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United States v. Aleo
681 F.3d 290
6th Cir.
2012
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*1 were not at Oktoberfest behavior

consistent, therefore to decided and, later, Appellant, fire suspend that, be- Simpson’s conclusion

e. him- reported had Appellant

cause excruciating pain, “reported

self in positions,” and his changing

difficult work,” Appellee “no had told

doctor “by independent two

but was seen walking around Oktober-

witnesses a crowded venue and

fest where it’s thought ... I easily accessed part.” on his

that ... was fraudulent overwhelming that the

I would conclude supports Appellant’s

weight of evidence investigation Appellee’s

contention “un- one-sided as to be poor

was so not sufficient

worthy of and thus credence” At a mini- satisfy an “honest belief.”

mum, presented sufficient has Appellant jury a reasonable permit

evidence Summary judgment

find the same. Therefore, I

Appellee inappropriate.

respectfully dissent. America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Craig ALEO, Defendant-Appellant

(10-1569/1570), (10-1833). Freeman, Appellant

John 10-1570, 10-1569, 10-1833.

Nos. Appeals, Court of

United States

Sixth Circuit.

Argued: Jan. 2012. May Filed:

Decided and *3 Tableman, Kenneth P. Ken-

ARGUED: Tableman, P.C., Rapids, P. Grand neth Heron, Detroit, Matthew Michigan, W. because he filed a motion asking the court Goetz, Michigan Appellants. compel government for Andrew amake for- Detroit, Attorney, mal regarding Assistant United States motion any victim who Michigan, Appellee. ON BRIEF: wanted to speak pursuant at trial to the Tableman, P. (CVRA), Kenneth Kenneth P. Table- Crime Victim Rights Act naming man, P.C., victim, Rapids, Michigan, Grand Mat- providing preview Heron, Crandall, thew Martin E. De- W. victim’s statement. Because there no troit, Michigan Appellants. objective Andrew evidence that trial counsel filed Goetz, faith, Attorney, Assistant United States this motion in bad we reverse. *4 Detroit, Michigan, Appellee. I BOGGS, ROGERS, Before: 14, 2009, April On Aleo was charged

SUTTON, Judges. Circuit with one count production of of por child (Count One), nography in violation of 18 BOGGS, J., opinion delivered the 2251(a) § U.S.C. and one count of posses court, SUTTON, in which ROGERS and (Count Two), sion of child pornography JJ., SUTTON, 306-12), joined. (pp. J. 2252A(a)(5)(B). § violation of 18 U.S.C. a separate concurring opinion. delivered This grand indictment issued from a jury in the Eastern District of Michigan. On OPINION April 2009, Craig Aleo charged was BOGGS, Judge. Circuit with one count transporting and ship (Count ping Three), child appeals pornography this we deal with two 2252A(a)(l). violation arising out of the criminal of 18 U.S.C. conviction and sentencing Craig indictment for this offense Craig ap- Aleo. Aleo issued from the (Part I), peals his Northern District of New sentence and his trial York.1 attorney, Freeman, John appeals the sanc- Aleo pleaded guilty to all counts. At imposed upon tion him the district sentencing, he was sentenced to the statu- (Part II). tory maximum for all three counts—720 imprisonment months of be served

Craig Aleo was sentenced to the statuto- —to consecutively. appeal, challenges On Aleo ry maximum sentence of 720 months of procedural and substantive reasonable- imprisonment pleaded after he guilty to sentence, requests ness his that his one count each of producing, possessing, case be remanded for resentencing before transporting and shipping por- child judge. a different We reverse his sen- nography. guidelines His range was 235- being substantively tence for unreasonable 293 months. Because we cannot find a resentencing. and remand for justification within the factors enumerated 3553(a) in 18 justify U.S.C. the vari- court,

ance imposed by the district we A resentencing. reverse and remand for Aleo, 66-year-old resident of Davis- counsel, Craig trial burg, Michigan, Aleo’s John Free- was identified October man, $2,000, was by agents sanctioned based on the from the Bureau of Immi- sanction, (ICE), district court’s inherent power gration and Customs Enforcement 1. charge Michigan The Northern District of New York ern District of to be consolidated transferred, Two, personal pursuant after Aleo waived with Count One and Count appearance, plea and sentence to the East- Fed R.Crim.P. 20. 27, 2009, agents obtained On March ICE who owned of individuals group of a

as one at Aleo’s Paypal account a search warrant a certain and executed and controlled to child- payments computers, make two Agents residence. seized that was used under inves- CDs, DVDs, While types websites. and other stored pornography into paid $99.95 $79.95 Aleo tigation, A search of these con- electronic media. sepa- for access to two account Paypal (Michigan) Police De- ducted the Utica May On websites. child-pornography rate 1,186 images of child partment showed child-pornography 24, 2008, joined Aleo these, images 912 of the pornography. Of identifying information website, giving prepubescent children. or videos showed agents ob- number. ICE card and credit and one video showed Eight images still and were able to warrant tained a search images. Aleo’s USB “sadomasochistic” address had Aleo’s email determine ap- “that contained 125 short videos drive im- child-pornography access been used have taken with a hidden peared to been 26, 2008, May May on ages and video all in a bathroom.” These showed camera through June and June January clips 2000. The the date *5 26, 2009, wife Aleo and his March On in the bath- adults and children showed entry at Alexandria port drove into room, a motion-sensi- probably filmed with York, Because from Canada. Bay, New showed a images tive camera. Several being database as on an ICE he was listed five-year-old later identified as Aleo’s girl, relating for violations investigation under dress, and putting on a granddaughter, stopped Aleo was pornography, to child girls of her and other “in vari- some were Customs officers secondary inspection. a ous states of dress.” laptop, a car and found inspected Aleo’s a girl of Aleo’s DVDs also shows One drives, memory and numerous thumb two five-year-old later identified as Aleo’s inspected, were officers cards. These taking a bath. The DVD granddaughter in- images exploitation, of child found 13 on November appears to have been made girls three of cluding prepubescent at least This video was described ICE men, on and one mov- performing sex acts Raymo Donald at Aleo’s detention agent ie file. 21, 2009, in hearing, April held the United arrested and read his Miranda Aleo was for the Eastern Dis- States District Court ownership of all rights. He then asserted Raymo, Michigan. According trict of agents that he and told the the electronics bathes, bath, girl Aleo she puts computer images contained knew and, Aleo dries her off while and then He also told the pornography. child her, drying penetrates vaginal her area child he subscribed two agents that Raymo finger. his also offered the with websites, Dreamzone.com pornography following description: He told the officers and HushHush.com. upload images, or trade but that he did can Q: specifically you see when What images and stored on his only downloaded the video? you watch told the officers that he computer. He display girl’s A: a of the little Certainly home, gave computer had another genitalia. that effect. This inci-

written statement the basis on which Aleo was dent was Q: genitals? on her It’s focused charged production in New York with Definitely. A: (Count pornography of child shipping Three). girl up

