*1 and, because by Daewoo America sented substance, dismiss
they them. lack America, STATES
UNITED
Plaintiff-Appellee, SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.
Alvin
No. 03-13639. of Appeals, States Court
Eleventh Circuit.
Aug.
Michael (Courh-Appointed), G. Nichola Orlando, FL, for Defendant-Appellant. Karin B. Hoppmann, Phipps, Tamra FL, Tampa, Plaintiff-Appellee. TJOFLAT, Before HILL, RONEY and Circuit Judges.
TJOFLAT,
Judge:
Circuit
This case is before us on remand from
Supreme
Court
instructions to
decision,
reconsider
panel
our
(11th Cir.2005) (Smith I),
in light of
Raich,
Gonzales v.
545 U.S.
125 S.Ct.
(2005).
of the statutes. The Government did not
attempt images demonstrate II. either traveled in interstate commerce Smith contends that both 18 U.S.C. themselves or produced with the in- *7 2252A(a)(5)(B) 2251(a) § § and 18 U.S.C. they tent that would travel in interstate are unconstitutional exercises of Con- Rather, by commerce. providing evidence gress’s ap- Commerce Clause authority that some of the photographs printed were I, plied to his conduct.5 In we Smith paper developer on Kodak that in upheld Smith’s claims and reversed his received Florida from York and that New It holdings convictions. is these of pictures some processed using were Supreme Court returned to us for recon- equipment received from California and Raich, in light sideration of Gonzales v. manufactured in Japan, the Government’s 545 125 U.S. S.Ct. 1 162 L.Ed.2d intention was to photo- establish that the (2005). graphs “produced using materials mailed, that have been or shipped, previous decision, trans- In our we not in ported that, interstate or foreign commerce.” ed challenged because Smith had not § 2251(a); 18 trial, U.S.C. also constitutionality see id. of the statutes at 2252A(a)(5)(B). only such a contention would be reviewed 4. The Congress may "regulate Government also introduced Smith’s 5. Commerce with Nations, discharge inmate foreign identification card found in among and the several Const, I, the lockbox. States.” U.S. art. cl. 3.
1283 (internal omitted). (1995)) quotation marks plain for error. “Under plain can I— Smith standard, appellate question an court we addressed before trial, at there an error not raised either correct and reconsider here —was whether (3) (2) (1) error, plain, and case, that statute, must be could applied to Smith’s If all three rights. that affects substantial regulating be to be conduct “sub- said met, may appellate court are conditions stantially interstate commerce.” affect[s] its discretion notice then exercise Id. (4) error, if only the error but
forfeited
issue,
prior opinion
As to this
our
stated
fairness, integrity, or
seriously affects the
at
“the law the time
trial
Smith’s
proceedings.”
reputation
judicial
public
‘unclear’ rather
than
was
‘settled
Williams,
United States
.F.3d
I,
contrary
him.”
clearly
to’
Cir.2006).
(11th
again review
We
Johnson
(quoting
at 1315 n. 7
F.3d
so,
doing
error.
In
Smith’s claim
States,
461, 468,
United
U.S.
I,
just as
mindful
are
(1997)).
1544, 1549,
Believing
inescapable
regulation
this conclusion to be
hensive
of interstate economic
holding
2205-15;
activity.
on Maxwell I’s
and reason-
See id. at
based
id.
(“Our
ing,
plain.
firmly
we found this error
See id. at
case law
establishes Con-
gress’
power
regulate purely local activ-
1323-25.
part
ities that are
anof
economic ‘class of
Our conclusion
the constitutional
activities’
have a substantial effect on
explicitly
was
reliant
error was
on
(“Con-
commerce.”);
interstate
id. at 2206
Framing our
I.
task under
Maxwell
gress
regulate purely
can
intrastate activi-
ain
context
review
where the law
ty
‘commercial,’
that is not
'...
itself
if it
trial,
at the time of
was not settled
but
concludes that
failure to regulate that
appeal,
of
we
settled at the time
noted that
activity
class of
regula-
would undercut the
question
the relevant
we must answer is:
tion of the interstate market in that com-
prosecution
“If Smith’s
were initiated to-
I,
In
modity.”).
revisiting Maxwell
obviously
so
day, would his conduct be
determined that
question
Raich called into
beyond
power Congress
proscribe
of
our
analysis
much of
ultimately
earlier
the district court should raise the
upheld
constitutionality
U.S.C.
timely
sua
even
sponte
issue
absent
ob-
2252A(a)(5)(B).
II,
§
See Maxwell
I,
(inter-
jection?” Smith
the intrastate III. its nography would undermine broader no opinion In had occasion prior to elimi- our we designed scheme regulatory other claims error. entirety, to reach Smith’s nate the market its prior our deter- Because now reverse “the difficulties that enforcement mination hold that there no [purely distinguishing attend between had, posses- the one sidered "economic." On II dealt with the 8. Because Maxwell pornography Supreme discern "economics” as "the sion of child Court defined nothing distinguish possession distribution, Smith's consumption of production, Maxwell's, finding we have trouble no (quoting at 2211 commodities.” S.Ct. 2252A(a)(5)(B) application of Smith's Dictionary Third New International Webster's constitutionally sound. We conduct to be other, (1966)). grouped togeth- it On the production on the therefore focus possession er intrastate manufacture charge. conduct Con- article commerce rationally regulate as a gress means could I, aggregation In Smith we determined that product. regulating Id. commerce in appropriate conduct was was not because his question, long We need not dwell on "noneconomic, activity.” purely intrastate dis- Raich made economic/non-economic Raich left some confusion at 1322. purposes. aggregation irrelevant tinction conduct could-be con- as whether Smith’s *10 1286 § constitutionally Sufficiency 2251 A. applying
error in
of the Evidence
conduct,
§ 2252A to
must
Smith’s
Arguments
address Smith’s additional claims.
