United States v. Aaron Thompson

may petitioner peti- amend his claims, America, tion delete seek UNITED STATES of unexhausted petition, Plaintiff-Appellant, stay fully exhausted petition then amend his include fully deleted claims once have been THOMPSON, Aaron Defendant- exhausted the state courts. See Ford Appellee. Cir.2002). Hubbard, 875, Furthermore, in- court must No. 01-30279. petitioner

form the of the status under the Court Appeals, United States any statute limitations of claims to be Ninth Circuit. purportedly prejudice.” dismissed “without 884; Hubbard, See id. Ford v. Argued Sept. Submitted 2002. at 885-86. Filed Dec. thirty

The Zarvela suggested

days petitioner to is sufficient time for a following

return federal court final ac- Zarvela,

tion the state courts. See

F.3d at 381. seems This reasonable. The

judgment of the district court reversed the case remanded to the district If

court. Petitioner chooses to dismiss claims,

unexhausted the district court shall

pass his petition containing only on ex-

hausted claims. the event

district court exercises its discretion

stay proceedings federal while Petitioner claims,

exhausts dismissed may require Petitioner to file his petition days. stay

new within state

may days until remain effect follow-

ing entry of judgment by final the Califor-

nia Supreme Court allow Petitioner to

present fully petition exhausted for habe- If

as review to the district court. Petition- time,

er to act within fails the allotted

stay be vacated pro nunc tunc as stay date enters the petition may

and his be dismissed consis- Zarvela, Lundy.

tent See

at 381.

REVERSED and REMANDED. Mercer, United Attor-

William W. ney, Sept, Marcia Good Assistant U.S. MT, plaintiff-appel- Attorney, Billings, for lant United States of America. Holton, Law, Attorney at Hel- Wendy ena, MT, defendant-appellee for Aaron Thompson. BEEZER, GOULD, and

Before BERZON, Judges. Circuit GOULD, Judge: Circuit appeals The government Thompson court’s Aaron forty-four possession for dis- months pornography tribution of child violation 2252A(a)(2) §§ 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). The issue is whether district court’s downward extent departure from the United States Sentenc- ing light of Guidelines was reasonable given departure. the rationale its district court’s basis Thompson was not in the conclusion “heartland” of the for which offenses differently Viewing was convicted. law, applicable we conclude that pleaded guilty abused its discretion sen- he to two counts of distribu- tencing forty-four months tion of pornography violation of 18 2252A(a)(2) based on its “heartland” conclusion. U.S.C. pos- and one count of session of in violation of In justifying departure, the downward 2252A(a)(5)(B). 18 U.S.C. on Based the persuasive treated as specific offense characteristics and other in our number of considerations that view adjustments in presentence detailed the adequate Thompson were not to remove report, Thompson’s total offense level was from the heartland. Those considerations 29. Thompson Because had no Thompson’s prior of- background, included edu- fenses, cation, family history, he had a criminal history category as well as his low in engaging risk of sexual offenses I. The offense history level and criminal against children and his need for category rehabili- together yield sentencing range therapy. tative None of these factors indi- of 87 In agree- to 108 months. the plea vidually, collectively, all nor of them war- ment, parties agreed joint to a sen- Thompson’s ranted that the conclusion recommendation, tence at the bottom of conduct falls outside “heartland” range, 87of months. States, offense Koon v. United 518 At the sentencing hearing, the district 2035, 81, U.S. 116 135 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 392 in Thompson found was not (1996). conclude the We sentence cannot heartland of the offenses in covered stand because of the district court’s reli- 2252A(a)(2) 2252A(a)(5)(B). §§ U.S.C. on prohibited, discouraged, ance or inade- concluded, The court “I do not believe that quately explained factors. We vacate the and, you therefore, fall in the heartland I resentencing. sentence and remand for am ... a making seven-level on ground you do not in fall