A: The little on a standing B cupboard figure and Mr.—the male ap- pleaded guilty Aleo without a plea pears drying to be child off. agreement to all against counts him. Q: aWith towel? The United States Probation Depart- towel, A: in portions With there prepared (PSR) ment a presentence report certainly appears also inap- be some for Aleo. The PSR calculated a base of- propriate contact. There’s some sexual fense level for Count One of 32. To this assault. level, base offense four levels were added because the production of child pornogra- Q: Specifically what? phy involved a minor under the age of A: Digital penetration. twelve; two levels were added because the Q: you So see Mr. finger Aleo’s or offense involved the commission of a sexu- you believe to be Mr. what Aleo’s fin- (the al act or sexual contact PSR described ger— the video of granddaughter Aleo’s as show- ing Aleo “penetrating] vaginal- [the child] Honor, Mr. going Freeman: Your I’m ly with finger”); his and two levels were object. I think we all know what that added Aleo because relative of the means. minor the offense and the minor was in The Court: Sustained. care, custody, or supervisory control. R.62 at 65-66.2 Therefore, Aleo Adjusted received an Of- fense Level of 40. This video was the basis for the Count *6 One. It was also the basis for a “Criminal One, Two, Counts and Three were Sexual Degree” charge Conduct 1st grouped, pursuant § to U.S.S.G. 3D1.2.4 against court,3 Aleo in Michigan state to One level pursuant was added to U.S.S.G. which pleaded Aleo “no contest.” § 3D1.4.5Three levels were subtracted for acceptance responsibility. of Aleo’s total offense, As a result of his Aleo’s mental offense level was thus 38. Aleo had no health was evaluated a psychotherapist history criminal points, making guide his psycho- referred defense counsel. The range lines months. 235-293 therapist meeting described Aleo as the clinical pedophile. definition of a government Aleo’s The objec- and Aleo made risk-assessment score indicated a low government risk tions to the PSR. The calcu- sexually to re-offend and low risk to act range lated Aleo’s guideline to be 262-327 out in months, a violent manner. arguing U.S.S.G. 3D1.4 re- 2. The video was submitted to National the person years age.” er Comp. is under 13 Mich. Missing 750.520b(l). Exploited and Center Children to L. any determine if it had been identified in previous law investigations enforcement “closely or if 4. The states that section related images it or from it had been “grouped together distributed or counts” should be into uploaded to the single internet. The found Group.” closely Center Counts are related when, suggesting no images information that the as this “one of the counts had been so used. specific embodies that is treated conduct as in, adjustment offense characteristic or other to, 3. The statute for guideline applicable "Criminal Sexual Conduct in the to another the "(1) Degree” provides: person the First A counts.” guilty engages pen- ... he if or she in sexual person any etration with another and provides grouped Section 1.4 that 3D counts following (a) circumstances exists: oth- specified [t]hat can result in a offense-level increase. history levels, to the offense level of 38 with criminal be added that 2

quired level of I. level of because adjusted offense grouped together. not be counts could statements, judge’s After initial calculation, government on this Based son-in-law, par- daughter Aleo’s that Aleo be sentenced recommended DVD, in the made ents of the victim both months, by a life term of followed statements. release. supervised government then made a statement calculation argued Aleo that the PSR’s reiterating its recommendation of 300 the video did not incorrect because imprisonment followed a life- months grand- his digitally penetrating him show supervised time of release. Aleo’s attor- arguments his daughter. Aleo reiterated ney spoke, stating then his belief that subsequent supplemental sentencing in a legitimate dispute “there is a factual con- memorandum, trial in which his counsel accuracy that there was cerning the factual he “reviewed the video argued that had touching penetration.” He re- sexual experi- it with another and [discussed] request judge iterated his that sen- attorney” criminal defense enced minimum of mandatory tence Aleo to the footage depicted drying girl Aleo imprisonment. months of off, touching. with no sexual allocution, Aleo stated the During car acknowledged Aleo his offenses following: minimum of 180 mandatory ried a sentence Honor, my apologize Your I want to and 60 months for months on Count One I family pain for all the which caused these requested Three. He Count my them actions and sins. I because imposed be mandatory minimum sentences forgiveness. ask for their offender, was a first-time he because he my I apologize forgiving wife for past society, positive had contributions past supported me and who has me this problems.6 health He asked he had year everyday and a visit with letters imposed to run con that the sentences be *7 every week. currently, so that he would serve 180 Honor, years ago, Your over 30 we imprisonment. months of that promise made a to each other we that together, would work hard and live

C enjoy our love for each other we would newly forever like we were weds. I April Aleo sentenced on was promise, your that Honor. But I broke judge stated that he had seen the The. promise. Through made her a new PSR, objections to the that he had re- prayer therapy together and we will sentencing ceived the memoranda from my I conquer affliction and will walk out sup- government Aleo and the and Aleo’s we live prison, willing, God and will The plemental sentencing memorandum. in together. out our lives retirement objec- judge parties’ stated that as to both least, Lastly, certainly but not the I adopt response tions he would apologize to the for the countless Department. judge Probation The stated Court I spent my that to have an hours because of actions. Aleo would thus be held disease, history kidney problems had with foot 6. Aleo had a of heart 2001. Aleo has also failure, gangrene complications a result of diabetes. In his from diabetes. He as surgery amputated; next month a quadruple bypass had a heart in fifth left toe was kidney transplant right amputated. required a toe on his foot was exist, mercy again way to have on me there’s no ask Court the sen- might guidelines I have a chance for sentencing tencing adequate so are ... to my promise. fulfill punish freedom and to the defendant for what he has done to the victims to make this sentencing judge then assessed thing right.... Aleo’s sentence and his reasons choos- In ing punishment. part, relevant he The Court believes that the factors stated: 3558 should be considered. Number one, one, punishment, and the

... I Court believes perhaps Number think this is punishment the harshest to this kind of despicable one of the most cases that I in, imposed action should be on years have ever been involved in 28 the defen- dant. thinking on the bench. I’ve been about

it, it I can’t think of thinking about In rehabilitation, terms of I don’t another case. possible. know ... if it’s even I have

... I’ve listened to the defendant’s listened to the thing whole and there is attorney argue today and listened I’ve no very remorse and rehabilitation is the defendant. I’ve heard not word of difficult, may may but there or not be. Everything remorse. Not a word. deterrence, absolutely. terms of defendant, health, about the poor his his very, very It’s important give toes, age, talking he lost some and he’s harshest sentence possible to deter oth- about the love for his wife. But not a— ers.... nothing of remorse. He doesn’t talk here, about the victims that the victims It will be the sentence of the Court going emotionally are to be scarred for that the defendant be committed the rest of their lives. The fact that Bureau of Prisons. As to Count One there,

images are out that he took them. Two, years, 360 months. As to Count relationship grand- That it was a of a months, years, ishe to serve daughter, granddaughter, his own consecutively to each other. thing.... flesh and blood. Not one No Three], it [Count remorse whatsoever. As is the sentence the Court the defendant be sen- ... The Court believes that the sen- months, years to 240 tenced or which tencing guidelines totally nonappli- are Again, is the maximum. to be consecu- cable to this case. There is no human tive other sentences.... committee, and that’s what the sentenc- *8 is, ing guideline commission it’s a human equalize committee that tries to a fair- pris- That should he be released from sentencing. ness terms of I don’t hope on and I he isn’t that he will be they anticipated grand-

think ever that a placed period supervised a of on release daughter would be involved this kind years.... for five victim, activity of—a in this kind of further, judge The stated “The discre- certainly grandfather doing not a it. I sentencing up tion of the is to me. way they There’s no would have been remorse, believe has no but even [Aleo] guide- able to even foresee that. the So remorse, I change he had would not certainly guideline lines ... is not a despicable of the act that sentence because this kind of case.... he did.” ... excluding Even the sexual touch- that, ing timely appeal. and all even if didn’t Aleo filed this [that] rule on

