OPINION
In this аction, Plaintiff United States Steel Corporation (“U.S.Steel”) — a domestic steel producer- — contests the Final Results of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s twelfth administrative review of the antidumping duty order covering corrosion-resistant carbon steel from the Republic of Korea (“Korea”). See Notice of Final Results of the Twelfth Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty Order on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea, 72 Fed.Reg. 13,086 (March 20, 2007) (“Final Results”) 1 ; Issues and Decisions for the Final Results of the Twelfth Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty Order on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea (2004-2005) (March 12, 2007) (Pub.Doc. No. 232) (“Decision Memorandum”). 2
U.S. Steel’s motion is oрposed by the Government, which maintains that Commerce’s allocation of indirect selling expenses in the Final Results was both based on substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law. The Government therefore urges that U.S. Steel’s motion be denied, and that Commerce’s Final Results be sustained in all respects. See generally Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 56.2 Motion for Judgment Upon the Agency Record and Appendix (“Def.’s Brief’).
The Defendant-Intervenors — collectively, POSCO — also oppose U.S. Steel’s motion. Like the Government, POSCO asserts that Commerce’s treatment of its indirect selling expenses was based on substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law, and that the agency’s Final Results should be sustained in all respects. See generally Memorandum of Defendant-Intervenors, POSCO and PO-COS, in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 56.2 Motion for Judgment Upon the Agency Record (“POSCO Brief’).
Jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000). 4 For the reasons detailed below, U.S. Steel’s Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record must be denied.
I. Background
U.S. antidumping laws require that anti-dumping duties be imposed upon imported merchandise that “is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value ...,” and results in material injury or the threat of material injury to a domestic industry. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673. The antidumping duty is equal to the “amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price [“EP”] (or constructed export price [“CEP”]) for the merchandise.” Id. Normal value is defined as “the price at which the foreign like product is first sold ... in the exporting country----” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(B)(i). When normal value exceeds the price at which the merchandise is first sold to an unaffiliated purchaser in the United States, а sale is considered “dumped.”
A. Overview of Indirect Selling Expenses
Among the adjustments that Commerce must make to the constructed export price is the deduction of “U.S. indirect selling expenses” (“indirect selling expenses” or “ISEs”), which are the focus of U.S. Steel’s challenge to the Final Results at issue here.
See
19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(l)(D).
5
Indirect selling expenses are those expenses incurred by a respondent (or, as in this case, a respondent’s U.S. affiliate) which are related to the sale of subject merchandise but which cannot be directly tied to any particular sale — in other words, expenses that “would be inсurred by the seller regardless of whether the particular sales in question are made,” including common expenses such as rent payments, and telephone charges that a company incurs in selling subject merchandise but which cannot be directly connected to a specific sale.
See Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG v. United States,
For example, companies typically do not calculate an amount of office rent based on how much rent was incurred in making any particular sale. Instead, companies generally report to Commerce the total amount of rent paid during the relevant period. In order to account for rent incurred in selling subject merchandise (so that an appropriate sum can be included in the agency’s antidumping calculations), Commerce must allocate to sales of subject merchandise a portion of the total rent paid by the company. In doing so, Commerce must allocate the total rent (as well as other total indirect selling expenses) between the company’s sales of subject merchandise and the company’s other activities, including sales of non-subject merchandise. Indirect selling expenses may also include, for instance, salaries paid to employees who sell subject merchandise, since salaries normally are paid without regard to whether the employees sell subject mеrchandise or non-subject merchandise, or — for that matter — whether the employees actually sell any merchandise at all, during the relevant period. See generally Pl.’s Brief at 2; Def.’s Brief at 8-9; Transcript of Oral Argument (“Tr.”) at 16.
The antidumping statute directs that, in calculating net U.S. prices using the CEP price methodology, Commerce is to deduct “any ... expenses generally incurred by or for the account of the producer or exporter, or the affiliated seller in the United States, in selling the subject merchandise (or subject merchandise to which value has been added)....” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d); see also id. at § 1677a(d)(l)(D). Thus, the statute includes a general provision for the deduction of selling expenses in the CEP price calculation, but is entirely silent as to how Commerce is to calculate those expenses (including indirect selling expenses).
Commerce’s regulations similarly include general provisions concerning the calculation of expenses. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g). Commerce’s stated preference is for the calculation of expenses on a transaction-specific basis. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g)(1). However, where expenses cannot be ascertained on a transaction-specific basis, the agency’s regulations permit expenses (including indirect selling expenses) to be allocated, provided, first, that the allocation is on “as specific a basis” as possible, and, second, that the methodology “does not cause inaccuracies or distortions”:
(1) In general. The Secretary may consider allocated expenses and price adjustments when transaction-specific reporting is not feasible, provided the Secretary is satisfied the allocation method used does not cause inaccuracies or distortions.
(2) Reporting allocated expenses and price adjustments. Any party seeking to report an expense or a price adjustment on an allocated basis must demonstrate to the Secretary’s satisfaction that the allocation is calculated on as specific a basis as is feasible, and must explain why the allocation methodology used does not cause inaccuracies or distortions.
19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g) (emphases added)
6
;
Under these circumstances,
Chevron
accords Commerce great discretion as to the methodology used in the calculation of indirect selling expenses.
See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
In the exercise of its ample discretion, Commerce has developed a standard, baseline practice known as the “relative sales value methodology,” which calculates indirect selling expenses by using the ratio of sales of subject merchandise to total sales.
See Micron Technology, Inc. v. United States,
As even U.S. Steel concedes, however, “it is not [Commerce’s] policy to require allocation of indirect selling expenses based upon relative sales value in every instance.”
See
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or Above From the Republic of Korea; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 61 Fed.Reg. 20,216, 20,217 (May 6,1996);
see also
Pl.’s Brief at 11; PL’s Reply Brief at 3-4. Commerce has broad discretion to use a different methodology where the agency determines that the alternative methodology is reasonable and non-distortive.
