United States v. Abu KhatallahUnited States v. Abu Khatallah
Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
AHMED SALIM FARAJ ABU
KHATALLAH,
Case No. 14-cr-00141 (CRC) also known as “Ahmed Abu Khatallah,”
also known as “Ahmed Mukatallah”
also known as “Ahmed Bukatallah”
also known as “Sheik,”
Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION
On September 11 and 12, 2012, a U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya was attacked, resulting in the deaths of four Americans, including United States Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens. In an eighteen-count superseding indictment, a grand jury charged Defendant Ahmed Salim Faraj Abu Khatallah with orchestrating and participating in the attack. Abu Khatallah has moved to dismiss all but one of the counts. He alleges that most of the statutes he is charged with violating cannot be applied to conduct undertaken outside of the United States, that one of them is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the two facilities destroyed in the attack do not meet the applicable statutory definitions of “federal facilities” or “U.S. property.” For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny the motions as to all but two of the counts challenged. The Court will, by separate order, request supplemental briefing with respect to those counts.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
During the civil war that erupted in Libya in early 2011, the rebel group seeking to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi, the Transitional National Council (“TNC”), established its base of *2 operations in the city of Benghazi. On February 25, 2011, the U.S. Department of State evacuated American personnel from Libya and suspended its operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. Less than two months later, the State Department reestablished its presence in the country through the arrival in Benghazi of U.S. Special Envoy J. Christopher Stevens. According to the State Department’s official report on the Benghazi attack, on June 21, 2011, Stevens moved into what would become a U.S. Special Mission compound. See Accountability Review Bd., U.S. Dep’t of State, Benghazi Attack Report 14 (Unclassified) (2012), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf (“State Department Report”). The compound was eventually comprised of “a diplomatic outpost, known as the U.S. Special Mission,” where a contingent of U.S. State Department personnel were based, and a second “facility . . . , known as the Annex,” where a contingent of other U.S. personnel were based. Indictment ¶¶ 5–6.
The United States officially recognized the TNC as Libya’s governing authority the following month, on July 15, 2011, and Gaddafi was ousted from power only a few weeks later. The U.S. Embassy in Tripoli reopened with a temporary-duty staff in September 2011. Stevens continued as Special Envoy to the TNC in Benghazi until he left the country on November 17, 2011. The Special Envoy position was not filled after Stevens’s departure, but he returned to Libya as Ambassador in May 2012, operating out of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. According to the State Department Report, “2012 saw an overall deterioration of the security environment in Benghazi, as highlighted by a series of security incidents involving the Special Mission, international organizations, non-governmental organizations . . . , and third-country nationals and diplomats.” Id. at 15; see also id. at 15–16.
Ambassador Stevens traveled to Benghazi to visit the Mission compound on September 10, 2012. Stationed at the compound and present during the Ambassador’s visit were Information Management Officer Sean Patrick Smith; Assistant Regional Security Officer Scott Wickland; Assistant Regional Officer David Ubben; Security Officers Tyrone Snowden Woods and Glen Anthony Doherty; and a Security Officer the Indictment refers to only as “Mark G.” See Indictment ¶ 16; State Dep’t Report 18.
The Mission and Annex were attacked on September 11 and 12, 2012. In two phases beginning on the evening of September 11 and lasting into the morning of September 12, armed intruders deployed small-arms and machine-gun fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars at both facilities. See State Dep’t Report 4. Buildings on the compound burned, and the fire spread to the Mission building housing Ambassador Stevens during his stay. Ambassador Stevens, Smith, Woods, and Doherty were killed in the attacks.
On July 15, 2013, a criminal complaint and arrest warrant issued for Abu Khatallah, whom the Department of Justice suspected of conspiring to commit and participating in the attack. Just under one year later, on June 16, 2014, a team of U.S. special military forces captured Abu Khatallah south of Benghazi. He was then transported to the United States aboard a Navy ship, the USS New York. According to news sources, Libya condemned the capture, calling for Abu Khatallah’s return to Libya for trial. See Ulf Laessing & Ahmed Elumami, Libya Condemns U.S. Arrest of Benghazi Suspect, Demands His Return, Reuters (June 18, 2014, 10:11 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/18/us-libya-security- idUSKBN0ET1KQ20140618#TGChTGE0utFtJmxL.97.
