437 P.2d 199 | Utah | 1968
Lead Opinion
This case is here on petition for rehearing of Case No. 10703, this Court, United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Company v. Nielsen, and the Industrial Commission of Utah, 19 Utah 2d 239, 430 P.2d 162 (1967).
We reaffirm our decision in that case. In doing so, we subscribe to the concurring opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Crockett with
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring) :
A rehearing was granted to re-examine the contention that the decision previously made
The particular fact situation here presented has an important bearing on the decision in this case. The employee, Mr. Nielsen, received his weekly award for his original injury to his knee and then accepted a lump sum settlement for the remainder so he could go into business for himself. After the lapse of about 13 years, he made a further claim upon the employer, who paid for his further surgery without objection. The disability to his arm, rated at 13 per cent, developed because of improper handling during the surgery. The attempt to extend coverage as far as this case does, is reminiscent of the old axiom that hard cases sometimes make bad law. It requires but little reflection to realize that if individual employees can impose undue and unreasonable burdens upon employers, this in the long run is hurtful to employees. Enterprises which provide employment must be treated fairly so they can operate on a solid foundation in order to create and continue jobs for their employees. Thus in the ultimate, what is fair and just for employers redounds to the benefit of everyone, including employees.
A fact which ought to be regarded as of controlling importance is that, as pointed out in our prior decision, “Nielsen, in accepting the lump sum settlement at his own instance and request, did so in exchange for and in lieu of any six-year compensation to which he would be entitled, thus exhausting his claim.” Despite the fact that the law in the field of workmen’s compensation is unique in some respects, the parties are still free to enter into and be bound by their contracts. No good
Nevertheless, in view of the total problem here presented, which includes the controversy which has developed over the interpretation and application of the statutes replied on by the respective parties, I deem it advisable to make some observations with respect thereto.
The requirement that an applicant for workmen’s compensation must file his claim within three years as provided by Section 35-1-99 U.C.A.1953, is not here involved.
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, * * *.
Whereas, the section relied on by plaintiff as indicating to the contrary, that there is a limitation to the time in which such claims can be made, is Section 35-1-66, which provides:
Where the injury causes partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during such disability and for a period of not to exceed six years from the date of the injury, * * * [compensation as stated],
Without repeating them here, it will be seen from the discussions in the prevailing and the dissenting opinions in the prior decision, that if the above sections are looked at separately, different conclusions can be arrived at as to limitation of time for making supplemental claims for workmen’s compensation. But it is true here, as it is practically everywhere in the law, that all of the law is not stated and cannot be stated in one provision. These statutes must be looked at together, in the light of established rules of statutory construction, with a view to reconciling any apparent conflict and giving each of them effect according to their purpose insofar as that can be accomplished.
In considering which of the above statutes was intended to be given preference in the instant situation it is appropriate to examine the alternative effects. If Section 78 prevails as defendant contends, once the employee has filed his claim within three years, there is no limitation of time whatsoever in which to file any supplemental claim. This has the advantage that, when an employee has a recurrence of disability stemming from the original injury, he is
Returning attention to the language of the statutes in question: It will be noted that Section 78 is speaking somewhat generally about the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission to deal with claims before it, but does not say any particular duration of time in which that can be done. There is nothing in that section inconsistent with the idea that it means that the Commission may “from time to time make such changes with respect to former orders” which are within limitations of time otherwise prescribed. To ascertain the limitation of time, we then look at the language of Section 35-1-66, which states that, “the employee shall receive, during such disability and for a period of not to exceed six years from the date of the injury,” compensation as listed therein. This language does speak specifically about time and seems quite plain in its meaning.
On the basis of the considerations I have discussed above, where the applicant had
. 19 Utah 2d 239, 430 P.2d 162.
. See Jones v. Industrial Comm. et al., 17 Utah 2d 28, 29, 404 P.2d 27.
. That a statute dealing with a subject in specific terms takes preference over a general one see State ex rel. Public Service Comm. et al. v. Southern Pacific Co., 95 Utah 84, 79 P.2d 25 (1938); State v. Burnham, 87 Utah 445, 49 P.2d 963 (1935); Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 423, 209 P. 207 (1922).
. That a later enacted statute generally takes precedence over a former one see Becker Products Co. v. State Tax Comm., 89 Utah 587, 58 P.2d 36 (1936); Neldon v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 P. 524 (1899); Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax Comm., 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1958).
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
I dissent. In addition to the reasons given in my dissent when this case was originally before us, I desire to make a few comments.
In the concurring opinion the statement is made that Mr. Nielsen had accepted a lump sum settlement so he could go into business. I cannot see that the transaction has anything to do with the matter now before us. He simply took a discounted lump sum value of the money he would have received had he taken it on the weekly basis. That money was for the injury which he then had. Now he has a permanent partial disability which is directly attributable to the prior injury. He filed his claim, and the Industrial Commission retains jurisdiction to make changes just to take care of a situation like that confronting Mr. Nielsen today. The plaintiff herein had no qualms about paying the surgical bill made necessary by the original injury, although some 13 years had elapsed. There is no claim made that this permanent disablement is not a result of the old injury. The claim is simply made that when a period of six years has elapsed since the date of the original injury, the insurer just does not have to pay anything to the injured workman.
The statement is made that the legislature perhaps should give its attention to an amendment to the statute. The legislature has already given its attention to the statute, and it is only this decision which hurts our conscience. We should hesitate to tell the legislature to follow Isaiah 35:8 and make the law so plain that “wayfaring men, * * * shall not err therein.” I think the statute is clear enough as is.