1.
Made at Trial
seeks one of three forms of relief.
Smith
At
of
the close
the Government’s
that there was insufficient
argues
He
first
case,
pursuant
moved
Federal
his
and therefore
convictions
evidence
Rule of Criminal
for a judg
Procedure 29
acquitted.
alternatively
He
be
he should
acquittal,
of
claiming
ment
insufficient evi
trial based on several
requests
new
prove
dence to
the interstate nexus with
evidentiary
jury
instruction
claims
2251(a)
regards
§
to both 18 U.S.C.
Finally, he asks
we set aside
error.
2252A(a)(5)(B)
and insufficient evidence
sentencing
a new
his sentences and order
prove
possessed
“knowingly”
he
after he is advised of the mandato-
hearing
child
pornography
violation
ry sentencing ranges and conditions of su-
2252A(a)(5)(B).
The district court de
pervised release.
address the suffi-
We
his
arguments,
nied
motion. Of these
outset,
at
ciency of the evidence
as a
only
on appeal
claims
that the evi
of insufficient evidence
finding
would obvi-
dence was
prove
that he
insufficient
alleged
need to consider the
ate
trial
knew the victim
awas
child.
review a
We
States,
See
errors.
Burks v. United
437
district court’s
judg
denial
motion for
18,
2141, 2150-51,
1,
98
U.S.
S.Ct.
57
acquittal
ment of
sufficiency
based on
(1978) (“Since
today
L.Ed.2d
we hold
the evidence
novo.
de
States
Jeopardy
pre-
the Double
Clause
Dulcio,
(11th
1269,
441 F.3d
Cir.
reviewing
cludes a second trial once the
2006). “In determining
gov
whether the
court has found the evidence
insuf-
legally
produced
evidence,
ernment
sufficient
ficient,
only
remedy
...
available for
must review the
light
evidence
most
that court is the
of a judgment
direction
favorable to
government
and draw all
Bobo,
acquittal.”);10 United States v.
reasonable factual
(11th
inferences
favor of
1264,1268
Cir.2005) (noting
jury’s
verdict.”
Id.
need
We
prudential
requires
court’s
rule “that
determine that
sufficiency
court
a reasonable
to review
fact-finder
the evidence
defendants,
could
by
have determined that
claims raised
even if resolu-
the evidence
proved
tion on
grounds
guilt
alternative
would other-
defendant’s
beyond rea
dispose
wise
case”
collecting
Peters,
sonable doubt. United
States
cases).
(11th
1263, 1268
Cir.2005).
403 F.3d
that,
note
Jeopardy
We
as far as
("Although
Double
reversing
we are
Kluver's convic-
implicated,
concerns are
we review the suffi-
error,
tion because of harmful constitutional
ciency of all the evidence admitted at trial— nonetheless we must still rule on Kluver's
admissible
inadmissible. See Lockhart v.
sufficiency argument
properly
because if the
Nelson,
40-41,
285,
488 U.S.
presented by
govern-
admitted evidence
(1988) ("It
Because Smith trial, regarding entirely his knowl any evidence on United States v. X-Citement age necessarily Video, Inc., edge victim’s must of the 513 U.S. (1994). presented The evidence
be circumstantial. L.Ed.2d 372 Because Smith did following: the by included court, the Government this issue at not raise the district (1) Mayo testimony of Officer the this claim for view error. —one war executed the search the officers who video with the knowl- X-Citement dealt ' specific training no re rant and who had requirement edge 18 U.S.C. exploitation— crimes or child garding sex (2). 2252(a)(1), § begin We with two ob- photo in the who the females described First, servations about X-Citément Video: (2) very the graphs “very, young girls;” suggest did not that the “know- Court Dickie, a sex testimony of Detective ingly” jurisdictional term extended to the investigator with sixteen abuse crimes/sex Id., of the statute. terms S.Ct. testified years experience, related who (“[W]e the term at 472 conclude that fe photographs that were of some of §in to the ‘knowingly’ extends both follow-up eighteen males under and whose sexually explicit nature of the material and her photographs of such led investigation Second, age performers.”). to the of the (3) victim; photo actual and a we note that X-Citement was not Video evidence, this graphs of the victim. Given holding. The inter- constitutional Court could inferences that the reasonable itself, preted concluding statute therefrom, juror reasonable drawn “knowingly” applied nature and that to the beyond could find reasonable doubt noted age provision, light of First obviously so a minor victim was com- precedent, Amendment “a statute much. must have known as defendant pletely requirement bereft of scienter court’s We therefore affirm the district age performers would raise judg motion for denial of the defendant’s Id. But serious constitutional doubts.” acquittal. ment of (Sca- 83-85, 115 at 474-75 see id. at S.Ct. conclusion, lia, J., dissenting). The howev- “Knowingly” 2. Plain Error — statutory er, interpretation. was one of and the Interstate Nexus Thus, analy- our guides X-Citement Video (1) argues in or- appeal, On interpre- only to the extent it aids our sis under der to be convicted either 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) § of 18 tation U.S.C. 2251(a) 2252A, § § prosecution or 2252A(a)(5)(B). § matter of required prove as a —either statutory interpretation or constitutional- 2252A(a)(5)(B), § 18 U.S.C. a. ly he knew the nexus was interstate —that noted, previously As 18 U.S.C. (2) satisfied, there evi- was insufficient 2252A(a)(5)(B) provides, in relevant the nexus prove knowledge dence to his part: beyond that re- a reasonable doubt. As knowingly Any person possess- who ... case, quirement pertains Smith sub- film, book, magazine, any periodical, es prosecution mits the obli- had. disk, computer any other videotape, or gation prove that knew that he child image material contains “produced using materi- photographs mailed, or been mailed, pornography has or shipped, als that have been or transported interstate shipped foreign in interstate com- transported means, includ- means, foreign commerce by any including by comput- merce produced 2251(a); by computer, id. or that was ing see also er.” 18 U.S.C *12 1288 mailed,
using
requirement
materials that have been
that “a scienter
apply
should
shipped
transported
or.
