United States v. AbramsUnited States v. Abrams
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Stewart
MEMORANDUM DECISION
STEWART, District Judge:Defendants Martin Abrams, Irving Cotier, Michael Gold, Frederick Pierce, and Leonard Siegel are jointly charged with fifteen counts of wire fraud, and one count of endeavoring to obstruct the communication of information regarding a federal criminal offense. In addition, defendant Abrams is charged with another count of obstructing a criminal investigation, and one count of tax fraud; defendant Siegel is charged with endeavoring to obstruct a grand jury investigation and one count of tax fraud; and defendant Gold is charged with two counts of tax fraud. All five defendants have filed various pretrial motions and discovery requests. A number of these requests were discussed at a pretrial conference held May 3, 1982. This Memorandum Decision disposes of all requests still outstanding after the May 3 conference, and summarizes those matters disposed of by agreement at the conference last week.
Severance Motions
Four of the five defendants (Cotier, Gold, Pierce and Siegel) move for severance of their cases from the joint trial of the other defendants. Defendants Gold, Cotier and Pierce assert they will suffer prejudice in a joint trial by virtue of gross disparities in the amount of evidence to be offered against them, as compared to other defendants. Defendants Gold, Pierce and Siegel also claim potential prejudice by virtue of defendant Cotier’s criminal record and statements to be introduced against him which, they argue, impermissibly inculpate them. Defendant Gold’ also asserts that antagonistic defenses bar a joint trial. For the reasons that follow, we deny all requests for severance at this time.
Rule 14 of the Fed.R.Crim.P. provides that “if it appears that a defendant ... is prejudiced by the joinder ... of defendants ... for trial together, the court may ... grant a severance or provide whatever relief justice requires”. The decision to sever is a matter left to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Aloi, 449 F.Supp. 698, 739 (E.D.N.Y.1977) (citing, inter alia, Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95, 75 S.Ct. 158, 165, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954)). To warrant exercise of the court’s discretion, the moving defendant must come forward with a showing that a joint trial would not merely lessen his chances of acquittal, but would in effect deny him a fair trial altogether. Id. (citing United States v. Borelli, 435 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 963, 28 L.Ed.2d 229 (1971)). In deter mining whether severance is appropriate, a district judge should consider, among other things, the number of counts and defendants, see United States v. Branker, 395 F.2d 881, 887 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1029, 89 S.Ct. 639, 21 L.Ed.2d 573 (1969); disparities in the quantum of proof offered against the various defendants, see United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 759 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947, 86 S.Ct. 1467, 16 L.Ed.2d 544 (1966); possible preju dice from the type of evidence (e.g. prior convictions) to be admitted against some of the defendants, see United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 945 (2d Cir. 1980); and the apparent relative culpability of the defendants, see United States v. Gilbert, 504 F.Supp. 565, 571 (S.D.N.Y.1980). The ultimate question for the district court is whether the jury will be able to “compartmentalize” the evidence presented to it, and distinguish among the various defendants in a multi-defendant suit. United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1976).
In this case, we have examined not only the parties’ motion papers, but also evidence adduced in
United States v. Stuckey,
SS 81 Cr. 0035 (CES), a previous trial of a Mego employee involved with the fraudulent sale of corporate assets alleged here. On the basis of these materials, we conclude
We also reject the arguments of defendants Gold, Pierce and Siegel that defendant Cotier’s criminal record and statements to the F.B.I. require a severance at this time. The government has indicated that it does not intend to introduce Cotier’s racketeering conviction as part of its casein-chief, but only to impeach Cotier should he take the stand. As yet, Cotier has not indicated whether he will testify or not. It is thus quite possible that the issue of Cotier’s conviction will not come up at trial at all. Should Cotier testify (and should we find the conviction admissible under
Finally, we reject defendant Gold’s argument that the possibility of conflicting defenses requires severance at this time. “[T]o obtain severance on the ground of conflicting defenses, it must be demonstrated that the conflict is so prejudicial that defenses are irreconcilable, and the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.” United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 195 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Becker, 585 F.2d 703, 707 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1080, 99 S.Ct. 862, 59 L.Ed.2d 50 (1979); United States v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 1348, 1351 (D.C.Cir.1970); United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120, 97 S.Ct. 1155, 51 L.Ed.2d 570 (1977)). In this ease, we do not find that defendant Gold’s argument that he told the truth to Abramowitz because he had nothing to hide while the other defendants lied could have this impermissibly prejudicial effect.
