United States v. Andrew F. Galo

America, UNITED STATES

v. GALO, Appellant. F.

Andrew

No. 99-3870. Appeals, Court of

United States

Third Circuit. 9,May

Argued 2000. Feb.

Filed Defender, Stark,

Shelly Federal Public Hackney, W. Penn Asst. Federal Public (Ar- Defender, Gerlach Karen Sirianni Defender, Asst. Public gued), Federal PA, Attorneys for Pittsburgh, Appellant. Litman, Attorney, Harry United States Schlueter, R. Asst. United States Bonnie Buchanan Attorney, Mary (Argued), permitted Beth Jessica H. to have contact with Attorney, Pittsburgh, Asst. United States him. jeopardized This would have Sheila’s PA, Attorneys Appellee. custody daughter of her because Galo had record, a state criminal the nature of * McKEE, Before: GREENBERG and which we discuss below. knew Sheila that GARTH, Judges, and Circuit Senior Jessica should not permitted have been to Judge. Circuit be in company supervision Galo’s without because of background. Galo’s Galo also THE OPINION OF COURT threatened to have the utilities at Sheila McKEE, Judge. Circuit H.’s residence turned off unless Jessica appeals Andrew Galo the sentence that spent time with him. The utilities were imposed following his conditional registered in his In name. addition to production depict- to of material coercion, cajoled threats and Galo also ing exploitation the sexual by telling Sheila her that he might day one 2251(a), pos- violation of 18 U.S.C. step-father, be Jessica’s and suggesting depicting session of material the sexual that he and Jessica therefor e needed time minor, a violation of 18 get acquainted. to 2252(a)(4)(B). argues U.S.C. He that evening On the of March 1999 Jessica se, these statutes are per unconstitutional stay did with During Galo. her visit he applied challenges and as to him. He also approximately sexually took explicit the district court’s use his state photographs nude instructing of her after court convictions to enhance his sentence her pose expose to nude and genitals. her impose mandatory minimum sen- Jessica knew that temper Galo had a years tence of 15 imprisonment. We hold she was therefore apparently too afraid to Congress validly that exercised its authori- resist or refuse. ty under the in enacting Commerce Clause 2251(a) 2252(a)(4)(B), §§ Galo took the film undeveloped and that contain- ing those statutes are not photographs Drug unconstitutional as these to an Eckerd do, however, applied However, to agree Galo. We processing. photo Store for that the erred enhanc- manager stopped there film processing the ing his sentence based his police and alerted as soon as she discover- convictions, and we will therefore sexually explicit ed the pho- nature remand for resentencing. tographs. responded Police and arrested when pick-up Galo he returned to the de-

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND. veloped photographs. Initially Galo told in relationship Galo was film police belonged to a Sheila H. had a young daughter Ohio, She whom changed friend but he later we will refer to as Jessica H. Jessica H. story and admitted that he knew the child previously sexually had been abused in the photographs was naked. He denied boyfriends. one of her mother’s That having intercourse with her and claimed abuse caused Children and Youth Services that he wanted to if the pictures see (“CYS”) temporarily remove Jessica would out.” Police “come obtained from her home. had placed She been back search warrant of Galo’s residence and in her during home before or rela- Jessica, pictures seized 10 additional tionship with her mother. pictures well as of Galo’s nieces. Some of pictures girls were of in their under-

At point, persuaded some Galo Sheila H. H., fully wear while others were clothed. Po- permit then Jessica thirteen old, lice also seized a .35mm Vivitar camera spend night at his apartment. being later the cam- accomplished by threatening that was identified as tell H. previously photographs. CYS Sheila had era that took the indecent * Greenberg Honorable Morton I. assumed Sen- ior Status on June 2251(d). not argued he was investigation disclosed Subsequent pro- of Jessica had been pictures subject mandatory indecent minimum sen- paper. photographic cessed on Kodak not because the state convictions did tence film, had all and Vivitar camera paper, the sexual of children relate to Pennsylva- manufactured outside of been 2251(d). required as The district nia. disagreed and that Galo’s concluded subject prior state court convictions did II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY. mandatory him to the minimum. Conse- 6, 1999, grand jury April a federal On quently, the district court Galo sentenced in a indictment. charged Galo two count (180 imprisonment years to a term of of 15 of charged production One him with Count months), by super- followed five of depicting sexual material the vised release. of U.S.C. violation appeal This followed. 2251(a), him charged and Count Two the possession depicting of material III. DISCUSSION. minor, exploitation of in violation sexual 2252(a)(4)(B). filed a of 18 U.S.C. Galo Challenge A. to Constitutional alleging motion to dismiss the indictment 2251(a) §§ 18 U.S.C. AND 2251(a) 2252(a)(4)(B) §§ un- and were 2252(b)(4)(B). appli- He constitutional. also claimed above, to vio- pled guilty As noted deprived the statutes him him cation of to 2251(a) §§ lating 18 U.S.C. and equal protection the laws. 2252(a)(4)(B). 2251(a), cap- Section is 29, 1999, July On the district court de- Children,” Exploitation tioned “Sexual nied Galo’s motion dismiss the indict- to provides part and relevant as follows: immediately ment and a con- entered uses, Any person per- who employs, plea ditional to both counts of the suades, induces, entices, any or coerces preserved following He indictment. the in, engage any sexually minor to ... appeal: issues for explicit pro- conduct for purpose (a) 18, Title Whether United States ducing any visual of such con- depiction 2251(a) Code, Section is a valid exercise duct, punished shall be un- provided authority granted (d), subsection if knows der such under the Commerce Clause. or has reason to know that such visual (b) supporting Whether evidence depiction will be in inter- transported jurisdictional element of Title mailed, foreign state or commerce or 2251(a) Code, States is United Section depiction produced that visual us- sufficient under the Clause. Commerce mailed, ing materials have been (c) Title Whether States United shipped, transported or or in interstate Code, 2252(a)(4)(B) Section is a valid means, foreign by any commerce includ- exercise of the authority granted Con- ing by computer, or if such visual de- gress under the Commerce Clause. actually piction transported been (d) Whether supporting evidence interstate or foreign commerce jurisdictional of Title element mailed. Code, United States Section 2251(a) added). 2252(a)(4)(B) (emphasis 18 U.S.C. is sufficient under 2252(a)(4)(B), captioned Clause. Section is “Certain Commerce involving activities material accepted The court Galo’s minors,” pro- sexual requested thereafter and the that Galo part: in relevant vides government addressing file whether briefs (a) (4) Any person who ... either subject state convictions would (B) knowingly possesses him the 1 or more mandatory minimum sentence books, films, years, magazines, periodicals, of 15 contained 18 U.S.C. vid- jurisdiction tapes, any or other matter which contain in connection with eo individ- been depiction visual that has application ual of the statute.” Rodia mailed, has been or trans- shipped Here, requirement that at least foreign in interstate or com- ported produce one of the materials used to merce, ma- produced using or which was pornography child travel in com- interstate which have mailed or terials been so provides jurisdictional merce hook. transported by any means shipped Consequently, we find that Rodia fore- (i) including computer, producing if— closes Galo’s attack the constitution- depiction of such visual involves the use 2252(a) 2252(a)(4)(B). ality §§ engaging sexually explicit of a minor Nonetheless, though clearly even we are (ii) conduct; depiction such visual Rodia,1 holding bound Galo ar- conduct; punished of such shall be gues that Rodia was wrongly decided. He (b) in provided subsection of this section. ignores jurisdiction- asserts that Rodia 2252(b)(4)(B). 18 U.S.C. After Galo was requirement al in contained sentenced, we decided United States v. 2254(b)(4)(B). Galo misreads Rodia. (3d Rodia, Cir.1999), 194 F.3d 465 cert. In Rodia we concluded that denied, 1131, 2008, 529 U.S. 120 S.Ct. 2252(a)(4)(B) jurisdictional hook of does (2000). L.Ed.2d 958 There we held that goal not achieve the of limiting the reach 2252(a)(4)(B) Congress pursuant enacted “activity the statute to that has sub authority to a valid exercise of under the stantial effect on interstate commerce.” 2252(a)(4)(B) Commerce Clause. Section recognized 194 F.3d at 468. We imposes liability anyone criminal on who “jurisdictional requirement element—-the possesses pornography child that has not precursor that materials like film or cam commerce, itself traveled interstate so eras moved in interstate commerce—is long as one of the materials used to create only tenuously related to the ultimate ac pornography has traveled interstate tivity regulated: possession interstate Congress commerce. We reasoned that pornography.” child Id. at 473. We noted rationally could have concluded that intra that, matter, possession practical limiting pornography “[a]s state child cre jurisdictional here, that substantially ated a demand affected factor is almost useless Accordingly, interstate commerce. Con since all but the most self-sufficient child gress regulate could possession film, cameras, intrastate pornographers rely will on pornography of child under the Commerce that chemicals traveled interstate effectively regulate Clause order to its commerce and will therefore fall within the impact Although on interstate commerce. Nevertheless, sweep of the statute.” Id. 2252(a)(4)(B), Rodia focused on Congress empowered we held that reasoning governs analysis same our enact the statute under the Commerce 2251(a) because both statutes contain “Congress rationally could Clause because jurisdictional the same element. possession have believed intrastate has substantial effects on in pornography Rodia, jur explained