or
interstate
statutory
each of the
elements
means,
by any
commerce
in-
foreign
or
conduct,”
criminalize otherwise innocent
by
pun-
...
cluding
computer
shall be
Video,
72,
X-Citement
The
view” doctrine
object
cause to believe that an
in plain
(1)
amits warrantless seizure where
an
conducting
view is contraband without
lawfully
place
officer is
located in the
object
i.e.,
some further
if
search of the
object
plainly
which the seized
could be
—
incriminating
‘its
character
“imme-
[is not]
right
viewed and must have
lawful
of
(2)
itself;
diately
object
apparent,”
plain-view
’—the
doc-
access to the
(second
incriminating
justify
character of the
im
trine cannot
item is
its seizure.”
(citations omitted)
mediately apparent.
California,
Horton v.
in original)
alteration
discussed,
III.E.2,
search,
(2)
part
challenged
society
see
we cannot
must
infra
plain
interpret "pro-
find that it was
error to
willing
recognize
expectation
ducing”
involving
profit
motive.
Smith,
legitimate.”
v.
United States
insufficiency
Smith's
of
evidence chal-
1143,
(11th Cir.1994) (citing
California
lenge therefore fails as well.
Ciraolo,
207, 211,
1809,
v.
476 U.S.
106 S.Ct
1811,
(1986)).
“In
Mayo
photographs,
saw
lieved that Officer
not
probabilities. These are
deal with
contain
obviously to
perceived
which he
technical;
they
prac
the factual and
are
young
very
sexually explicit
images
everyday
life on
tical considerations
out a “reason
men,
sufficient to make
girls, is
prudent
which reasonable
guilt.”15
for belief of
technicians,
ground
able
act....
‘The substance
legal
any, suggesting that
independently
viewing
discovered
argues
without
15. Smith
testimony of
rely on the
incapable
the court cannot
photographs,
of de-
the court was
witnesses,
any alleged
actually
must
view
“immediately apparent”
but
termining
that it
probable cause
to determine if
they
pornography.
contraband
were child
Indeed,
however,
the officers followed
had
authority,
existed.
points
nor have
to no
knowing
legal
technicalities of
argu
other
whether
makes several
had,
fact,
those crimes
been satisfied.
why it could not have been
ments as
to the officers
“immediately apparent”
Second,
that be
Smith contends
a crime.
evidence of
were
photos
look at each
cause the officers did not
First,
there was no evi
alleges
he
“immediately
it
not have been
photo,
could
officers knew that Smith’s
dence that the
that the ones not viewed were
apparent”
requirements of
met the technical
conduct
if this were
evidence of a crime. Even
“produc[ed]”
(namely, that he
the statute
true,
nothing
argument
say
would
as defined
18 U.S.C.
photographs
immediately appar
it
whether was
about
necessary
that he had the
mens
that the
that the officers
photographs
ent
rea,
photographs
either trav
actually
properly
seized.
did
view
commerce or were made
interstate
eled
raised
Regardless,
argument
this
has been
that traveled
interstate
using materials
rejected by
court.
before and has been
commerce).
stated, probable cause is
As
Blum,
See United States
knowledge
legal
technicali
not based on
(11th Cir.1985) (“The appellant ar
ties,
there is a
but rather on whether
gues
way
agent
that there is no
could
that a crime
ground
reasonable
to believe
immediately
recognized a box full of
have
“There is no rule of
has been committed.
papers as evidence without
miscellaneous
an officer to know with
requires
law which
reading
going through the box and
each
certainty that all
absolute
elements
evidentiary impor
to determine its
item
completed
been
when
putative crime have
....
agents
tance
Once the
saw [some
reasonably ap
an article which
he seizes
evidence, however,]
evidentiary
*16
pears
incriminating
to be
evidence.” Unit
apparent.”);
value of these would be
Slo
(cid:127)
Slocum,
587, 605
ed States v.