D the district court’s failure to sexually touched his whether or not he procedural the and sub- challenges Aleo right him the granddaughter deprived of his sentence. stantive reasonableness sentencing proven have enhancements ease be remanded for Aleo asks that his by government by preponderance judge, because resentencing to a different the evidence. have Judge Friedman would he believes difficulty putting previ- out of his mind his government required The is expressed views of the case. ously support the existence of a factor establish Reasonableness Procedural ing sentencing pre enhancement the evidence. United ponderance argument first is that his sen- Aleo’s (6th Gibson, States v. 985 F.2d proeedurally unreasonable. tence Cir.), denied, cert. argues he the district Specifically, (1993). 2981, 125 L.Ed.2d 678 If a “con dispute court failed to rule on the factual sentencing factor ap tested enhancement depicted as to whether or not the video pears probation report in the and is not sexually touching granddaughter, Aleo proved government hearing, at the and this failure violated Federal Rule of factor the court must insure is 32(i)(3)(B). Criminal Procedure He also proved by otherwise be reliable evidence to cal- argues that the district failed using it to increase the sentence.” fore range. guidelines culate the McMeen, United States a district court’s sen We review Cir.1995). (6th tence under an stan abuse-of-discretion Baker, dard. F.3d United States v. court did rule on Aleo’s The district (6th Cir.2009). A is sentence objection regarding touch whether sexual proeedurally if the district unreasonable ing took court stated place. district (or improperly court “fails to calculate cal plea that Aleo’s no-contest state court culates) range, treats the Guidelines an admission of the offense constituted mandatory, Guidelines as fails to consider the con charged, which was same as 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence Therefore, tested enhancement. the court facts, clearly on erroneous or fails to based ruled that fact of Aleo’s touch sexual adequately the chosen sentence.” explain ing granddaughter of his had been estab Ibid. lished, satisfying Rule 32. Further, by a proved

Federal Rule of Criminal Proce sexual contact was 32(i)(3)(B) that, provides preponderance dure sen of the evidence. Officer “[a]t tencing, any disputed Raymo’s testimony the court must—for about the video and portion presentence report plea charge or other Aleo’s no-contest to the dispute controverted matter —rule on the Sexual Conduct in the First De- “Criminal ruling unnecessary gree” prove or determine that a in state court suffices to preponderance either because the matter will not affect fact of the evidence. *9 Vanbuhler, sentencing, or because the court will not United States v. 558 See (E.D.Mich.2008) 760, in sentencing.” F.Supp.2d consider the matter The 765-67 requires compliance” (imposing sentencing Sixth “literal enhancement based Circuit Tackett, plea with Rule 32. v. on defendant’s no-contest to a Michi- United States (6th offense). 603, Cir.1997), By 113 to gan pleading F.3d 613 cert. de no contest nied, 1089, 879, 522 139 in the First De- U.S. 118 S.Ct. Criminal Sexual Conduct (1998). argues gree, every L.Ed.2d 868 Aleo also Aleo admitted essential ele-

299 comply offense. United States v. to with” the basic aims of sentenc ment of the (6th Cir.1982). Freed, 24, 3553(a).7 25-26 688 F.2d ing as set forth 18 U.S.C. Therefore, Aleo admitted that he “en- sentence, deciding In on a defendant’s the of the vic- gage[d] penetration” sexual judge by begin considering should the Sen Comp. §L. tim. 750.520b. See Mich. tencing range prescribed Guidelines the defendant’s offense. Gall v. United that his sentence was argues Aleo next States, 38, 49, 586, 128 S.Ct. 169 the procedurally unreasonable because (2007). judge L.Ed.2d 445 The sentencing judge failed to calculate the should Baker, range. 559 F.3d at 448. guideline then allow the state and the defendant argues judge that the did Specifically, he argue they for the sentence believe should range after not re-calculate the Aleo raised imposed. judge be should then con objection sentencing to the enhance- 3553(a) all sider of the factors. If the regarding ment sexual contact. Because judge that an “decides outside-Guidelines dispute the district court resolved the re- warranted, sentence is judge] [the must contact, and because the garding sexual consider the extent of the deviation and prop- for sexual contact was enhancement justification sufficiently ensure the by a of the erly proved preponderance compelling support degree to the evidence, properly the district did Gall, variance.” U.S. 128 S.Ct. range guidelines calculate the as with 586; Davis, see also United States v. history argu- I. category criminal Aleo’s (6th Cir.), denied, F.3d cert. ment that the court failed to calculate the U.S. 172 L.Ed.2d 746 guidelines range is meritless. (2008). judge’s The “farther the sentence Therefore, proce- Aleo’s sentence was departs guidelines from the sentence ... durally reasonable. compelling justification the more the based Reasonableness Substantive 3553(a) on factors in section must be.” Poynter, United States argues Aleo next that his 720- (6th Cir.2007) (internal quotation substantively month unrea sentence omitted). choosing marks After a sen sentence, deciding on a the sonable. tence, judge adequately explain the must it judge impose must “a sentencing sentence sufficient, greater necessary, “meaningful appellate but not than to allow review and (4) 7. The to be taken the factors into account kinds of sentence the sentenc- sentencing ing range are: established for— (A) applicable category of offense (1) the nature and circumstances of the of- applicable category committed history fense and the and characteristics of guidelines defendant in the [is- as set forth defendant; Sentencing sued Commission and in (2) imposed— the need for the sentence sentenced]; effect on the date defendant is (A) reflect the seriousness of of- fense, law, promote respect for the (5) any pertinent policy [issued statement offense; provide just punishment for the Sentencing and in effect Commission (B) adequate to afford deterrence to sentenced]; conduct; on the date defendant is criminal (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence (C) protect public from further defendant; disparities among defendants with similar crimes of the (D) guilty records who found of simi- provide have been the defendant with needed conduct; training, lar educational or vocational medical care, provide any the need to restitution to or other correctional treatment in the manner; most effective victims of offense. *10 available; 3553(a). § the 18 U.S.C. kinds sentences a perception of fair sentenc- sioned crime as horrendous as Aleo’s. promote the Gall, at 128 S.Ct. 586. strongest possible He stated the deter- ing.” rence type was needed this of crime. im review the sentence We repeatedly He also stated Aleo was of discretion. Id. at for an abuse posed Importantly, though, the remorseless. a sentence is outside 586. When 128 S.Ct. judge also stated that he would have im- range, appellate the court guidelines the posed the same if had sentence even he presumption a of unrea “may apply remorseful, thought Aleo had been based Instead, reviewing Ibid. the sonableness.” entirely “despicable on the act that he “due deference to the dis give court must Therefore, judge primarily did.” the 3553(a) § the trict court’s decision guidelines his variance from based the on factors, whole, justify on a the extent of the act of possessing actual Aleo child- respect variance.” Ibid. must the the We pornography, transporting pornogra- child sentencing that the court observed the fact phy, filming five-year-old grand- his firsthand, defendant and the witnesses daughter sexually touching the bath and sentencing that the court has wide vari drying her while off. her We must deter- ety sentencing compare cases each compelling justified mine whether reasons to, appellate unlike an court. Our case imposing statutory penalty the maximum usurp sentencing judge’s role is not to the on this act. position interpreter as the best However, facts. we must ensure that First, question judge’s we the district variance, greater the when there is the sentencing guidelines belief that the could range variance the set the from Sen not have envisioned a crime such as Aleo’s. Guidelines, tencing compelling the “more fact, Sentencing the Guidelines do envi- justification the based on the factors in sion a crime guide- such as Aleo’s—Aleo’s 3553(a)” Poynter, § was. See F.3d lines calculation included several enhance- 3553(a)(6). 352; 18 U.S.C. specifically ments addressed judge