See
NSK,
B. The Facts of This Case
In reporting its data for the period covered by the аdministrative review here at issue (in response to Commerce’s original questionnaire, as well as two supplemental questionnaires), POSCO proposed that Commerce use an alternative methodology — the “payroll methodology” — to allocate the indirect selling expenses incurred by POSCO’s U.S. sales affiliate, POSCO American Corporation (“POSAM”), in reselling to unaffiliated U.S. customers subject merchandise that POSAM had purchased from POSCO. Specifically, POSCO used payroll data to divide POSAM’s payroll expenses and other common expenses into the three distinct categories of PO-SAM’s activity during the relevant period: (1) POSAM’s sales of subject merchandise (purchased from POSCO); (2) POSAM’s sales of non-subject merchandise; and (3) POSAM’s non-sales-related activity (in particular, POSAM’s management of two subsidiaries). See generally POSCO Brief at 2, 13, 15-16; see also Pl.’s Brief at 2-3; Def.’s Brief at 3, 11-13; Tr. at 19.
For purposes of calculating the indirect selling expenses ratio, POSCO first identified the actual payroll expenses of each of the POSAM employees engaged in each of the three categories of POSAM’s activity. 8 POSCO then allocated POSAM’s common expenses — rent, depreciation, travel, etc.— to each of the three categories in direct proportion to the percentage of the total actual payroll expenses expended on each category. Finally, POSCO identified the sales revenue for the period of review for each of the three categories of activity. See generally POSCO Brief at 3, 13, 15-16; see also PL’s Brief at 2-4; Def.’s Brief at 3, 9-10, 11-13; PL’s Reply Brief at 1 n.l.
In calculating the indirect selling expenses ratio, POSCO included only those expenses and sales revenues associated with the first category of activity (i.e., POSAM’s sales of subject merchandise). POSCO reasoned that the calculation of indirect selling expenses is — by definition- — -intended to capture expenses related to sales of subject merchandise. POSCO therefore excluded expenses related to the second category of POSAM’s activity (ie., sales of non-subject merchandise), because those expenses did not concern sales of subject merchandise. And POSCO excluded expenses related to the third category of POSAM’s activity (i.e., POSAM’s management of its investments), because those expenses concerned a non-selling activity, and thus did not concern sales of any merchandise (subject or not). Using this methodology, POSCO derived an indirect selling ratio, which it then applied to the reported gross unit prices to calculate the per-unit indirect selling expenses which POSCO reported to Commerce. See generally POSCO Brief at 3, 10-11; see also PL’s Brief at 4-5; Def.’s Brief at 3, 9-11; PL’s Reply Brief at 1 n.l.
In the Preliminary Results, Commerce did not use the payroll methodology that
In the briefing that followed Commerce’s issuance of the Preliminary Results, POSCO further explained, in detail, the basis for its proposed payroll methodology. With the benefit of that further explanation, as well as additional time to analyze POSCO’s proposed methodology, Commerce determined that the evidence supported POSCO’s claims, and therefore concluded that POSCO’s proposed methodology was reasonable, accurate and not distortive, given the specific facts of this case. See Def.’s Brief at 3-4, 11-13. Accordingly, Commerce calculated its Final Results using the indirect selling expenses ratio derived from POSCO’s payroll methodology. Commerce explained:
In the Preliminary Results, we recalculated the POSCO Group’s [indirect selling expenses] because the POSCO Group had not adequately explained the basis for its exclusion of certain expenses in its reported [indirect selling expenses] calculation. Specifically, we recalculated the POSCO Group’s [indirect selling expenses] by including all indirect selling expenses incurred in the United States, including expenses related to POSAM’s sales of non-subject merchandise and its non-selling activities during the [Period of Review]. However, the POSCO Group provided evidence shoioing that the POSCO Group correctly calculated its [indirect selling expenses] by excluding expenses related to [1] POSAM’s sales of non-subject merchandise and [2] its non-selling activities .... Thus, the Department will change the [dumping] margin program in the final results to reflect the POSCO Group’s original [indirect selling expenses] ratio.
Decision Memorandum at 45 (emphasis added) (footnоtes omitted). In the Final Results, Commerce recalculated POSCO’s dumping margin at 0.35%. See Final Results, 72 Fed.Reg. at 13,087; see also Decision Memorandum at 44-45.
In the instant action, U.S. Steel challenges Commerce’s Final Results solely as to the agency’s use of POSCO’s payroll methodology to calculate POSAM’s indirect selling expenses.
II. Standard of Review
A final determination by Commerce in an antidumping case must be sustained, except to the extent that it is found to be “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i);
see also NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States,
Moreover, any evaluation of the substantiality of evidence “must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight,” including “contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn.”
Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States,
Further, while Commerce must explain the bases for its decisions, “its explanations do not have to be perfect.”
NMB Singapore,
To determine whether Commerce’s interpretation of the antidumping statute is in accordance with law, the two-part test set forth in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
Under the second step of a
Chevron
analysis, “[a]ny reasonable construction of the statute is a permissible construction.”
Timken Co. v. United States,
Finally, the Court of Appeals has underscored that, “[i]n recognition of Commerce’s expertise in the field of antidumping investigations,”
Corns Stool,
III. Analysis
In its Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record, U.S. Steel contests Commerce’s calculation and allocation of POSAM’s indireсt selling expenses in the Final Results of the twelfth administrative review of the antidumping duty order covering corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products from the Republic of Korea. See Pl.’s Brief at 1, 8-19; PL’s Reply Brief at 1-15.
Although U.S. Steel frames its case in a number of different ways, U.S. Steel contends — in essence — (1) that Commerce erred in excluding POSAM’s “investment management” expenses from the pool of indirect selling expenses to be allocated, and (2) that Commerce erred in using POSAM’s payroll data — rather than PO-SAM’s sales data — in allocating the company’s common expenses. See, e.g., PL’s Reply Brief at 11; Tr. at 30, 32-34; see also POSCO Brief at 6. In addition, U.S. Steel asserts that Commerce impermissibly switched methodologies between prior administrative reviews and the review at issue here, as well as between the Preliminary Results and the Final Results in the instant review. See PL’s Brief at 5-6, Ills. Each of U.S. Steel’s arguments is analyzed in turn below, and for the reasons detailed there, must be rejected.
Given the particular facts of this case, Commerce’s use of the payroll methodology in the Final Results allocated POSAM’s indirect selling expenses to sales of subject merchandise on a more specific basis than would have the relative sale value methodology that U.S. Steel advocates. Commerce’s use of the payroll methodology therefore was more consistent with the agency’s regulations, which require the allocation of expenses “on as specific a basis as is feasible.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g)(2); see Def.’s Brief at 18-19; POSCO Brief at 1-2, 13, 18-19; Tr. at 25, 27, 54, 60; see also POSCO Brief at 19 (emphasizing that use of relative sales value methodology in this case would have been distortive and inaccurate, because it would hаve included “expenses associated with sales of non-subject merchandise and non-selling activities”); id. at 13, 17 (same); Def.’s Brief at 19 (same); Tr. at 25-28, 60, 64 (same).
