of exper- form that critical function. How can the tise and authority which increased the risk jury expected be to evaluate reliability would be swayed by his lay opinion testimony when “experi- testimony, rather rely than on its own ence agent] [the jurors ha[s] that interpretation of the calls.” Id. at 751. themselves d[o] have” is not identified Accordingly, interpretations “his jury? for the Freeman, Marcus calls beyond went permissible lay opinion at Of equal 597. importance: when a case 701(b) testimony under because, Rule rath- agent is not required provide the factual er than being helpful jury, it basis for his testimony, the district court usurped jury’s function.” Id. has way no of assessing whether he is “rely[ing] upon [or]

These conveying] eases well identify inadmissi- the dangers of ble hearsay allowing police evidence” or other improper officer—who is not an bases lay ordinary lay opinion person testimony. testify Kevin based on —to Freeman, 498 masses 904. The majority’s information not described in any holding thus detail to the undermines both jury. When our founda- circuit held tional gatekeeping played Kevin role Freeman judge an agent’s “inter- and the pret[ation factfinding role of ambiguous jury. of] Rule 701 statements based does not such general contemplate abdication. knowledge of the investiga- tion” permissible lay opinion testimo- Nor, contrary to the majority’s supposi- ny, it did not address these risks at all. tion, is what majority permits here, 498 F.3d at 902. relying Freeman, on Kevin any way similar a lay witness identifying photo-

The majority now reads Kevin Freeman graph based on past contacts with providing blanket approval for Officer individual, contacts outside the jury’s Thompson’s lay opinion testimony, even knowledge. Maj. Op. See at 1208-09. though he failed to explain the basis for his There are four reasons at why least opinions invoked, and often any without analogy work, does not and why the detail testi- source, as to the his knowledge of mony in this case went beyond far presented evidence not at trial. That un- intended lay confines opinion rule, derstanding may well be an accu- —which Rule rate reading of Kevin Freeman —confirms that our case law has sanctioned a major First, we actually idea, have no nor did breakdown properly placed limits on the jury judge, whether Thomp- Officer lay opinion testimony. The main- majority son’s testimony was “rationally based on *35 otherwise, tains rejecting the holdings in perception^,]” [his] 701(a), Fed.R.Evid. cases such as Hampton, Grinage, and instead on what he heard from others' —via able to who was photographer during professional conversations, so reports, on— only photograph in a identify individual an investigation. the of the course through the the details amplifying after testi- not Thompson was Second, Officer not would be equipment specialized of use had knowl- he which something of to fying though testimony, even lay opinion giving itself jury The not. jury did edge that the (am- his own reporting the end was in he information as well as tapes, the heard perceptions. plified) the crimes. constituting the events about the telling instead Thompson Officer C. particular to meaning he ascribed the jury leav- conversations, than rather of pitfalls the illustrates This facts case jury. the to to permitted are determination officers ing which regime of on the basis lay witnesses testify as ordinary an is not Third, officer police investigation from the derived information directly with He is associated lay witness. the whole, is before of which not all aas regard- be likely to is the prosecution, equipment using specialized jury, exper- authority or special enjoying ed as jury.2 available methodologies not expert testifying as not tise, if even recordings the acknowledge when prem- parties All interpretation, His witness. Thompson knowledge quality. Officer vast here, poor on asserted were ised, as the “let[ting] ac- ken, likely testimony to be began is his jury’s the beyond calls jail phone usual the the “sometimes than that weight know” more corded “some- ... hear” and provide to ability of hard kind whose are witness percipient to under- hard a little was meant be bit might it testimony Rule times coherent fuzzy,” “[Sjometimes they’re just stand.” preserve. them.” good on so volume’s and “the statements Thompson’s Finally, Officer Officer whether asked prosecution The improved technologically regarding [he] us to what “direct could Thompson tapes, listened by which means clear— a real it’s not hearing” “[i]f w[as] his testi 70-73, indicates pp. see infra system.” it try play over we when requirement meet the third mony does not trial, because throughout And on based “not [be] it 701—that of Rule on the “clear always were statements technical, specialized scientific, or other Of- asked often prosecution recording” Rule 702.” scope knowledge within partici- particular what Thompson ficer 701(c); United States also see Fed.R.Evid. “saying here?” pants were Cir. Finley, 301 repeatedly also Thompson Officer 2002) requirement (identifying, the re- understanding of for vouched issue subject matter 702, that “the Rule way of “a better he had cordings because knowledge of common beyond must be Specifi- jury. than the to” them listening using Perception layman”). average jury that told Thompson cally, Officer lay the sort is not equipment specialized the record- he listened to the trial A prior directed. Rule is at which opinion audio. The interpreting testimony son's prior that unlike in to note important It entirely Officer interpretation of relies majority thus challenging an officer’s cases conversations, holding that the parties here have Thompson’s own recorded recording or any "vague” and that this Court provided were not transcript statements recorded at issue. calls telephone provide opinions "would Thompson's Officer transcript with notation only a has Court Maj. Op. at 1210. jury. helpful context” Thomp- "(Audio Officer played)” followed *36 ings times, “a lot of the ... pushing the listened to a total of 120 of ... these ears, headphones my into and slowing tapes” and “tr[ied] to maintain notes of a some of phone the calls down.” In addi- lot of them.” jury The was then told that tion having to able to been “control ... it would “[e]ertainly not” have to “listen to phone calls” “play[ing] it back all ... three 150 hours.” It only would be hear- listen[ing] seconds and to it again,” ing Officer “[l]imited number calls.” Thompson was also able to “sit down Throughout trial, [in] a Officer Thompson super super-quiet room” when listening was provide asked to interpretation his — recordings. result, As a Officer the calls on the basis of the “investigation” Thompson “was confident [he] was whole, as a hearing and he frequently invoked his it correctly” notes,” and “in [his] which knowledge he of “all of the conversations!.]” repeatedly referenced trial, during Thus, when the quality of a recording possible “tried as best as to write down poor, was Officer Thompson jury told the accurate statements.” Officer Thompson that rely he could on his extensive knowl- thus affirmed ability his to “translate” the edge of other recordings to ensure that he calls if jury was unable to hear them was translating the call properly. For ex- clearly. ample, prosecution when the noted that it