The sentenced Aleo district unique characteristics his offense. Four imprisonment, to 720 months of which is levels were produced added because Aleo longer almost two and one-half times than child pornography with a minor under the months, top guidelines of Aleo’s age of twelve. Two levels were added guidelines range. range, As it exceeds the because offense involved the commis- not entitled to a presump sentence is sion of a act sexual or sexual contact. Two Gall, tion of reasonableness. 552 U.S. at levels were added because Aleo was a rela- Further, because tive of the minor and the minor inwas beyond far goes guidelines sentence so care, custody, or supervisory control. range, we must determine the district Therefore, the guidelines expressly take provided compelling reasons such into account defendant who creates child a variance. We must also determine relative, pornography using when the sentencing statutory whether Aleo at the twelve, age relative was under the un- sentencing disparities maximum will create supervision, der the individual’s who between Aleo and similar offenders. See sexually during the defendant touched 3553(a)(6). 18 U.S.C. pornography. creation of the guide- The specifically lines do not differentiate the judge provided The district several rea- grandparent/grandchild sons for from sentencing imposed. relationship variance judge that he other familial relationships, stated believed the but neither do guidelines possibly they could not have envi- differentiate the parent/child relation-

301 offense, which, statutory in an maximum years. when involved sentence of 20 ship, of con- id. at 406. equally deserving Poynter, or more See Under Aleo’s seems took into ac- sentence guidelines dispar- demnation. The should avoid unwarranted very sentencing ity factors that the with count the sentences received for similar Therefore, they did not. crimes. It is judge said unwarranted for Aleo to the belief that these factors were not envi- receive a sentence ten greater times than guidelines sioned the creators of the is in Gawthrop, sentence in which the justification compelling not a for History defendant also had a Criminal cat- guidelines range. judge’s II, variance from the egory opposed as category Aleo’s I, nearly or five greater times than the justified The district court its variance defendant in Hunley. compel- There is no by stating that “the guidelines from the ling justification differentiating his of- strongest was needed possible deterrence” fense dramatically so from theirs. However, all for Aleo’s offense. “not ... to a sex offenders deserve what amounts only Not did the district court err in its sentence; otherwise, Congress life would disparity consideration of because similar statutory range not have set a of 0-60 significantly offenders have received light years.” Poynter, 495 F.3d at 354. The sentences, er it also failed to note 720-month sentence threatens to cause defendants who received sentences of the it disparities sentencing, pro- because statutory maximum significant committed for what top-of-the-range vides sentence ly example, worse crimes. For in a case in not a offense. top-of-the-range which the defendant was sentenced to 65 years, the defendant made a pornographic imposed The district court a harsher videotape of committing himself sexual imposed than sentence on Aleo has been acts on girlfriend’s eight-year-old his on defendants who committed similar occasions, daughter on separate three two case, grandfather crimes. In a recent while drugged asleep she was and one possessed images 64 minor who his where she awake out and acted granddaughter sexually explicit posi- Vowell, commands. v. United States 516 tions, as well as 908 other downloaded (6th Cir.2008). F.3d The offense files, child-pornography images and re- contact, oral-to-genital conduct included top-of-the-guidelines ceived a sentence of attempted genital pen anal and months of imprisonment. United planned etration. He Id. also Hunley, Fed.Appx. States v. 885- (6th Cir.2008). on the In tape In sell the internet. Ibid. another three-year-old being apprehended, order to avoid the de grandfather persuaded his on him fendant also stole a car and fled authori granddaughter perform oral sex him, per- sentencing ties. the district court showing images her of children forming guideline range oral varied from a of 188-235 sex. United States Gaw- (6th Cir.2002). years throp, impose months to a sentence of 65 imprisonment, supervised a lifetime of re He received 70 months of followed lease, representing midpoint guideline statutory of his where the maximum sen months, years. at 511.8 range of 63-78 and well under his tence was 70 Id. gage

8. Cases from outside our circuit also serve to in a host of sexual activities on camera male, including vagi- type oral and demonstrate the of offenses that should with an adult given punishment be the harshest the law can nal intercourse. He was sentenced to with- one, 1,200 (his example, per- in-guidelines months offer. In a defendant sentence of they 13-year-old stepdaughter grouped because suaded his to en- four counts were not *12 302 deserving statutory has reversed sentences as maximum:

This circuit where the dis- substantively who, unreasonable example, those for fled the authori- compelling jus- offer a trict court failed to ties, accept did responsibility, not or who a that varied tification for sentence dra- previously have been convicted of sex of- In matically guidelines range. from the fenses with children. case, substantively recent we reversed as im- unreasonable 720-month sentence starkly Poyn Even more than in posed repeat on a child sex offender. ter, the district court in Aleo’s case did not Poynter, Poynter 495 F.3d at 358. sexual- reasonably distinguish Aleo from other sex boys ly drugged abused and several over offenders young who molested relatives. at He period years. pleaded of Id. why did not take into account guilty to four counts of illicit sexual con- Aleo should receive the possible harshest guideline range duct with minors. His sentence, though even he had not commit was calculated to be between 188-235 possible ted the worst variation of the judge justified months. Ibid. The district had, example, crime. He cooperated months, statutory maxi- imposing 720 the authorities, responsibility with admitted sentence, Poynter mum because victimized actions, only for his committed one children, multiple drugs used alcohol or involving known offense sexual contact them, seduce and he was recidivist. with a minor. There nowas evidence that Circuit, however, Ibid. The reasoned Sixth drugged he the child or committed more “primary ground” the district court’s than brief sexual contact. we share While upward variance was the court acts, the district court’s at outrage Aleo’s Poynter wanted to from prevent offending justifications offered the district again. guidelines Id. at 353. Because the court do not vari support enormous specifically “Repeat dealt with and Dan- beyond guidelines range ance and the gerous Minors,” Against Sex Offender[s] disparity other, with sentences of similar provided enhancements for this cate- substantively offenders. The sentence was offender, gory court held that Therefore, unreasonable. justified. variance was Ibid. The court we reverse and might discussed offenders who be more remand for resentencing.9 separate argues resentencing occurred on four occasions and in 9. Aleo that a should be judge. "multiple, remanded to a different A separate volved decision to instances of fear judge Sarras, remand to a different harm”). is based on con and risk of United States v. judge siderations of whether the on remand is 1191, (11th Cir.2009). 575 F.3d 1207-10 capable providing a fair and re unbiased case, where a another defendant was sen hearing of the as well as with consider statutory tenced to the maximum for all efficiency preservation ations of and the counts, with the sentences to run consecutive See, judicial e.g., resources. United States v. ly, years imprisonment, for a total of 140 Faulks, (3d Cir.2000); 201 F.3d images the defendant had taken at least 150 Garcia-Robles, United States v. 640 F.3d pornographic made at least videos of (6th Cir.2011) (considering whether there (he boys years three over the course of made indicating is "evidence in the record that the tapes boy boy of one from the time the was 8 judge difficulty conducting district will have 15), drugging boys until he was to facili sentencing” proceedings.). de novo We trust tate the offenses. The defendant transmitted Judge Friedman will revisit matter these files on the internet. United States v. completely open with a mind at the de novo Johnson, (11th Cir.), 1241-42 resentencing place, that must now take denied, cert. Faulks, 201 F.3d at and we thus do not (2006). L.Ed.2d 329 accept argument. Aleo's Paragraph 28 refers to the defendant’s

