Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
Criminal No. 11-0106 ALI MOHAMED ALI,
Defendant . MEMORANDUM OPINION
On July 13, 2012, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion granting in part and denying
in part defendant Ali Mohamed Ali’s motion to dismiss the indictment.
United States v. Ali
, ---
F. Supp. 2d ----,
On July 19, 2012, the government filed a motion asking the Court to reconsider its holding with regard to Ali’s prosecution in Count Two for aiding and abetting piracy. (Motion for Reconsideration, July 19, 2012 [Dkt. No. 242] (“Gov’t Mot. for Reconsideration”).) [2] The government argued that the Court erred when it held, consistent with the indiсtment, the statutory text and legislative history, and international law, that Ali can only be convicted of aiding and abetting piracy if the government proves that he was on the high seas when he facilitated piratical acts. [3] A few hours later, Ali filed a preliminary opposition to the government’s motion *3 for reconsideration. (Defendant Ali Mohamed Ali’s Opposition to the Government’s Motion for Recоnsideration of the Court’s July 13, 2012 Decision on Ali’s Motion to Dismiss, July 20, 2012 [Dkt. No. 244].)
At a status hearing on July 20, the Court denied the government’s motion for
reconsideration on grounds that the government, merely by submitting additional commentary
regarding Article 101(c) of the UNCLOS, had not met its heavy burden to show that the Court
had “patently misunderstood a party, . . . made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented
to the court by the parties, [or] . . . made an error not of reasoning, but of apprehension,” or that
“a controlling or significant change in the law or facts [had occurred] since the submission of the
issue to the [C]ourt.”
United States v. Coughlin
,
of the United Nations’ legal experts and independent international law-of-the-sea scholars, all of whom have declared that Article 101(c)’s facilitation provision is not restricted by any particular geographic scope.” (Gov’t Mot. for Reconsideration at 1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).) Attached to the government’s motion were 91 pages of exhibits consisting of commentary from the Legal Committee of the International Maritime Organization, an unpublished paper that “[r]enowned international legal sсholar and expert on the law of the sea[] Professor John Norton Moore” presented to a 2009 counter piracy workshop sponsored by Booz Allen Hamilton ( id. at 4), excerpts from a “2011 law-of-the-sea treatise” by “British Commander Andrew Murdoch, another recognized expert on the law of the sea and piracy” ( id. ), excerpts from Robin Geiss and Anna Petrig’s Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea (2011), excerpts from a 2010 working paper by Thomas Fedeli entitled “‘The Rights and Liаbilities of Private Actors: Pirates, Master[], and Crew’” (Gov’t Mot. for Reconsideration at 6), the “British Piracy Act of 1721, [8 Geo. 1, c. 24 (Eng.)] (as enacted also in Australia and the British Colonies) (repealed in Australia in 2002)” (Gov’t Mot. for Reconsideration at 8 n.7), and a 2008 U.N. Security Council Resolution. All of these sources were previously available to the government but were not cited until after the Court issued its July 13, 2012 Memorandum Opinion.
Setting aside the merits
vel non
of the government’s legal arguments for reconsideration,
the Court was most surprised by the dramatic shift, on July 20, in the government’s position with
regard to the facts. In the government’s June 11, 2012 opposition to Ali’s motion to dismiss, the
government clearly stated that “the evidence will show that [Ali] was acting as a negotiator for
the pirates while the
CEC Future
was on the high seas.” (Gov’t Mot. to Dismiss Opp’n at 9.)
Based on this representation, it was assumed by thе Court and defense counsel that, in order to
convict Ali under Count Two, the government would simply have to prove what the indictment
alleged and what it said it could prove—that Ali, with the requisite intent, “act[ed] as a
negotiator for the pirates
while the
CEC Future
was on the high seas
.” (
Id.
(emphasis added).)