As we “[a] commerce.” Id. at terstate 468.2 Galo ... [or isdictional element refers to hook] incorrectly decided argues that Rodia was provision in a federal statute that re reality ignored because we that Con quires government specific to establish intrastate, justifying gress purely facts the existence of federal had criminalized commerce; (3) Appeals 1. those hav- See United States Court of for the activities Operating ing Third Circuit Internal Procedure a substantial relation to interstate com- Lopez, 9.1. merce. States v. 514 U.S. United (1995). 115 S.Ct. 131 L.Ed.2d 626 Rodia, (1) (2) categories we found that categories activity In 2. There are three broad pertinent analysis turned regulate were not to our can under the Com- (3), (1) category attention to which was at the Clause: the channels of interstate merce commerce; (2) of the matter.” 194 F.3d at 473-474. the instrumentalities of inter- "heart (15) than years nor more However, ar- than fifteen despite Galo’s activity. local (30) thirty years.... were well contrary, we gument to the an “criminaliz[ed] that the statute aware upon two is based Galo’s enhancement linked to inter- directly not activity that is he entered state court guilty pleas However, at 468. state commerce.” Id. year niece January of that there, purely fact that noted as we Pennsylvania police Kensington, New told is not fatal to activity is criminalized local sexually abusing her had been the statute. grade. to fifth preschool years up her from niece, initially the abuse According us is wheth- precise question before

The pro- vaginal touching, but Congress’s power under consisted er it was within to oral sex and intercourse. gressed enact 18 U.S.C. Clause to Commerce told her 2254(a)(4)(B), when the niece stopped criminal abuse imposes which However, police told mother. she also possess who child liability on individuals sexually had abused her broth- traveled that Galo pornography that has not itself subsequently questioned long police as one of ers. The in interstate commerce as brothers, they that Galo her confirmed pornogra- materials from which the sexually abused them. so traveled. had also phy was created age told nephew, older then inquiry Rodia answers the Galo’s Id. sexually abusing police affirmative that had been and Galo’s attack on Galo past years. him for the six The abuse constitutionality of statute is therefore sex, of oral and anal and touch- consisted to no avail. youn- genitals. of each other’s Galo’s ing that the statute is His assertion police ger nephew, age then told the to him is also applied unconstitutional as him sexually that had abused at vari- Galo analysis in Rodia without merit as our 6 to the ous times from the time he was proper that could clearly shows reached 13. That abuse also con- time he of child ly regulate possession intrastate of touching genitalia. sisted of oral sex and produced by that pornography .materials 16,1990, charged February Galo was had traveled interstate commerce.3 On in the of Pleas of West- judgment we will affirm the Common Consequently, Pennsylvania, two County, moreland with of conviction. inter- involuntary of deviate sexual counts Enhancement Pursuant B. Sentence minors, course, of corruption two counts of 2251(d). to 18 U.S.C. endangering the welfare of two counts children and four counts of indecent as- to the district challenge Galo’s sault. is more court’s

troubling. provides 18 U.S.C. 16, 1991, be- appeared March On part: relevant pled guilty judge fore a state trial ... Any individual who violates this sec- minors, endangering the wel- corruption of be fined under this title or tion shall indecent assault. fare of children and (10) imprisoned years not less than ten in- involuntary deviate sexual Charges (20) twenty years, nor more than but plea to a dropped pursuant tercourse were un- person such has one agreement. accepted The court et chapter der this U.S.C. to one and one-half to [18 and sentenced Galo seq.], any ... or under the laws of State imprisonment. three When custody that finally to the sexual released from on was As a condi- person began parole. shall be fined un- sentence he such required was parole for not tion of that he imprisoned der this title and less above, 3. As noted the camera and film that merce. com- Galo used both traveled in interstate program the defendant conditionally a sexual offender