II daughter request speak and her deals with the opinion II of this Part *13 sentencing. Please let me know wheth- trial $2,000 imposed on Aleo’s sanction you permission er intend to seek from counsel, Freeman was Freeman. John Also, speak. please the court for her to decided the district court sanctioned when an provide proof me with offer re- in a motion bad- that he filed a meritless garding you expect say. what her to a victim who to intimidate faith effort replied, that the stating The AUSA CVRA sentencing during Aleo’s speak wished to him require request permission did not rights to her under hearing, pursuant speak, from the court for a victim to (CVRA), Rights Act Crime Victims’ that he did not have to tell Freeman what court abused its dis- § 3771. The U.S.C. say. would the victim that motion deciding in Freeman’s cretion Therefore, re- faith. we was filed bad 13, 2010, Freeman a mo April On filed verse the sanctions. that compel. requested tion to The motion “a prosecutor

the court order the to file motion, A formal with notice to defense coun sel, seeking for the child com permission when he received On March at sentenc plainant’s speak mother PSR, that Freeman learned victims ing.” Freeman described his fruitless daughter namely Aleo’s Aleo’s offense— correspondence email with AUSA. son-in-law, parents of the abused prosecutor that Freeman said because at the speak granddaughter planned — that he had had refused to do as he asked hearing. Freeman states sentencing compel court to no choice but to ask the concerned about what the vic- he became no prosecutor under the “motion and say discussing after the issue might tims requirement tice of the CVRA.” 6, Free- April April Aleo on 5. On with sentencing, At Aleo’s Freeman reiterat- concerns about the victim expressed man motion. request ed the embodied in an email to the Assistant statements (AUSA) that he not judge The district indicated did Attorney who was United States motion, that he was want to discuss the the ease. He wrote: prosecuting may torney assert the Rights provides: for the Government Crime Victim’s Act 10. The (a). per- rights in subsection A described (a) vic- Rights of crime victims.—A crime may obtain following rights: accused of the crime son tim has the chapter. any under this form relief (4) any right reasonably to be heard public proceeding in the district court in- (3) Motion for relief and writ of manda- release, sentencing, any volving plea, or rights described in subsection mus.—The parole proceeding. (a) be asserted in the district court shall being prosecuted is which defendant (b) Rights afforded— or, underway, prosecution the crime if no is (1) general. any proceeding court —In court in the district in which in the district victim, against involving a crime an offense court shall the crime occurred. The district ensure that the crime victim the court shall asserting any up and decide motion take rights afforded the described in subsec- right forthwith. If the district victim’s (a).... tion sought, movant denies the relief may petition appeals for a writ the court of (d) Enforcement and limitations.— of mandamus.... the crime Rights. crime victim or —The added). (emphasis 18 U.S.C. 3771 representative, at- lawful and the victim’s motion, deny argued he He going to defendants have due- issuing process right a written order. at sentencing would be to have notice facts, regarding disputed and be heard 3, 2010, after it May On had issued its citing Hayes, United States v. 171 F.3d Aleo, the court judgment regarding issued (6th Cir.1999) 389, 392 and United States denying compel an Aleo’s motion to order Silverman, (6th briefing additional from the and ordered Cir.1992) (en banc), denied, cert. parties question sanctioning on the 123 L.Ed.2d 159 The order described the motion Freeman. *14 (1993). He stated that recognized he that It as unwarranted and baseless. stated judges could consider evidence at sentenc solely that “Freeman’s motion serves as a trial, ing that would be inadmissible at but to attempt blatant intimidate minor any that evidence must nevertheless have mother,” victim’s and that “Freeman reliability sufficient indicia of support its should client does not know his have a Therefore, probable accuracy. Freeman right respond pursuant to a statement advocate,” argued, as a “zealous he had CVRA, to the and Freeman’s intention to wanted to might determine what facts be mockery do so makes a of the CVRA.” brought out at sentencing the child’s 3771(d)(3) The court did note that —a mother, brought in case she up disputed or of the subsection CVRA cited Free- unreliable facts. up man—directs the court to “take and filed, any decide motion” but stated that government’s The response to the language “certainly this does compel request briefing court’s recommended the victim to a motion.” file The court that Freeman not be gov- sanctioned. The requested govern- that Freeman and the would, ernment assumed that the court briefing ment on the of ap- submit issue Freeman, it decided to sanction un- do so propriate sanctions. der Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure appropriate sanctions, 42, brief on which states the elements of criminal (1) Freeman stated that the motion contempt had been as: that the defendant en- (2) filed in faith “a good potential gaged misbehavior, to address in that the misbe- process conflict between a defendant’s due havior obstructed the administration of (3) rights right justice, and a victim’s to be heard ... that the misbehavior occurred under court, He noted that in presence [CVRA].” 3771(d)(3) deciding mentioned the court the defendant acted with the intent motions, him Flint, which led to believe that Vaughn obstruct. v. City 752 (6th required, 1160, Cir.1985). motions were cited an article F.2d 1167 gov- The by Amy Baron-Evans, regarding “Rights ernment stated Freeman’s erroneous read- ing Procedures Under the Crime Victims’ of the CVRA did justice, not obstruct Rights given Act” that had him this idea.11 government because the never told the Indeed, 11. portunity respond this article does state that any asserting motion requires alleged CVRA victim or rights. “[a] victim necessary victim’s This is to effectu- ” any 'right', Amy [to] 'assert' right 'motion.' ate process.” the defendant's to due Baron-Evans, Rights and Procedures Under Ibid. Baron-Evans is resource counsel who Rights the Crime Victims’ Act and New Federal Sentencing has served as the National Re- Procedure, 30, 2009, April Rides Criminal source Counsel in the Office of Federal Public Massachusetts, http://www.fd.org/docs/select- available at Hamp- Defenders for New shire, topics rules/rules-article-final.pdf?sfvrsn=2. and Rhode Island. She was ranked as — 2004, 2005, The article also Super Lawyer states that "the defendant a Massachusetts given must be op- notice and a full and fair and 2008. judge’s review a decision to generally We about the motion victims impose it. sanctions under his inherent au ignored thority for an abuse of discretion. Metz v. Nevertheless, court issued the district (6th Bank, Cir. Unizan $2,000 on imposing sanctions an order 2011).13 may A court exercise its inherent that “defen The court stated Freeman. party to sanction when a has “acted power im initial brief affirms Court’s dant’s faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for the motion to bad that Freeman filed pression” reasons,” The court oppressive the victim’s mother. or when the conduct intimidate (cit Freeman had been aware stated that “tantamount to bad faith.” Ibid. was speak mother intended to the victim’s Chambers, 45-46, ing 501 U.S. at issued on March the PSR was since 2123; Roadway Express, Piper, Inc. faith, acting good If he had been 752, 767, U.S. S.Ct. 65 L.Ed.2d he have filed argued, the court would (1980)). three-part test to deter compel April earlier than motion to faith present mine whether such bad *15 2010,12 have attached the ideally would “(1) the district court found is whether objec as an for motion and notice request meritless, that the claims advanced were court sanc to the The district tion PSR. (2) that counsel knew or should have 42, as the not under Rule tioned Freeman this, and that the motive for known envisioned, under its had but government an filing improper purpose suit was for authority to sanction “bad-faith inherent Ibid, (citing Big such as harassment.” v. litigation.” in Chambers NAS conduct Co., Liberty v. Mut. Fire Ins. Corp. Yank 2123, CO, Inc., 32, 42, 111 S.Ct. 501 U.S. (6th Cir.1997)). 308, 313 (1991). 115 L.Ed.2d 27 21, 2010, Freeman filed a mo- On June if motion was Even Freeman’s the court’s or- tion for reconsideration of meritless, should and even Freeman him, sanctioning addressing the court’s der this, given have known the court has not argued power to sanction. He inherent that any support position evidence to its purpose improper that he did not have an to harass the Freeman filed the motion motion, the Baron- filing quoted in an may uphold mother. We order victim’s article on which he had relied. Evans an find “express even without sanctions court denied the motion. The district willfulness, bad faith or reckless ing of ness,” only if the record sets forth but timely appeal. filed this Freeman faith. party that the acted in bad