Moreover, the exercise of Commerce’s ample discretion may permit it to select from among several reasonable methodologies in a given case. Here, even assuming, arguendo, that the relative sales methodology would have been a reasonable choice, Commerce’s use of the payroll methodology cannot be said to have been unreasonable, and so must be sustained.
A. U.S. Steel’s Claims Contrasting POS AM Data and Commerce’s ISE Allocations
U.S. Steel first argues that, “by adopting the payroll methodology in the Final Results, [Commerce] grossly distorted, and thereby incorrectly allocated, PO-SAM’s [indirect selling expenses]” (“ISEs”). See PL’s Brief at 14; see generally id. at 13-17; PL’s Reply Brief at 2-5. Significantly, U.S. Steel does not contend that any of the data that POSCO submitted are inaccurate. See Def.’s Brief at 14. In attempting to prove its case, U.S. Steel does little more than state the results of Commerce’s use of POSCO’s payroll methodology, compare those results to PO-SAM’s sales or other data, and assert that — ipso facto — a distortion exists. See Def.’s Brief at 14-15, 16; see generally POSCO Brief at 17-19.
U.S. Steel emphasizes, for example, that POSAM’s sales of subject merchandise constituted a certain percentage of its total sales, contrasting that figure with the per
U.S. Steel’s attempts to prove distortion simply by pointing to contrasting figures — with no supporting rationale or analysis whatsoever' — is not valid legal argument.
See, e.g., U.S. Ass’n of Imps, of Textiles & Apparel v. United States,
Moreover, as to the substantive merits of the matter, U.S. Steel fundamentally fails to appreciate the significance of the percentage of POSAM’s total payroll which was paid to the individual who managed POSAM’s subsidiaries, together with the fact that those “investment management” activities generated no sales revenue for POSAM, and the fact of the “very, very small” size of POSAM’s workforce— factors which, taken together, largely explain the figures that U.S. Steel seeks to contrast and cast as evidence of unlawful “distortion.”
See generally
POSCO Brief at 17;
see also id.
at 13-14 (noting that extent to which POSAM’s total expenses are attributable to salaries “underscor[es] the significance of personnel activities (as reflected in payroll information) to the [indirect selling expenses] ratio calculation”);
id.
at 15-16 (same); Tr. at 24;
id.
at 24-25 (POSCO explains that “the investment manager[,] while one individual,] actually represents a fairly significant portion of the total workforce, so when you’re hearing about the distortions ... [and that] there was so much assigned to the investment category, ... well it’s correct because [the] investment manager alone was a significant portion of the work force,” and that “[w]hen you understand these contextual aspects, the fact that [POSAM] is not just a sales entity and the fact that it’s a fairly small organization, ... all of [U.S. Steel’s] allegations ... about the so-called distortions ... just fall away then.”).
12
But see
PL’s Reply Brief at 6-9
U.S. Steel insists that POSAM’s investment management expenses should have been included in calculating indirect selling expenses. U.S. Steel argues that, like accounting and human resources, “activities [such as investment management] benefit the corporate
entity
— ie., POSAM — and properly belong in the pool of [indirect selling expenses] to be allocated.”
See
Pl.’s Brief at 12;
see also
Pl.’s Reply Brief at 9; Tr. at 12. U.S. Steel concludes that Commerce “should
not
have excluded PO-SAM’s investment management expenses in the calculation of the company’s [indirect selling expenses],” citing
Aramide
for the proposition that it is Commerce’s practice “to
include
[in the calculation of indirect selling expenses] the general and administrative (“G & A”) expenses, such as expenses associated with investment management, that are incurred in support of the respondent’s U.S. sales affiliate.”
See
Pl.’s Reply Brief at 6-7
(citing Aramide Maatschappij V.o.F. v. United States,
U.S. Steel is wrong on both the law and the facts. In
Aramide,
a parent company provided “various corporate-level administrative support services that at a minimum ... were indirectly related to ... [the] selling functions” of the U.S. selling affiliate of a foreign producer.
See Aramide,
U.S. Steel misstates the rule of Aramide, and — in addition — misapplies the decision given the facts of this case. According to U.S. Steel, Aramide requires that “[all] G & A expenses of a respondent’s U.S. sales affiliate” be included “in the pool of [indirect selling expenses] to be allocated because they are indirectly related to selling regardless of their classification by the respondent.” See PL’s Reply Brief at 8 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). U.S. Steel therefore concludes that “POSAM’s investment management expenses should have been allocated to, rather than excluded from, the pool of [indirect selling expenses] because [the investment management expenses] were indirectly related to selling.” Id. (emphasis added).
As a threshold matter, Commerce’s exclusion of POSAM’s investment management expenses from the agency’s calculation of indirect selling expenses was based on the specific, somewhat unusual facts of this case (discussed below) — not on the classification of those expenses by the respondent, POSCO. See PL’s Reply Brief at 8; Tr. at 29 (U.S. Steel argues that treatment of POSAM’s “investment management” expenses should not be based on their characterization by POSCO).
Further,
Aramide
cannot possibly be read as broadly as U.S. Steel suggests, to require that
all
G
&
A expenses must necessarily be included in the calculation of indirect selling expenses,
in every case.
The Government also distinguishes
Ar-amide
from this case on its facts. Commerce concluded that the investment management function in this case was totally unrelated to sales of subject merchandise, “in contrast to the situation in
Aramide
..., relied upon by U.S. Steel, where the respondent attempted to remove financial services expenses from the calculation of indirect selling expensеs solely because they were ‘of a corporate-wide administrative nature.’ ”
See
Def.’s Brief at 12-13
(quoting Aramide,
U.S. Steel disputes Commerce’s determination that the investment management function here lacks even an indirect relationship to POSAM’s sales, and does not belong in the pool of expenses used to calculate the indirect selling expenses ratio. See generally Pl.’s Brief at 12-13; Pl.’s Reply Brief at 7, 9, 10-11; Tr. at 11-12, 28-29, 34, 39-40, 66-68, 89-92. However, U.S. Steel has pointed to nothing to cast doubt on the agency’s finding that POSAM’s investment management function is wholly distinct from POSAM’s sales function and does not support or confer a benefit on sales, and thus should be excluded from the calculation of indirect selling expenses (unlike G & A expenses— such as human resources and accounting— which, in fact, do support or benefit sales).