complete residing being from in a home prohibited pled he was convicted felon-in- present. were He was on possession where minors of a firearm in violation of 18 when he became involved Shei- parole That 922(g)(1). plea subjected U.S.C. la. him enhancement con- tained 18 U.S.C. which pro- court relied the tran- The district vides as follows: script guilty plea hearing Galo’s (1) In person the case of a who violates court, he the elements of state offenses to, 922(g) section of this title and has of- three pled guilty proof and the relevant by previous any in its convictions court ... for prosecution fered the state Galo, felony a violent ... person and deter mined such shall be $25,000 “related to the sexual ex- state conviction fined not more than and impris- purposes of children” for of an ploitation years.... oned not less than fifteen 2251(d). However, enhancement under (2) As used this subsection— conclusion, the court nec- reaching conduct, op- essarily focused on Galo’s as “(B) the term ‘violent means felon/ to the elements of the offenses he posed punishable by imprisonment crime for a convicted of in state court.4 was year term exceeding one that— argues that the district court Galo now “(i) use, has as an element the attempt- incorrectly concluded he had been use, physical ed or threatened use of violating “relating state laws convicted another; against force children,” “(ii) burglary specified other of- [or in- required to enhance his sentence. He or otherwise fenses] involves conduct required sists that the district that a serious presents potential risk of “categorical approach” deciding a in follow - injury to another. physical provisions whether the enhancement of 578, Taylor Id. 110 at S.Ct. 2143. con- 2251(d) “categorical § applied. Under the prior ceded that his convictions for assault approach,” sentencing the court can look robbery counted toward the enhance- only to the fact of conviction and the statu- they involved of ment because the use tory prior definition of the offense. The However, physical against persons. force by not controlled the analysis court’s is he court could argued district not Tay- the giving conduct rise to conviction. States, 575, 600-602, rely upon burglary two convictions de- lor v. United 495 U.S. (1990). 2143, for an sen- ciding qualified 110 109 L.Ed.2d 607 he enhanced S.Ct. Office, 5Gl.l(b), § by Id. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. 4. As calculated the U.S. Probation state. required statutorily a minimum sen- "[w]here Galo’s total offense level was 28 and his crim- II, greater tence is than the maximum of the category yielding guide- history inal a applicable guideline range, statutorily the re- range imprisonment 87 line for of months guide- quired minimum sentence shall be the (9 (7.25 years). years) to 108 months Presen- ¶¶ line sentence.” 29, 32, ("PSR”) Report tence ever, at 64. How- statutorily required minimum sen- 2251(d) provides that if a Section further 2251(a) violating § is 120 months tence for 2 defendant has or more convictions "under (10 years) have never for individuals who § chapter seq.~\ U.S.C. 2251 et [18 any been convicted of of federal crimes 117, 109A, chapter chapter or under the 2251(d) specified § or convicted of an of- any relating exploi- laws of State to the sexual relating exploitation fense to the sexual person shall be ... tation of such any 18 children under the law of state. imprisoned 30 nor more not less than 2251(d). statutorily required However, § The U.S.C. life.” in the district court the than 2251(a) violating § is pled guilty minimum sentence for parties agreed although Galo that (15 offenses, years) prior for individuals who multiple 180 months those offenses any prior only prior for of the feder- have one conviction would amount to one conviction 2251(d) prior § specified purposes or one sentence enhancement under al crimes for 2251(d), pleas relating § were entered si- for because his conviction an offense any multaneously. App. at 149-151. of children under the law of 924(e). state or even within a ment from state to He insisted that tence under jurisdiction only upon where he was given of the state based under the law (Missouri), “did his convictions convicted instrument or specificity charging of the presents serious instructions, involve ‘conduct not jury availability of the injury to anoth- physical risk of potential difficulties are transcript. trial Such The 110 S.Ct. 2143. er.’” Id. at sentencing applying where a avoided the Fifth Circuit Appeals 924(e) only enhancement looks to the based its affirmed the enhancement prior offense of conviction elements burglary that “the word conclusion law. as defined 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) burglary means however categorical has not been approach This (internal define it.” Id. a state chooses to limited omitted). quotation marks 924(e). Menifee, In Roussos v. F.3d Supreme Court was The issue before (3d Cir.1997) relied, we 162-63 applying whether and held that part, Taylor on the rationale statutory “must look to the the Bureau of Prisons had erred when offenses, or wheth- prior definitions of the factors and not considering enhancement may other evidence er the court consider focusing on the elements of the offense of prior crimes.” concerning the defendant’s construing “convicted 2143. After 495 U.S. S.Ct. purposes nonviolent offense” for of award- history, carefully examining legislative ing a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. text the statute noting 3621(e)(2)(B). “con- the enhancement on grounded crimes, specified victions” for the Court language of the relevant statute the enhancement focused the held than the text of the here is even clearer inquiry court’s “on the ele- Taylor involved in and Roussos. statutes conviction, not [on] ments the statute above, § when an applies As noted the facts of each defendant’s conduct.” Id. conviction ... individual “one exception narrow not relevant to With one relating under the laws of State analysis the Court concluded: sexual of children.” As only plausible interpretation language expressly refers to 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) that, like the rest of “conviction,” to “conduct” not statute, generally the enhancement re- In or- the sexual children. quires only the trial court to look to the here, uphold der to the enhancement we statutory fact and the defi- of conviction 2251(d) § applying would have to read nition of the offense. prior “previously when the defendant has been Id., at 110 2143. The Court also S.Ct. any convicted under the laws of state “practical noted that difficulties and conduct upon based potential approach unfairness of a factual language of children.” The daunting are all where [because] [i]n cases § in- fairly does not that support that alleges the Government defen terpretation. generic actual fit the defini dant’s conduct dissent, thoughtful Judge In his Garth burglary, tion of the trial court would have in reminds us that United States v. Wat- Id., to determine what that conduct was.” (3rd kins, Cir.1995), 54 163 we noted F.3d 601, 110 at S.Ct. 2143. in that enhancement contained Although approach a factual would be 924(e) § allow a court to does possible charging some cases where the apply upon that enhancement based a de- theories of instrument disclosed the actual in certain fendant’s actual conduct instanc- jury, it presented the case as to the would Dissent at In we es. See 586. Watkins nature possible often not be to discern the stated: prior Applica- of a defendant’s conduct. “statutory when the definition of

tion of the enhancement such instances inequitable prior enough permit offense” is broad would therefore result treat-