Defendant Cotier’s Motion to Dismiss the Wire Fraud Counts
We deny defendant Cotier’s motion for dismissal of the wire fraud counts as to him on the basis that he committed no acts “in furtherance” of the alleged scheme to defraud. We assume the argument challenges the legal sufficiency of Counts 1-15 of the indictment as to defendant Cotier since factual matters are not to be determined on a motion to dismiss. See
United States
v.
Barta,
635 U.S. 999, 1002 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied,
450 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 1703, 68 L.Ed.2d 199 (1981). An indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs the defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.
United States v. Bailey,
444 U.S. 394, 414, 100 S.Ct. 624, 636, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980). To prove a violation of
We also deny defendant Cotier’s motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. “The fact that a scheme may extend back beyond the limitation period
Defendant Abrams’ Motion to Dismiss Obstruction of Justice Counts
Defendant Abrams moves to dismiss Counts 16 and 17 of the indictment (the obstruction of justice counts) for failure to state the “essential facts constituting the offenses charged” as required by
Counts 16 and 17
1
track the language of the statute in question
2
and allege
Defendant Cotier’s Motion to Suppress and for a Franks Hearing
Defendant Cotier moves to suppress conversations intercepted pursuant to a wiretap order issued April 3, 1979 in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and documents obtained pursuant to search warrants issued in the same court April 18, 1979. Cotier argues that the affidavits upon which the order and warrants issued were insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, and also that the search warrants were impermissibly broad. Defendant Cotier moves in the alternative for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 158, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2677, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) to challenge the veracity of the affidavits submitted in application for the wiretap order and search warrants. We deny both motions.
In reviewing the sufficiency of affidavits submitted in support of the issuance of a search warrant, the papers are to be read as a whole, in a common sense fashion rather than technically. United States v. Kahan, 572 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833, 99 S.Ct. 112, 58 L.Ed.2d 128 (1978) (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)). A finding of probable cause made by the judge or magistrate who reviewed the documents is entitled to deference by the reviewing court. United States v. Perry, 643 F.2d 38, 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 138, 70 L.Ed.2d 115 (1981). These two principles lead us to reject defendant’s argument that the inclusion of arguably irrelevant material in the affidavit supporting the application in question (“the Hersh affidavit”) renders that affidavit legally insufficient. Rather than focusing on isolated portions of the affidavit to determine its sufficiency as the defendant would have, we look to the document as a whole to see if probable cause was shown.
The bulk of the government’s evidence of probable cause consisted of information received from Joseph Szapor, a cooperating government witness involved in the Northern New Jersey trucking industry for over twenty years. Hirsch Aff. at 31. Szapor, who had previously furnished reliable information to the F.B.I. on at least ten other occasions,
id.,
related to the F.B.I. that defendant Cotier had been introduced to him in February 1976 as the “Local 560 repre
Defendant Cotier argues that the information provided by Mr. Szapor cannot constitute probable cause because it fails the requirements set out in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-115, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1513-14, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) that both the underlying circumstances of the informant’s knowledge and the trustworthiness of the informant be demonstrated before his information be credited. We disagree. Since Szapor’s reports were based on his own personal observations, the underlying circumstances of his knowledge are clear and presumably reliable. United States v. Rollins, 522 F.2d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918, 96 S.Ct. 1122, 47 L.Ed.2d 324 (1976). The fact that Szapor was a participant in the very crime at issue, was, by itself, sufficient to establish the trustworthiness of his disclosures. United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1982). Moreover, the affidavit contained sufficient indices of Szapor’s reliability. It stated Szapor had previously provided reliable information to the government, Hersch Aff. at 31, and it contained ample evidence of independent corroboration, e.g., id. at 36 (consensually recorded conversation concerning payoffs), and 35 (corroborating telephone bill records). See United States v. Rollins, 522 F.2d at 165 (informant’s story may be corroborated by verification of “innocent aspects” of the story). Under these circumstances, we find the government did present the United States District Court judge of the District of New Jersey with an affidavit warranting the issuance of the wiretap order on April 3, 1979.
