UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Angeline ROAN EAGLE, Appellee.
No. 87-5437.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Decided Jan. 18, 1989.
Submitted June 17, 1988. Certiorari Denied April 17, 1989. See 109 S.Ct. 1764.
Robert A. Mandel, Asst. U.S. Atty., Rapid City, S.D., for appellee.
Before LAY, Chief Judge, BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.
JOHN R. BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Angeline Roan Eagle and Georgianna Brave were charged, in a single indictment, with first degree murder for the killing of Roland Belt. Because all three were American Indians and the crime took place on an Indian reservation, federal jurisdiction exists under
Brave pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter,
Roan Eagle appeals, contending that the trial court erred in (i) allowing the prosecution to exercise a peremptory challenge as to prospective juror French, the only Indian venireman, (ii) allowing the prosecution to examine Brave and FBI agent Davis concerning a prior unsworn statement Brave made to Davis, (iii) limiting the defense‘s efforts to inquire into Brave‘s plea bargain, (iv) admitting certain statements under the excited utterance hearsay exception, and (v) refusing Roan Eagle‘s proposed jury instructions on intoxication and its negation of the specific intent to be an aider and abettor under
We affirm.
The Evils of Strong Drink in a Family Gathering
Roland Belt was killed during what started out as a family social gathering but ended in bloodshed hours later. Belt, Brave, Roan Eagle, and other participants had been drinking throughout the evening. Brave‘s sixteen-year-old son Richard Little was among those present at the gathering, but according to his own account had not been drinking.
Little later testified that when Roland Belt got up to leave shortly before 4:00 AM, he and his niece Georgianna Brave began arguing. Brave then started hitting Belt, and Roan Eagle soon joined in. All three fell to the floor during the fighting. A momentary lull in the struggle then occurred, during which Brave went to the kitchen and returned with a knife. Brave stabbed Belt in the upper body a number of times, then dropped the knife and went
Sometime afterward, the police were called. Officer James Yellow Boy was the first to arrive. He later testified that Little waved down Yellow Boy‘s patrol car and told him that “[m]y mother stabbed [Belt].” About an hour had elapsed since the stabbing, according to the government. At the time, Little was crying. Yellow Boy then went to check Belt‘s body, which was just inside the front doorway. More or less contemporaneously, he overheard Brave drunkenly bragging that she had stabbed Belt. Yellow Boy arrested Brave. Little—still crying—then approached Yellow Boy and volunteered that “[m]y mom, along with my aunt [Roan Eagle], stabbed [Belt].” Little also told Yellow Boy that the murder weapon was a “brown-handled butcher knife, with the blade curved upward.”
Officer George Twiss arrived about 4:30 or 4:35 a.m. About 15 minutes after his arrival, Twiss questioned Little. Sergeant Frank Martinez arrived at 4:36 a.m. He checked Belt‘s body for himself, and then talked with Little, although briefly.6
How Long Does Excitement Last?
The officers’ testimony as to Little‘s statements to them was admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule,
On direct examination, Twiss related the content of Little‘s statement:
He said [Belt] had been stabbed by [Brave] and [Roan Eagle].... He said they had been arguing and drinking, and that [Brave] had hollered at [Belt], something about, “[y]ou raped my daughter....” [Belt] was trying to leave the residence. As he went toward the door, he was attacked by the two women—stabbed.... I believe he said [Brave] was the one that first stabbed [Belt].... He said they followed [Belt] around the living room, stabbing him, cussing—or kicking and cussing at him, hitting him, until he finally fell down by the bannister next to the front door.... And he said afterwards, they were still mad and stomping around, hollering. And he tried to help [Belt] up, but he couldn‘t get him up.... He said that the last one to stab [Belt] was [Roan Eagle] and she had the knife, the last time he saw it.... He said he was afraid and he was afraid of them and afraid for [Belt]. So he ran back toward the residence. As he came in the front door, [Roan Eagle] and [Brave] were dragging [Belt] towards the front door. When they saw him [Little], they stopped.... [Little‘s] exact words were: after [Belt] had fallen by the bannister, he tried to help him up. He couldn‘t get him up.