I reasoning heartland and for the articulated 2000, Thompson In August opened a file by Supreme the United States in Court on the server internet a manifest departed the Koon case.” Thus purpose trade im- pornographic from the offense level set forth ages with others. On four occasions be- in the plea agreement, changing the of- 28, 6, tween August 2000 and November fense from crimi- level 29 to With the 2000, four different undercover Federal I, history category nal was a result (FBI) Investigation Bureau of agents had sentencing range new of 41 to 51 months. correspondence online with Thompson, Taking into account the reasons that im- who obtained what he believed were child downward, pelled it to the court pornographic images and, agents Thompson sentenced to months rather in exchange, gave fifty-eight them differ- specified than to the months assent pornographic images. ent child The FBI parties plea agreement. of the warrant obtained a to search home, than where discovered more The district court’s conclusion that 10,000 images of child on heartland, Thompson per- not in the was computer. hard drive of his And that was mitting striking not computer all. From the the FBI sentence, agreed about half the was based gained evidence that had distributed expressly on several factors. articulated 47,000 images more than Au- such since Thompson court stressed that viewed gust 2000. images pornographic the child at home and work; Thompson plea agreement segregated entered a never at that he the files on 16, 2001, 6, 2001, February on a separate computer and March location on his others; Caperna, that he States inaccessible make them Cir.2001). doing, give any prior crimi- so we “substan had been involved never tial deference” to the district court’s deci conduct; history had that he no nal depart, because “it embodies the abuse, sion to any nor there drugs or sexual exercise of discretion a sen family; traditional that he was history such Koon, tencing court.” 518 U.S. educated; pose a he did not risk S.Ct. 2035. against chil- offenses engaging sexual court also said that dren. The Ill rehabilitation, and ex- potential for showed the signifi To better understand longer that a sentence pressed concern concept, begin cance of the “heartland” we delay reha- necessarily access to Federal with the introduction the Sen Thompson, program, because bilitation tencing Guidelines: permitted such a not to enter be part a of his sentence program good sentencing until the The Commission intends guideline carving The district court did as had been served. courts to treat each factors, “heartland,” typical not how these either stand- out a a of cases explain set cumulatively, sufficiently embodying that each ing guide- alone or the conduct an bring this case outside the line describes. When a court finds unusual case, particular a atypical the the court did one which heartland of offense. As guideline linguistically applies but justify its of these factors with not use significantly where conduct adequate sentencing to “the reference differs from norm, may court the the consider wheth- guidelines,. and official policy statements er a is warranted. Sentencing Commis- commentary of the sion,” and remand for resen- we reverse 4(b) 1, A, Pt. Intro. Comment U.S.S.G.-Ch. 3553(b); § see 18 also tencing. U.S.C. added). (2002) (emphasis As we said 801, Working, v. United States Stevens, 197 1263 United States (9th Cir.2002). 807 (9th Cir.1999), determine whether targeted by falls in a offense the heartland

