UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ROWLAND MARCUS ANDRADE
Case No. 20-cr-00249-RS-1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
October 7, 2025
Rowland Marcus Andrade was convicted by a jury of one count of wire fraud, in violation of
I. BACKGROUND
In 2020, a grand jury indicted Andrade on one count of wire fraud and one count of money laundering. Broadly, the Indictment alleged that Andrade defrauded investors out of more than $10 million by misrepresenting the commercial and technological viability of his cryptocurrency project, AML Bitcoin, which he claimed was anti-money laundering and know-your-customer compliant. See Dkt. 1. A jury convicted Andrade on both counts, see Dkt. 615, and he was sentenced to an 84-month term of imprisonment, see Dkt. 719. He was ordered to surrender to serve his sentence on October 31, 2025. See id.
After Andrade‘s motion for a new trial was denied, see Dkt. 694, he filed a notice of appeal
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To obtain a bond pending appeal, a defendant must show:
- by clear and convincing evidence that [he] is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released . . .; and
- that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in—
- reversal,
- an order for a new trial,
- a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment, or
- a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less than the total of the time already served plus the expected duration of the appeal process.
The final statutory requirement—that the defendant present a “substantial question” that is “likely to result in” particular relief—contains two separate showings. The first goes to the merit of the appellate argument. To show that the question is “substantial,” the defendant must establish that it is “fairly debatable” or “fairly doubtful.” See United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1281–82 (9th Cir. 1985). Included within that definition are questions that are “novel,” those “not plainly covered by the controlling precedents,” or those that “involve important questions concerning the scope and meaning of decisions of the Supreme Court.” Id. at 1281 (quoting
The second goes to the centrality of the question to the defendant‘s conviction and sentence. See Handy, 761 F.2d at 1280 (“[L]ikely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial’ defines the type of question that must be presented.” (emphasis in original)). The defendant must establish that, if the court of appeals agrees with his argument, the relief specified in the statute is “likely.” See Miller, 753 F.2d at 23. A question—even a “substantial” question—that is harmless, lacks prejudicial effect, or was insufficiently preserved does not compel a bond pending appeal. See id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Flight Risk
Andrade has adequately demonstrated that he is not a flight risk. As he points out, he has an exemplary record of appearing for court appearances and complying with court orders. He has strong ties to the community through his wife and children. Even after conviction, Andrade was permitted to self-surrender to the Bureau of Prisons, and there has been no indication that he has initiated plans to go abroad. Compare United States v. Holmes, 2023 WL 2899525, at *2 (explaining that defendant booking an international one-way flight schedule to depart a few weeks after the jury‘s verdict weighed in favor of finding defendant to be a flight risk).
B. Danger to the Community
Andrade has also adequately demonstrated that he is not a danger to the community. He was convicted of a non-violent crime that required an elaborate web of lies and deception. It is unlikely that he would be able to re-spin that web (or something similar) during the pendency of his appeal even if he wanted to. In addition, he has no other criminal history to suggest that this conviction will fail to deter future criminality.
The government rightly points out that economic harm constitutes a danger to the community, but its contention that Andrade might do harm while released relies almost entirely on
C. Questions for Appeal
Andrade raises various questions that he intends to appeal. Those questions are all either not substantial, inconsequential, or both.
i. Jury Instruction on Money Laundering
Andrade intends to argue on appeal, as he did during and after trial, that the jury instructions on the money laundering charge were defective. The jury was instructed that to convict Andrade of money laundering, they must find he “conducted or intended to conduct a financial transaction involving property that represented the proceeds of wire fraud.” Tr. 2963. Andrade requested an instruction that would have required the jury to find this financial transaction was the purchase of a cashier‘s check in the amount of $600,000 and that the wire fraud which produced the proceeds was that charged in Count One of the Indictment.
As explained in the order denying Andrade‘s motion for a new trial, see Dkt. 694, at 3–5, Andrade‘s assertion of error stems from a misreading of the Indictment. Count Two of the Indictment did not limit the unlawful activity which produced the funds that were then laundered to the wire fraud charged in Count One. Rather, it alleged that proceeds of “wire fraud in violation of [
Even if the Ninth Circuit were to disagree, Andrade would still face penal exposure from the wire fraud conviction, and a new sentence would not “likely” contain a prison term shorter
ii. Jury Instructions: Good Faith
Andrade intends to argue on appeal that the jury instructions were defective because the good faith instruction was unclear about who bore the burden of proof. This argument is not substantial.