On cross-examination, Twiss testified that Little had still been “upset,” “agitated,” “excited,” and “crying” when, close to daybreak, the search of the crime scene was finally concluded and Twiss took Little to stay with Little‘s grandmother Sara Brave.5
Keeping the Jury in the Dark
Before Roan Eagle‘s trial, the prosecution raised the question of the extent to which the defense would be permitted to reveal to the jury the details of the Brave‘s plea bargain. The court ruled that in assaying Brave‘s credibility the jury could be made aware of (i) the charge in the indictment, (ii) her cooperation with the prosecution, and (iii) the fact that she was allowed to plead guilty to a lesser charge; but the court expressly prohibited any inquiry into (i) the specific lesser charge (manslaughter) to which she pleaded, or (ii) the sentence to which she was exposed, or might receive. The court also elected to defer sentencing Brave until it had heard “what the total facts are as brought out in [Roan Eagle‘s] case.”
An Indian Venireman Excluded
During jury selection, the prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge to strike prospective juror French, the only Indian venireman. In response to Roan Eagle‘s charge that the peremptory was racially motivated and in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the prosecution recited three reasons which were accepted by the trial court as racially neutral and adequate to justify the peremptory.
Hearsay from the FBI
At trial, the prosecution called Brave, and asked her if she recalled speaking to an FBI agent the day after Belt was killed. Brave responded affirmatively, but elaborated that she told the agent that she didn‘t remember anything that had happened the previous night after a relatively early point in the evening, before the altercation began. On cross-examination, in conformity with the court‘s pretrial ruling, the defense could not and did not inquire about Brave‘s sentence or the specific reduced charge to which Brave pleaded or the potential sentence she knew might be imposed.
FBI Agent Davis then testified that during their interview, Brave initially denied having any recollection about the stabbing of Belt, but subsequently admitted remembering the stabbing. He testified that Brave had then given a “somewhat detailed statement” of the facts surrounding that stabbing, which included an explanation of when and how it had occurred. He did not relate the content of that statement to the jury, quote Brave‘s words, or otherwise elaborate. This was the entire substance of Davis’ testimony.
Roan Eagle was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. Brave was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment, the maximum penalty for voluntary manslaughter.
Roan Eagle appeals, contending that the trial court erred in the five particulars previously stated.
Many Are Chosen, Few Shall Serve, (More Are Struck)
Batson v. Kentucky requires that when a defendant makes a prima facie showing that the prosecution has exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion by peremptorily challenging jurors of a particular race, the prosecution must then come forward with a racially neutral explanation to justify the challenge. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
A prima facie case is established when the defendant can show that “he is a member of a cognizable racial group, ... and that the prosecutor has exercised peremp
First, both French and Roan Eagle are American Indians. This is a recognized minority group for purposes of a Batson inquiry. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987).
Second, citing United States v. Porter, the Government argues that Roan Eagle “woefully” failed to make a prima facie case. United States v. Porter, 831 F.2d 760 (8th Cir. 1987). We do not agree. Porter found no prima facie case when one of two black veniremen was struck. One black venireman, however, remained and served on the jury. In the case of Roan Eagle, there was one potential American Indian juror and that juror was struck.
Other circuits have developed this area of the Batson inquiry along similar lines. The Third Circuit found that a prima facie case existed when the only two black veniremen were struck. United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741 (3rd Cir. 1988).8
The Tenth Circuit has gone further and determined that whenever the government strikes all members of the defendant‘s race, a prima facie Batson case has been made. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987.)
As we see it, it is the prosecution that, by arguing that there was no prima facie case, has “woefully” failed. We therefore conclude that a Batson inquiry into the striking of the juror was called for.
A Batson inquiry next raises the procedural question as to how the judge is to handle the inquiry. Essentially, is the Judge required to hold an evidentiary hearing or some sort of mini-trial on the merits of the claim?
On the whole, we think not. In a recent decision, Judge Butzner, for the Fourth Circuit, wrote that the defendant-appellant‘s insistence on an evidentiary hearing in which the prosecutors and defense attorneys and possibly other witnesses would be examined and cross-examined misconceives the Batson inquiry.... Batson does not require this intrusion on the trial proceedings.... Batson requires the prosecutor to “articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case...” United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
Therefore “If the trial court believes the prosecutor‘s explanation, a reviewing court ordinarily should give this credibility finding ‘great deference.‘” Id.
The nature of the inquiry, although adversarial, does not rise to the level of a mini-trial. Rather, in the context of the Batson inquiry, once the prosecutor has advanced his racially neutral explanation, the defendant should have the opportunity to rebut with his own interpretation.