II statute, “comparison a court must make a depart A decision to district court’s conduct the between the of defendant from is reviewed under the the of other Id. the Guidelines and conduct offenders.” Koon, Koon, 104-05, standard. See at 1268 at (citing abuse of discretion 518 U.S. 2035).1 2035; case, 99, In at 116 S.Ct. United 116 S.Ct. court U.S. summary particular presented prescribed 1. We a of our law on Guideline. 518 93-94, First, sentencing in our recent decision United U.S. at S.Ct. Parish, 1025, identify district court should what features 18, Cir., 2002): Oct. the case it Id. at of make unusual. Next, S.Ct. 2035. must court determine may depart ap- court from the A district ground on it is whether the which contem- range plicable Guideline if it finds "that forbidden, plating a encour- aggravating mitigating exists an or there kind, aged, discouraged by or the Guidelines. Id. degree, of a or to a not circumstance may depart The court not on forbidden by adequately taken into consideration 95-96, ground. Sentencing Id. at 116 S.Ct. 2035. The formulating the Commission in may encouraged guidelines depart ground on an that should in a result sentence long encouraged ground as as that is not different from that described.” U.S.S.G. statement) already particular § (policy (quoting taken into 5K2.0 account 3553(b)). Koon, guideline. Id. Supreme U.S.C. offense at 116 S.Ct. 2035. encouraged explained discouraged, a factor is or Court how district should If account, already range decide taken into the district whether from but comparison, there not make such tices were unusual for pornogra- did users of Thomp- phy, to show no showing they are, is little the record and there is they Thompson’s conduct differs from that other would not son’s of remove con- duct from the offenders. Some the features men- heartland of offenses to pled which guilty. Concealing tioned warrant one’s files casual designat- low end of the observer distrib- uting images only illicit range, do not to those who seek Thomp- ed but remove them out do not the criminal acts conduct alter son’s from heartland.2 possession and por- distribution of child proof record and voluminous nography any way that makes the of- por- maintenance and distribution of child ordinary fenses different from the case. nography do not show that Thompson’s accessing manner of It also storing the incorrect the court pornographic Thompson’s files differentiated con- consider of a lack criminal typical from that record concluding duct offender en- basis for in possession and conduct was outside the gaged distribution heart- land of his crimes. pornography. Thompson’s give ex- The Guidelines own clarity: the rule with pert witness testified that it is not unusual for of pornography viewers to restrict such range limit of from lower the Crimi- home, conduct the or to the History conceal nal Category I set for a is first in a pornographic files hidden location on with the offender lowest risk of recidi- computer.3 Therefore, if prac- the Even these departure furtive vism. a below the may only depart "pres- upon expert, court if the factor is Parish’s who was asked exceptional degree ent to an or in some compare district court "to Parish's conduct way other the case different makes from ‘typical’ with the conduct of a offender under ordinary present.” case where factor is Parish, this statute.” F.3d same at 1027. Id. If the Guidelines do not mention expert That "concluded that Parish's conduct all, factor at a must consider significantly was less than that of serious of- particular whether this factor warrants de- involving possession fenders in other cases of parture. Id. pornography.” Id. We note that the affirmatively offender Parish had "not down- permissible It is for a court to consider 2. files, pornographic loaded the factors other than the indexed the defendant’s conduct files, fashioning arranged filing system, when a sentence. The Guidelines them in a or provide that computer created a search on his mechanism determining impose [i]n sentence to for ease reference or retrieval.” Id. In- guideline range, deed, within the or whether a images possessed that Parish "had warranted, departure guidelines from the automatically been downloaded into his Tem- consider, limitation, may the court without porary sharp Cache Internet file.” Id. In con- any concerning information the back- trast, Thompson responsible here for a was ground, and character conduct of the defen- system intentionally which down- dant, prohibited by unless otherwise law. pornography images loaded child received (2002). commentary § U.S.S.G. 1B1.4 As the images and distributed such others provision explains, on this a con- Indeed, only them return. was in Parish re- guidelines sider "information do not sponsible possession, apparently for and determining take into account in a sentence arising automatically knowledge his without guideline range within the or in determin- images pornographic viewed when he on the ing whether and to what extent to responsible But internet. was for 1B1.4, guidelines.” § from the U.S.S.G. cmt. a scheme automatic of child distribution (2002). background 47,000 pornography, distributing more than contrast, upholding In 3. while a district images, whatever his motives. Parish, departure court's in we downward stressed properly that the district court relied rationale, however, That guideline range family. or in his of the limit lower justifying in not been a factor Category I on the ba- should have History Criminal a history where offenses adequacy criminal sis of the include As charged did not child abuse. appropriate. be cannot Stevens, pornography in a child we said (2002). 4A1.3, policy § statement U.S.S.G. depart- had in which the district court case Supreme In the United States Court Koon downward, part ed because defen- language Guidelines quoted any not sexual acts engaged dant had that a concluded with children: aas first- status based on defendant’s position is district court’s inconsis- [T]he warranted because time is not offender statutory with the scheme. Title tent took that factor into “[t]he Commission 2252A(a)(5)(B) prohibits pos- U.S.C. formulating history the criminal account knowingly alone. Defendant session at 116 S.Ct. 2035. category.” U.S. images than possessed more Dickey, 924 See also United States essence, pornography.... (“The (9th Cir.1991) Guidelines possession alone in- court held that possibility make allowance for the due place Defendant sufficient offender.”). being first defendant possession of a Pos- heartland offense. justify also not its did The district session, however, is what statute concluding Thompson’s education use of proscribes. outside heart- that his offenses were Stevens, 197 land, grounds departing down- or as True, Thompson has bachelor’s ward. reasoning apply The same rule and here. technology, his degree in business noted, than Thompson possessed As more prospects good is relevant to 10,000 education images of child sentencing in a and for for 47,000 rehabilitation images. than such distributed more Notwithstanding, range. the Guidelines engage he did not in other That offenses “[ejducation and vocational explain abuse, that child and in the such as sexual was in ordinarily relevant deter- skills are not likely not particularly district court’s view a sentence should be out- mining offenses, whether wholly to in sexual engage such is applicable guideline range.” side the Thompson’s culpable conduct irrelevant. (2002). the 5H1.2 In Koon U.S.S.G. distributing large in possessing considering that when Court made clear places him amounts discouraged are factors that Guide- within heartland for those offenses. lines, only if “the court should court, in significant part, the district an present exceptional degree factor to is justifying departure, downward way or in other makes case some Thompson’s background and fam- stressed ordinary from the case where the different ily rather than his conduct. The district Koon, U.S. at present.” factor is emphasized these court doubtless factors (citation omitted). Neither S.Ct. Thompson particularly to suggest that is provides district court nor record if in respond placed to well a likely rehabil- any ed- reason believe program. The court was itation from the ucation makes his case different should receive concerned ordinary case. possible, as as that a treatment soon court,