As we find that the initial Hersh affidavit was sufficient, we need not address defendant’s argument that the search warrants issued on the basis of supplemental information obtained through the wiretaps should be suppressed as fruits of a poisonous tree. We reject defendant’s second argument that these warrants were so impermissibly broad as to constitute “general warrants”. The warrants in question uniformly authorized searches for the following property:
U.S. currency and commercial paper; safety deposit keys and rental receipts; documents relating to the illegal acquisition, transfer, concealment, and disposition of payoff funds and of commissions derived therefrom, including particularly bank deposit records, invoices, bills, receipts, and account ledgers; personal telephone and address notebooks, and other documents showing the identities of persons participating in the described offenses; and other documents and items (particularly a blue attache case) — which are contraband, fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of violations of18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud incidental to cash— generation), 1952 (travel act — commercial bribery), § 1962 (racketeering activity— payoffs for labor peace) and29 U.S.C. § 186 (Taft-Hartley payments) as described in the attached and incorporated affidavit.
Given the nature of the offense under investigation, it was proper and necessary for the searching officer to use generic terms to describe the items sought.
United States v. Scharfman,
448 F.2d 1352, 1355 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied,
405 U.S. 919, 92 S.Ct. 944, 30 L.Ed.2d 789 (1972). The use of the qualifying phrase “which are contraband, fruits and instrumentalities or evidence” of the violations specified, moreover adequately particularized the item to be seized.
Id.
We also deny defendant Cotier’s request for a Franks hearing, see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), to challenge the veracity of the warrant affidavit. Defendant asserts that Hersh’s affidavit was intentionally or recklessly false when it averred that Joseph Szapor had been a confidential informant for the F.B.I. “intermittently for the past 20 years”, as Szapor testified in the trial of United States v. Provenzano, 80 Cr. 315 (HLS), that he had been an informant for only “a couple of years”. Additional testimony excerpted by the government casts considerable doubt as to whether Hersh’s statement was false or not. See Aff. of Scott Campbell, Ex. I. Even assuming, however, that Hersh’s statement was false, and recklessly so, the particular statement attached was not essential to the finding of probable cause. As discussed previously, the reliability of Szapor was established by the fact of his participation in the offense in question. Corroboration of other facts he supplied, moreover, further indicated his reliability. “[I]f, when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content in the. warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is required.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 171-177, 98 S.Ct. at 2684-87. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for a hearing is denied.
Request for Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes
Defendant Michael Gold requests the court to order the disclosure of instructions given to the grand jury on the elements of the offenses charged; in the alternative, defendant Gold moves for an in camera inspection by the court of the instructions. Defendant Gold bases his request upon the refusal of the Assistant U. S. Attorney to provide copies of “the charge to the grand jury” and any colloquys between the grand jury and any Assistant U. S. Attorneys upon defendant Gold’s request. This, Gold argues, raises “a substantial question as to whether defendant Gold was indicted by a grand jury with knowledge of the applicable law”. Defendant Michael Gold’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Pretrial Motion at 16. Defendant Siegel also moves for an in camera inspection of the grand jury minutes, on the grounds that the Organized Crime Division of the Justice Department declined to approve a racketeering charge sought by the United States Attorney for the Southern District one week before the filing of the indictment. Defendant Siegel argues that the government’s intention to charge a violation of R.I.C.O. may have led to the introduction of evidence or the making of statements that prejudiced the grand jury in its deliberations, even though the R.I.C.O. charges had been excised by the time of the voting of the indictment. We deny both requests.
It is well established that unless a defendant presents a particularized need, claims a gross and prejudicial irregularity influencing the grand jury, or presents some similar compelling necessity, inspection of the grand jury testimony is to be
Nor do we find that defendant Siegel has made a sufficient showing of irregularity to warrant our review of the grand jury’s proceedings. Defendant Siegel’s suggestion that unrelated evidence or improper remarks may have prejudiced the grand jury is, of course, pure speculation. Such a showing is generally not sufficient to lift the veil of secrecy that surrounds grand jury proceedings. United States v. Aloi, 449 F.Supp. at 739 (citing United States v. Permisohn, 339 F.Supp. 52, 55 (S.D.N.Y.1971) and United States v. Crisona, 271 F.Supp. 150, 159 (S.D.N.Y.1967)). Although in certain cases, a suspicious “sequence of events” may suffice to move a court to inspect grand jury minutes, United States v. Krasnoff, 480 F.Supp. at 727, we do not find that defendant Siegel has established that this is such a case. The government argues that since the racketeering charge initially contemplated was predicated upon precisely the same wire fraud and obstruction offenses that are charged in the instant indietment, the danger of extraneous evidence prejudicing the grand jury would have been minimal. See Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition at 58. While we find this argument persuasive, we need not rest our decision on this point alone. It seems to us that in this case the grand jury could have been no more influenced (and the defendant no worse off) than if the government had sought an indictment on the R.I.C.O. count, and the grand jury had voted a no bill on the R.I. C.O. count and returned the others. Certainly in that case, the defendant would have no grounds to claim the entire indictment void due to prejudicial extraneous evidence. In that case, as in this case, the presumption of the regularity of the grand jury’s proceedings would lead one to assume that the grand jury understood the elements of all the offenses charged, and returned an indictment on only those counts for which it found sufficient probable cause. Thus, possible exposure to evidence of other crimes, or even mention of such, cannot be a sufficient ground to warrant a complete review of the grand jury’s minutes. While the inflammatory potential of references to organized crime before a grand jury has been raised in the past, it has rarely resulted in the dismissal of the indictments in question. See, e.g., United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 887-8 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120, 95 S.Ct. 802, 42 L.Ed.2d 820 (1975); United States v. Riccobene, 451 F.2d 586, 587 (3d Cir. 1971). We conclude, therefore, that defendant Siegel has not shown either a “gross or prejudicial irregularity” influencing the grand jury, United States v. Aloi, 449 F.Supp. at 698, or even a “certain amount of suspicion cloudpng]” the indictment, United States v. Krasnoff, 480 F.Supp. at 727. 5 Accordingly we deny his request for an in camera inspection.