579 924(e). § on conduct that falls as an enhancement under conviction based 924(e)(2)(B) § scope outside of the Court stated: [here, scope outside the of 18 U.S.C. statutes, burglary A few States’ de- 2251(d)], necessary § to look becomes burglary fine more broadly, e.g., by beyond Only the statute of conviction. eliminating requirement that the en- may in such cases unlawful, try be by including places, or particular to the facts of the case look such as vending automobiles and ma- order to determine whether the trier of chines, Also, other than buildings.... necessarily fact found elements that may there be offenses under some the offense as a “violent qualify would that, laws States’ while not called “bur- 924(e)(2)(B). felony” under glary,” correspond in part substantial However, pronounce- 54 F.3d at 166. generic burglary.... This question re- Supreme ment to the dis- referred Court’s quires general us to address a more where a state cussion situations statute issue—whether the sentencing court encompasses is that it so broad offenses 924(e) applying must look to the predicates that serve as for enhancement statutory definitions of prior of- 924(e), as well as offenses that do fenses, may or whether the court con- Taylor, not. the Court held that the sider other evidence concerning the de- burglary enhancement contained prior fendant’s crimes. The Courts 924(e) applied whenever a defendant had Appeals uniformly have held that prior conviction for a crime that had the 924(e) mandates a formal categorical same elements as no “generic” burglary, approach, looking only statutory to the matter how the crime was labeled under offenses, definitions of the and not 599-600, state law. 495 U.S. at particular underlying facts those Accordingly, 110 S.Ct. 2143. the Court reasoning convictions. We find the concluded persuasive. these cases burglary has been convicted of (citations Id. at S.Ct. omit- 924(e) purposes of a ted). crime, regard- if he convicted It was this context that we made our label, its exact less of definition hav- pronouncement in Watkins. ing the basic elements unlawful or argued prosecution’s Watkins into, in, unprivileged entry remaining documentary reliance evidence to es- structure, building with intent tablish that his state convictions commit a crime. qualified as enhancements under given Id. at S.Ct. When government’s failed to meet the burden of burglary nar- statute defined more proof sentencing. rejected We that ar- (such rowly generic burglary than as not gument because the uncontested facts in requiring felony the intent commit to a presentence report the that established following entry) a violent crime there was prior predicate Watkins’ convictions were clearly problem no as the conviction 924(e). § offenses under We stated: must, definition, include the elements of Here, provided the information in the However, generic burglary. some states presentence report enabled the district burglary unprivileged define to include en- certainty to ascertain with the court try In of a vehicle. such cases the the statutes of conviction and statutes necessarily satisfy conviction would not the encompass only conviction conduct that However, generic burglary. elements of 924(e)(2)(B)© § scope falls within the case, in a if the actual- such defendant had (ü).... argue Watkins is forced ly entering building, a been convicted of per copies for a se rule that certified generic would have committed a he/she judgments required of conviction are burglary though even the statute’s defini- sentencing in a court every tion included conduct that could not serve case before replace intended in 1986 to the 1984 pri- the defendant’s may determine that “violent felonies” burglary or convictions are for definition of “generic” 924(e)(2)(B). §of meaning within the something entirely Although different. justification persuasive find no for We pre-existing a definition the omission of rule and decline to such an inflexible in- Congress’ of a term often indicates adopt it. definition, reject that we draw no tent to Watkins, (emphasis 54 F.3d at 167-68 add- such inference here. ed). (citations 589-90, Id. at 110 S.Ct. 2143 However, in can our discussion Watkins omitted). from the focus of the not be divorced Having burglary, established that a as inquiry Taylor. Supreme Court’s defined, originally predicate remained a There, the had to discern what Con- Court offense, sentencing held that appli- intended when it amended the gress adopt “categorical ap- courts must 924(e) cable statute 1986. When if a conviction proach” determining originally enacted in 1984 it included bur- burglary “burglary” for constituted a for predicate enhancing as a offense for glary 924(e). above, §of As noted purposes violating a sentence of one convicted of given when a state statute includes con- (a 922(g)(1) possession felon U.S.C. burglary duct as that would not constitute firearm). However, “[bjurglary was de- a “generic burglary,” ‘any felony in the fined statute itself as only accomplish required inquiry can consisting entering remaining surrep- it first determines if the prior conviction titiously within building property that is “generic burglary” was tantamount as engage of another with intent to in conduct ” 924(e). Thus, §in originally defined constituting a Federal or State offense.’ Watkins, acknowledged we the sen- Taylor, 495 U.S. at 110 S.Ct. 2143. 924(e) tencing beyond court must “look the stat- The current version of was enact- Congress passed ed into law when ute of conviction” when a defendant has a Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986. prior conviction under a statute that labels Id. at 110 S.Ct. 2143. Those amend- burglary conduct as a that would tradition- changes in original ments made three (such ally burglary not be defined as 1984 enactment. “This amendment illegally entering of a vehicle with the in- expanded predicate triggering offenses crime). situation, to commit a tent “robbery the sentence enhancement from prior “burglary” conviction can burglary” felony to “a violent or a seri- predicate serve as a offense under offense”; drug ous it defined the term if the conduct defendant’s constituted felony” “burglary”; “violent to include Otherwise, burglary.” “generic there was pre-existing it deleted the definition of no conviction for “burglary” burglary.” Id. at 110 S.Ct. 2143. 924(e). Accordingly, our decision in Thus, in Taylor, the Court had to examine Watkins does not allow a legislative history of the amendments impose an enhancement under Congress to determine if intended a sub- based on conduct that did not result in what change pred- stantive constituted a crime to sexual 924(e). icate offense under The Court exploitation of and the dissent’s concluded that the omission did not mean language reliance Watkins is change intended defi- misplaced. burglary. nition of similarly unpersuaded by We are the legislative history sug- The as a whole upon dissent’s reliance v. United States gests that the deletion of the 1984 defini- (9th Sweeten, Cir.1991), 933 F.2d 769 tion of burglary may have been an inad- v. Barney, and United States 955 F.2d 635 casualty complex drafting vertent of a Cir.1992). (10th event, dissent at In In See 585-86. process. nothing there is Sweeten, history the to show that district court count refused to