evidence B Metz, “must 655 F.3d at 490. The court something party more than that find argues Freeman appeal, On or knowingly pursued a meritless claim be court abused its discretion the district any stage proceedings.” action at of the despite him the fact cause it sanctioned (internal marks omit quotation Id. at 489 good in compel motion to was filed ted). improper purpose. faith and not for an 42, contempt, covering sentencing hearing Procedure criminal was held on

12. Aleo’s 15, April punishing 2010. bad-faith mechanism for sole We do not need to conduct in criminal cases. questionable may be whether the inher- It conduct reach this issue because Freeman’s authority even exists in a ent to sanction under either the fails to merit sanctions argument An criminal case such as this one. authority or Rule 42. court’s inherent that Federal of Criminal can be made Rule 306 in only tangible punish attorney evidence the district a defense a criminal filing a frivolous faith was case for motion. pointed regarding bad timing of Freeman’s allegedly belated moving point, Before forward with this However, indeed raised Freeman motion. a few steps let me take back. From days matter about ten before the hear- present, founding to the the federal courts with the correspondence the email

ing, possessed “implied powers” have that “are Only the matter could not be when AUSA. necessary to the exercise of all others.” by agreement did he file. The resolved (7 Hudson, United States 11 U.S. subsequent filing of does not the motion Cranch) (1812); 3 L.Ed. 259 accord acting that he was in bad faith. establish NASCO, Inc., 32, 43, Chambers v. 501 U.S. fact, to the court responses Freeman’s (1991). 115 27 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d evidence, tangible in the form of provide power That inherent extends civil 3771(d)(3) Baron-Evans article and Chambers, See criminal cases. CVRA, relying on a that he was 2123; Allen, Illinois v. S.Ct. litigation strategy and was not colorable 342-43, U.S. S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d acting Finally, nothing faith. in the bad (1970). And power would seem or motion wording original tone of his authority to attorneys include sanction an intention to harass the vic- indicates criminal cases. When the es- Constitution them, and, It even if tims. was not sent to Supreme tablished a Court Congress compelled the court granted, would have courts, later the lower created federal government directly, the victims *16 the not came implied delega- those actions with an themselves. record demonstrates the tion to allow courts to formulate proce- error, in only Freeman’s motion was cases, dures for their a including mecha- that he filed it in bad faith. Without lawyers nism to control the before them. faith, of Freeman’s the dis- evidence bad a giving One cannot create court without trict court abused its discretion. to judges power the control the courtroom. much, Congress recognized

The First as Ill contempt creating power a for civil and day. criminal cases exists to this See reasons, RE- Based on the we foregoing 17, Judiciary § Act of ch. 1 Stat. Aleo’s REMAND VERSE sentence and 73, 83; § 401. In 18 U.S.C. Rule resentencing; for we the sanc- REVERSE of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce- counsel, imposed on John tions Aleo’s trial adopted lay dure to out process Freeman. exercising the criminal-contempt power. SUTTON, Judge, concurring. Circuit intrigues What me is not whether courts, in lower federal the absence this full, join I the court’s decision in includ- rule, statute and have nonetheless would ing its conclusion that the district court power misbehaving to sanction criminal abused its discretion when it invoked its lawyers. They assuredly defense had power impose inherent to sanctions on de- inci- power necessary from the outset as a attorney filing fense John Freeman for creation, had Congress dent of whether separately motion. I frivolous write to contempt common law power codified the express skepticism about a lower federal My in not. re- question 1789 or is what power court’s ever to use inherent authori- inherent power today. mains of that ty, opposed as contempt power to the es- (18 401) by § power tablished statute and Article III to create Congress’s U.S.C. (Fed.R.Crim.P. 42), implemented by rule federal “inferior” courts includes 11(b). spells The Rule out authority. Be- Fed.R.Civ.P. limit their power lesser procedural prerequisites imposing creat- courts “were lower federal cause the (“notice and a legislature oppor- a sanction reasonable Congress,” by ed acts ... power tunity respond”), may who seek sanc- their “inherent may “limit[ ]” Chambers, court), 501 U.S. at (opposing parties rule.” tions statute 2123; Robin- parte (monetary accord Ex types of sanctions available S.Ct. Wall.) (19 505, 511, 22 son, L.Ed. nonmonetary) purpose and the and limits 86 U.S. (1873). (“limited why the lower explains That of a sanction to what suffices to their inherent may not use compara- federal courts or repetition deter of the conduct situated”). “thwart[ ] or power “cireumvent[ ]” similarly others ble conduct mecha- sanctioning other purposes 11(c). rules, Fed.R.Civ.P. Other statutes directly Congress provided has nisms” grant permissive courts regulations through the Rules directly or less statute authority to address related sanctioning Chambers, Act. Enabling problems civil cases. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 401; 16(f), 37, 56(h); § S.Ct. 26(g)(3), 18 U.S.C. 1927; see also 28 U.S.C. 8 U.S.C. case, it have would Had this been civil 1229a(b)(6) (immigration proceedings); A use of inher- easy an case. court’s been (trademark § 2.120(g) proceed- 37 C.F.R. filing of Mr. to sanction the power ent R.App. pro- P. 38 ings); (appellate Fed. motion (allegedly) frivolous Freeman’s (bank- ceedings); Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9011 reconciled with the sanction- could not be ruptcy proceedings). the Fed- already place under ing regime In a civil Procedure. eral Rules Civil carefully In the face of these delineated sharp- court faced with district regulations, thing it would be one invoke may, indeed litigation tactics elbowed authority gap fill a sanctioning inherent must, under attorney misconduct sanction Rules, such as conduct outside the Civil requires attorneys to Rule which Civil Chambers, jurisdiction. the court’s See *17 motion, any written certify “pleading, 36-37, 50-51, at 111 S.Ct. 2123 501 U.S. paper” is or other attorney to “attempted] and his (litigant (1) im- any for being presented “not a fraud on the court” under perpetrate harass, as to cause proper purpose, such taking a series of bad-faith transactions needlessly in- unnecessary delay, or judicial filing process before thwart litigation”; the cost of crease lawsuit). quite It be another to would (2) or by existing law “warranted the burden of power invoke that ease extending, for argument nonfrivolous existing punish Rules—to satisfying Civil reversing existing law or modifying, or that fall exempted by a Rule or practices law”; establishing new meeting a Rule’s standard short of (3) contentions [that] on “fact based conduct. See United States sanctionable or, (1st evidentiary specifi- if support have 661 985 F.2d One 1987 BMW identified, likely have evi- cally Bunch, so will Cir.1993); 946 F.2d Carver v. cf. dentiary support op- (6th Cir.1991) (local after reasonable rules court investigation further or portunity for Rules of conflict with the Federal “cannot discovery”; and Procedure, Congress, and Acts of Civil prescribed practice procedure on a “reaso- rules “warranted” based Court”). (or Accordingly, Supreme a “lack of informa- belief nabl[e]” tion”) a district court this been a civil lawyer party if or is had inherent gap-filling not have used its factual contentions.” could “denying] ... Any Mr. Freeman. ef- power to sanction defendants that likely would be met with lawyer fort to sanction would have to sanctions advanced in a civil proceed- (9th fall on the relevant rules ing.” rise or based Becraft, In re 885 F.2d Cir.1989). already place. in statutes Surely the decision not to im- port Rules, Civil Rule 11 into the Criminal But not a this was civil case. In con example, to take one was an intentional many trast to the rules and statutes em Otherwise, and sensible one. the risk of powering impose courts to sanctions in legitimate, sanctions could chill indeed con- cases, civil the number of rules and stat stitutionally required, advocacy, and dis- solely attorney utes directed misconduct trict courts could sanction litigation in a criminal case is: none. Even the utterly stances are appropriate contempt power §by authorized 401 and criminal A plea cases. frivolous of not 42 applies Criminal Rule to misconduct in guilty example is one of the latter. United See, criminal civil e.g., cases. Young White, (2d States v. 980 F.2d v. United States ex rel. et Vuitton Fils Cir.1992). A frivolous refusal to admit S.A., 787, 789-90, charged elements of a offense is another. (1987); 95 L.Ed.2d 740 United States v. See ABA Model Rule of Professional Con- Moncier, (6th 593, 594, Cir. (prohibiting lawyers duct 3.1 2009). from making void, All we have is a not a gap, arguments frivolous permitting but crimi- when it comes the statutes and rules attorneys nal-defense pro- “defend the solely directed to attorney misconduct in ceeding cases, require as to that every [so] ele- leaving just criminal pow one other established”). ment of What, the case be er contempt available—the power—which moreover, prosecutor if a “sign[ed] an applies to all un- federal cases. justified indictment,” keeping mind the What should courts infer from this cate- prosecutorial “doctrine of immunity”? silence, gorical from the absence of other White, 980 F.2d if a What statutes and rules applicable to sanctions imposed monetary against sanctions in criminal cases? Does it mean that the government, implicating sovereign its im- contempt power is only tool available munity potentially amounting to a to district courts to deal attorney with greater sanction than Congress allows for misconduct criminal cases? Or does it prosecutions? bad-faith See 18 U.S.C. Congress mean that and the Rules draft- 3006A, Statutory (allowing *18 sessment of costs government attorneys in criminal cases based on inher- in a criminal case where position “the of authority, ent ways whether used in vexatious, frivolous, United States was rules, mirror the civil ways that mirror faith”); Horn, or in bad v. United States inherent powers cases, innovated civil (1st Cir.1994). 29 F.3d 763-64 Chambers, 50-51, see 501 U.S. at 111 S.Ct. 2123, or ways? still other Perhaps the Rules drafters could tailor a