A grand jury sitting in Washington, D.C. issued an initial indictment against Abu Khatallah within two weeks, and a superseding indictment approximately four months later, on *4 October 14, 2014. The Superseding Indictment (“Indictment”) identifies the Defendant as Ahmed Salim Faraj Abu Khatallah, also known as Ahmed Abu Khatallah, Ahmed Mukatallah, Ahmed Bukatallah, and “Sheik,” and describes him as having been “the commander of Ubaydah Bin Jarrah . . . , an Islamist extremist militia in Benghazi, which had the goal of establishing Sharia law in Libya,” until that group merged in 2011 with Ansar al-Sharia, “another Islamist extremist group in Libya with the same goal,” and Abu Khatallah became the new group’s “Benghazi-based leader.” Indictment ¶ 9. The Indictment notes that Abu Khatallah’s first entry into the United States was in the District of Columbia. Id.
The eighteen-count Indictment charges Abu Khatallah with providing and conspiring to
provide material support to terrorists, resulting in death, under
Abu Khatallah has filed a series of motions to dismiss all but Count Three of the
Indictment. He challenges Counts One and Two on the ground that
The Court will deny Abu Khatallah’s motions as to Counts One and Two, Four through Fifteen, and Eighteen. The Court will reserve ruling on his motion as to Counts Sixteen and Seventeen, and will request supplemental briefing from the parties on certain questions pertinent to those counts by separate order.
II. Legal Standard
A criminal defendant “may raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that
the court can determine without a trial on the merits.”
III. Analysis
A. Motion To Dismiss Counts One, Two, and Four Through Eighteen for Lack of
Extraterritoriality
Abu Khatallah has moved to dismiss all but Count Three of the eighteen-count
Indictment on the ground that most of the statutes he is charged with violating do not apply to his
actions in Libya as a matter of statutory construction. Recent Supreme Court decisions have
indeed sharply limited the extraterritorial application of federal statutes. Unless Congress clearly
intended as much, the Court has said, federal statutes do not apply abroad. But these restrictive
expressions have all appeared in civil cases. An almost century-old case, United States v.
Bowman,
1. Generally Applicable Principles of Extraterritoriality
The Supreme Court has repeatedly—and quite recently—insisted that “[w]hen a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial аpplication, it has none.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.,
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a “canon of construction . . . rather than a
limit upon Congress’s power to legislate.” Morrison,
Aside from administrability and predictability concerns, the presumption against
extraterritoriality is also rooted in ideas of institutional competence and the separation of powers.
Its robust application “protect[s] against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other
nations which could result in international discord.” Kiobel,
So strong is the presumption, the Supreme Court has said, that geographically unbounded
terms like “every” and “any” fail to rebut it. Kiobel,
The Supreme Court has slightly diluted the presumption’s potency by conceding that it is
“not . . . a ‘clear statement rule.’” Morrison,
2. Harmonizing the Apparent Civil/Criminal Divide
As detailed above, the modern Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to apply the
presumption “in all cases.” Morrison,
a. The Facts and Holding of
United States v. Bowman
The defendants in Bowman had allegedly conspired to defraud the Emergency Fleet
Corporation—all of whose stock was owned by the United States—on board a ship approaching
Brazil. Bowman,
The Bowman Court took a starkly different approach, however. It began its analysis by observing that “the necessary locus [of proscribed activity], when not specially defined, depends upon the purpose of Congress as evinced by the description and nature of the crime.” Id. at 97. Bowman postulated two broad types of crimes for these purposes. First were “[c]rimes against private individuals or their property, like assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement and frauds of all kinds.” Id. at 98. These offenses principally “affect the peace and good order of the community,” and so must seemingly be committed within the political community that they disturb. Id. If Congress intends to punish such crimes extraterritorially, “it is natural for [it] to say so in the statute, and failure to do so will negative the purpose of Congress in this regard.” Id.
But a different rule of construction applies to “criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated.” Id. For these offenses, “to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home.” Id. Congress “has not thought it necessary” to explicitly enable their overseas application, instead “allow[ing] it to be inferred from the nature of the offense.” Id.