Defendant Abrams requests an order directing the government to disclose any hearsay statements it plans to introduce at trial pursuant to
Defendants’ Brady Motions
Defendants Cotier, Siegel and Abrams move for orders directing the government, pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), to produce all information that tends to exculpate them. We note the government acknowledges its obligations under Brady and warrants it will undertake them in good faith. See Response to Defendants [sic] Request for Bills of Particulars, Ex. A at 12, 17. Accordingly, we see no reason to so order the government’s compliance at this time.
Defendants’ Requests for Bills of Particulars
Finding the government’s response to the defendants’ requests for particulars on Count 1 through 15 adequate, we decline to order any further response from it. Counts 16, 17 and 18 having been dismissed, the requests for particulars on those matters are moot. We also find the government’s responses to requests concerning Counts 19 and 20 adequate, and thus decline to order any further particularization on these points.
Matters Disposed of at May 3, 1982 Conference
Discussion at the conference held on May 3, 1982 resulted in the following agreements:
1. Abrams’, Pierce’s and Siegel’s Motion for Order Directing Government to provide Its Witness List: The government has agreed to provide at least 24 hours notice of the witnesses it plans to call at trial, unless special circumstances (communicated to the court) make such disclosure undesirable.
2. Abrams’ Request for Pretrial Disclosure of Impeachment Evidence (Paragraph 12 of Abrams’ Notice of Omnibus Motion): The government agrees to provide the criminal records of its witnesses and details of any agreements such witnesses might have with the government at the time it provides notice that such witness will be testifying.
3. Defendant Abrams’ Motion for Pretrial Disclosure of the Government’s Intention to Introduce Hearsay Statements UnderFed.R.Evid. 803(24) and 804(b)(5): The government acknowledges its obligations underFed.R.Evid. 803(24) and 804(b)(5) to provide advance notice of an intention to offer statements under these exceptions, and the particulars thereof.
4. Defendant Siegel’s Motion for Pretrial Disclosure of 3500 Material: The government agrees to provide 3500 statements at least one full day before its witnesses take the stand, again unless special circumstances obtain.
5. Defendant Abrams’ Request for Pretrial Disclosure of Similar Act Evidence: The government has indicated it does not intend to introduce any similar act evidence.
6. Abrams’ Request for Pre-Marking of Government’s Exhibits: Although no specific timetable was set at the conference, the government has agreed it will indicate what exhibits it will be offering prior to trial.
7. Abrams’ and Siegel’s The government has agreed Request for Information to provide the requested Concerning Electronic information, but is unable Interceptions or Consensual to do so until its all agency Recordings (Abrams’ Notice check is completed, of Omnibus Motion Requests Nos. 6 and 7; Siegel’s Notice of Motion Request No. 8):
8. Abrams’ Request for a The government will be Bryant hearing: furnishing the court next week recordings to be offered at trial to determine their audibility and admissibility.
9. Defendants’ Request to As discussed at the Make Additional Motions: conference, these requests are granted.
Remaining Matters
The remaining items requested by defendants may be disposed of summarily.
1. Defendant Abrams
Req. No. 2 (discovery pursuant toFed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(lXB) : It appears government is adequately complying with its obligations under this rule.