708 F.2d
(“In
cum,
rable’ serves tective Dickie testified that the victim con testimony admissibility for the concern- through pictures tinued to look after she itself.”). ing the out-of-court identification had identified Smith and continued to sin gle among identifications are ex out pictures Out-of-court process violations the man had using photographs. amined for due who taken the Thus, circumstances, given totality “The court must first decide two-part test: impermissi say we cannot that the fact that [procedure] whether the victim bly suggestive, suggestive custody and if it was the was in time of identifica necessarily court must then determine whether the tion transformed an otherwise *18 procedure spontaneous arising identification created a substan identification into one of misidentification.” out of impermissibly suggestive proce tial likelihood Unit an Russo, 1443, v. 796 F.2d 1452 dure. Because we find that the procedure ed States (11th Cir.1986). contends that the impermissibly suggestive, Smith was not we need impermissibly procedure procedure identification not determine whether the cre because, suggestive at the time of ated a substantial likelihood of pre misidentific identification, trial in the victim was custo- ation.16 argues
16. Smith also district court evidence must be heard before motion to testify required suppress should have the victim to be can resolved. We con evidence clude, therefore, adopting magistrate judge's report fore that the court could have require procedure and recommendation. There is no determined that the identification however, ment, types impermissibly suggestive without that certain or forms of was not Evidentiary Rulings discretion to admit evidence if it has D. tendency prove disprove a fact in certain evidence at claims that Conversely, issue. we are mindful that the irrelevant, relevant, or if either trial was court’s discretion exclude evidence un by “substantially outweighed danger narrowly der Rule 403 is circumscribed. 403, Fed.R.Evid. prejudice,” unfair extraordinary remedy[,] ‘Rule 403 is an not have been admitted. therefore should only sparingly which should be used since that the court should not He also contends permits it the trial court to exclude con- un- have admitted other-crimes evidence cededly probative evidence.’ The balance 404(b) Federal Rule of Evidence der Rule, therefore, under should be under Federal Rule of opinion evidence in admissibility.” struck favor of United some of this evi- Evidence 701. While Norton, (11th 1354, 1361 867 F.2d States objection over dence was admitted Smith’s Cir.1989) (citations omitted) (quoting Unit trial, being challenged other evidence is Betancourt, ed States v. 734 F.2d appeal for the first time on and is there- (11th Cir.1984)). Accordingly, we “look at subject error review. Our fore in light the evidence most to its favorable analysis organized accordingly. admission, maximizing probative its value minimizing prejudicial its undue im Objections Raised at Trial Elkins, pact.” States v. United 885 F.2d objected following (11th Cir.1989). 775, 784 irrelevant, evidence as either see Fed. 401, 402, overly prejudicial, R.Evid. see We cannot hold that the district (1) in photographs concluding of Smith court erred the chal Fed.R.Evid. 403: (2) himself; photographs lenged pic evidence was relevant. The naked (not victim) other women tures of Smith were the ones the victim Smith with sexually conduct; singled out as engaged explicit photographs photog in (not victim) (3) photographs rapher. of women Given Smith’s defense was person pictures, that another took the striking sexually suggestive positions. We certainly evidentiary photographs court’s rul these were relevant review the district establishing photographer’s identity. for clear abuse of United ings discretion. (11th Tinoco, engaged in pictures of Smith sexual States v. Cir.2002). in a identical abuse of discretion arises acts with other women room “An photo when the district court’s decision rests to the one which victim was fact, establishing also upon clearly finding graphed erroneous relevant law, producing improper photographs errant conclusion of or an Smith’s role ap fact that had application of law to fact.” United States of the victim—the he (11th Baker, pictures of a sexual nature in peared Cir. 2005). appeared to be the same location possesses “The district court broad what Cir.1995) (second
hearing directly alteration add from the victim. Additional Soto, considering argument, ed) ly, in Smith’s we are (quoting United States v. presented at (5th Cir.1979) not confined to the evidence (quoting 1098 n. 5 *19 " suppression hearing: ruling on the cor '[I]n Griffin, States v. 1326 n. court's denial of a motion rectness of the trial (internal 1977)) quotation Cir. marks omit ‘may any suppress,' ... we consider evi ted)). regard, testimony at In this the victim's presented at the trial of case and dence the substantially Detective trial corroborated to the evidence introduced [are] not limited proce Dickie's account of the identification ” hearing the on the [at] motion.' dure. Villabona-Gamica, States v. identity, that tended to establish probable that he fre- box it more could make purposes. locale for similar content. That the knowledge, the and sexual quented as the pictures, itself, these as well Additionally, and nature of the crime therefore poses in in women similar pictures of other tending to the nature of the evidence victim, those of the setting as the same it, emotionally charged does not prove establishing pic- relevant to de- prosecution mean that the must be included “lascivious ex- tures of the victim probative of its most evidence. prived any pubic area of genitals of hibition[s] particularly true when the district This is 2256(2)(A) § (defining 18 U.S.C. person,” court, here, limiting offers instructions as conduct”),17 and that “sexually explicit proper purpose of admitted evi- as the “knowingly,” opposed to inadver- Thus, pro- dence. when we maximize the pictures the of the victim tently, possessed value discussed above and minimize bative § by 18 required 2252A(a)(5)(B). U.S.C. any impact, cannot conclude prejudicial court could have found the district