The Bowman Court held that the charged crime fell comfortably within this second category. The statute had been amended in 1918 to encompass false claims harmful to corporations in which the United States owned stock. Id. at 101. The Court found that this *12 provision “was evidently intended to protect the Emergency Fleet Corporation,” which was “expected to engage in, and did engage in, a most extensive ocean transportation business” that serviced “every great port of the world open during [World War I].” Id. at 101–02. Two key factors informed the Court’s decision: that Congress had sought to stifle “frauds upon the Government,” and—because of background assumptions about the Emergency Fleet Corporation’s worldwide business—that those frauds were likely to occur “on the high seas and in foreign ports and beyond the land jurisdiction of the United States.” Id.
Bowman also supplemented its holding (if only in dictum) with a list of six other federal crimes whose nature commanded an inference of extraterritorial application. Because Bowman has been entirely absent from the Supreme Court’s modern extraterritoriality decisions, these six crimes are important data points for understanding Bowman’s underlying rationale. The Court noted that all six appeared in a chapter of the U.S. Code entitled “Offenses against the operations of the Government,” id. at 98–99; each crime had evidently been designed to forestall some tangible or intangible harm to the U.S. Government. In asserting that each of the following offenses would apply extraterritoriality, the Court also commented on the statutes’ anticipated geographic reach:
(1) A consul’s knowingly certifying a false invoice . “Clearly the locus of this crime as intended by Congress is in a foreign country . . . .” Id. at 99.
(2) Forging or altering a ship’s papers . “The natural inference from the character of the offense is that the sea would be a probable place for its commission.” Id. (3) Enticing desertions from the naval service . Congress must have “intend[ed] by this to include such enticing done aboard ship on the high seas or in a foreign port, where it would be most likely to be done.” Id.
(4) Bribing an officer of the U.S. civil, military, or naval service to violate his duty or to aid in committing a fraud on the United States . The Court concluded that it would “hardly [be] reasonable to construe this not to include offenses” directed at consuls, ambassadors, and military officers “in a foreign country or on the high seas.” Id. *13 (5) Defrauding the United States in the disposition of property captured as prize . “This would naturally often occur at sea, and Congress could not have meant to confine it to the land of the United States.” Id.
(6) Stealing or embezzling property of the United States furnished or intended to be used for military or naval service . “It would hardly be reasonable to hold that” Congress did not intend to punish offenses against U.S. military property located “in foreign countries, in foreign ports or on the high seas.” Id. at 100.
In sum, for statutes whose geographic reach is ambiguous, satisfying Bowman first requires proof that a criminal offense directly harms the U.S. Government. Bowman also suggested that the presumption against extraterritoriality cannot be rebutted inferentially unless the enacting Congress very likely envisioned, and can be assumed to have authorized, a considerable number of extraterritorial applications. Yet whether Bowman’s preconditions are satisfied is hardly a mechanical inquiry. Bowman left open the key question of how many foreseeable extraterritorial applications are necessary to warrant the inference that Congress “clearly” intended to allow prosecutions for acts occurring overseas. Its treatment of two statutory examples suggested that the number of expected extraterritorial offenses must outweigh domestic ones—that the former must be “probable” or “most likely.” Id. at 99. But Bowman’s fifth example pointed toward a looser “locus” test for extraterritoriality—that the crime “would naturally often occur” abroad. Id. The D.C. Circuit’s resolution of this issue in favor of the latter formulation must guide this Court’s analysis of Abu Khatallah’s extraterritoriality challenges.
b. The D.C. Circuit’s Application of Bowman : United States v. Delgado-Garcia Along with other lower courts, the D.C. Circuit has sought to reconcile modern extraterritoriality doctrine’s across-the-board, rule-like rigor with the more flexible and individualized inquiry required in criminal cases by Bowman. Its reading of Bowman precludes *14 two possible approaches to this case: (1) to proceed as if the Supreme Court has overruled Bowman sub silentio and apply only the restrictive test outlined in Aramco, Morrison, and Kiobel; or (2) to assume that federal crimes designed to prevent harm to the U.S. Government necessarily satisfy Bowman (and so apply extraterritorially) absent a clear indication to the contrary.
The defendants in United States v. Delgado-Garcia,
But Delgado-Garcia also forecloses the expansive reading of Bowman espoused by the
Government at the oral hearing on Abu Khatallah’s motions—that any federal criminal statute
designed to prevent harm to the U.S. Government necessarily applies abroad absent an
affirmative indication of congressional intent to cabin its reach. Hearing Prelim. Tr. 30.