As POSCO explained, and as Commerce concluded, the critical, distinguishing fact here is that POSAM is not only a sales organization. Unlike the typical U.S. sell
POSAM’s investment management function provided no conventional “investment management” services, generated no sales revenue whatsoever, did not — either directly or indirectly — support POSAM’s sales function, and, indeed, hаd no relationship whatsoever with POSAM’s sales function (direct or indirect), except that the two otherwise separate and distinct business units shared certain common expenses, including expenses for, inter alia, supervisory and administrative support personnel, rent, travel, communications, and depreciation. See POSCO Brief at 11-12, 17, 18; Def.’s Brief at 12; Tr. at 19-20, 22-23, 23-24, 26, 41-42, 44, 46, 60, 78, 80, 91-92.
As the Government notes, U.S. Steel is correct that “the managing of a company’s investments is an activity that can be included as an indirect selling expense.”
See
Def.’s Brief at 12
(citing
Pl.’s Brief at 12). But the “investment management” function here is a very different animal. And investment management expenses should be excluded from the pool of indirect selling expenses where — as here — the investment management function is “unrelated to
the sale of subject merchandise.” See
Def.’s Brief at 12 (emphasis added)
(citing NSK,
U.S. Steel claims at one point in its briefs that POSAM’s investment management expenses should be included in
In its final challenge to Commerce’s exclusion of POSAM’s “investment management” expenses in the agency’s calculation of indirect selling expenses, U.S. Steel — in the course of oral argument — challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. U.S. Steel contends, in essence, that the record is devoid of evidence to support Commerce’s conclusions about the actual function of the investment manager and the absence of any benefit to POSAM’s sales function. According to U.S. Steel, there is no evidence here that POSAM’s investment management function differs in any way from the investment management functions at typical U.S. selling affiliates in other, similar cases (where investment management expenses are generally treated as part of G & A expenses, and included in the pool of indirect selling expenses for allocation to sales of subject merchandise). See Tr. at 11-12, 39-40, 66-68, 89-91; cf. PL’s Brief át 12-13 (arguing that “virtually every company has employees dedicated to ‘managing investments’ ”).
U.S. Steel is simply wrong. The evidence on POSAM’s “investment management” function may be somewhat thin, and a bit cryptic. But that evidence is also undisputed, and — under the circumstances — more than sufficient to constitute “substantial evidence” to support Commerce’s decision to exclude “investment management” expenses from the pool used to calculate POSAM’s indirect selling expenses. See POSCO Letter to Commerce (Aug. 4, 2006) (Conf.Doc. No. 74) at 2-5; POSCO First Supplemental Questionnaire Response (May 23, 2006) (Conf.Doc. No. 46) at Exh. 27; POSCO Second Supplemental Questionnaire Response (July 26, 2006) (Conf.Doc. No. 66) at 4-5, Exh. 9 (including POSAM’s Organization Chart, Job Descriptions and Legal Structure); POSCO Section C Response (Dec. 2, 2005) (Conf.Doc. No. 11) at Exh. C — 18; see also Tr. at 41-44, 55-57, 91-92; POSCO Brief at 11-12,17; Def.’s Brief at 12.
The substantial evidence test “requires only that there be evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
See Cleo Inc. v. United States,
In addition to its criticism of Commerce’s exclusion of investment management expenses from the calculation of indirect selling expenses, U.S. Steel also attributes some of the alleged “distortion” to the use of payroll “to allocate [common] expenses that bore no rela
But U.S. Steel’s analysis is inherently flawed. As discussed above, U.S. Steel ignores the fact that, as Commerce found, POSAM’s investment management function generated no sales revenue, and did not even indirectly support or benefit PO-SAM’s sales of merchandise (whether subject or not). See generally POSCO Brief at 11-12, 17-18; Def.’s Brief at 12; Tr. at 19-20, 22, 26, 44, 46, 91-92. Further, because POSAM’s executives and administrative staff support and have responsibility for all personnel, Commerce reasonably concluded that it was appropriate to allocate the payroll expenses for executive and administrative personnel in direct proportion to the salaries of the employees that they supervised and/or supported — including those employees who were responsible solely for the sales of non-subject merchandise, as well as the individual devoted exclusively to non-selling (“investment management”) activities, who had nothing to do with sales of any merchandise, subject or not. See POSCO Brief at 17-18.
U.S. Steel launches similar attacks on Commerce’s allocation of assorted other “common expenses.”
See generally
Pl.’s Brief at 15-17.
16
But, again, the payroll
In a typical case, the U.S. sales affiliate is dedicated solely to sales of merchandise (whether both subject and non-subject merchandise, or subject merchandise alone). See, e.g., Tr. at 75. In such a case, it is generally reаsonable to use the relative sales value methodology to allocate indirect selling expenses to, inter alia, sales of subject merchandise. Id. at 75-76. But — as discussed herein — this is not a typical case; so application of the relative sales value methodology here made little sense.
In this case, the U.S. sales affiliate, PO-SAM, is also engaged in non-selling activity — specifically, the management of two POSAM subsidiaries, a function that did not support and conferred no benefit on
Commerce had no choice but to use some other methodology to properly account for the expenses associated with PO-SAM’s non-selling function, because the relative sales methodology was not designed to do so. Under the circumstances, it was neither illogical nor unreasonable to begin with another fact that makes this case somewhat unusual — the fact that PO-SAM’s relatively small staff and the discrete nature of each staffer’s responsibilities made it possible not to allocate (as in the typical case) but, in fact, to specifically assign personnel salaries to three categories, depending on individuals’ responsibilities: (1) sales of subject merchandise; (2) sales of non-subject merchandise; and (3) non-selling activities (i.e., management of POSAM’s two subsidiaries). Commerce then excluded the salaries of those engaged in the sales of non-subject merchandise, as well as the salary of the “investment manager” who managed POSAM’s subsidiaries, because the activities of those individuals either did not relate to sales of subject merchandise or did not relate to sales of merchandise (whether subject or not), and thus were not properly included in the calculation of the indirect selling expenses ratio for subject merchandise.