Req. No. 3 (discovery pursuant toFed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(lXD) ): Inasmuch as the government’s letter of February 17,1982, see Aff. of Paul B. Bergman at ¶ 9, may contain some ambiguity, we grant this request to the extent provided for inFed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(D) .
Req. No. 4 (request for copies of statements by defendant and co-defendants): Req. No. 9 (information concerning search warrants): It appears the government has complied with this request. See Aff. of Paul B. Bergman, Ex. B. It appears the government has complied with this request. See Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions at 43.
2. Defendant Cotier
Req. No. 7 (suppression of all verbal statements pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,86 S.Ct. 1602,16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)): As defendant Cotier provides no argument on this point in his brief, the request is denied.
Req. No. 9 (directing government to preserve documents): We assume the government recognizes its responsibilities in this regard.
3. Defendant Siegel
Reqs. Nos. 2, 3 (discovery It appears government has under Fed.R.Crim.P. complied with these 16(a)(lXA) and 16(a)(1)(C)): requests. Req. No. 4 (discovery under See Abrams’ Req. No. 3.Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(aXl)(D) ):
Req. No. 7 (concerning It appears the government searches and seizure): has complied with this request. See Government‘s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions at 43.
Government’s Motion for Reciprocal Discovery
We grant the government’s motion for reciprocal discovery under
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Count 16 of the indictment reads:
AN ENDEAVOR TO OBSTRUCT THE COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION REGARDING A FEDERAL CRIMINAL OFFENSE
From on or about May, 1979, up to and including February 27, 1980, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendant, MARTIN B. ABRAMS, and others to the Grand Jury known and unknown, did unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, and corruptly endeavor by means of bribery and misrepresentation to obstruct, delay, and prevent persons from communicating information relating to a violation of federal criminal statutes of the United States to federal criminal investigators (Title18, United States Code, Sections 1510 and 2).
Count 17 reads:
ANOTHER ENDEAVOR TO OBSTRUCT THE COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION REGARDING A FEDERAL CRIMINAL OFFENSE
From on or about February 27, 1980, up to and including the date of the filing of this Indictment, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendants, MARTIN B. ABRAMS, IRVING COTLER, MICHAEL GOLD, FREDERICK C. PIERCE, and LEONARD S. SIEGEL, and others to the Grand Jury known and unknown, did, unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly and corruptly endeavor by means of misrepresentation to obstruct, delay, and prevent persons from communicating information relating to a violation of criminal statutes of the United States to the United States Attorney’s Office, criminal investigators of the Department of Justice, and to other federal criminal investigators (Title18, United States Code, Sections 1510 and 2).
.
(a) Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation, or force or threats thereof to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investigator; or Whoever injures any person in his person or property on account of the giving by such person or by any other person of any such information to any criminal investigator— Shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. .. .
. Count 18 of the indictment .reads:
AN ENDEAVOR TO OBSTRUCT A GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION
From on or about June 16, 1980, and continuing up to the date of the filing of this Indictment, a Grand Jury of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York had commenced and was conducting an investigation to determine whether violations of criminal statutes of the United States had been committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere.
From on or about June 16, 1980, up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendant, LEONARD S. SIE-GEL, and others to the Grand Jury known and unknown, did unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly, and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice by misleading a prospective grand jury witness and endeavoring to cause him to give false testimony to the aforesaid grand jury (Title18, United States Code, Sections 1503 and 2).
. The search warrants authorized officers to search the following locations:
The office of Irving Cotier, located in the premises d/b/a Cober Transfer Corporation and Bargel Leasing Company, Inc., 91 East Peddie Street, Newark, New Jersey. (Particularly the desk, file cabinets and storage facilities under the personal control of Irving Cotier.)
Residence of Irving Cotier located at 136 Summit Street (whole house), Englewood, New Jersey
The automobile driven by Irving Cotier, being a 1979 4-door yellow Lincoln Continental bearing a current New Jersey license 837 JUJ.
The person of Irving Cotier (W/M/DOB:2-4-12).
. We thus distinguish this case from United States v. Krasnoff, 480 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y.1979), in which Judge Duffy ordered an in camera inspection upon a defendant’s claim that the government had used immunized statements to obtain additional counts against the defendant by the grand jury. Krasnoff involved the use of evidence arguably tainted by a prior grant of immunity — a type of evidence that federal courts are directed to scrutinize with particular care. See, e.g., United States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1977). In this case, defendant Siegel makes no argument that the grand jury heard evidence tainted in this manner.