*15
According to Delgado-Garcia, the generally worded statute at issue in Bowman applied abroad
“
because
the Emergency Fleet Corporation . . . ‘was expected to engage in, and did engage in, a
most extensive ocean transportation business.’” Delgado-Garcia,
The Government’s reading of Bowman echoes Judge Rogers’s dissenting opinion in Delgado-Garcia. She understood Bowman to mean that when Congress “protect[s] the United States government from harm,” it generally must be assumed to have done so “irrespective of [the harm’s] origin.” Id. at 1355 (Rogers, J., dissenting). For such crimes, in other words, “it is obvious that in declaring them to be crimes Congress intends to prohibit them everywhere.” Id. at 1354. The majority rejected this line of reasoning, concluding that it “is for Congress, not this Court,” to decide whether particular acts would “harm the United States government even if [they were] completed abroad.” Id. at 1346 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 1355 (Rogers, J., dissenting)). [1] The Delgado-Garcia majority offered a different explanation of what it means for federal criminal offenses to be “not logically dependent on their locality”—that they “have many obvious extraterritorial applications.” Id. at 1346–47.
Delgado-Garcia held that both
In this Circuit, then, Bowman is satisfied when (1) a federal criminal offense directly
harms the U.S. Government, and (2) enough foreseeable overseas applications existed at the time
of a statute’s enactment (or most recent amendment) to warrant the inference that Congress both
contemplated and authorized prosecutions for extraterritorial acts. Delgado-Garcia’s “locus”
inquiry specifically asks whether a statute “ha[s] many obvious extraterritorial applications,” id.
at 1347, or whether offenders “will often be outside the United States,” id.
[3]
As long as such a
*17
likelihood existed when the statute was passed—whether because of the nature of the offense (as
in Delgado-Garcia), contingent faсts about the United States’s presence abroad, or some
combination thereof—courts may properly infer a congressional intent to permit extraterritorial
uses. This process yields the necessary “clear indication of an extraterritorial application.”
Morrison,
3. Abu Khatallah’s Statutory Challenges
Abu Khatallah concedes that Congress intended the offense charged in Count Three (
a.
Whoever kills or attempts to kill any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States Government (including any member of the uniformed services) while such officer or еmployee is engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties, or any person assisting such an officer or employee in the performance of such duties or on account of that assistance, shall be punished—
(1) in the case of murder, as provided under section 1111; (2) in the case of manslaughter, as provided under section 1112; or (3) in the case of attempted murder or manslaughter, as provided in section 1113.
Cautious of its institutional limitations in resolving an issue of this nature, the Court
answers affirmatively. The parties have not informed the Court as to when
Here, the Court is satisfied that
Abu Khatallah nonetheless argues that a comparison between
Other statutes not cited by Abu Khatallah lend some credence to his position that “when
Congress intend[s] a homicide statute to apply extraterritorially, it specifically state[s] so.” Mot.
Dismiss 6. One of them,
The D.C. Circuit’s recent refusal to permit a Bivens cause of action to remedy harm
inflicted extraterritorially does not change the Court’s analysis. In Meshal v. Higginbotham, 804
F.3d 417 (D.C. Cir. 2015), decided after the Court heard argument on Abu Khatallah’s motion,
the D.C. Circuit offered the following hypothetical in declining to recognize the asserted implied
private right of action: “If Congress had enacted a general tort cause of action applicable to
Fourth Amendment violations committed by federal officers (a statutory Bivens, so to speak),
that cause of action would not apply to torts committed by federal officers abroad absent
sufficient indication that Congress meant the statute to apply extraterritorially.” Id. at 425 (citing
Morrison,
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Abu Khatallah’s motion as to Counts Four
through Nine, which charge him with violating
b.
(c) A person who kills any person . . . in the course of an attack on a Federal facility involving the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, or attempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be punished as provided [elsewhere].
* * *
(g) As used in this section:
(1) The term “Federal facility” means a building or part thereof owned or leased by the Federal Government, where Federal employees are regularly present for the purpose of performing their official duties.
Because
Abu Khatallah points out that
Yet a criminal statute whose legislative history and neighboring provisions are bereft of
foreign references may still apply extraterritorially if Bowman’s “harm” and “locus” elements
(as understood by Delgado-Garcia) are both satisfied. Again, the Government has not provided a
concrete figure for or independently substantiated how many federal facilities exist outside the
United States. But it has assured the Court that they number in the “hundreds.” Opp’n 12. Abu
Khatallah does not contest this approximation. Cf. Bin Laden,
c.