581 determining In whether a “burglary of a habi- conviction for a may offense convicted of a crime which be predicate a been Texas as tation” defined because Texas toward enhancement under counted The sen- to include vehicles. Taylor, employ “categori- “habitation” a court must a that it was there- court concluded tencing inquire rather than into approach,” cal “ ‘burglary’ a not a conviction for for e underlying requires facts. This a com- Sweeten, Taylor. sense” under generic of the relevant parison of the elements government appeal- at 767. The 933 F.2d with elements state statute the basic ed, Ninth Appeals for the and burglary Taylor identified in the deci- the statute in reversed because Circuit sion. to include defined “habitation” question (citations omitted). F.2d at 638 The the statute was Accordingly, “vehicles.” holding was based the fact court’s “trailers, camp- limited to such vehicles “Taylor sentencing allows ‘the ers, primary pur- mobile homes-whose beyond the mere fact of conviction go not as a dwelling to serve as a pose is range jury where a was a narrow cases Id. at 770. transportation.” mode of all the elements of actually required find Therefore, defendant’s conviction burglary.’” (quoting Id. at 639 generic consistent burglary of a habitation was 2160). at S.Ct. the conviction “generic burglary,” quite situation is different. As not Our a offense under predicate constituted above, governs the statute that ed 924(e). reaching this conclusion the “prior a conviction requires enhancement only upon court relied the elements to the sexual of ... laws inquiry into and did not allow an offense the en exploitation of children.” Therefore the Texas stat- the conduct violated governed by whether the law hancement is Thus, contrary to the inference ute. violated relates previously the defendant dissent, Judge Garth’s the court raised children.” to' “sexual Sec agree “we that it would have been stated: require sentencing tion does not inquire into error for the district court to deter mine if the underlying the facts Sweeten’s Texas con- of a crime as generic satisfies the elements Id. at 769. viction.” 924(e). Rather, does Similarly, Barney, the defendant had if the statute court need determine Wyoming statute been convicted under conduct) (not previ was the defendant burglary to include unautho- that defined ously convicted of relates building, occupied into “a entry rized Moreover, exploitation of children. vehicle,” with the intent of structure practical is consistent with conclusion committing a crime. 955 F.2d at 638.5 guided the Court’s considerations appeals upheld The court of As the Court noted analysis Taylor. defendant’s enhancement of the court’s there, poten practical difficulties “the transcript of the sentence because the approach are tial unfairness of factual colloquy prior burgla- from the guilty plea 601, 110 S.Ct. daunting.” 495 U.S. illegally that he had en- ries established “[a] cautioned that previously have We Therefore, building, not a vehicle. tered approach ap [to case-by-case, specific fact convictions satisfied prior burglary ... could statute] plying an burglary” under “generic elements mini-trials, to hold 924(e). however, sentencing courts force the court stated Again, and otherwise evidence and witnesses court stated: hear inquiry. the limits of prior conviction that from the indictment actually involved two defendants. 5. The case analysis crime Barney discussion to the court's to commit a We limit our had the intent Trombley’s prior The court did conviction. “burglarized” structures. he entered the when Barney’s prior convictions to not allow one public. open were The structures predicate because there as a offense serve no indication from at 640. F.2d guilty plea colloquy or 582 relating exploitation examination of the to the sexual of chil-

engage in a detailed offense,” dren, prior equal involved in the it force to con- specific pertains facts all of which “would be avoided with a gambling, underage drinking duct such as categorical approach focuses on the [that drug or use. The statute is aimed at prior offense].” elements of the United any conduct of nature that tends to cor- (3d Preston, 81, v. 910 F.2d 85 n. 3 States in- rupt enough children. It is broad Cir.1990). allowing a an “R” clude minor to view rated video. 2251(d) incorporates Section cate- gorical approach deciding because it focuses the what conduct can be said to minor, sentencing court’s attention on the statuto- corrupt the morals of a the com- ry prior conviction. It definition of community, mon sense of the as well as statute, given the elements of a not decency, propriety the sense of and the conduct that violates it that if determines morality people which most entertain is the statute relates to sexual apply sufficient to the statute to each children. case, particular and to individuate what particular conclude, therefore, conduct is rendered criminal

We that the district by it. erred when considered Galo’s determining conduct in whether he was Decker, 99, v. Commonwealth 698 A.2d 101 subject enhancement. (internal (Pa.Super.1997) quotation marks The court should have focused on the omitted); also Commonwealth v. Tau see statutory definitions of those convic- Kappa Epsilon, 530 Pa. 609 A.2d 791 tions. (1992) (fraternities prosecuted corrupt- for Accordingly, we must examine the statu- ing the morals of minors based un- tory definitions of the crimes Galo was derage drinking). previously convicted of and determine Endangering the Welfare of a Child is

whether they are state “laws defined as follows: of children.” parent, guardian, A or other su- pervising the welfare of a child under 18 earlier,

As recited Galo’s state con (1) years age an commits offense he victions were for two counts each of: knowingly endangers the welfare of the Corruption of Minors in violation of 18 Pa. (2) 6301; care, duty child violating protec- Endangering Ann. Cons. Stat. support. the Welfare of a Child violation of tion or 18 Pa. (3) 4304; Indecent Ann. Cons. Stat. 18 4304. The stat- Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Assault violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. ute clearly duty relates to a breach of the 3126(a)(1) (a)(2). Ann. of care rather than sexual exploi- abuse or Corruption of tation. It includes such par- Minors is defined as fol- conduct as lows: refusing medically necessary ents to obtain

Whoever, upon religious treatment for a child based being age years of 18 Barnhart, beliefs. upwards, by any See Commonwealth v. corrupts act (1985) corrupt Pa.Super. tends to 345 497 A.2d any morals of minor aids, age, less than 18 (parent prosecuted or who refusing obtain abets, entices or encourages any such medical treatment for child defended crime, minor any commission of child, charges endangering welfare of knowingly who encourages assists or involuntary manslaughter by explain- such minor in violating parole his or her “if ing go I would to a I doctor would be court, order of commits a misde- faith.”). turning my my back on It also meanor degree. of the first parental criminalizes negligent such con- leaving plastic bag 18 Pa. duct as too close to a (emphasis Ann. Cons. Stat. added). It is readily apparent sleeping subsequently that al- infant who suffo- though Fewell, the statute can include conduct cates. Commonwealth v.