It longer delay opportuni- in sentence would is also clear that downward, ty ex- signif- some to receive treatment. departing attached plained that any history fashioning of sexual sentence icance to lack case, factor, significant or most oth- by Thompson himself “the substance abuse protecting public two of the district as favoring er than those recidivism, departure, is preventing get as well as to suggest dis- place get departures can trict court [Thompson] [he] some where similar involving treatment.” cases child pornography have be- come so frequent pattern to indicate a judicious These concerns are and under- that may merit consideration Sen- However, considering standable. when tencing Commission. matters, these the district court did not compare Thompson with 1. Thompson’s Report other offenders Presentence of posses- convicted of the same contained a list of offenses “factors that war- sion rant pornography. departure.” and distribution One encompassed the for potential This consideration of rehabili- “heartland” factors that we find the dis- tation, grounds depar- other trict judge improperly applied. agree like the I reject above, not justify ture that we does holding. with this “the Sentencing While departure the circum- “heartland” under displace Guidelines do not the traditional stances of this case. role judge compas- of a district in bringing sion and common sense to of the Many district court’s con “in process” so that areas where the Sen- judicial cerns be well taken tencing spoken Commission has not —ar- exercise of discretion to sentence low in a eas outside the heartland considered cases prescribed range. They may be relevant in the Guidelines—district courts should departure on bases than other those not hesitate use their discretion de- articulated, adequate grounds if legal vising provide sentences that individual- present. we accept misappli But cannot justice ized give reasons [must] concept cation of heartland based on departure their that allow us to ensure prohibited, discouraged, inadequately or permissible that the explained appearing factors on the record Williams, the law.” United States v. Any departure before us.4 on remand (2d Cir.1995) (internal 309-10 and, explained, must be if adequately there omitted, quotation marks and citation em- departure, is must estab added). phasis why any lish factor impelling present general or Aside “extraordinary” “atypical” from the “heartland” fac- tor, degree, as any departure Thompson’s probation sug- as well how is also officer consistent of post-offense with framework that gested his rehabilitation guidelines and our settled on sentenc impaired law and his volition to control ing. poten- addiction to were warranting tial departure. factors The AND