(f)(1) Whоever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other personal or real property in whole or in part owned or possessed by, or leased to, the United States, or any department or agency thereof, or any institution or organization receiving Federal financial assistance, shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both. * * *
(3) Whoever engages in conduct prohibited by this subsection, and as a result of such conduct directly or proximately causes the death of any person, including any public safety officer performing [his] duties, shall be subject to the death penalty, or imprisoned for not less than 20 years or for life, fined under this title, or both.
As with
The Court answers in the affirmative. Statutory “Federal facilities”—buildings owned or
leased by the U.S. Government, where federal employees are regularly present for the purpose of
performing their official duties—are but a subset of “personal or real property in whole or in part
owned or possessed by, or leased to, the United States, or any department or agency thereof.” 18
*
Abu Khatallah insists that
Nor is it material that
d.
(c)(1)(A) . . . [A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; (ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
* * * (3) For purposes of this subsection the term “crime of violence” means an offense that is a felony and—
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
Count Eighteen specifically charges Abu Khatallah with “us[ing], carry[ing], brandish[ing], and
discharg[ing] firearms . . . during and in relation to” every other offense with which he has been
charged. Indictment, Count Eighteen ¶ 2. Abu Khatallah has not disputed that each of these
other offenses qualifies as a “crime of violence” under
The Supreme Court’s decision in Small v. United States,
In short, the offenses underlying Count Eighteen—
e.
(a) Offense. Whoever provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of section . . . 844(f) . . . , 930(c), . . . 1114, 1116, . . . [or] 1363, . . . or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment of an escape from the commission of any such violation, or attempts or conspires to do such an *31 act, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
Unlike with respect to
B. Motion To Dismiss Counts One and Two as Unconstitutionally Vague and
Overbroad
Abu Khatallah has also moved the Court to dismiss Counts One and Two of the
Indictment as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. As previously noted, those Counts charge
*32
Abu Khatallah with violating (and conspiring to violate)
1. Whether the Material-Support Statute Applies Only to Actions
that Constitute “Terrorism”
According to Abu Khatallah, the material-support statute punishes only conduct that
*33
constitutes terrorism. See Mot. Dismiss 5. He contends, however, that the statute is not
sufficiently definite with regard to what constitutes “terrorism” to provide fair notice of what
conduct is prohibited. Because the Government charged him with “provid[ing] material support
and resources to
terrorists
,” Indictment, Count Two ¶ 2 (emphasis added), he suggests, “[t]he
absence of a specific ‘terrorism’ element in
In response to the Government’s argument that his void-for-vagueness challenge falters
at the gate because the term that he considers vague—“terrorism”—has no necessary connection
to criminal liability under
a. Statutory Text
Abu Khatallah argues that “the plain language of the statute . . . demonstrates that”
criminal liability under “the statute requires some connection to terrorism.” Reply 3. Yet the
only “plain language” that Abu Khatallah points to is in the non-operative heading, which labels
b. Statutory History
Abu Khatallah further contends that the statute’s passage as an anti-terrorism measure
demonstrates that some connection to terrorism is required for criminal liability to attach under
c. Statutory Enforcement
Finally, Abu Khatallah maintains that “the government’s enforcement of
Although the Government may have consistently used
Because
2. Whether
Yet the bulk of crimes for which providing material support would subject a person to
criminal liability under
More importantly, the material-support statute does not provide the Government with the
kind of “unfettered discretion” in enforcement that has been held to violate due process. See
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
3. Whether the Indictment Violates the Double Jeopardy Clause
Abu Khatallah shifts his focus to the Double Jeopardy Clause,
Whether two counts are multiplicitous and thus violate the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy is assessed under the Blockburger test:
[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not,” i.e., whether either is a lesser included offеnse of the other.
Mahdi,
Applying this standard, Abu Khatallah contends that, “[a]s defined by the government,
providing material support in violation of
The Government need not make this choice, however, because Abu Khatallah misapplies
the Blockburger test. Both the material-support statute and the object offenses require proof of a
fact or element that the other does not. For instance, to prove that a person has violated
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, faсilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.