Because clearly its the district court abused tendency had some pictures these admitting discretion in the evidence. probable less and make Smith’s defense probable, statutory requirements more the 2. Plain Error that that court abused its do not find finding them relevant under discretion alleges following Federal Rule of Evidence evidence should not have been admitted (1) object despite his failure to at trial: say that dis We also cannot discharge Smith’s inmate identification finding trict court abused its discretion (2) card; repeated references to the fact questioned value of the probative (3) incarcerated; that Smith was and is substantially outweighed evidence was not (non-redacted) recording and “unsanitized” prejudice, unfair see by potential for Smith, transcript phone call made 403, particularly light Fed.R.Evid. (4) incarcerated, mother; while to his Offi admissibility in favor of presumptions Mayo’s testimony that pictures cer he stated contends that above. Smith pornographic young found were and of himself, pictures pictures naked of other (5) girls; testimony regarding the number women, pictures of Smith with other lockbox; photographs found jurors’ likely women were to inflame the (6) testimony particular photo about a prevented emotions and a level-headed graph depicting penises. two “[W]hen evaluation of all the evidence. That is a party evidentiary raises a claim of error permissible necessary not a conclusion but appeal, for the first time on we review it jury might one. The also have been able what was— n Baker, only.” it for 432 F.3d at evaluate the evidence photographs reading clarity defendant’s lock- 1202. For ease of within 2251(a) § prohibits production depiction appear 17. 18 U.S.C. to make it is such as depictions "sexually explicit of visual con- sexually inviting suggestive, to be for ex- minors, involving duct” and 18 U.S.C. ample pose in a location or in a associated 2252A(a)(5)(B) prohibits knowing pos- ...[;] activity sexual whether pornography,” session of "child which 18 designed depiction has been elicit sexual 2256(8) defines, part, U.S.C. as involv- Record, response in the viewer.” vol. no. ing "sexually explicit The court conduct.” photographs at 74. That the of the vic- jury, objection, instructed the without sexually explicit tim were found with other sexually explicit conduct included "lascivious likely photographs could make it more exhibition,” which, explained, the court in- purpose response. their was to elicit a sexual setting volved consideration of "whether the *20 respect photographs to the here: tion with discussion, that standard repeat to the persons other than the victim.19 As plain, is if is error there evidence, of the because Feder- may remainder rights, we exercise affects substantial 105, error, provides of Evidence which al Rule an recognize such our discretion cir- fairness, limiting appropriate for instructions seriously affects the it long so as cumstances, request,” only operates “upon judicial reputation of public or integrity, see Fed.R.Evid. give failure to a “[t]he conclud- have no trouble proceedings. We only is error when such limiting instruction satisfy cannot this difficult that Smith ing requested.” an instruction is to a limit ourselves and therefore burden Miranda, 1357, 1360 States claims of Smith’s brief discussion (11th Cir.1999). Thus, we find no margin.18
error. Raised at Trial Not
E. Other Claims Jury Regarding Instruction 2. more issues not raises several Smith “Producing” are reviewed at trial. These too preserved error. argues that the district Smith jury in providing not court erred Adequate Limiting 1. Lack of defining “producing” as used in struction Instruction 2251(a). “Producing” is statu 18 U.S.C. defined, circularly, torily somewhat the district argues Smith manufacturing, directing, issu adequate limiting “producing, provide not court did ing, publishing, advertising.” or 18 U.S.C. evidence he regards instruction 2256(3). that a court III.C, “It is well settled supra. The dis challenges part unduly not terms that are limiting instruc need define provide did trict court therefore, on discharge cannot establish error alleges that the inmate 18. Smith card, repeated ground. as well as the identification incarceration, including Additionally, argues the incar- references to his evidence, phone Mayo's opinion conversation from tes- unsanitized Officer Smith's ceration improperly regarding as "other jail, testimony were admitted timony, well as other "Evidence of description crimes” evidence. photographs and a number of crimes, wrongs, acts not admissible components particular of a the anatomical person admissible, prove in order the character if otherwise photograph, even conformity Fed. therewith.” show action in unfairly prejudicial substantially more were 404(b). say that this evi We cannot R.Evid. Federal Rule of probative in violation of than propensity evi plainly admitted as dence was this evidence could be 403. All of Evidence assuredly could district court dence. The establishing iden- probative considered probative of the evidence to be have found photographs, tity in the of individuals merely descriptive. identity and/or photographs ownership and nature of Mayo’s testi- surrounding probative also claims that Officer evi- other the context mony photographs he observed in evi- say We cannot dence. dence, pornographic unfairly nature and of plainly prejudicial, lockbox was even if girls” opinion "very, very young unfairly preju- was evidence plainly so prejudicial let alone by non-expert. outweigh proba- We not satisfied substantially are its offered dicial as to Mayo's opinion plainly "sci- that Officer value. tive technical, entific, specialized,” ... Fed. ... may this evidence “You consider required him 19. would have R.Evid. which determining wheth- purpose of for the limited expert pursuant to Fed- qualified as an to be perpe- as the identity of the defendant er the than the of Evidence rather eral Rule charged has been estab- crime trator of the lay pursuant opinion of a witness admissible vol.12, Record, Smith, at 70-71. no. lished.” Rule of Evidence to Federal *21 1298 2251(d) children,” (West, § ambiguous or or that are within 18 U.S.C.A.