VACATED REMANDED possi- district court failed to these consider BERZON, grounds departure. Judge, Circuit ble for downward concurring: I separately point write to out Post-offense rehabilitation —as distin- two fea- Thompson’s guished post-sentencing tures of Aaron Presentence rehabilita- Report depar- that could have been considered tion1—can be a for basis reject government's readily 4. We this case re- confident that the district court will apply quest the law as clarified us herein. at'argument that on for a remand resen- tencing reassigned case be to a different § precludes 1. U.S.S.G. 5K2.19 de- Judge. United District We see States no evi- parture post-sentencing for ef- rehabilitative bias, appearance impropriety, dence of or Sentencing forts. The reasons for the Com- ground change, other for such a and we are mission's amendment to this effect in 2000 Green, pedophilia for is program 152 F.3d treatment v. ture. United Butner, Cir.1998), that United States (9th we noted North Carolina. 1202, 1207 Cf. (9th already Cir. Malley, have determined circuits “[s]everal (“The 2002) requested specifically be rehabilitation post-offense that Malley assign indicated accord of Prisons Bureau departure” basis at program United States See also to the sex offender treatment group. with Cir.1997) Institution.”); 820, 823 Butner Correctional Kapitzke, 130 Federal (di 3553(a)(2) (2002) (“Because acceptance responsibility see also 18 U.S.C. postoffense rehabilitation consider, guideline takes to inter recting courts account, under sec- into alia, efforts “the with needed providing defendant if only the defen- warranted 5K2.0 is tion medical training, or vocational educational to enough be exceptional efforts dant’s care, treatment or other correctional acceptance cases which atypical of manner”). generally See most effective usually grant- is reduction responsibility Williams, (upholding at ed.”). reducing “heartland” downward at to a sentence from least months the ru- Á consideration relevant provided prisoner, it months because conti- post-offense rehabilitation bric rehabilitation,” candidate for an “excellent nuity of needed treatment. for a testimony eligibility treatment expert with immediate characterized had to rehabili- otherwise he would have having responded post-offense program; being years begin to immedi- some six or seven tation and as well-suited “wait In dis- of treatment.2 continuation If in interim the Butner ate treatment. treatment, cussing Thompson’s future or program budgetary were terminated “al- concern that expressed judge resolve other .reasons or if Williams’s qualify under [Thompson does] though prison pressures weakened under the crite- system’s] initial prison federal [the life, him curing the chance of of his addic they’re not ria, qualify, sure will and I’m ways perhaps tion his criminal sex offender treat- going' put [him] [a hand] the other [I]f [on vanish.... ap- sentence program [his] until ment] [the is cured of his addiction Williams point most" efficient where proaches may ultimately sentence] shorter serve will be available.” of the treatment use public criminal protect from future Thus, for an inmate like longer sentence might otherwise com acts that Williams post-offense re- Thompson interrupts' his mit.”). remand, court, in On needed treatment. delays habilitation view, my has the discretion to consider post-offense actual efforts judge indicated facility opposed potential and rehabilitation —as only diagnosis federal expert Thompson's who are 2. The conducted departures were inconsistent that such he had statutory provisions applying "impris- post-offense rehabilitation stated that to seriously. "very partici- taken He’s person[s]” "inequitably and would bene- treatment oned group only gain opportunity pating [set- to be well in and in individual fit who those tings]. insight growing. empathy § 5K2.19 His is His de novo.” U.S.S.G. resentenced (2002). by growing expressed concern ... also." She background cmt. Consideration post-of- of pre-sentencing potential interruption post-offense, of about district courts prison system: "[I]f de- fense rehabilitation in the as factor downward rehabilitation contrast, not, long period per- Thompson] like have a parture [offenders does concern treatment], they some- imprisonment [for of time that wait serving sons a term or intro- hardened, it’s among times ... become comparably inequitable duce results them.” harder to reach convicted individuals.

1079 reason) power for rehabilitation —as basis down and volitional impair- if departure, sufficiently exceptional. (ie., ward inability ments an to control behav- ior person that the is wrongful). knows explicitly The district court also failed to application specifically The note includes Report’s address the Presentence refer types impairments both in the defini- capacity ence to under diminished U.S.S.G. tion of “significantly reduced mental ca- (in § Malley, 5K2.13. at 1033 Cf. pacity.” “granted which the same district court departure five-level downward for dimin Sentencing U.S. app. Guidelines Manual § ished capacity 5K2.13 and ex C, (2002). amendment See United traordinary acceptance responsibility”). 938, Sadolsky, States v. 234 F.3d Report Presentence cited Cir.2000) (“the § amendment to 5K2.13 ex McBroom, United States v. 124 F.3d 533 panded the [‘significantly definition of re (3d Cir.1997), in which Third Circuit capacity’] duced mental to include volition pornogra considered an addiction to child impairments.”); al see also United States phy. emphasized McBroom (2d 557, Silleg, 563-64 Cir. seeking “McBroom is not de downward 2002) (“In plain of the light language of the he parture because was a victim of sexual Sentencing Guidelines and the views of Rather, abuse. McBroom that at claims most issue, other circuits to consider the offense, the time of the from a suffered we hold that the capacity diminished of a significantly capacity. reduced mental defendant in pornography a child case may McBroom points merely his childhood form the for a basis explain why mental capacity his was re where the requirements of section 5K2.13 point compelled duced to the where he felt satisfied.”). possess pornography.” Id. at 551. There is evidence the record that the Sentencing Commission Thompson on multiple tried occasions to application defining added an note computer all containing erase files “significantly capaci- term reduced mental but drawn back “ ty” § ‘Significantly Guideline 5K2.13: Expert testimony addictive manner. capacity’ reduced mental means the defen- sentencing suggested that had dant, convicted, although significant- has a an addiction to material for which he (A) ly impaired ability to understand the open was convicted. On remand it is wrongfulness comprising of the behavior consider, consistent power the offense or to exercise Sentencing with the di- Commission’s (B) reason; or control behavior that rectives, Thompson qualifies whether for a is wrongful.” knows U.S.S.G. defendant based on Guideline (2002) 5K2.13, (emphasis § n. cmt. add- 5K2.13, illuminated as McBroom. ed). explicated The Commission its defini- 2. Turning to the wider context of this as tion follows: appeal, noting it bears Koon United “significant- The amendment defines States, 81, 98-99, S.Ct. U.S. ly mental capacity” reduced accord (1996) emphasized L.Ed.2d 392 with the decision United States v. role of (3d Cir.1997). district courts front-line sentenc- McBroom, 124 F.3d 533 ing have, decisionmakers. District courts “sig- McBroom concluded that noted, advantage Koon “an institutional nificantly capacity” mental in- reduced (i.e., appellate in cognitive making[departure] cluded over courts impairments both determinations, inability especially an see wrongful- to understand the so ness many appellate of the conduct or to than exercise more Guidelines cases