The reverse is also true. To state the obvious, to establish that someone has committed
one of the object crimes enumerated in
4. Whether
1. Abu Khatallah’s Facial Challenge
Both Abu Khatallah and the Government proceed from the same premise: that “[a] law is
unconstitutionally overbroad if it ‘punishes a substantial amount of protected speech, judged in
relation to [its] plainly legitimate sweep.’” Opp’n 8 (quoting Virginia v. Hicks,
2. Abu Khatallah’s As-Applied Challenge
As to the statute’s overbreadth “as applied” to him, Abu Khatallah complains that “the
government seeks convictions based on [his] beliefs and communications.” Mot. Dismiss 9.
This complaint is unfounded. First, the Indictment refers to Abu Khatallah’s beliefs and views
*42
about the American presence in Benghazi for evidentiary reasons: “to demonstrate, among other
things, his motive and intent,” Opp’n 11; see also Mot. Dismiss 9 (acknowledging that the
Government “provided as evidence . . . the beliefs [Abu Khatallah] held and the messages he
communicated”). Evidence that Abu Khatallah “viewed U.S. intelligence actions in Benghazi as
illegal,” Indictment, Count One ¶ 20(a), for instance, could support the Government’s theory
about the object of the conspiracy with which Abu Khatallah is charged, see id. ¶ 19. Because
the “First Amendment . . . does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech . . . to provе motive or
intent,” Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
Thus, to the extent “that the government seeks convictions based on Mr. Abu Khatallah’s
[alleged] beliefs and communications,” Mot. Dismiss 9, those beliefs and communications either
provide evidence “of his motive for soliciting and procuring illegal attacks against the United
States,” United States v. Rahman,
C. Motion To Dismiss Counts Ten Through Fifteen on the Ground that the
Mission and Annex Were Neither “Federal Facilities” nor “U.S. Property”
Finally, Abu Khatallah moves to dismiss counts Ten through Fifteen of the Indictment,
which, as noted above, charge him with offenses related to attacking a “federal facility” in
violation of
1. Statutory Background
2. The Parties’ Arguments
Abu Khatallah begins his argument with the observation that the “common-sense
meaning” of the statutes at issue “presumes that the government acts within the larger legal
framework established by Congress, abiding by treaties it has enacted.” Def.’s Mot. Dismiss,
ECF No. 90 (“Mot. Dismiss”) 6. The governing treaties here, he contends, are the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes and the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Rеlations and Optional Protocol on Disputes (the “Vienna
Conventions”), which “require mutual consent between States to establish diplomatic relations
and missions,” id. at 4 (citing Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol
on Disputes art. 2, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and
Optional Protocol on Disputes art. 2, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227).
[5]
Abu Khatallah maintains
that because the United States never sought such consent from the TNC to establish the Mission
or Annex, the Mission and Annex were not lawfully possessed, leased, or owned by the United
States, and therefore did not constitute federal facilities or U.S. property under
The Government counters that these statutes should not be read to incorporate treaty
*45
requirements found nowhere in the statutory text because “federal crimes . . . are solely the
creatures of statute,” and Congress is entrusted with designating elements of federal criminal
offenses. Opp’n 7 (quoting Staples v. United States,
3. Applicability of the Vienna Conventions
As multilateral treaties, the Vienna Conventions “are contracts between sovereigns,
[which] should be construed to give effect to the intent of the signatories.” Gonzalez Paredes v.
Vila,
Even if the Government is incorrect that criminal laws are “creatures of statute” that
should not be read in light of international law, see Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,
The treaties require mutual consent for the “establishment of consular
relations
,” Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes art. 2, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77 (emphasis added), and the “establishment of diplomatic
relations
. . . and of
permanent diplomatic missions
,” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol
Disputes art. 2, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227 (emphases added). The establishment of consular
or diplomatic relations with a foreign state is distinct from the U.S. Government’s owning or
leasing “a building or part thereof . . . where Federal employees are regularly present for the
purpose of performing their official duties,”
Furthermore, the establishment of permanent diplomatic or consular relations is distinct
from the use of nonpermanent locations for temporary diplomatic purposes. See Tachiona ex rel.
Tachiona v. Mugabe,
Abu Khatallah himself appears to concede that the Special Mission in Benghazi was established as a temporary concern: “In December 2011, the State Department approved a one- year continuation of operations in Benghazi.” Mot. Dismiss 2 (citing State Dep’t Report). And the State Department report he cites for support describes the Mission’s staffing as “short-term” and “transitory,” State Dep’t Report 4, noting that the Mission “was never a consulate and never formally notified to the Libyan government,” id. at 14–15.