See Ali II
,
At thе July 20 status hearing, however, the government essentially confessed error and admitted that it had scant evidence to show that Ali aided and abetted the pirates while he was on the high seas. (7/20/12 Tr. at 67, 69.) The government revised its account of the evidence and stated, for the first time, that Ali boarded the CEC Future on November 9, 2008, in territorial waters ( id. at 6–7, 70, 73), and that the CEC Future then sailed through international waters for a matter of “minutes,” once or maybe twice, on November 9 or maybe early on November 10, before stopping in Somali waters near Eyl, where it remained for the duration of the incident. ( at 7 (“We’re not talking about days, Your Honor. We’re talking about minutes.”); see id. at *5 16–20.) The government acknowledged that Ali did not call the ship’s owners until after the CEC Future had returned to Somalia’s territorial waters on November 10. ( Id. at 16–17.) The government conceded, therefore, that “it would be very difficult” for it to prеvail on Count Two under the Court’s interpretation ( id. at 67), because it had no “specific evidence” that would show that from “the moment that [Ali] boarded [the CEC Future ] . . . he did X, Y, and Z while he was in territorial waters versus the moment that he crossed” into international waters. ( Id. at 69.) In response to the government’s new representations, the Court repeated that its rejection of Ali’s due process challenge to Counts Three and Four was “largely dependent on what [the Court] understood would be a clear showing of high seas” and noted that it was inclined to reconsider its holding. ( See id. at 43–44.)
By letter dated July 24, 2012, the government notified the Court that it intends to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the Court’s July 13, 2012 Memorandum Opinion. ( See Letter Regarding Intention to File a Notice of Appeal, July 24, 2012 [Dkt. No. 259].) While the government has been less than clear on the issue ( see supra n.5), given its representations on July 20 and the fact of its interlocutory appeal, it can only be assumed that the government is not confident of its ability to show that Ali ever did anything to aid and abet the pirates while he was on the high seas. Moreover, at a hearing on July 24, 2012, the government indicated that it would most likely seek an interlocutory appeal of the Court’s rulings with regard to both Counts One and Two. As the Court indiсated, first on July 20 and then again on July 24, this procedural *6 history has caused the Court to reverse its prior ruling with regard to the hostage taking charges so that the government can seek interlocutory review of the dismissal of Counts Three and Four as well.
It bears emphasizing that Ali’s due process challenge to Counts Three and Four presents an incredibly difficult legal question—one that should be considered along with thе Court’s rulings on the piracy charges. As the Court stated in its July 13 Memorandum Opinion:
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires that “[n]o person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. V. Neither the Supreme Court nor the D.C. Circuit has addressed whether or how the Due Process Clause limits the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal statutes. And although the courts that have considered the question “are in consensus” that the extraterritorial application of U.S. law “must comport with due process,” United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera ,634 F.3d 1370 , 1378 (11th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases), they are split as to what due process requires. [ United States v. Campbell ,798 F. Supp. 2d 293 , 306–08 (D.D.C. 2011).] “One line of cases reasons that ‘[i]n order to apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus betweеn the defendant and the United States so that such application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.’” Id. at 306 (alteration in the original) (quoting United States v. Davis ,904 F.2d 245 , 248–49 (9th Cir. 1990); citing [ United States v. Yousef ,327 F.3d 56 , 111 (2d Cir. 2003)]; United States v. Mohammad-Omar ,323 F. App’x 259 , 261 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished)). Another line of cases “require[s] only that extraterritorial prosecution be neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair,” and these cases “are not concerned with whether a sufficient nexus exists.” Id. at 307 (citing United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo ,993 F.2d 1052 , 1056 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Cardales ,168 F.3d 548 , 553 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Suerte , 291 F.3d 366, 375–77 (5th Cir. 2002)).
However, “‘[t]his difference is less real than apparent.’” (quoting
United States v. Shahani–Jahromi
,
Ali II
,
the specific violation of § 1203 with which Ali is charged exhibits the two
features that have traditionally denoted universal jurisdiction crimes: hostage
taking is “universally condemned by the community of nations”
and
the relevant
conduct occurred “outside of a [s]tate or where there is no [s]tate capable of
punishing, or competent to punish, the crime.”
at *18 (quoting
Yousef
,
time that the government lacks proof that Ali facilitated piratical acts while the CEC Future was on the high seas.