The specific assignment of salaries (discussed above) disposed of a significant percentage of POSAM’s total expenses, another somewhat distinctive fact. What remained to be accounted for were the “common expenses.” Commerce could not properly treat those common expenses as though they related exclusively to sales of subject and non-subject merchandise, because they were shared (i.e., consumed in part) by POSAM’s investment manager. To determine the amount of common expenses attributable to the sales of subject merchandise, Commerce had no choice but to determine some means of accounting for the common expenses consumed by the investment manager (as well as the common expenses consumed by those individuals who sold non-subject merchandise). Particularly given the fact of the specificity with which personnel salaries were assigned in this case, it was neither illogical nor unreasonable for Commerce to decide to allocate POSAM’s common expenses in accordance with the first step of the process — that is, in proportion to the very specific assignment of the salaries of individual POSAM personnel to the company’s three activities.
While U.S. Steel criticizes Commerce’s use of payroll to allocate common expenses in this case, a certain measure of imprecision is inherent in the allocation process; common expenses are allocated for the very reason that they — by definition — cannot be precisely assigned. Further, it is a fact that a number of major common expenses, such as rent, are fixed. Moreover, as discussed herein, in a number of instances where U.S. Steel argues that some particular common expense does not necessarily vary in proportion to salary, it is equally true that the expense does not necessarily vary relative to sales. The relative sales value methodology that U.S. Steel advocates thus would be no more specific than the payroll methodology that Commerce used. The bottom line is that there is no record evidence
here
— none— to indicate that POSAM’s common expenses were incurred in proportion to
B. U.S. Steel’s Factors Assertedly Used to Evaluate Alternative Methodologies
U.S. Steel maintains that its claims of distortion are supported not only by the specific examples addressed above, but also by three factors which U.S. Steel contends are “normally considered and applied by [Commerce] itself in determining the appropriateness of an alternative allocation methodology.” See Pl.’s Brief at 17; see also id. at 17-18; Pl.’s Reply Brief at 2, 5-14. 17 As set forth below, however, U.S. Steel again fails to show that Commerce’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence or was otherwise not in accordance with law.
1. Results of Relative Sales Value Methodology versus Alternative Methodology
U.S. Steel points to the “difference in results between the relative sales value methodology and the alternative methodology in question” as one factor that Commerce has considered in the past in determining whether an alternative methodology is distortive.
See
Pl.’s Brief at 17
('citing
Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Administrative Review of Gray Portland Cement and Clinker From Mexico' — August 31, 2001 through July 31, 2002,
As the Government points out, U.S. Steel does not identify any flaw or error in POSCO’s reported data. See Def.’s Brief at 15-16. Nor does U.S. Steel do anything to explain why a difference in results between the two methodologies demonstrates distortion — much less why it means that the payroll methodology was distortive. See Def.’s Brief at 15-16. Instead, U.S. Steel simply states the ratio that results from each of the two methodologies, and summarily concludes that “the payroll methodology is distortive.” See Pl.’s Brief at 17.
The Government notes that it should come as no surprise that different methodologies produce different results, and states that different results do not necessarily mean that one methodology is distortive.
See
Def.’s Brief at 16. The Government pointedly observes that there would be little point in seeking to use a
new
methodology if that methodology could be used only if its results mirrored those of Commerce’s default methodology.
See
Def.’s Brief at 16. In sum and substance, U.S. Steel is arguing that the results produced by the payroll methodology are different from those produced by the
U.S. Steel’s invocation of Clinker from Mexico is also unavailing. In Clinker from Mexico, Commerce concluded that a particular alternative methodology was not distortive, because it produced results similar to those produced by the agency’s default “relative sales value” methodology.
See
Clinker from Mexico,
Obviously, Commerce was aware of the differеnce in results between the payroll methodology that it used in the Final Results and the relative sales value methodology, which was used in the Preliminary Results. As outlined above, Commerce’s decision to use the payroll methodology cannot be said to have been unreasonable. By using the payroll methodology here, Commerce properly sought to exclude from the calculation of indirect selling expenses those payroll and common expenses that were attributable to POSAM’s sales of non-subject merchandise, as well as its management of investments (its non-selling activities). In contrast, if Commerce had used the relative sales value methodology here, the calculation of indirect selling expenses would have included both expenses related to sales of non-subject merchandise and expenses related to POSAM’s non-selling activities. See generally POSCO Brief at 18-19.
To be sure, POSCO’s indirect selling expenses ratio would have been higher had it been calculated using the relative sales value methodology, as U.S. Steel advocates. But U.S. Steel has advanced no argument or evidence to indicate that the mere difference in results between the methodologies renders the payroll methodology distortive in this case.
2. Disproportionate Allocation of ISEs to Norir-Subject Merchandise
According to U.S. Steel, “[t]he fact that the payroll methodology allocates [indirect selling expenses] disproportionately to [non-subject merchandise] is another factor that illustrates its distortive nature.”
See
Pl.’s Brief at 17-18 (final alteration in the original)
(citing
Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Antidumping Duty Administrativе Review on Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Spain — March 5, 1998 through August 31, 1999,
Specifically, U.S. Steel contends that— because sales of non-subject merchandise constituted only a certain percentage of POSAM’s total sales — the extent of the
As the Government points out, U.S. Steel’s reliance on Wire Rod from Spain is simply misplaced.
See
Def.’s Brief at 17; Pl.’s Brief at 17
(quoting
Wire Rod from Spain,
In Wire Rod from Spain, a respondent based its proposed allocation methodology upon the hours that its employees worked.
See
Wire Rod from Spain,
In contrast, as the Government observes, here there is no claim — by U.S. Steel, or anyone else — that POSAM’s payroll data are in any way inaccurate. See Def.’s Brief at 17. Nor has U.S. Steel identified any particular flaw in the payroll methodology as it was used in this case, except to assert generally that the results of that methodology appear to be disproportionate. See Def.’s Brief at 17. Unlike Wire Rod from Spain, Commerce in this case was satisfied that POSCO’s alternafive allocation methodology — using PO-SAM’s uncontested payroll data — was not distortive. See Def.’s Brief at 17; see also sections III.A & III.B.2, supra (analyzing and rejecting, on the merits, U.S. Steel’s claim of distortion based on the mere fact that POSAM’s sales of non-subject merchandise constituted only a certain percentage of its sales, a figure that U.S. Steel seeks to contrast sharply with the percentage of indirect selling expenses allocated to those sales). U.S. Steel’s criticisms thus cast no doubt on either Commerce’s methodology or the Final Results in this case.