583 (1995), children,’ A.2d 1109 Pa.Super. exploitation 654 titled ‘sexual or physical intentional assaultive behavior use these terms their statutory nature. a nonsexual Commonwealth v. definitions.” Government’s Br. at 31. We 2251(d) Vining, (Pa.Super.2000) § 744 A.2d 310 disagree. The (adult prosecuted for caregiver burns and apply would if a prior defendant had a left in beatings inflicted on toddler her involuntary for conviction deviate care). sexual intercourse as defined under the Pennsylvania. law of That impos- offense call,

Indecent assault is a much closer liability es criminal “in engaging devi- obviously because it relates to the sexual ate sexual complain- intercourse8 with a However, nature of an offender’s conduct. ant: ... who is criminalizes, to, years less than 13 and relates nonconsen- touching regardless sual indecent of the age-” Pa. 18 Cons. Stat. Ann. 3123(a)(6). § The definition does not con- age. Pennsylvania victim’s law establishes exploitation tain the term “sexual that this offense is when of chil- committed Nevertheless, prior dren.” a person who has indecent contact6 [a] category involuntary for this deviate complainant with the causes com- subject sexual intercourse would a defen- plainant to have contact indecent 2251(d) § dant enhancement be- person is of indecent assault (1) cause the conviction would be for a crime person if: so does without (2) consent; relating exploitation to the sexual of chil- complainant’s person Similarly, dren. conviction for compulsion;.... does so forcible statutory rape would establish a conviction 3126(a)(1) Pa. Ann. Cons. Stat. any “under the laws of relating State (a)(2). conduct would have consti- exploitation the sexual of children” and regardless tuted a violation of this statute 2251(d) subject a defendant to the en- age Although of the of his victims. hancement.9 intended to condi- this, minor could be the victim of either 2251(d) tion pre- enhancement under on offenses, of Galo’s other two state none of cisely this kind of conviction rather statutory definitions of those three generic than on convictions that relate to crimes establish conviction under “laws exploitation sexual of minors because relating exploitation to the sexual of chil- specific of the conduct of the accused. As dren.” Supreme Taylor, only Court noted in government argues applying way ap- can the enhancement be the categorical approach produce would an plied in a manner that is both uniform and “absurd result” “the because enhanced practical. penalty provisions of 18 U.S.C. sum, only apply previously would to defendants convicted because has not specifically violating relating states with statutes that are been convicted for law intercourse,” 6. "Indecent contact” is defined in 18 Pa. Cons. 8. "Deviate sexual under Penn- as, alia, law, "[a]ny sylvania statutory touching 3101 as of the is defined inter Stat. Ann. "[sjexual parts per per sexual or other intimate intercourse os or anus be- purpose gratifying arousing beings.” for the sexu- tween human 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. person.” al desire in either 3101. "Sexual intercourse addition to [i]n ordinary meaning, its includes intercourse anus, per per penetration os or with some 7. The dissent’s contention that three of "[a]ll slight; required.” however emission is not Pennsylvania statutes under which Galo Id. previously enough convicted are broad children,’ include 'sexual de- Code, ...”, pending underlying facts, Pennsylvania on the dis- 9. The Crimes in a subsec- see statute, really rape imposes sent at is little more than tion of the criminal lia- an asser- bility "engages previously tion that Galo was convicted of on individual who in sexu- complaint with a [w]ho conduct al intercourse age.” what re- than 13 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. children. This is not statute less 3121(a)(6). quires. Ann. 575, 2143, L.Ed.2d 607 110 S.Ct. 109 exploitation U.S. to sexual (1990), improperly applied reading district and a common-sense 2251(d) 2251(d) § to Galo’s sentence. Pennsylvania § and the relevant pled guilty, statutes to which Galo as well

IV. my plea colloquies review of Galo’s and reasons, reject we For all of the above presentence report, his convince me other- challenge to constitutional Galo’s Moreover, I wise. fear that the crabbed 2251(a) 2242(a)(4)(B). However, §§ majority interpretation by provi- state convic- because none of Galo’s 2251(d) § preclude sions of would sentence the laws of tions were convictions “under enhancements that are not warranted exploita- State to sexual Congress but that intended. Let me de- children,” subject he is not to the tion of velop point. 2251(d) Therefore, § enhancement. we remand for will vacate sentence and Galo’s I. resentencing.10 had been in 1990 in Galo indicted West- GARTH, in Judge, concurring Circuit County, Pennsylvania moreland on a ten- part dissenting part. him charged count information which with I obliged separately am to write be- minors,3 corruption endangering cause, major- though agree even I with the children,4 assault,5 welfare of indecent ity’s disposition of Galo’s first three issues involuntary sexual deviate intercourse.6 disagree strongly on I with its appeal,1 These offenses committed had been recognize failure to the District against nephews his two of whom —both Court’s enhancement of Galo’s sentence pled guilty were minors. Galo to all and, therefore, approved should be af- involuntary counts other than the deviate firmed. counts, sexual intercourse which were dis- pursuant plea agreement missed to a after complains that his sentence was pleas eight his to the other improperly by the District enhanced because, Galo, counts. information about these con- claims he did not suffer a re- presentence victions is found Galo’s (Pennsylvania) sexually state conviction for port, objected. to which never exploiting Unfortunately, children.2 Through pleas guilty, ad- majority panel agreed of this with him Galo also narrowly eight mitted to the rise construing giving 18 U.S.C. facts to the 2251(d). § My reading authority, counts of the information in Westmoreland case States, particularly Taylor County. v. United 495 2008, (2000), Although specific puts we hold en- 146 L.Ed.2d 958 § apply, hancement we does not claims rest. suggest ought do not ignore calculating ap- that conduct in an 2. The District Court enhanced Galo's sen- propriate Sentencing sentence under 2251(d), sentencing § tence under 18 U.S.C. clearly Guidelines. His conduct is rele- years, him to 15 the minimum sentence with determining though vant to his sentence even the enhancement. hancement, If there had been no en- predicate is not be a offense under range of sentence to which 2251(d). subject Galo was ten statute was twenty years.