In light of poor quality of the re- “was having trouble hearing” a particular cordings, Officer Thompson’s expressed recording, and asked Officer Thompson to confidence his own im- “translation]” “clarify there[,]” what we were hearing bued him “with an aura expertise and Officer Thompson stated “I’ve listened to authority which increased the risk that the literally probably in excess of 100 hours of jury swayed would be by his testimony.” conversation, so got I’ve a pretty good Grinage, 390 F.3d at 751. Although the grasp on being able to listen to this[J” court instructed jury that the “[state- before telling the jury what being was ments made on phone calls are the said. evidence, not the discussion that counsel Officer Thompson directly also testified had,” and witnesses have the instruction portions about of the recordings that were

was an ineffective cure when jury not, fact, played for jury. For repeatedly reminded that it had a more example, he testified that there is “a very ability limited to hear and understand the short clip out of the phone call,” same phone calls than did the witness. Unit- Cf. which Defendant Willie L. “says, Wilson Robinson, ed States v. ” ‘Yeah, they got my ring from the house.’ (6th Cir.1983) (holding that it was error to When prosecutor attempted correct tapes portions admit of which were entire- Officer Thompson, suggesting that the clip ly inaudible because it the jury caused “ may have said only ‘They my got rely too heavily on transcrip- unreliable ring[,]’” Officer Thompson responded “I tions of the conversations). recorded think clip actually was cut a little risk jury improperly would short.” He also testified regarding por- defer to Officer Thompson’s judgment was tion of a conversation which Wilson compounded by repeated his states that he is going “exit[ ] line that he listened to hundreds of hours of just a moment” go get recordings to which the not privy. “paperwork,” including police report. He jury “just told the knows, so everyone But the prosecutor decided “to move ahead there’s about 150 hours or jail so phone to where Mr. Wilson is returning with the call recordings.” those, Of he “probably paperwork, rather than necessarily listen- *37 “ portion had this they just ‘[i]f responded paper- the getting and him going ing to other know and didn’t the conversation decision of prosecutor’s Although the work.” other investigation and to avoid things about the is understandable skip ahead to silence, any- the I conversations, maybe. But of to minutes having to listen think — Thompson of the calls Officer all to trust to asked has listened body who jury hold, Wil- on the call placing to of conversations prior all the that of aware and ” his get go to going he was at 982. that F.3d son stated me.’ 718 with agree would paperwork. legal Thompson’s sug- Officer Hampton, inAs interpretation no other Freeman, Thomp- that gestion Officer in Marcus As when correct would be calls calls phone telephone from the conclusions “drew son to unavailable ... other context —context as from placed as well heard jury the had that the “risk jury the a serious jury ... evidence calls and the phone —created so, infringed superior he doing the officer’s In to defer 'w[ould] to. jury no access to what recordings to decide jury the the of case” and the role upon the knowledge told evidence, instead from the at 981. infer Id themselves. to inferences what conclusions