3. Relationship Between Nature of Expenses and Their Allocation
The third and final factor which U.S. Steel contends is “normally considered and applied by [Commerce] itself in determining the appropriateness of an alternative allocation methodology” is whether common expenses are allocated in “direct relation to the manner in which [they were] incurred.”
See
Pl.’s Brief at 18
(quoting Micron Technology,
U.S. Steel argues that, in using the payroll methodology here, Commerce’s allocation of POSAM’s common expenses “bears no relation to the manner in which such expenses were incurred.”
See
PL’s Brief at 18;
see also
PL’s Reply Brief at 2-3, 12, 14. In an attempt to illustrate its point, U.S. Steel singles out one particular type of expense included among POSAM’s common expenses, and argues that “nothing in
Although it is true that — -as U.S. Steel asserts — the particular type of expenses that U.S. Steel cites as an example does not necessarily directly “inerease[ ] as ... payroll increase^],” the same thing can be said of relative sales value: The particular type of expenses that U.S. Steel cites as an example also does not necessarily increase as sales increase. In short, the asserted infirmity that U.S. Steel highlights in the payroll methodology plagues the relative sales value methodology as well (and, indeed, is an issue that is largely inherent in the nature of common expenses and in the process of allocation). U.S. Steel thus has failed to identify a flaw specific to the payroll methodology, or its use in this case, which would be cured by the use оf the methodology that U.S. Steel advocates.
Even more fundamentally, there is no truth to the basic premise of U.S. Steel’s argument — that is, U.S. Steel’s claim that an alternative allocation methodology is legally permissible only if all indirect selling expenses are allocated in a way that bears “a direct relation” to the nature of those expenses, In support of that proposition, U.S. Steel points to
Micron Technology,
The
Micron Technology
court concluded that the three allocation methodologies proposed by the respondent during the administrative review there at issue were “more appropriate” than Commerce’s default methodology, because each of the alternative methodologies bore “a direct relation to the manner in which the ... expense [at issue was] incurred.”
See Micron Technology,
U.S. Steel thus engages in the same sort of faulty logic that characterized its analysis of Clinker from Mexico, discussed in section III.B.l, above. That the alternative methodologies at issue in
Micron Technology
bore “a direct relation to the manner in which ... [the expenses at issue were] incurred” may have been
sufficient
to warrant the approval of those methodologies in
the specific case
there before the court. But that is not to say that such a “direct relation” is
necessary
in
this case,
much less
all cases,
as U.S. Steel maintains.
See
PL’s Brief at 18
(quoting Micron Technology,
C. Commerce’s Change of Methodology
Lastly, U.S. Steel faults Commerce for changing the methodology used by the agency to allocate POSAM’s indirect selling expenses. See generally Pl.’s Brief at 11-12, 13. U.S. Steel emphasizes that Commerce used the relative sales value methodology in prior administrative reviews involving POSCO, and, indeed, that POSCO itself advocated the use of that methodology in the tenth administrative review. See Pl.’s Brief at 11-12. In addition, U.S. Steel seeks to make much of the fact that Commerce used the relative sales value methodology in the Preliminary Results in the administrative review at issue here. See Pl.’s Brief at 13. U.S. Steel argues that Commerce “changed allocation methodologies between the preliminary and final results not based on any new evidence, but based on documents that were provided to the [agency] well before the preliminary results,” and that the documents therefore cannot justify Commerce’s decision to change methodologies for the Final Results. See Pl.’s Brief at 13; see also id. at 6.
Contrary to U.S. Steel’s implication, the mere fact of Commerce’s use of the relative sales value methodology in prior administrative reviews did not obligate the agency to continue to use that methodology fоr all future reviews.
See generally
POSCO Brief at 19-20. It is well-established that Commerce is re
Further, there was a key change in POSCO’s operations between the periods covered by prior administrative reviews and the period covered by this review. See POSCO Brief at 20. 24 Particularly given the different facts in the twelfth administrative review, it was not unreasonable for Commerce to use a different allocation methodology, to seek to achieve a more specific and more accurate indirect selling expenses ratio.
U.S. Steel’s complaint that Commerce switched methodologies between the Preliminary Results and the Final Results in this administrative review is no more well-founded.
See generally
POSCO Brief at 20-21. It has long been recognized that Commerce is not bound by the positions taken or the methodologies employed in its preliminary determinations.
See, e.g., Peer Bearing Co. v. United States,
In this case, as U.S. Steel emphasizes, Commerce had the requisite documentation in hand before the Preliminary Results issued.
See
Pl.’s Brief at 6, 13. Nevertheless, because Commerce had not yet had an opportunity to digest that information or to carefully analyze POSCO’s proposed payroll methodology, the agency relied on its default methodology — the relative sales value methodology — for purposes of the Preliminary Results.
See
Def.’s Brief at 3-4, 11;
see also
Decision Memorandum at 45. After the Prelimi
IV. Conclusion
For all the reasons set forth above, Commerce’s well-reasoned decision — based on the specific facts of this case — to exclude POSAM’s “investment management” expenses from the pool of indirect selling expenses and to allocate those expenses based on payroll data (rather than relative sales value) was supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law.
U.S. Steel’s Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record therefore must be denied, and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Notice of Final Results of the Twelfth Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty Order on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea, 72 Fed.Reg. 13,086 (March 20, 2007), as amended at 72 Fed. Reg. 20,815, 20,816 (April 26, 2007), must be sustained.
Notes
. Commerce’s Final Results were amended to correct a ministerial error in the calculation of the dumping margin for Union Steel Manufacturing Co., Ltd. See Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea; Notice of Amended Final Results of the Twelfth Administrative Review, 72 Fed.Reg. 20,815, 20,816 (April 26, 2007).
. Because the administrative record in this action includes confidential information, two versions of that record were filed with the Court. Documents in the public version of the administrative record are numbered sequentially, and are cited herein as “Pub. Doc. No. -.” Documents in the confidential version of the administrative record are also numbered sequentially, but differеntly from the public version, and are cited herein as “Conf. Doc. No.-.” The public version of the administrative record consists of copies of all documents in the record, with all confidential information redacted. The confidential version of the record consists of complete, unredacted copies of only those documents that include confidential information.
. As originally filed, U.S. Steel's Complaint was not limited to POSCO. U.S. Steel also challenged Commerce’s calculation of the indirect selling expense ratio as to Union Steel Manufacturing Company, Ltd. See Complaint, Count II. However, U.S. Steel subsequently dismissed its Complaint as to Union Steel. See Order of Dismissal in Part (Jan. 22, 2008).