1.Galo had claimed that has not validly exercised Commerce its Clause author 3. 18 Pa.C.S. 6301. 2251(a) ity enacting 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) pertain of which to the —both 4. 18 Pa.C.S. 4304. por sexual of children and child nography. majority aptly As the so holds—a 5. 18 Pa.C.S. 3126. holding agree with which I decision —our Cir.1999), Rodia, (3d v. United States 194 F.3d 465 denied, 1131, rt. 529 U.S. 120 S.Ct. 6. 18 Pa.C.S. 3123. ce Thereafter, charged Supreme in men of the Galo was Court’s decision States, Taylor in federal court v. a two-count indictment United 495 U.S. (1990), depicting of material production with the S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 607 of children. The the sexual that no court should be called majority, in has detailed that opinion, finding respect its conduct fact indictments, prior prior indictment and has described Galo’s nor should sen preschool of his niece from tencing ignore undisputed sexual abuse courts facts in majority opin- As the grade. prior to fifth connection with state convictions. noted, Third, majority ion has Galo’s abuse of his niece the has also failed to rec sex, vaginal touching, included oral and ognize that this Court and several of our neph- His earlier abuse of his interpreted Taylor intercourse. sister Circuits have to oral and anal sex and touch- permit sentencing prior ews included courts to review ing genitals. guilty pleas their and the of descriptions prior presentence reports convictions in in order These acts of Galo have never been de- prior to deter mine the nature of a convic nied, contradicted, and, have never been as sentencing purposes. tion for above, objected I have recited Galo never Thus, sentencing the court is not confined presentence report their inclusion in the to reading to the mechanistic of a statute in connection with his prepared that was which, as the majority apparently con Indeed, plea federal indictment. the collo- tends, “magic must contain the relevant by conducted the quies both District Court (in case, terms” “sexual of Ackerman in the judge by Judge children”). Rather, Taylor7 as both Court of Common Pleas Westmoreland us, the I cases discuss below instruct we County only not flesh out the actions taken beyond can look the words of the statute by explicit to his sexual con- giving rise to the enhanced sentence. niece, nephews duct with his but also great inform Galo in detail of the criminal III. consequences subject which he to was Though Supreme the intended to for those terms sentence actions. the need for mini-trials for foreclose sen- because, I as I under- point stress tencing courts to deter mine the elements that, majority it holds opinion, stand conviction, of a because it did not prior despite explicit Galo’s admissions of his sentencing engage desire “the court to through pleas guilty, acts the statu- factfinding process regarding an elaborate of the crimes of which tory definitions offenses,” Taylor, prior the defendant’s specifi- convicted are claimed not to be by no 495 U.S. S.Ct. cally related courts from prohibited sentencing means so, majority, says children and determining prior the elements of convic- improperly applied District Court through to tions reference admissions enhancement to Galo’s sentence. guilty pleas unambiguous and to docu- I explain why majority Let me believe the which the did not ob- ments to defendant degrees was 180 off the mark this con- ject, presentence such as indictments and clusion. reports.

II. interpreted courts have Several Circuit Taylor. First, Supreme Court’s decision majority I believe Sweeten, v. in which the United States interpreting “relating erred in the term to” Second, majori district court had enhanced the defen- narrowly as as it did. under 18 U.S.C. ty recognize grava has failed to that the dant’s sentence prior agree my colleagues Tay- statutory definition of the 7. While I tion and further, offense, Taylor goes point prescribe "categorical approach,” in fact as I lor does here, appear and as the cases which have inter- which would to restrict the out prior preted Taylor court to at the fact of convic- have held. look alia, copy a certified produce ernment on, a Texas conviction inter based judgment of conviction. 54 prior of a each burglary following (3d Cir.1995). analyzing After habitation, explained: F.3d 163 the Ninth Circuit does, Judge Stapleton of our Court held that a Taylor clearly say, “To as copies judgments that these certified may inquire into the sentencing court not required were not to establish is not conviction prior facts of a underlying were for that Watkins’ convictions judgment and cor- say original felonies, (just stating only violent criminal statute are the responding case): may that a materials (9th “statutory 933 F.2d definition of should consider.” when Cir.1991). permit enough offense” is broad conviction based on conduct that falls the Ninth Circuit held Accordingly, 924(e)(2)(B) scope outside of proper consider the that it was Sweeten [here, scope outside the of 18 U.S.C. guilty to the Texas plea of defendant’s 2251(d)], necessary § to look becomes indictment, and his because conviction Only beyond the statute conviction. “[cjonsideration of these additional docu- may sentencing in such cases court ments, by the proffered government when in particular to the facts of the case look sentencing, require any does not search- at to determine whether the trier of order underlying into the facts of a ing inquiry necessarily fact found elements F.2d at 769. defendant’s conviction.” 933 qualify would the offense as a “violent Circuit, Therefore, “it held the Ninth is 924(e)(2)(B). § felony” under ... error for a district court to restrict its greater signifi- 54 F.3d at 166. Of even original judgment consideration to the cance, well “[i]t we noted is estab- criminal corresponding conviction and stat- circuit, others, lished in this and all that a with documentation presented ute also sentencing may rely court on the facts set clearly judicially noticeable facts that presentence report forth in the when their predicate that the conviction is a establish accuracy challenged by is not the defen- purposes.” conviction for enhancement Watkins, dant.” 54 F.3d at 166-67. Sweeten, 933 F.2d at 769-70. The Tenth Circuit considered a similar IV. in with a issue connection sen- Applying Taylor progeny and its to this in tencing enhancement United States v. case, sentencing I would hold that (10th Cir.1992). The Barney, 955 F.2d 635 at the state court properly looked held that: Court colloquy whether plea determine sought where enhancement on the sex- “relating convictions were through obtained basis of conviction exploitation ual of children.” All three of may guilty plea, Pennsylvania under which statutes in- underlying look to the indictment or previously Galo was convicted are broad guilty plea formation and the text of the enough exploitation to include “sexual to determine whether the defendant was children,” depending underlying on the charged with and admitted conduct facts, forth in the state court infor- as set question which falls without within the mation, guilty pleas, Galo’s two Taylor’s generic definition. ambit of Indeed, presentence report. federal 955 F.2d at 639. majority readily that violations of concedes Watkins,

Finally, exploi- v. these statutes could include sexual United States 581-82), Maj. at application Op. considered tation of {See 924(e) sentencing inexplicably in a case but does not extend this rea- soning, to examine and previously report where the defendant had been documents, underlying charging convicted of five violent felonies and had as in- argued Taylor precedent that his sentence should not have structed requiring been enhanced without the Gov- Watkins. 6301, “Corruption mi- deciding apply 18 Pa.C.S.