I lean toward the former view. There Civil-Rule-11-like sanctioning regime to good are reasons to think Congress setting. and the criminal they conspicu- But and, Rules drafters meant ously to treat civil suspects, one consciously have cases and criminal cases differently when not done so. Neither Congress has done it comes to regulating attorney miscon- so statute. Nor has the President done duct. To ensure that criminal defendants so executive order. See Exec. Order receive advocacy, zealous “generally 12,778, 55,195,55,197, courts Fed.Reg. 55,- No. (Oct. 1991) tolerate arguments on behalf of criminal 200 (directing federal gov- (1) any person of in its Misbehavior “seek sanctions attorneys eminent presence or so near thereto as to ob- opposing counsel opposing against justice; of struct the administration exempting but appropriate” where parties any of its officers Misbehavior cases). inac- flagrant Sometimes criminal transactions; in their official action, where particularly tion amounts (3) Disobedience or resistance to its Rules stand side Criminal nearly silent writ, order, rule, de- process, lawful autho- many Civil Rules with the by side cree, or command. only would it be Not rizing sanctions. § 401. The statute covers civil many of the civil-sanc- 18 U.S.C. to import

difficult Rules, a elu- contempt, and criminal “somewhat into the Criminal tioning powers Union, distinction, Int’l United Mine sive” three-quar- than of more passage but the Bagwell, Workers Am. Enabling the Rules century of a since ters 129 L.Ed.2d any passage law without the Act became (1994). contempt Generally speaking, civil omis- that the suggests rules comparable compliance “to coerce future with is used sion is no accident. “compensate or to for the court’s order” something reflects Perhaps the omission misconduct, resulting from In re injuries” drafting sanctions difficulty of else—the (6th 302, 305-06 Cir. Jaques, 761 F.2d resulting criminal cases and rules for 1985), contempt “imposed is while criminal to use an allowing district courts utility of and does not “serve punitive purposes” case-by-case on a power inherent-sanction aggrieved party an or compensate former, I but I do not doubt Chandler, basis. action.” In re coerce future the answer. (6th the latter Cir.1990); cannot believe see also presents al., rules drafting such Federal Wright The reason Alan et 3A Charles (4th ed.). a criminal that the stakes of challenge is Practice & Procedure objec- contempt if not all A fair trial is the a criminal most high. trial are so cases, overriding punitive citations will be and backward- it is the tive in civil but looking. cases. in criminal imperative constitutional a free- that district courts have

The notion Rule 42 of the Federal Rules Criminal frivo- floating power inherent to sanction for crimi- spells process Procedure out the attorneys in taken legal positions lous personally contempt. nal Unless the conduct,” flips not civil cases criminal cases but contemptuous or heard the “saw notice, a reasonable priorities. provide these it must allow defense, an appoint prepare time to inference: Con- That leaves the best contempt. Fed. attorney prosecute give the Rules makers meant gress and 42(b), (a). it comes to When R.Crim.P. tool—the con- just courts one the federal attorney in crimi- misconduct sanctions attorneys power discipline tempt —to trials, 401 and that is all there nal is— *19 is the statute criminal cases. Here how why the federal Rule 42—and one wonders lay power pro- and the and Rule out the it at that. should not leave courts in full: says The statute cess. Chambers, true, held that a federal it is have States shall A court of the United to sanction bad- is not “forbidden court imprison- fine or of the inherent power punish to conduct means faith discretion, ment, both, conduct could at its such because that power simply or or the under the statute authority, and none oth- also be sanctioned contempt of its 50, 2123. at 111 S.Ct. 501 U.S. er, Rules.” as— 310 civil, criminal, rejecting effort, a a 2369. In that the