. All citations to federal statutes are to the 2000 edition of the United States Code. Similarly, all citations to federal regulations are to the 2005 edition of the Code of Federal Regulations.
. Specifically, read in context, 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(l)(D) provides:
(d) Additional adjustments to constructed export price
For purposes of this section, the price used to establish constructed export price shall also be reduced by—
(1) the amount of any of the following expenses generally incurred by or for the account of the producer or exporter, or the affiliated seller in the United States, in selling the subject merchandise (or subject merchandise to which value has been added)—
(A) commissions for selling the subject merchandise in the United States;
(B) expenses that result from, and bear a direct relationship to, the sale, such as credit expenses, guarantees and warranties;
(C) any selling expenses that the seller pays on behalf of the purchaser; and
(D)any selling expenses not deducted under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
19. U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (emphases added).
See Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 824 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4164 ("SAA”) (stating that 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(l)(D) "provides for the deduction of indirect selling expenses"); see also 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d) (setting forth Congress' intent that Statement of Administrative Action is to be "regarded as an authoritative expression by the United States concerning the interpretation and application of the Uruguay Round Agreements and [the Uruguay Round Agreements] Act in any judicial proceeding in which a question arises concerning such interpretation or application.”).
. In promulgating its regulations, Commerce cited language in the Statement of Administrative Action (“SAA”) that instructs the agency to permit companies to allocate direct selling expenses when transaction-specific reporting is not possible, provided that the allocation method used does not result in inaccuracies or distortions.
See
Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties: Final Rule, 62 Fed.Reg. 27,296, 27,346 (May 19, 1997) (Preamble)
(quoting
Statement of Administrative Action). Although the statement in the SAA focused on
direct
selling expenses, Com
. Commerce’s regulations further provide that the agency will not reject a method for the allocation of indirect selling expenses merely because the method may include expenses incurred in connection with the sale of non-subject merchandise. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g)(4).
. POSAM has a "very, very small” workforce — a total of only [ ] emplоyees. See Tr. at 24-25.[] of the [] individuals sold exclusively subject merchandise, [ ] sold both subject and non-subject merchandise, [] individuals were dedicated to sales of non-subject merchandise, one individual (referred to as the "investment manager”) was responsible for managing two POSAM subsidiaries, [] executives were responsible for oversight and management of the operations of the company as a whole, and [] general administrative personnel provided support services for the company. See Tr. at 16, 20, 50, 55-57, 82; PL's Brief at 3 n.l.
. While POSCO's proposed payroll methodology yielded an indirect selling expenses ratio of []%, Commerce's application of the relative sales value methodology in the Preliminary Results produced a ratio of []%. See POSCO Brief at 3; PI.'s Reply Brief at 5.
. Specifically, the payroll methodology allocated []% of POSAM's total indirect selling expenses to sales of subject merchandise, which accounted for []% of POSAM's total sales. See Pl.'s Brief at 4, 14-15 & Figure 1; Pl.'s Reply Brief at 2-3; Def.'s Brief at 15; POSCO Brief at 17.
. Specifically, the payroll methodology allocated []% of POSAM's total indirect selling expenses to sales of non-subject merchandise, which accounted for []% of POSAM's total sales. See Pl.'s Brief at 14 & Figure 1; Pl.’s Reply Brief at 3; POSCO Brief at 17.
.As discussed in note 8 above, POSAM's workforce was "very, very small” — a total of only [] employees.
See
Tr. at 24-25, 55-57, 78. Moreover, POSAM's total payroll constituted []% of POSAM's total expenses.
See
POSCO Brief at 13-14, 15. And the salary of POSAM's "investment manager” constituted
.
See, e.g., NSK Ltd. v. United States,
. See also Tr. at 17 (where Government notes that "the characterization as an investment manager is what’s causing the confusion here”); id. at 19-21 & 46 (where POSCO and Government explain that POSAM’s "investment manager” performs a function that is not performed at typical U.S. sales affiliates); id. at 20-21 (where POSCO explains that PO-SAM’s "investment management” function is analogous to "a private equity firm which buys companies and has someone who manages [them]”; POSAM's "investment manager” is "not like a day trader sitting at a computer, ... [and] moving the company's money around to ... buy stocks and bonds”); id. at 41-42 (where Government explains that "[i]f [POSAM’s investment manager] were ... a day trader, ... if he [was] ... managing foreign currency trades for the entire corporation or something like that, there’s no question that [the 'investment management' function here] would be a G & A expense that should be allocated across the company because it would benefit the entire company”— but "what [POSAM's investment manager's] doing is managing solely [the two POSAM subsidiaries]”); id. at 46 (where Government explains that POSAM's "investment manager” is "doing ... the actual management function of these subsidiaries within the U.S.,” but that — in a typical case — "investment management” refers to "an overall G & A function that’s benefitting the entire corporation because someone being referred to as an investment manager might be managing bank accounts or stock portfolios for the corporation or for a multi-national corporation handling ... foreign currency exchanges, moving ... company bonds or company assets between banks in different countries. Something like that would benefit the sales of subject merchandise and non-subject merchandise and would properly be considered G & A.”); id. at 56-57 (where POSCO explains that POSAM's investment manager "is not an investment manager who’s managing stocks, doing hedge funds, et cetera ”).
. Specifically, Commerce allocated []% of the payroll expenses for POSAM's executives and administrative staff to activities other than sales of subject merchandise (i.e., to sales of non-subject merchandise and to management of POSAM’s subsidiaries), which accounted for []% of POSAM's total sales revenue. See Pl.’s Brief at 14-15 & Figure 2. But see POSCO Brief at 17-18.
. U.S. Steel targets communication expenses as a particularly "vivid” illustration of the alleged distortion, asserting that it is "inconceivable” that sales of subject merchаndise consumed only the allocated percentage of communication expenses, given the magnitude of the contribution of sales of subject merchandise to total sales. See Pl.’s Brief at 15 & Figure 2. Specifically, U.S. Steel emphasizes that Commerce allocated “[] of total communication expenses” to sales of subject merchandise, which accounted for [ ]% of PO-SAM’s total sales. See PL’s Brief at 15 & Figure 2. But see POSCO Brief at 18.