nors,” “Whoever, provides: being of the demonstrated, enhancement. As I have age years upwards, by any of 18 act the Ninth and Tenth permit- Circuits have corrupt the corrupts or tends to morals of ted district courts to look at the underlying years age minor less than 18 guilty pleas and this Court commits a misdemeanor of the first de- has held Watkins that the presentence 6301(a)(1). gree.” 18 Pa.C.S. As the report may be considered in a sentence- out, majority phrase “by any points enhancing context as well. I have re- clearly relating act” “can include conduct viewed Galo’s state court colloquy, his children,” Court, plea colloquy in District and the (Maj. Op. addition to other conduct. case, presentence report in this none of 582.) which, if by consulted the majority, have been opinion, discussed its and I cannot “Endangering Pa.C.S. wel- children,” understand how the provides parent, position Government’s “[a] fare of guardian, other that Galo had a supervising age welfare of a child under 18 the sexual of children can be knowingly rejected. commits an offense if he endan-

gers the welfare of the child violating V. care,

duty protection support.” 4304(a). duty Pa.C.S. Such a of care is me Let revisit the relevant proceedings certainly by sexually exploiting violated in the Court of Common Pleas and in the the child. District Court for a moment. In the plea court, colloquy the state court 3126, Finally, 18 “Indecent as- Pa.C.S. judge explained: I’m going “Now to ex- sault,” provides that person “[a] who has plain the counts to which you plead- will be complainant indecent contact with the ing guilty. you And will notice that this is complainant causes the to have indecent what the Commonwealth would be re- person contact with the of inde- if quired prove you pled not guilty. person cent assault does [ ] so you admitting by This is what are complainant’s pleading without the consent[or] the charges.” to these He then person by compulsion.” does so forcible outlined four (2). 3126(a)(1) By 18 Pa.C.S. and its elements that the Commonwealth would (“indecent contact”), language prove this statute before have Galo could be convict- manifestly exploitation, concerns sexual as ed of corruption the two counts of of mi- admits, majority stating 1) that “it nors, obvi- Jerry 18 Pa.C.S. 6301: “that ously relates to the sexual nature of an eighteen years Galo was a child under conduct,” 583), (Maj. Op. offender’s at and 2) age”; you “that at the time were over obviously may the sexual conduct involve 3) eighteen years age”; you “that en- minor, age as statute no restric- gaged Jerry in indecent contact with tion.8 4) Galo”; corrupted and “that that contact corrupt or tended to his morals.” As to Pennsylvania

Because all of the statutes minors, corruption the second count of under which was convicted include government “would to prove have “sexual of children” and are overbroad, regard those same elements to Scott properly the District Court conviction,” judge explained Galo.” As the state court “beyond went the mere fact of Galo, corruption at of minors to “indecent U.S. S.Ct. Then, majority Pennsyl- regardless age 8. The victims. has characterized the of his states, proscribing unaccountably, ”[a]lthough it vania statute indecent assault as minor this, recognizes "a much closer call.” It could be the victim of or either of Galo's offenses, statutory statute criminalizes conduct such as Galo’s other two none of the defi- touching neph- nonconsensual indecent of his nitions of those three crimes establish a con- ews and that Galo’s conduct would viction under 'laws to the sexual ex- admits ” 583.) (Maj. Op. ploitation have a violation statute of children.’ constituted of this (his and nephews), abusing her brothers of the element an essential contact”9 nephews. two interviewed the pled police to which Galo an element offense and report and guilty, presentence to the Galo, plea According his through guilty.- earlier, the abuse of the elder and elements. I noted these facts admitted oral anal sex “consisted of nephew and/or three set forth judge The state penis,” other’s and touching and of each endanger- counts of for the two elements nephew “consist- younger the abuse children, 18 Pa.C.S. welfare of ing the and later touching penis each other’s ed of 1) was under Jerry “that 4304: of oral sex.” 2) you owed “that age”; eighteen care, support protection duty been contra- charges have never These 3) duty him”; you violated “that dicted, have never admissions having in- endangered his welfare require This case does not been denied. state court with him.” The decent contact mini-trials, finding or nor does judicial fact same elements judge “[t]he stated that subjective, disputable review of require in count ten but proven be would have to justify actions to evidence of Galo’s again, Galo regard to Scott Galo.” Once uncontradicted sentence. These enhanced endangering to two counts of pled guilty integral admissions are charges and Galo’s child, for “indecent welfare of a which and leave court convictions to Galo’s state the offense. was an element of contact” uncertainty as to the content of Galo’s no Galo, guilty, admitted through They each relate to sex- prior convictions. elements. these facts and of children. Thus we do ual judge explained Finally, the state by the problem encounter the foreseen not assault, indecent 18 Pa.C.S. Taylor when it ex- Supreme Court 1) you “that had inde- has two elements: adding another lev- pressed concern about person with another assault or contact cent sentencing pro- finding fact el of your spouse”; was not and that ceedings. 2) the contact was made without “that VI. judge consent.” The state court person’s referred to explained that “[t]he nature of the Because of broad Jerry paral- and “[t]he count four is Galo” which Galo Pennsylvania statutes under regard at count nine with charge lel convicted, properly the District Court was Galo,” as chil- both of whose status Scott Taylor inquiry further conducted respect with proven dren would have be that, case, determined Galo’s corruption of minors counts pled guilty to which he state offenses Galo, the welfare of children. endangering of chil- court related to “sexual guilty, admitted these through decision to dren.” The District Court’s and elements. facts apply plea colloquy, the terms of the By sentence was well line Su- in state eight to these counts pled precedent preme precedent contact,” i.e., “indecent involving Accordingly, from and other Circuits. with children. Addi- exploitation,” “sexual majority’s I from the respectfully dissent report described tionally, presentence en- failure to affirm the District Court’s court conviction under Galo’s state hanced sentence of Galo. presentence report stat- convictions. charged ed Kensing-

after his niece the New informed sexually that Galo had been police

ton parts of the majority ing the sexual or other intimate would I do not believe purpose arousing gratify- qualifies person for the dispute contact” as that "indecent Op. person.” (Maj. majority points ing sexual desire in either exploitation.” The "sexual 3101).) (quoting Pa.C.S. "[a]ny at 583 n. 6 touch- out that this term is defined

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Andrew F. Galo

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Date Published: Feb 6, 2001

Citation: 239 F.3d 572

Docket Number: 99-3870

Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.