technical jury.” understanding of the through Apr. common the Westlaw 2003 amend- 22 Pepe, 747 674 n. (2) ments); States requirement the that he Cir.1984). We do believe that not register as a sex offender as a condition of unduly technical or am- is so “producing” release, supervised requests his and resen- plainly require specific to biguous as tencing. At initial in- arraignment on the contends, however, instruction. Smith dictment, the court advised Smith “producing” necessarily re- that because 2251(a) § charge ten-year carried a mini- to be in the business quires an individual mum twenty-year maximum sentence. pornography, a definition making of child arraignment superseding At on the in order. Nowhere the stat- plainly was indictments, superseding second or the common utory definition under- readings formal of waived the indictments. standing “producing”20 of the word do we point prior receiving presen- At no to requirement monetary profit discern report tence he that might was advised he Thus, if “producing,” motive. even as used anything ten-to-twenty- face more than a statute, require did accused This, Smith, year according sentence. pornography propo- be in the business—a right was a violation of his constitutional quite skeptical— sition which we are about process. due obviously Accordingly, it is not so. cases, Smith cites no and we are aware plainly by district court did not err not none, reading of that mandate a formal of defining “producing” jury.21 for the Sentencing the Federal Guidelines. The Lack of Regarding Mandatory Notice charged, statute under which he was Sentencing Minima § specifically U.S.C. delineates the sentencing range for provi- violations its that, additionally argues sions, prior both with and without offenses prior sentencing, given he was not for (1) relating to exploitation mal notice of sexual of children. either the enhanced sen Moreover, 3583(d) tencing range arising prior § from a convic U.S.C. mandates “relating tion exploitation registration to the sexual supervised as a condition of "produce” published 20. A possessing definition of con- that the defendant knew he was Because, discussed, temporaneously passage to the pornography. of the Protec- child III.A.2,we Against Exploitation supra part tion of Children Sexual do not find that there 95-225, 2(a), plain § Act of Pub.L. requiring No. was error committed in not (1998), nexus, provides part: Stat. 7 knowledge in relevant “1. of the interstate we cannot forth; bring yield. To by say 2. To create plain mental the district court committed error in physical effort. 3. instructing jury Similarly, To manufacture. 4. To not as such. exist; above, give cause or occur to rise supra to. 5. To indicated note even if we forward; bring sponsor exhibit. 6. To were to find error in the district court's present public....”' jury proof American failure to instruct Heritage Dictionary English 2251(a), Language knowledge age of the required § it (New ed.1976). College light jury’s would be harmless error in of the finding, proper based on instruction and ade- evidence, quate age that Smith knew the 21. Smith also claims that the district court 2252A(a)(5)(B). purposes § the victim for instructing committed jury "knowingly” applies to each statutory 22.According elements of both 18 U.S.C. to the statute effective at the 2251(a) 2252A(a)(5)(B). time, § § We note at the enhancement increased the sentenc- respect outset ing range ten-to-twen1y years to fifteen- 2252A(a)(5)(B), jury 2251(d) (West, properly to-thirty years. in- 18 U.S.C.A. amendments). prove structed that through Apr. the Government had to Westlaw *22 such, any plain in 18 basis for error review. As described person for release 4042(c)(4), everything say applies I here with even category persons § U.S.C. of- force in the civil greater convicted of context where includes individuals right no an Exploitation there is constitutional attor- categorized as “Sexual fenses (including ney.1 Abuse of Children” and Other 2252A). § 2251 &
both 18 U.S.C. I begin, To recite what should now be a 110; 4041(c)(4), ch. 18 U.S.C. U.S.C. plain familiar standard: error re- Under 5D1.3(7). statutory scheme USSG viéw, may appellate court exercise its sentence, and mandated Smith’s therefore plain discretion to notice an error that is erred say plainly that the court we cannot rights, long and that affects substantial so additional notice of by providing not fairness, integrity, 'as error affects sentencing provisions. minimum judicial public reputation proceed- or ings. immediately apparent It should be IV. that the standard itself sets an extraordi- reasons, judgment foregoing For the narily for a defendant to difficult burden of the district court is particularly instances where overcome— the district court has substantial discretion
AFFIRMED. (for example, admit where the evidence TJOFLAT, Judge, specially Circuit probative claims that the value defendant concurring: substantially out- piece of evidence is by potential preju- for unfair weighed its judg- obviously I concur in the court’s 403). dice, Evidentiary see Fed.R.Evid. I entirety. separately write ment its and the trial rulings, which counsel courts so why appellate I believe explain aware, judge should have been are often view, rare- my only should rarely- and,— quite fact-specific case- and and it is there- evidentiary errors. I ar- ly plain —notice unlikely fore that a defendant would be based on the inter- rive at this conclusion or eviden- point able to to court decision plain error standard action between of the tiary making rule the admission inferences that should be drawn and the obviously Despite evidence erroneous. object failure to at from defense counsel’s difficulty, certainly there are circum- trial. in which an court could appellate stances note, scope my initially, I the limited that, case law at the time say given extant only I the admission of discussion. discuss appeal, piece of evidence admitted objec- by prosecution, over no evidence hearsay clearly (e.g., excludable trial was tion, in criminal cases. There is no need under not otherwise admissible to address exclusion of evidence offered 804). I Federal Rules of Evidence 803 (as introduc- attempted the defendant however, believe, that even such do sufficiently raise tion of the would evidence recognizable as properly circumstances are appeal) for full review on issue plain error. evidentiary rulings in favor of the defen- (as rote I is often overlooked appeal). cannot What prosecution dant standard is application I error only am concerned with criminal cases as objection, impos- it is almost without only that it is the defendant’s Sixth believe the district court to conclude right provides Amendment to counsel that sible plain