The instruction stated that “[i]f the defendant acted in good faith, then he lacked the intent to defraud required to prove the offense of wire fraud as charged in Count One.” Dkt. 612, at 22. Read alongside the other wire fraud instructions, it was perfectly clear that the government bore the burden of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Andrade did not act in good faith. The wire fraud instructions told the jury that “the government must prove . . . beyond a reasonable doubt . . . the defendant acted with the intent to defraud, that is, the intent to deceive and cheat.”
In any event, the instructions gave Andrade more than to which he was legally entitled. In the Ninth Circuit, it is “well settled that a criminal defendant has ‘no right’ to any good faith instruction when the jury has been adequately instructed with regard to the intent required to be found guilty of the crime charged, notwithstanding the normal rules governing ‘theory of defense’ requests.” United States v. Shipsey, 363 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). Nowhere in any of his papers on this point has Andrade acknowledged—much less grappled with—that settled case law.
iii. Jury Instructions: Multiple Schemes
Andrade intends to argue on appeal that the jury instructions were erroneous because they did not include, as he requested, a multiple schemes instruction. That instruction would have told the jury that they must acquit “[i]f [they] find that the scheme charged did not exist . . . even though you may find that some other scheme existed” and that they must acquit “[i]f [they] find that the defendant was not a member of the charged scheme . . . even though that defendant may have been a member of some other scheme.” Dkt. 480, at 43:3-6.
This argument is also not substantial. Though Andrade relies exclusively on case law discussing the propriety of multiple conspiracies instructions. See, e.g., United States v. Moe, 781 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1247 (9th Cir. 2004), he is correct that the Ninth Circuit has recognized considerable overlap between participation in a conspiracy and participation in a fraudulent scheme, see United States v. Lothian, 976 F.2d 1257, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1999). Multiple conspiracies instructions are used to mitigate the possibility of spillover—the risk that a jury finds one defendant culpable for the conduct of the other defendants in the case. See United States v. Anguiano, 873 F.2d 1314, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, it is at least “fairly debatable” that, when the government charges multiple individuals with wire fraud stemming from several schemes involving different configurations of the defendants, a multiple schemes instruction is necessary to mitigate the same spillover risk.
The problem for Andrade is that he was tried alone, and “there is no problem of spillover when, as in this case, the defendant stands trial alone.” Anguiano, 873 F.2d at 1318. That is because the jury was only asked to assess the guilt of one individual: Andrade. It could not have accidentally imported the guilt of Dillman or Abramoff to Andrade because the guilt of Dillman or Abramoff was not simply before it.
iv. Violation of Napue
This argument is not substantial. Trial exhibit 805, supplemented by Special Agent Quinn‘s testimony, was neither false (a point Andrade concedes) nor misleading. The jury could have reasonably inferred from that evidence Andrade enjoyed dominion over AML Bitcoin‘s social media accounts—a conclusion supported by ample evidence in the record. See Tr. 895 (Testimony of Bernadette Tran, one of Andrade‘s office assistants: “[Andrade] had to approve everything that went out. So everything, we‘d probably, like, send him a version, and then he would say yes or not and then we would post it.“); Tr. 1051 (Testimony of Melanie Cowan, a marketing employee of Andrade: Q: “And was it your practice to review the updates to the Twitter post with Marcus Andrade before they went up? A: When I was with Republic One, it was with Melissa and then with Marcus, yes.“).
Andrade complains that the image was created after many of the misrepresentations were made and that the passwords were changed shortly before that, so the image possessed little probative value as to who controlled AML Bitcoin‘s social media activity during the critical period. Maybe so—Andrade was free to expose that weakness on cross-examination and make the argument to the jury during closing statements. Neither the image nor the accompanying testimony precluded that construction of the evidence.
v. Evidentiary Rulings
On appeal, Andrade intends to revive a slew of the evidentiary objections. He, for example, contends that important exculpatory evidence was erroneously excluded as hearsay, that damaging
Andrade mostly incorporates the arguments he made in his motion for a new trial, see Dkt. 742, at 11–12, which itself rehashed the arguments presented before and during trial. Those arguments have now been considered and rejected multiple times in prior orders and proceedings.
To the extent Andrade attempts to argue that particular evidentiary decisions were close—and thus that his argument on appeal would be “substantial“—his efforts are unavailing. Consider, for instance, his brief discussion of purportedly “exculpatory evidence.” Dkt. 742, at 11. Andrade claims “these issues are fairly debatable . . . because the jury was erroneously deprived of numerous pieces of critical exculpatory evidence.”