them well as recordings’ poor quality, of Offi- light In at 598. draw.” jury the left played, selection limited the re- invocation of repeated Thompson’s cer it to need[ed] “the information without left jury was “the evidence cordings lay assessment independent an conduct information— some he had to trust vague from Aside testimony.” Id opinion made to them —that unknown information as a investigation” “the to references the words interpret situated to him better explain to “failed whole, Thompson Officer at Id they were.” calls than in the used ex- interpretations his the basis —what 597. jurors the themselves had that he perience on cross-ex- questioned Notably, when lay a failed to therefore did not have—and fre- phrase particular whether amination Marcus 701.” Rule under foundation inter- be “could by Wilson quently used Grinage, all Freeman, 597. at ways,” of different any number preted [in] into admitted calls were 2,000 recorded think “I out Thompson stated Officer were only evidence, though thirteen even if I think be. context, certainly could it 747-48. F.3d at at trial. played prior the in context it you placed opin- gave Grinage officer the When after made the statements statements the all of’ having “listened ion based jury had access the that,” of which not all least able jury was calls, the id at it into a certainly puts better to, it “I think informed recordings the to listen similar testimony was This perspective.” desired. testimony, if it so officer’s the Hampton, where troubling found to that calls—not contrast, none of Here, by possible if it was asked agent during trial —were played the ones even un- perhaps jury, else—the someone —to Thus evidence.3 into directly admitted differently, and a statement derstand recording of played essentially, were calls government failed appears — It jury morning, next recording. The recordings contain- excerpts of the preserve telephone original hear "the calls, it could asked if portions telephone only those ing play- recordings of the recordings, not thereof, at trial. actually played were record- the trial presumably because during deliberations asked back?” — When origi- than to hear calls," ings were even harder jail phone all recordings of "review had government tapes. But because recording nal only the audio played court excerpts, defense preserve failed telephone in which proceedings trial when Thompson “interpreted Officer those mare held that an officer’s interpretation of conversations on the basis of his listening statements “that were not drug encoded calls,’ to ‘all of the the jury had no way of jargon, but instead were phrases that were verifying his inferences or independent- more likely to be jurors understood *38 ly assessing logical steps the he had tak- without assistance” violates Rule 701. 498 Freeman, en.” Marcus 730 F.3d at 597 F.3d at 900. 983).

(quoting Hampton, 718 at F.3d It is For example, Kevin Freeman held “not understandable that “the jury, left in the helpful to the jury,” regarding dark id. at the source of officer’s [Officer information, interpretation Thompsonj’s of one likely [would] defendant’s “in- g[i]ve him the benefit of the doubt in struction] [to to speak another] with him situation.” Id. at 596. But to allow the later they so that get ‘can the particu- all jury to so do is to sanction an abdication of lars,’” as being “a reference to the ‘de- ” jury’s duty. tails,’ id. at 900. Similarly, when one defendant asked another