that evidence is recognize where it becomes the discussion I also prior appeal. after trial but neatly circumstances excludable follows does not fit into or counsel inculpatory, rather than thing patory at all. It is one committed may to tie a witness to certain state- to, want evidence, objected if should say Reviewing admission of evidence ments.2 excluded; quite it is another to have been error, however, can serve to no of evidence over admission say that *23 strategic counsel’s deci- transform defense sense. in some abstract objection is error Trial into district court errors. sions in the former circumstance is The error strategy does not become counsel’s sound failure to sustain the court’s the district urging.3 counsel’s plain appellate error at latter, in the the objection; defendant’s infringe- evidently improper the error is of cer- A conclusion that the admission right unwaivable a defendant’s a upon plain constitutes error is ment tain evidence only by admissible evidence. the evidence was so to be tried determination that, the second formulation obviously prejudicial with inadmissible and problem object, counsel can waive eviden- to despite defense counsel’s failure is that defense restrictions, court, legitimate have sponte, and often has the district sua should tiary Thus, doing for so. Defense the exis- excluded evidence. strategic reasons believe, the dis- example, plain for that a tence of error review forces may counsel court, in the rever- turn excul- trict an effort to avoid will out to be piece of evidence object to struction is error when such an instruc- not to evidence of- 2. The decision Peaden, requested.”); aspect United States v. is an of trial strate- tion is for admission fered 1493, Cir.1984) ("In (11th may make on behalf of the 727 F.2d 1501 gy counsel determining requires Henry Mississippi, v. U.S. whether statement See 379 defendant. 569, 451-52, 564, 443, limiting no instruction was S.Ct. 13 L.Ed.2d reversal because 85 ah, (1965); given, Wayne La Fave et Crimi- in fact we must first decide at whose 3 R. 408 (2d 2006) ("General give lay we to 11.6 ed. door the failure instruction. Procedure nal failing plain to as to If the court committed agreement exists decisions trial, appeal, recognize limiting jury the need for the instruction guilty plea, defendant's trial, However, sponte, testifying the defendant sua we must reverse. if presence at defendant, required request a Peaden to the instruc- and that decisions on are for the matters, tion, larger group its absence. substantially such as his failure to do so caused evidence, strategic may objecting are for Since for reasons counsel have to inadmissible instruction, (footnote omitted)). Accordingly, request an counsel.” chosen not to by strategic a the defendant is bound evi- would be reluctant to determine as matter counsel, long dentiary strategic gave so decisions made of law that choice rise counsel's (citations provided. process as effective assistance omit- to a due violation.” Baines, ted)); United States v. 586 F.2d ("Counsel (5th Cir.1978) may refrain willing recognize We to have been requesting strategic non-objection an instruction in order not to possibility renders for emphasize potentially damaging nearly impossible finding plain evidence and error in limiting strategic request a for other reasons. We decline to of a failure to context (citations "Lawyers frequently guess choose for second counsel’s decision.” instruction. Prichard, omitted)) (In strategic request limiting 661 F.2d reasons not to in- Bonner (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), In order find error in this structions. therefore, context, adopted binding precedent a court must conclude the decisions of law, strategic prior down a matter of counsel's the former Fifth Circuit handed 1, 1981.). recognize miscarriage I er- in manifest October choice resulted Inc., Contracting, patently incompatible with justice.” Sherman v. Burke ror review is more context, (11th Cir.1990), evidentiary super- rule in this as the rule 891 F.2d part by only operates "upon request.” Fed.R.Evid. seded in non-relevant statute as stated 105; Sherman, Hosp., at 1534. I be- Rehab. see Andrews Lakeshore lieve, however, (11th Cir.1998); regarding see also United the observations F.3d 1405 Miranda, strategic non-objection carry over into other States v. Cir.1999) ("The give limiting evidentiary failure to in- contexts as well. retrial, approach other would rewrite the and a to intervene duties of conviction sal judges sys- on its own initia trial and counsel in our legal exclude the evidence so, tem.”). determining In whether do tive. ignore possi must district court either I I quick should be add that hold no choosing not bility that defense counsel is infallibility respect illusions of (and object strategic reasons there cases, legal profession. In some defense instance) every or must fore intervene may actually fail counsel to notice that possibility against potential
weigh
being
inadmissible evidence is
admitted.
(assuming
one is
time and cost
retrial
others, however,
may
In
counsel
make a
circumstances).
possible under the
even
strategic
object
decision not to
to the ad-
the district court even at
To the extent
appel-
mission of evidence. The role of an
*24
however,
analysis,
it does
tempts the latter
review,
plain
late court under
there-
specific
during
at a
moment
the course
so
fore, is to sort out the error
from the
trial
of the entire
of the
without
benefit
strategy,
strategy
to the extent
is consid-
(in
other evidence
particular,
record
what
at all.
appel-
ered
This is
role for which
offer,
prosecution
prepared
is
to
particularly
late courts are
ill-suited.
I
or defense in
prosecution
what use the
believe our ineffective assistance of counsel
evidence). Because it
tends to make of the
in
regard.
case law is instructive
difficult, if
extraordinarily
impossi
not
is
invariably
Ineffective assistance claims
determine, mid-trial,
ble,
whether the
to
involve a determination of whether an at
piece
admission of a certain
of excludable
torney
acting strategically
incompe
a defendant’s substan
prejudices
evidence
tently.
appropriately
We have
concluded
rights,
possibility
tial
of a retrial cre
ought
that such determinations
not to be
court
ates an incentive for the district
appeal.
made on direct
See United States
result essen
always to intervene.4 This
(11th
1102,
Griffin,
699 F.2d
Cir.
of the abili
tially deprives defense counsel
1983) (“The law of this Circuit
is
a client’s
ty
strategically
to determine
representation
inadequate
claims of
cannot
consequence I
most effective defense—a
appeal
determined on direct
where such
be
prefer
Estelle
would
avoid.5 Cf.
claims were not raised before the District
Williams,
501, 512, 96 S.Ct.