This, however, need not necessarily be a lengthy process. If the trial judge is able to reach a determination on the basis of a short exchange between prosecutor and defense then that is the trial court‘s prerogative. The scope of our review is restricted to a determination of whether the trial court was “clearly erroneous” in its factual basis and had a reasonable basis for concluding that the prosecutor‘s explanation was racially neutral.
In support of its challenge, the prosecution stated three reasons for striking French: (i) French had been on a prior jury that had acquitted another criminal defendant, (ii) the prosecutor‘s independent recollection was an individual convicted in an unrelated case was French‘s brother, and (iii) his assessment that French was “slovenly” and accordingly would not “be a good juror for the prosecution.”
In rebuttal, Roan Eagle urged that: (i) the government did not strike another, white, juror who had also served on the same prior jury as French, (ii) the govern
There is precedent for the striking of a juror for prior service on a jury that acquitted and for striking a juror because of a close family relationship to a convicted criminal. United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Excluding jurors because ... they acquitted in a prior case ... is wholly within the prosecutor‘s privilege.“); United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The appellants admit that the prosecutor supplied an objective explanation for striking the black woman whose two sons had been in trouble with the law.“). Finally, the argument that French was perhaps hostile or unfriendly to the prosecution based on the subjective evaluation of French‘s dress and mannerisms is precisely the reason why peremptory challenges exist. Admittedly, there is a fine distinction between disguised racism and prosecutorial privilege based on subjective evaluation, but if peremptory challenges are to continue, we follow precedent to award substantial leeway to the prosecutor‘s privilege.
Unable to second guess the trial court and substitute our judgment for his, we find that Roan Eagle‘s Constitutional rights were not violated by the striking of French from the jury.
Mixing Confrontation and Hearsay
Roan Eagle contends that the examination of Georgianna Brave and FBI Agent Davis constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Roan Eagle claims that it denied her her right of confrontation of the witnesses, and allowed in inadmissible hearsay.9
We do not agree.
In regard to Roan Eagle‘s hearsay objection to the questions that were asked of Brave about her prior statement, this did reveal some details of that statement, but only to the extent necessary to attempt to prod Brave in the face of her claimed loss of memory. Moreover, all those details related solely to Brave herself, except those revealed in the question that provoked the hearsay objection from Roan Eagle‘s counsel. The objection was sustained and the jury was instructed to disregard the question and answer.
In the absence of any indication that the jurors failed to follow that instruction, it is clear that Roan Eagle suffered no loss of her Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The only Sixth Amendment right of cross-examination related to Brave‘s asserted inability to recall making a statement, and Davis’ basis for asserting that Brave did make a statement. Roan Eagle was not denied those opportunities for cross-examination.
We find no basis for Roan Eagle‘s attack on this issue.
Keeping the Jury in the Dark
Roan Eagle claims that the trial court erred in forbidding her to cross-examine Brave about the details of her plea bargain to essentially establish what re
The decision of the trial court was not made in the heat of the trial or under circumstances leaving little opportunity for reflection. On the contrary, and reflecting the trial Judge‘s long-held convictions, the determination was made at a hearing on July 31, 1987. The trial Judge was emphatic:
I have consistently held in these types of cases, consistent by an experience, I think, of 3 [of such cases], that the fact that she has offered favorable treatment is relevant, and the fact that she has agreed to cooperate is relevant, and that as a result of a plea bargain, which gave her the opportunity to enter a plea to guilty to a reduced charge, but I do not open up what the charge she plead to. I have no objection to having the record indicate that she was charged with first degree murder. And that that was the indictment. She was indicted for first degree murder. And that in return for her cooperation, she entered a plea to a lesser charge. Her sentence is not to be admitted, nor the charge she actually plead to.
(R. 27, 28). (emphasis added)
What is behind the trial Judge‘s longtime practice is not shrouded in mystery or undisclosed by the anonymity of the Judge‘s robe. What the Judge was consciously worried about was the likelihood—indeed, the probable certainty—that the jury, learning that Brave who was by all counts as guilty as Roan Eagle, would get a maximum of a ten-year sentence while Roan Eagle faced the specter of a Judge-imposed sentence up to life. Within the leeway between first degree murder, second degree murder and manslaughter which the court had severally to submit to the jury, the jury would likely select the crime under the Judge‘s charge which would result in a like punishment.