The bipartisan Senate intelligence report on the attacks, issued in January 2014, likewise characterizes the Mission as nonpermanent, using the term “U.S. Temporary Mission Facility.” U.S. Senate Select Comm. Intelligence, Reviеw of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012, at 4 (2014), http://www.intelligence.senate.gov /sites/default/files/press/benghazi.pdf. And commentators have hypothesized that part of the reason the attack was so devastating was the mission’s “confusing legal status”: “It wasn’t an *48 embassy or even an official consulate; it was so off-book that the Libyan government was never officially notified of its existence. This put the mission outside the normal State Department procedures used to allocate security funding and personnel.” Zack Beauchamp, 9 Questions About Benghazi You Were Too Embarrassed to Ask, Vox (Oct. 12, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.vox.com/2015/10/12/9489389/benghazi-explained. While this account may bolster Abu Khatallah’s argument that the United State never obtained consent from the TNC to establish the Mission or Annex, it demonstrates that such consent was not required under the Vienna Conventions given the transitory nature of the posts.
Moreover, as the Government points out, it would make little sense for a foreign state to have veto power over the protections these statutes afford federal employees working in federal facilities. See Opp’n 8. While requiring the host state’s consent to establish diplomatic or consular relations or permanent diplomatic facilities is consistent with the purposes of diplomacy and international cooperation, limiting the scope of a U.S. criminal statute designed to protect federal workers, whether within U.S. boundaries or abroad, subverts Americans’ safety to the decision of a foreign state.
4. Applicability of the Vienna Conventions The Government also urges the Court to reject Abu Khatallah’s Vienna Convention argument because it presents a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, which the Government is entitled to establish at trial. The Government doеs not explicitly concede that it did not seek or obtain consent from the TNC to set up or operate the posts, but it also does not directly refute Abu Khatallah’s claim that it never made the recognized Libyan Government aware of the locations. It focuses instead on the inapplicability of the treaties.
As discussed above, however, resolution of the questions before the Court does not turn
*49
on the Mission’s or Annex’s status under the Vienna Conventions. Rather, the Court is able to
determine as a matter of law that, whether or not the United States obtained consent from the
TNC to set up the Mission and Annex, the Vienna Conventions do not bear on those entities’
status as federal facilities or U.S. property. The Court may therefore address Abu Khatallah’s
argument at this stage. See United States v. Yakou,
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Abu Khatallah’s motions to dismiss Counts One, Two, Four through Fifteen, and Eighteen. It will reserve ruling and order supplemental briefing on Abu Khatallah’s motion to dismiss Counts Sixteen and Seventeen. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge Date: December 23, 2015
Notes
[1] The Court thus rejects the Government’s gloss on Bowman—that a federal criminal law applies abroad whenever “the statute’s purpose would be undermined were its scope confined to the United States’ territorial boundaries.” Govt.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 101 (“Opp’n”) 5.
[2] The Court found that the very nature of the harm tended to undermine the presumption against extraterritoriality: Because border-protection statutes are “fundamentally international, not simply domestic, in focus and effect,” it “makes no sense to presume that such a statute applies only domestically.” Id.
[3] Delgado-Garcia оffered several virtually identical formulations of this standard. See, e.g., id.
at 1346 (“[M]uch of the conduct that
[4]
[5] Abu Khatallah finds support for his reading of the Vienna Conventions in the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual. See Mot. Dismiss 4–5 (“When a decision to open a post has been reached, the acceptance of the foreign government is necessary and must precede any public disclosure of the proposed action.” (quoting 2 Foreign Affairs Manual § 422.1-1, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210051.pdf)).
[6] Articles 12 and 23 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which Abu Khatallah also cites, see Mot. Dismiss 4, are not to the contrary. Article 12 provides that “[t]he sending State may not, without the prior express consent of the receiving State, establish offices forming part of the [diplomatic] mission in localities other than those in which the mission itself is established.” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol Disputes art. 12, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227. To the extent this article applies to the Mission and Annex, the most it could do would be to call into question their status as parts of the United States’s diplomatic mission in Libya. It would not affect their status as federal facilities or U.S. property under U.S. law. Article 23 is even less applicable to the question before the Court as it concerns diplomatic missions’ exemption from local taxes. See id. art. 23.