But was not S.Ct. Chambers ais difference between the “[t]he and there Court reasoned that balance struck impli- in Chambers that two. The conduct by the Rule between societal costs the 11, moreover, inter- cated Rule may Civil of rights the not be casually accused beyond ... twined with “bad-faith conduct overlooked because a court has to elected only ... the reach of the Rules that the analyze question supervisory the under the inherent could address.” Id. at 50- power 255, 108 power.” Id. at S.Ct. 2369. 51, setting, 111 In S.Ct. 2123. the 52, § so here. Rule Just Like 401 and reasoned, it Court would “foster extensive 42 de competing Rule balance values: to litigation” require and needless satellite to punish ter and offensive conduct the on conduct separate district court to out the yet hand give one to criminal at defense forbidden Rules from sanc- the conduct torneys represent space the to their clients only through power. tionable the inherent zealously on the history other. The of the 51, at 2123. Id. 111 S.Ct. When a contempt federal shows the statute faced with not with conduct intertwined Judiciary not figment. tradeoff is The purview other conduct outside the gave Act 1789 “power of federal courts the Rules, says Chambers that the court “ordi- punish by ... to or at imprisonment, fine narily rely should on the Rules rather than courts, of the discretion said all contempts the power,” resorting inherent to the latter authority.” 17, judge of 1 A Stat. only when “neither the statute nor the eventually grant abused broad pow this of 50, up Rules are to the task.” Id. at 1826, Peck, er. In Judge James of S.Ct. 2123. States United District Court for Dis Chambers, Since the Court has twice Missouri, trict imprisoned of and disbarred courts admonished lower not to use inher- lawyer for criticizing opinion ap on power sidestep ent to Federal Rules of remarkable, peal- mildly understanda —a Criminal scope Procedure. “Whatever the ble, lapse in judgment. See J. Arthur of power, inherent it does not [a court’s] Stansbury, Report Trial H. James of of include power develop rules (1833); Barton, 2-5 Benjamin Peck H. An circumvent conflict with Federal or I Theory Article the Inherent Powers of of Rules of Procedure.” v. Criminal Carlisle Courts, the Federal Cath. U.L.Rev. States, 416, 426, United 517 U.S. (2011). & In response 44-45 n.315 pub (prohibiting L.Ed.2d outcry action, lic over the judge’s Congress using district authori- courts from inherent imposed new on limitations the federal ty grant judgment acquit- motions contempt power. courts’ See Act of Mar. tal filed the time prescribed outside limit (establish 1,§ ch. 4 Stat. 487 by Federal Rule Criminal Procedure ing appear the limitations that now in 18 29(c)); accord Bank Nova Scotia 401(1)-(3)). U.S.C. The an next time States, 250, 254-55, United attorney criticized of Judge one Peck’s rul (1988). S.Ct. 101 L.Ed.2d 228 on ings appeal, anyone think does represent Rules the relevant Rules com- judge disregarded could Congress’s have Congress’s mittees’ judgment about contempt power limitations on the by in how best competing to balance values. voking authority? his inherent sanctioning Scotia, instance, Bank Nova may Of course not: a judge use inher district pow- court tried use its inherent power ent power. end-run cabined er to disregard inquiry the harmless-error *20 Criminal prescribed by Federal Rule of That leaves question the whether the 52(a). 254, Procedure 487 at at filing U.S. 108 conduct issue here —the of a frivo-

311 witness, it potential impose; addressing harass a Rules a situation lous motion to of behavior that we assume—is the sort the at all. contemplated so Rules of, and is thus purview falls within government calls our attention to a imposed by, subject to the limitations handful cases which other courts of Yes, it to me. § 401 and Rule 42. seems appeals approved the use of inherent-pow attorney’s A criminal defense conduct er in criminal sanctions cases. But these contempt if it satisfies four amounts to point. cases illustrate our The govern (1) misbehav- criteria: it “must constitute case, one, ment cites no nor have we found (2) 401(1)”; it “must ior under 18 U.S.C. in which a court of appeals affirmed a amount to an of the adminis- obstruction power district court’s use of its inherent (3) justice”; it occur in the tration of “must impose on an attorney filing sanctions for presence”; court’s “there must be frivolous motion in a criminal case. The Chandler, a form of intent to obstruct.” orders, cited cases either reverse sanctions If a criminal defense 906 F.2d at 249. see United v. Gonzalez-Lopez, States 403 motion with attorney files a frivolous no (8th 558, Cir.2005); F.3d 564-67 United proceedings motive other than to obstruct Figueroa-Arenas, States v. 292 F.3d witness, contempt pow- or intimidate a (1st Cir.2002), attorney 279-82 or concern potentially er covers the conduct—and advancing misconduct unrelated to legal accompanied by procedural would be protections including arguments, of Rule the re- see United States v. Kouri- Perez, (1st Cir.1999) attorney’s guilt 1, 4-5, be quirement 187 F.3d beyond a reasonable doubt. See In proved (attorney made ad hominem at baseless (6th Smothers, 438, 442 re 322 F.3d Cir. including prosecutor, allega tacks on an 2003). granddaughter tion that she was the Republic former Dominican dictator Rafael Why the district court invoke that didn’t Wallace, Trujillo); United States say. But power here? It does not (D.C.Cir.1992) 1214, 1215-16, F.2d likely explanation most is that Freeman’s (attorney neglected to call witnesses to conduct fell short of what 401 and Rule rescheduled); appear, forcing trial to be require, perhaps improper because his Romero-Lopez, also States v. see United proved beyond not be a rea- motive could Cir.2011) (attor (1st 107-08 so, just If sonable doubt. that is the sort ney up failed to show scheduled sen of the Rules “circumvention]” States, 11 tencing hearing); Bills v. United Carlisle, permit. warns us not to Court (4th Cir.2001) Fed.Appx. (per 342-43 1460; Bank 517 U.S. at S.Ct. curiam) (same). it comes to court When Scotia, Nova filings, Congress and the Rules makers power 2369. A court’s inherent to sanction context-specific balance when struck contempt power is not a second-division 11 in Rules they included Rule the Civil attorney’s be used when an conduct is any parallel and omitted sanction almost, quite, punishable but not under natural infer criminal context. The most § 401 and Rule 42. If a court is to invoke that, the contrast is ence to draw from attorneys at power punish its inherent criminal defense at punish courts wish to context, all in the criminal it must be in torneys improper filings, they should response categorically beyond to conduct satisfy contempt pow the strictures of the scope contempt power. er, they however not rework this balance resorting pow- a court to its inherent power. fit their inherent circumventing any er is not limitations the see under *21 silence, from even But inferences seven- silence, LEWIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, contain Susan

ty-five years of risks of Rather than take the position their own. may courts never invoke that lower federal sanctioning power an when it inherent ACQUISITION HUMBOLDT CORPO- cases, filings in comes to frivolous criminal RATION, INC., dba Humboldt Manor that a part suggest

the better of valor is Nursing Home, Defendant-Appellee. tempted to invoke district court its inher- No. 09-6381. powers ought urge to resist the ent unless satisfactorily it can address these consider- Appeals, United States Court of ations: Sixth Circuit. 1. Is there relevant Criminal Rule? so, If why not invoke it? Argued: Nov. 2011. 2. covering Is there a Civil Rule May Decided and Filed: 2012. so, If it possible same conduct? is that the opted drafters the Criminal Rules not to

impose similar sanctions criminal cases

because the Rule Civil does lend itself

to the criminal context?

3. If neither the Criminal Rules nor issue, speak Civil Rules should a impose case-by- such on sanctions urge Advisory

case basis or Committee

on the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-

dure to invoke the deliberative and inclu-

sive Rules Act Enabling process to consid- adoption

er the of a new Rule? See Mark Kravitz, Revise,

A. To or Not to Revise: Question,

That Is the 87 Denv. U.L.Rev. (2010). gives pause If none of this a court

and if imposing a criminal sanction for a filing

frivolous remains consistent with the

“restraint appropriate and discretion”

any judicial exercise of inherent power,

Chambers, 501 U.S. at

this rare case. And the court of sanction,

appeals it upholds may be a

unique one. Notes the as- ers assumed courts also could sanction against

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Aleo
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: May 15, 2012
Citation: 681 F.3d 290
Docket Number: 10-1569, 10-1570, 10-1833
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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