When the stakes are so high and the credibility of the one-time associate-in-crime is acutely involved, the accused is entitled as a matter of right to effective cross-examination. This includes not only the specific crime to which the co-actor is pleading guilty, but the range of punishment to which the one pleading guilty is exposed to in contrast to what that person knows—or ought to know—is the potential sentence for a conviction following a plea of not guilty.
Had Brave really been in fact a witness—as the Judge had to assume she would be when he ruled in July—her testimony would be subject to the most vigorous attack on credibility. Having to acknowledge that she had pleaded guilty to a charge of manslaughter, she had to know from
We are of the positive conclusion that the trial judge‘s decision is clearly wrong. The details of a plea can be highly relevant to a jury in assessing the credibility of a guilty-pleading co-defendant who has taken the stand to testify for the prosecution. This is especially true if that witness has not yet been sentenced as there is a continuing incentive to give testimony that strengthens the prosecution‘s case. Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir. 1979) (“The fact that Miller was not aware of the exact terms of the plea agreement only increases the significance, for purposes of assessing credibility, of his expectation of favorable treatment.“).
When a witness who has entered into a plea agreement and, as contemplated
Despite the fact that we have enunciated a rule that would seem to lead us to hold for Roan Eagle, this is a situation where the credibility of Brave was not really an issue. Brave‘s testimony did not incriminate Roan Eagle in any way. Brave‘s professed amnesia about the events of that night, was testimony, no matter how “pleasing” to the prosecutor, which could not have led the jury to any conclusion about the guilt of Roan Eagle.
We, therefore, conclude that although the trial court patently erred, the error was harmless.
A Matter of Hearsay
Regarding the statements made by Little to various police officers which were then admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, we find that any error that occurred, if any, was harmless.
The trial court allowed in the second statement10 as an excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The first statement11 was apparently admitted not as an excited utterance but as a
We see no reason why the first, as the second, of these utterances or statements were not admissible.
One can argue that by allowing these statements in under different rules and by limiting the first statement as the trial Judge did to
Whether the trial court erred in receiving the first statement as an excited utterance or simply under
We therefore uphold the trial court‘s ruling.
Aider and Abettor Specific Intent Required?
The final issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury on intent required for an aider and abettor.
Roan Eagle contends, on appeal, that aiding and abetting is a specific intent crime and that she was therefore entitled to have the jury so instructed.14
The trial court instructed the jury that first degree murder was a specific intent crime and that to be guilty of aiding and abetting first degree murder the requisite intent was also specific intent. The trial court, however, refused to instruct the jury that aiding and abetting was, itself, a specific intent crime and thus that the jury should acquit Roan Eagle of aiding and abetting second degree murder if they found she was intoxicated at the time.
We find that the trial court‘s jury instructions were correct. To be guilty of aiding and abetting is to be guilty as if one were a principal of the underlying offense. Aiding and abetting is not a separate crime but rather is linked to the underlying offense and shares the requisite intent of that offense.15
Roan Eagle does cite some seemingly contradictory language in previous decisions this circuit may have made on this point.16
But long ago this court clearly stated “[g]enerally speaking, to find one guilty as a principal on the ground that he was an aider and abettor, it must be proven that he shared in the criminal intent of the principal....” Johnson v. United States, 195 F.2d 673, 675 (8th Cir. 1952).
If the intent of the aider and abettor is different from that of the perpetrator, the aider and abettor‘s guilt is measured by the intent that actuated him.
Source: 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 170, citing People v. Beeman, 35 Cal.3d 547, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318 (1984).
We do not find that this basic premise has been overturned by anything we have subsequently written.17
Although the language in Kelton might appear to be contradictory, the court was referring to specific intent or purposive attitude. The language indicates that there must be a knowing participation in the activity, not that one can only be guilty of aiding and abetting if one has the specific intent to aid and abet.
The trial court, therefore, did not err in instructing the jury as it did.
AFFIRMED.
BEAM, Circuit Judge, special concurrence.
I concur in the result reached in this matter. However, I do not agree with the majority discussion with regard to the requirements imposed upon trial courts by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Since this issue is presently before the court en banc in United States v. Wilson, No. 87-2280 (8th Cir. Dec. 8, 1988) (en banc), I will not burden this opinion with an exposition of my thoughts on the subject. Further, with regard to cross-examination of Georgianna Brave about her plea agreement, I do not