Therefore, the Court must confront the question of whether Ali’s prosecution for hostage
taking under 18 U.S.C. § 1203 can satisfy due process by means of the nexus test or otherwise.
“Courts that have applied [the] nexus test have considered a wide range of factors including (1)
the defendant’s actual contacts with the United States, including his citizenship or residency; (2)
the location of the acts allegedly giving rise to the alleged offense; (3) the intended effect a
defendant’s conduct has on or within the United States; and (4) the impact on significant United
States interests.”
United States v. Brehm
, No. 1:11-cr-11,
*9
Ali’s prosecution under § 1203 does not pass muster under
any
of these criteria. Ali is a
Somali citizen, and at the time of the charged conduct he was residing in Somalia. The acts
giving rise to the alleged violation of § 1203 occurred on a Bahamian-flagged ship sailing off the
coasts of Somalia and Yemen, halfway around the world from the United States. The
government has not claimed that Ali or his alleged co-conspirators intended to have any effect on
the United States by their actions. Nor has it claimed, with any force, that the hijacking of the
CEC Future
indeеd affected U.S. interests. Finally, the Court has held that Ali’s prosecution for
hostage taking, while within the U.S. government’s authority, is not supported by any of the five
international law theories justifying the extraterritorial application of domestic criminal statutes.
See Ali II
,
It remains the case that 18 U.S.C. § 1203 “fulfill[s] U.S. obligations under the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,
opened for signature
Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force June 3, 1983) (entered into fоrce for
the United States Jan. 6, 1985) (the ‘Hostage Taking Convention’),” ,
Ali II
,
that Ali need not have acted on the high seas, the Court cannot agree that his prosecution for hostage taking is consistent with his Fifth Amendment due process rights.
The Court will therefore vacate Section II(D) of its July 13, 2012 Memorandum Opinion,
see Ali II
,
/s/ ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge Date: July 25, 2012
Notes
[1] Ali, a Somali citizen, is charged in a four-count indictment for his alleged role in the November
2008 – January 2009 hijacking of the M/V
CEC Future
in the Gulf of Aden. (Second
Superseding Indictment, May 8, 2012 [Dkt. No. 172] (“Ind.”).)
See Ali II
,
[2] The government requested that the Court address its motion for reconsideration “by midday оn July 26” in order to enable the government, if the Court were to deny its motion, to “decide promptly whether to notice an [interlocutory] appeal.” (Gov’t Mot. for Reconsideration at 13 n.12 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3731).)
[3] The Court stated three separate rationales for its holding with regard to Count Two. First, the
indictment alleges, in Count Two, “that Ali acted ‘on the high seas,’”
Ali II
,
[4]
But see Ali II
,
[5] Curiously, a few days later, the government attempted to retreat from its concession by аrguing that its representation in its opposition to Ali’s motion to dismiss was indeed “correct.” (Government’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Request for Pretrial Release, July 23, 2012 [Dkt. No. 250] at 10 n.5.) In that July 23, 2012 filing, the government claims that Jama Ibrahim, one of Ali’s alleged co-conspirators, will testify that Ali intentionally facilitated acts of piracy during the matter of minutes while the CEC Future was on the high seas. ( )
[6] In fact, the Court noted that, “[i]f the hostage taking had occurred within another state’s
territory and, therefore, not as part of an alleged incident of piracy on the high seas, Ali’s
argument would be far more compelling.” ,
[7]
See, e.g.
,
United States v. Cardales
,
[8] In opposing Ali’s nexus argument, the government feebly states that “defendant minimizes the
fact that there was a United States nexus in this case” because the indictment alleges that “at the
time the
CEC Future
was seized, it was cаrrying cargo owned by an American company.”
(Gov’t Mot. to Dismiss Opp’n at 29 n.12.) Without more, this argument carries no weight. The
Court is aware of no case finding a proper nexus where cargo owned by a U.S. company was
involved, as opposed to, for example, U.S. citizens.
See, e.g.
,
Yousef
,
[9] See United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII- 5&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited July 25, 2012).