Andrade‘s discussion of certain government evidence that he claims was admitted without a proper foundation is equally unpersuasive. He contends that the extent to which the purportedly erroneous admissions prejudiced him is “fairly debatable,” but he makes no effort to show that the decisions themselves were close calls (except by asserting that they were erroneous). The showing required to demonstrate personal knowledge is not demanding. See Strong v. Valdez Fine Foods, 724 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he requirement of personal knowledge imposes only a minimal burden on a witness; if reasonable persons could differ as to whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe, the witness‘s testimony is admissible.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, Andrade must show that it is “fairly debatable” that no reasonable person could have thought the various witnesses had personal knowledge of the matters to which they testified. Now as before, he cannot do so.
Andrade‘s complaint about the admission of AtenCoin evidence fares no better. Andrade appears to contend that it is unsettled under existing law whether “other acts” evidence can be admitted as “inextricably intertwined” to the charged conduct without a showing that the other acts were also criminal. However, in fraud cases, conduct undertaken as part of the same scheme is admissible under the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine even if the government did not charge
vi. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Andrade intends to argue on appeal he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on claims of prosecutorial misconduct because he created a “reasonable suspicion” of misconduct. However, “reasonable suspicion” requires evidence, and Andrade has none. For example, as to his claim that the government suppressed evidence about Abramoff, Andrade offered only the declaration of his counsel that Johnathan Buma, a former FBI counterintelligence officer, could testify. That declaration lacked any foundation for Buma‘s ability to testify to the government‘s handling of information about Abramoff relevant to this case.
Andrade‘s other complaints were thoroughly dealt with in the order denying an evidentiary hearing. See Dkt. 535. His arguments as to the purported invasion of attorney-client privilege were universally meritless. So too were his arguments about the government‘s participation in the destruction of evidence. Those arguments stemmed from a misrepresentation of the facts (as in the case of the Erickson phone) or specious inferences that the government facilitated the destruction of evidence by not reminding defense counsel to subpoena it (as in the case of the Abramoff
True, Andrade did identify some government obstinance in producing certain evidence. See Dkt. 535, at 6 (noting multiple instances in which the government produced evidence only after a motion to compel or a threat of a motion to compel). However, a viable suppression claim (or a viable prosecutorial misconduct claim premised on suppression) requires, naturally, suppression. The evidence Andrade identified was eventually produced, and his defense team had it all with plenty of time remaining before trial.
vii. Denial of a Final Continuance
Andrade intends to argue on appeal that he ought to have been granted a continuance to process what he describes as an “eve-of-trial dump of records that the government seized from Mr. Andrade‘s accountant Karl Ruzicka.” Dkt. 656, at 41. This argument is not substantial.
As explained at length in the order denying the motion for a continuance, Andrade has failed to establish that the documents produced by the government established anything new in the case. See Dkt. 541, at 5. Rather, the documents had either already been produced to Andrade through other rounds of discovery or Andrade had access to the facts contained in the documents through other means. See id. Andrade does not genuinely contest that finding in the instant motion. If the documents would not have revealed anything new, there was no error in denying a continuance for the sole purpose of examining those documents in more detail—especially considering the tremendous latitude district courts enjoy in scheduling matters, see Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983).
With the benefit of hindsight, it is now even clearer that Andrade suffered no prejudice from the tardy disclosure. Ruzicka made himself available to Andrade before and during trial, and Andrade in fact called him during the defense case. See Tr. 2329:5–2369:17. Andrade was also ultimately fully able to cross examine FBI Forensic Accountant Theresa Chiu about the documents. See, e.g., Tr. 1992:17. Andrade continues to claim that he might have done something different at trial with earlier production of these documents, but even now he does not identify
viii. Cumulative Error
Finally, Andrade intends to argue that all the previously identified errors cumulatively prejudiced him, even if none individually did. As explained, Andrade has not presented a substantial argument for appeal, so there are no errors to cumulate. Even if there were, they would not amount to prejudice. Andrade‘s conviction is amply supported by the wealth of admissible evidence offered by the government. The jury heard evidence on a number of defense theories—including good faith, diminished capacity, and cross-cutting schemes—and it rejected them all. Andrade had more than five years to prepare his case and four weeks of trial to present it. That it did not work is not the result of legal errors, but of the realities of his case.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Andrade‘s motion for a bond pending appeal is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 7, 2025
RICHARD SEEBORG
Chief United States District Judge