Kevin “how everything Freeman allows jury’s critical out,” had turned factfinding role to be we held usurped by unhelpful law en- forcement testimony testimony based on officer’s evidence not that the defendant “was presented at trial. As other asking circuits have ... how did the out, deal turn ‘drug ” held, this procedure has no basis in the how did everything go?’ Id. This testimo- Federal Evidence, Rules of undermines ny was particularly troubling because it trial jury, and cannot be allowed.4 involved the agent’s case speculation as to whether the defendant was involved in a

II. drug conspiracy, the precise issue jury Freeman, Even under Kevin the admis- required to decide. noted in We Kev- sion of some of Officer Thompson’s testi- in Freeman that the case agent’s “special- mony was in error. ized knowledge particular of the language of drug

The bulk traffickers of Officer did not Thompson’s give him carte testimo- ny appears to blanche to testify have interpretation involved as to meaning of “not only code other words words in but also common telephone recorded calls words used in common ways.” without regard Marcus to reliability or relevance.” Freeman, 730 F.3d at 598. Kevin Free- Id. at 904. counsel expressed concern that if allowed ac- interpretations vide of recorded conversations cess to recordings, the full jury might based on knowledge their investigation, of the inadvertently portions hear that were never subject to safeguards.” various Maj. Op. See trial, played at agreed the court to tell the at 1207 n. A5. careful review of the cases jury originals that "the were not submitted cited makes they clear that do not condone evidence, into provided can't be at this time." See, happened what here. e.g., United States Albertelli, v. (1st 687 F.3d 444-48 Cir. Although agree I appellate defendants’ 2012) (approving officer’s where it argument that it would prudent have been did "rely on appeals broad totality to 'the the district require court to government investigation’ of the usually but point instead portions isolate the telephone of the calls ed to information”); sources of played United evidence, at trial admit them into Jayyousi, (11th 1102-03 any defendants forfeited argument in this re- Cir.2011) gard by (approving police consenting officer’s testimo to the district court’s cho- ny regarding meaning sen of code solution. words used calls); telephone recorded United States v.

