This is аn appeal from the district court’s granting of a permanent injunction forbidding appellant Diamond “from engаging in or permitting, suffering, or causing, directly or indirectly, any fill or construction operations” on certain salt *159 water tidal marshlands owned by Diamond. Appellant argues that the injunction must be vacated on four separate grounds: (1) the Secretary of the Army or his designate did not request the bringing of this suit, as required by statute; (2) the District Engineer’s granting of a dock permit to appellant in 1965 established a harbor line, and filling shoreward of this line is expressly permitted if begun — as аppellant’s operations were — before 1970; (3) the marsh in question is not part of a navigable waterway and thus falls outside the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers; and (4) appellant’s property is above the mean high tidе line, and the Corps of Engineers has no authority landward of this line. Finding no error in the findings and conclusions of the district cоurt, we affirm.
(1) 33 U.S.C. § 413 makes it the “duty of United States attorneys to vigorously prosecute all offenders against . [sections 401, 403, 404, 406, 407, 408, 409, 411, 549, 686, and 687 of this title]
whenever requested to do so by the Secretary of the Army or by any of the officials hereinafter dеsignated .
,.” (emphasis added). The government brought suit against Mr. Diamond pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §§ 403 and 407. Appellant argues that no person authorized by § 413 requested proceedings against him. It is clear, however, that the United States Attorney’s duty to prevent violations of the law justifies his taking action against illegal fill operations regardless of who brings the violatiоn to his attention. United States v. Interlake Steel Corp., N.D.Ill.1969,
(2) In 1965 appellant sought and obtained a permit to build a walkway and dock on his property. Up until 1970, riparian owners with open pile structures (docks) could fill shoreward from the dock without a permit, as long as their dock marked the boundаry of a designated harbor line. In 1970 the applicable regulation was amended to require a permit for this tyрe of filling, but the new regulation specifically exempted fill operations begun prior to its effective date. 33 C.F.R. § 209.150. Appellant contends that the District Engineer’s approval of his dock in 1965 constituted a de facto designation of а harbor line. Hence, he argues, because he began his fill operations before 1970, he needs no permit.
The government responds that the Regulations provide a specific procedure for designating harbor lines, and no such lines have ever been established around Diamond’s property. Intervenor, State of Georgia, also contends that Diamond is not a riparian owner. The district judge found that “[t]he grant of the permit in 1965 as to the dock facility did not constitute establishment of any harbor line” (App. at 53) and cited United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., D.N.J.1973,
In the case before us thе district judge considered the effect of 33 C.F.R. § 209.-150(b)(2). He held that the evidence showed that harbor lines are designated only in accordance with formal procedures and that no harbor lines have been established in the аrea of Diamond’s property. These conclusions have not been shown to be incorrect. We see nothing in § 209.150 suggesting that the Regulation is concerned with any harbor *160 lines but those established in accordance with the рrocedure set out in § 209.-150(c) and its predecessors. Thus, appellant gained no right to fill the marsh by obtaining the dock permit.
(3) Appellant also contends that Richardson Creek, the body of water adjoining his land, is not navigable аnd thus that the Corps of Engineers has no jurisdiction over it. The district court found as a fact that “Richardson Creek is navigable within the meaning of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407) and the Regulations promulgated pursuant thereto” (App. at 46). Appellant’s main argument here is that Richardson Creek is not navigable because it has no interstate or foreign commerce and is not always navigable in fact. These two tests, however, are not necessarily cоntrolling on legal navigability.
See
United States v. Holland, M.D.Fla.1974,
(4) “[T]he Corps has no power landward of . [the mean high tide line] to regulate . . . [the landowner’s] conduct or force reconstruction of the topography as it existed before he began work.” United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 5 Cir. 1973,
Affirmed.