1080 pornography convictions. See do,” an er child for that reason are and courts Goldberg, of information” for F.3d 1133 “important source States v. 295 United (internal Id. Sentencing (10th Cir.2002); Commission. States v. Grosen United omitted). and citation marks quotation (5th Cir.2000); heider, 200 F.3d Unit 321 from the Introduction to quoted Koon (11th Davis, 204 1064 ed v. F.3d States Guidelines, emphasizes that which Stevens, Cir.1999); v. 197 United States permanent body, is a The Commission (9th Cir.1999); v. 1263 United States F.3d and empowered by law write rewrite (8th Drew, Cir.1997); Ka 131 F.3d 1269 progressive changes, with guidelines, 820; v. pitzke, 130 F.3d United States By monitoring years. when many over (11th Cir.1997); Everett, 129 1222 F.3d guidelines from the and courts Wind, v. United States for doing reasons analyzing their stated Goossens, Cir.1997); v. United States and decisions with references so (4th Cir.1996); v. F.3d 697 United States Commission, time, thereto, over will (2d Cir.1996). Barton, See 76 F.3d 499 speci- guidelines be able to refíne DeCosta, 5, 9 also States v. 37 F.3d United departures fy precisely more when (“Child (1st Cir.1994) pornography is not a permitted. not should and should be crime, and his victimless for DeCosta but 93-94, (quoting 116 S.Ct. Id. surely very this is affair. We family sad A, introductory cmt/ pt. U.S.S.G. ch. multiple commend the district court for its 4(b)). then on to quote The went Court to the efforts to find solution best suited following passage approval from Deane, circumstances.”); United States v. Breyer in Judge then-Chief written Cir.1990); (1st United Rivera, United States (1st Cir.1990); Studley, 907 F.2d 254 (1st Cir.1993): Becker, Flexibility R. Discre Edward court’s ignore special To Sentencing Judge tion Available to the “ordinariness” competence —about Prob., Regime, Fed. Under Guidelines particular of a case— or “unusualness” 1991, at 12 earlier (describing Dec. an Sentencing depriving risk judges between federal and the dialogue source of important Commission of Sentencing pornogra Commission on child information, namely, the reactions of the sentencing). phy depar The downward fact-specific trial to the circum- judge cases, in that were reversed these tures case, reactions, re- stances of the which to that we added which reverse departure, duced to reasons written precisely Thompson, “reactions of determine help can the Commission how, judge[s] fact-specific trial to ... cir whether, revision Guidelines cumstances, which ... reduced to written place. should take departure, can help reasons for the Com added). (Emphasis how, whether, mission determine judge in case did not place.” should take Guidelines revision anomalously departing act Rivera, 994 F.2d at 951. One relevant (Criminal when a first offender may particu circumstance Commission I) History pornogra Category larly delay is the sex wish consider phy years, case. last In the six consider prison in the federal offender treatment alone, ing published ten opinions cases Butner, at its North system specifically from have seven different Circuits resulted — facility resulting lengthy Carolina appellate judges’ reversal de — cisions to depart downward first-offend sentences. these comments I

With concur

opinion. Plaintiff-Appellee,

Jeffrey GRANT, Allen

v

. BEACH; Long OF Beach

CITY LONG Department; Slavin,

Police Denise esa Slavin;

Dennis Hafken Unknown

shied, Defendants, Watson; Bahash,

Katherine Joe

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 01-56046. Appeals,

United Court of

Ninth Circuit.

Argued and 2002. Submitted Nov.

Filed Dec.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Aaron Thompson

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Date Published: Dec 6, 2002

Citation: 315 F.3d 1071

Docket Number: 01-30279

Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.