4. majority opinion Rollins, references six other Cir.2008) 830-33 circuits, says which it (same). pro- "allow officers to Bat- informed that Once that function. translat- case, Thompson Officer In this fact, Haynes, was, Brandon be man “likely similarly were phrases ed interpreting capable than was more jury assis- jurors without understood without -the assistance much statement example, Wilson’s For at 900. Id. tance.” Thompson. testimony appears of Officer Thompson’s Officer the words simply repeating have involved testimony con- Thompson’s As Officer calls, in telephone the recorded said rep- speculation “either largely of sisted it.” Other hear “couldn’t - case statements,” its already clear etition of Thompson’s of Officer testimony consisted interpreted 701 as violated Rule admission meaning of state- speculation Freeman, Kevin by this court. For exam- terms. of clear up made ments calls, said Wilson during one ple, *39 “whoever, the effect of to the something HI. informant) is, it’s close.” (confidential ] [Cl court’s error was district Although the that, meant what Wilson asked When the unless is not warranted plain, relief “close he meant Thompson stated Officer rights” and “affected substantial error to to “close opposed as physically, to them” fairness, integrity, the “seriously affected This testimo- actuality.” to or close reality judicial pro- of reputation public or the part pure speculation to ny amounts Vences, 169 v. United States ceedings.” Wilson to what Thompson as of Officer Cir.1999) (internal (9th quo- 611, 613 F.3d was “close.” Cl he said the when meant omitted). The and citation tation marks interpreta- Thompson’s Although Officer “ sub- ‘affect[ ] that an error requirement one, unhelpful it was a reasonable tion was ... in most ... cases rights’ stantial ability— same had the jury, which to the prej- have error must been that the means interpret such responsibility —to affected the have outcome It must udicial: language. ordinary United court proceedings.” district day call in a Similarly, recorded 734, 725, 113 Olano, U.S. v. Pitka, Donny with altercation after the (1993). On L.Ed.2d 508 S.Ct. “ said, Wou having Wilson is described review, “bears defendant plain error that started shit.’ know, the one he’s respect with persuasion the burden Batman, that was time with ... ‘That Id. prejudice.” ” explained Thompson then him.’ Officer only with that burden has met Wilson for a nickname “Batman” is jury 7 for on Count to his conviction respect Haynes. co-conspirator, Brandon alleged in violation against witness retaliation directly derived testimony, was which This 1513(b)(2). dis- I § therefore 18 U.S.C. investigation knowledge of his from respect Count only with sent powers jury’s own within the was “[wjhoever 1513(b)(2) punishes Section under reason, permissible would be any in' conduct engages knowingly (ap- at 901-02 498 F.3d Kevin Freeman. injury to another bodily causes thereby drug coded regarding testimony proving to retaliate intent ... with person on, went how- Thompson jargon). Officer ... information any person against ever, explain, appears [Wil- “[i]t a Fed- ... of the commission relating in- sonj’s November referring back ato person given ... eral offense in fact ... cident, Pitka Mr. where ” To convert officer.... law enforcement purchase from setting up the one who 1513(b)(2) viola- §a assault into simple Haynes.” This statement Mr. Brandon have therefore, offense must tion, function, even under jury’s usurped the intent specific been committed acknowledgment limited Kevin Freeman’s against provid- me,” to retaliate a witness for paperwork in on provided “sen[t] to law no ing speculative information enforcement. See basis for his conclusion. Maggitt, Thompson’s Without Officer prejudicial United States (5th Cir.1986). testimony, there is a probabili “reasonable 593-94 ty jury that the would not have convicted” Thompson’s Officer “translation]” Wilson on Count 7. Teag United States v. testimony regarding the recorded ue, Cir.2013). 1192-93 phone only calls contained direct evi- Finally, question there is no that Officer intent dence Wilson’s to retaliate Thompson’s testimony “seriously affected against providing Pitka for information to fairness, integrity, public reputation law Thompson enforcement. Officer testi- judicial Vences, proceedings.” a call regarding fied between Wilson and (internal quotation marks cousin, Haynes, day Gabriella after omitted). In “offer[ing] a gloss narrative the incident with Pitka. Thompson Officer ... consisting] entirely almost of [his] testified that Wilson admitted to having hit “ ” “ personal opinions of what the conversa- ‘Donny’ ‘he’s because the one that ” meant[,]” Peoples, tions 250 F.3d at started this shit.’ Officer Thompson testi- Officer Thompson’s unhelpful fied about another call in which “Wilson “usurped the function of the to decide talking they put about how [is] Mr. Pitka’s *40 what to infer from the content of the paper[,]” name ... in the meaning “the calls,” Grinage, 390 F.3d at Nothing 750. jail.” documents went to the Officer could be more central to the integrity of Thompson also told the jury that Wilson judicial proceedings than right to have stated in a call morning of the assault police prosecu- or the —not go can’t into hallways.” “[s]nitches tion—decide a guilt defendant’s or inno- Thompson’s Added to Officer’s reasons, cence. For these I dissent from about the informant being “close” and the III(B) Part majority opinion. incident,” reference to the “November speculation professed “translation]” “already statementsf,]”

these clear Kevin

Freeman, provided F.3d at a di-

rect link between the assault and Wilson’s

intent against to retaliate being Pitka for QUEEN ANNE PARK HOMEOWNERS “[s]nitch[.]” ASSOCIATION, Washington non- Aside from Thompson’s Officer testimo- profit corporation, Plaintiff-Appel- ny, the evidence of Wilson’s intent was lant, minimal. Wilson was present in the gym when Anthony Defendant Gadson and

alleged co-conspirator Donte Edwards con- STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY fronted Pitka about being a “snitch.” COMPANY, Ed- foreign insurance wards, who testified prosecution, company, for the Defendant-Appellee. never said that he shared with Wilson his No. 12-36021. suspicions that Pitka had been a confiden- United States Court of Appeals, tial informant. Pitka himself testified Ninth Circuit. nothing before, Wilson said himto during, assault, alleged after the Aug. and that Pitka why did not know he was attacked. Al-

though Pitka testified that he later be-

lieved it was because the government

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Anthony Gadson
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Aug 19, 2014
Citation: 763 F.3d 1189
Docket Number: 12-30007, 12-30047
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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