U.S. Steel further alleges the existence of "significant distortions” in Commerce's allocation of common expenses to sales of non-subject merchandise. See Pl.'s Brief at 16-17 & Figures 1-2. Specifically, U.S. Steel points to the fact that Commerce allocated to sales of subject merchandise and to sales of non-subject merchandise common expenses (and communication expenses in particular) which were generally comparable, even though sales of subject merchandise and sales of non-subject merchandise make very different contributions to POSAM’s total sales (i.e., []% and []%, respectively). See Pl.’s Brief at 16-17 & Figures 1-2; Tr. at 37-38. But see POSCO Brief at 18.
Criticizing Commerce’s use of the payroll methodology to allocate communication expenses, U.S. Steel emphasizes that, as a matter of pure logic, communications expenses do not necessarily vary in proportion to salaries. See Tr. at 65. But it is equally true that, as a matter of pure logic, communications expenses do not necessarily vary in proportion to relative sales value either. See Tr. at 61. Certainly U.S. Steel has not identified even a scintilla of evidence to prove that, in this case, communications exрenses increased with the relative value of sales. Thus, as to this point, there would be no advantage to use of the relative sales value methodology that U.S. Steel advocates.
Nor is there any record evidence here to support U.S. Steel's assertion that selling subject merchandise incurs disproportionately higher communications expenses than does selling non-subject merchandise (or, for that matter, managing POSAM’s two subsidiaries).
See
Tr. at 54-55, 86-87. U.S. Steel seeks to make much of evidence of frequent communication between POSAM, its U.S. customers, and its corporate parent in Korea concerning
Moreover, contrary to U.S. Steel's claims, the mere fact of higher sales value alone does not compel the conclusion that the individuals selling subject merchandise made more or longer telephone calls than the individuals selling non-subject merchandise. See Tr. at 63-64. Given that there were equal numbers of POSAM employees selling subject merchandise and non-subject merchandise, U.S. Steel's implication seems to be that one sales group was feverishly working the phones, while — as POSCO puts it — the other sales group played solitaire on their computers every day. See Tr. at 63-64, 82-83. Among its several grave flaws, U.S. Steel's theory fails to acknowledge that it is possible to make a very high value sale with a single phone call. See Tr. at 52-53, 88-89 (highlighting role of price of merchandise being sold).
U.S. Steel also disputes the reasonableness of the travel and entertainment expenses that Commerce allocated to POSAM’s investment manager, as compared to the travel and entertainment expenses allocated to "the entire sales force for POSAM's subject merchandise.” See Pl.'s Brief at 16 (emphasis added); id. at Figure 2. Specifically, U.S. Steel notes that Commerce allocated to the investment manager travel and entertainment expenses totaling [] the travel and entertainment expenses for that sales force. See Pl.'s Brief at 16 & Figure 2. But see POSCO Brief at 18.
What U.S. Steel conspicuously fails to note, however, is that "the entire sales force for POSAM’s subject merchandise” is [] people. See Tr. at 61. Thus, distilled to its essence, U.S. Steel's complaint is simply that the payroll methodology allocated to POSAM's investment manager a[] share of travel and entertainment expenses than was allocated to [] who sold subject merchandise. Reframed in that fashion, U.S. Steel's claim hardly screams "distortion.” Further, U.S. Steel cannot dispute that the investment manager incurred travel and entertainment expenses in connection with his management of POSAM's two subsidiaries. See Tr. at 76. Moreover, it is uncontroverted that the investment manager's salary constituted []% of POSAM’s total payroll. See POSCO Brief at 17; Tr. at 58-59, 81. It would seem to be a not unreasonable assumption that a higher-compensated employee would spend a greater sum on travel and entertainment. But, in any event, there is no record evidence to indicate that sales of merchandise (whether subject or not) incurred travel expenses that were disproportionate (either higher or lower) relative to those incurred in the management of PO-SAM's subsidiaries. Tr. at 86. In short, this claim of distortion by U.S. Steel — like its other, similar claims — is neither supported by evidence nor compelled by logic.
. U.S. Steel makes no claim that its asserted factors have been compiled — much less collectively memorialized or codified — anywhere. Instead, U.S. Steel apparently has distilled the three factors itself, from various sources.
. Specifically, the payroll methodology yielded an indirect selling expenses ratio of []%, while the relative sales value methodology results in a ratio of []%. See PL’s Brief at 17; Pl.’s Reply Brief at 5.
. See also Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties: Final Rule, 62 Fed.Reg. 27,296, 27,348 (May 19, 1997) (Preamble) (stating that an allocation method that includes non-subject merchandise is distortive when expenses are "incurred ... disproportionately on the out-of-scope or the in-scope merchandise" — but also emphasizing that "there is no basis for irrebuttably presuming such disproportionality without regard to the facts of a specific case”) (cited in PL's Brief at 17-18).
. In particular, U.S. Steel notes that the payroll methodology allocated []% of PO-SAM's indirect selling expenses to sales of non-subject merchandise, even though such sales constituted only []% of the company's total sales. See Pl.’s Brief at 18; Pl.'s Reply Brief at 10-11. U.S. Steel contrasts that observation with the fact that the payroll methodology allocated only []% of the indirect selling expenses to sales of subject merchandise, which make up []% of total sales. See PL’s Reply Brief at 11.
. U.S. Steel focuses specifically on repair and maintenance expenses. See PL's Brief at 18; Pl.’s Reply Brief at 12.
. Finally, as the Government emphasizes, “Commerce has accepted indirect selling expense allocation methodologies similar to POSCO's in previous reviews.”
See
Def.'s Brief at 18
(citing
Issues Memorandum for the Antidumping Duty Investigations of Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from the Republic of Korea,
U.S. Steel seizes on Stainless Steel from Korea (one of the cases that the Government cites), and argues that payroll information was used there only to allocate
"salary type expenses." See
Pl.’s Reply Brief at 13-14
(iquoting
Stainless Steel from Korea,
. U.S. Steel appears to argue in the alternative that — even assuming that none of the three alleged factors that it identifies is sufficient to carry the day — "the three factors considered as a whole conclusively demonstrate that the payroll methodology is distorted.” See PL’s Reply Brief at 5 (emphasis added); see also id. at 6. As set forth here in section III.B, none of the three asserted factors supports U.S. Steel's case. And this is one instance where the whole is no greater than the sum of its parts.
. Specifically, during the period covered by the tenth administrative review, a substantial portion of POSAM’s expenses related to sales to POSAM’s subsidiaries.
See
Issues and Decisions for the Final Results of the Anti-dumping Duty New Shipper Review and the Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea: Tenth Administrative Review (2002-2003),