425 U.S.
(1976) (“Under
opportunity
and there has been no
Court
our
1303 object “must that no competent not to to inadmissible establish coun- fense counsel margins.6 at the sel would have taken least the action that his evidence—at counseldid take.” then, Presented, the choice be 1310, Crosby, Michael v. 430 F.3d 1320 (1) legitimate strategy presuming tween (11th Cir.2005) (citations paragraph finding error the extreme case omitted) (quoting break McNeal v. Wainw (2) rarely finding im presuming error and (11th 674, Cir.1984) right, 722 F.2d 676 I choose the former. I proper strategy, (citations omitted); v. Campbell, Callahan by borrowing conclusion fur arrive 897, Cir.2005); Chan our ineffective assistance case ther from States, 1305, dler United stated, generally pre is oft law. As (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (footnote and ci lawyers perform competently. sume that omitted)). tation I presump believe this Cronic, See, e.g., States v. U.S. just tion is relevant 2039, 2046, L.Ed.2d 104 S.Ct. context inas the ineffective assistance con (1984) (“[W]e lawyer presume such, long text. As so as we are unable to provide guiding hand competent is judicial competent take notice that no at needs.”); Cone, that the defendant Bell v. torney object would fail to to the admission 1843, 1863, 535 U.S. evidence, of certain I say would not (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) L.Ed.2d 914 the district court’s sponte failure sua (“[A] every lawyer ... presumption intervene and exclude the evidence is er ethically, diligently, and performed has ror. competently appropriate is because such
performance generally characterizes only do I believe our ineffective Not profession.”). members of an honorable assistance case law instructive as to how *26 recently noted: We have we should treat of plain evidentiary claims “[Cjounsel errors, not unconsti- I will be deemed but also believe there is a tactical tutionally deficient because of connection between the two issues that is ever, strong presump- rarely, decisions.” There is a if discussed. In order to performance satisfy prongs plain tion that counsel’s was rea- the first three standard, adequate, great sonable and defer- error we would have find: error, being ence shown to choices dictated that should have been obvious counsel, strategy. presumption seriously prejudiced reasonable “The and that In stronger rights. of reasonableness is even when defendant’s substantial other words, reviewing performance incompetent of an for not we are counsel was fact, having objected.7 may trial counsel.” To over- In counsel experienced many as as three presumption, petitioner incompetent come this have been Indeed, by reversing performance under sel's was deficient and that the conviction opposed plain finding to a error review performance prejudiced the de- deficient ” counsel, we ineffective assistance of misallo- Rolling Crosby, fense.’ v. responsibility cate for the error to the court as (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Maharaj 1300 v. counsel, opposed appropriately where it Corr., Sec’y Dep’t for belongs. Any diligence inspired by incentive (11th Cir.2005)). concluding In that the first being thereby fear of labeled "ineffective” is satisfied, prongs plain three error are we eliminated. For more on the interconnection determine that counsel made an obvious error plain between error and assis- ineffective rights. substantial that affected defendant’s tance, see infra. To the extent the doctrines of ineffective assis- perfectly not coter- tance and error are counsel, prove 7. "To ineffective assistance of minous, they certainly overlap significantly. establish 'both that coun- [defendant must] (once object time of the evidence was counsel’s failure to not strate at the
times admitted, circumstances, more when he failed to gic. Consequently, once in such evidence, yet again to strike the move strong argument there be made closing argument should the Gov during unwittingly the presump shifted evidence) per comment on the or ernment tion on collateral attack from strategy closing argu once but as late as haps justification incompetence. The for this prejudice previously ment when the latent apparent result is not to me. Yet, if then choose not clear. became reasons, For I foregoing would not to notice the our discretion to exercise engage error review of the admis- error, say if we could or sion of excludable evidence unless I were fairness, integrity, public or affected the certain that there could be no reasonable judicial proceedings, plain er reputation of strategic objecting reason for not at the Thus, found.8 we would ror would not be time the evidence was admitted. but, appeal, a retrial on direct not order factual briefing the benefit without essentially pro we would
development, firm very grounding for a subse
viding
quent ineffective assistance determination attack. par
on collateral What makes this for
ticularly troubling me is that in an claim, “the defendant
ineffective assistance
presumption
must overcome the
un
GLOVER,
Gillins,
Geneba
James
indi-
circumstances,
ac
challenged
der the
vidually
private attorneys general,
‘might
tion
be considered sound trial strat
”
alternatively
on behalf of a class of
egy.’ Maharaj
Sec’y
Dept.
similarly situated,
all others
Plain-
Com.,
Cir.2005)
tiffs-Appellants,
(quoting
v. Washington,
Strickland
668, 689,
2052, 2065,
U.S.
104 S.Ct.
(1984) (quoting
L.Ed.2d 674
Michel v. Lou
GROUP, INC., Philip
LIGGETT
Morris
isiana,
91, 101,
158, 164,
350 U.S.
USA, Defendants-Appellees.
(1955)) (internal
strategy implies least that defense —at counsel, possible I note presume even if it were for us to fense whom we to be com- once, that there was conclude error that af- petent, perhaps declined not but three rights, fected defendant’s substantial it would times, object to the admission of the evi- nearly impossible still be to find that the Again, dence. to the extent we believe this error standard was satisfied. It would be object speaks compe- failure to to counsel's fairness, very difficult to conclude that the tence, provides ap- collateral review a more integrity, public reputation judicial propriate forum to resolve that issue. proceedings had been undermined de- where
