244 Conn. 513 | Conn. | 1998
Opinion
The dispositive issue in this appeal involving an uninsured motorist arbitration award is whether the parties’ submission to arbitration was unrestricted, where the insurance policy language (1) required the arbitrators to decide whether the insured was “legally entitled to recover damages,” and (2) provided that “local rules of law as to arbitration procedure and evidence will apply.”
The undisputed material facts are as follows. The defendants sought to recover uninsured motorist benefits for the death of their decedent, who was a passenger in a motor vehicle that was involved in an accident and was operated by Brian Thompson. The defendants demanded arbitration of their claim. The plaintiffs and defendants agreed, pursuant to the arbitration clauses contained in three motor vehicle insurance policies issued by the plaintiffs to the decedent’s family,
The arbitrators found that the evidence “clearly established that the motor vehicle operated by . . . Thompson . . . was an uninsured vehicle . . . and
The plaintiffs then applied to the trial court to vacate the arbitration award alleging that the arbitrators had exceeded their powers by: (1) finding the coverage issues in favor of the defendants; (2) finding that the defendants were “legally entitled to recover damages” under the terms of the insurance policies; and (3) failing to comply with the provision of the policies that “ ‘[ljocal rules of law as to [arbitration] procedure and evidence will apply.’ ” The defendants filed an application to confirm the arbitration award, and asked the court to award interest from the date of the arbitration decision.
In the trial court, both parties agreed that the threshold issue was “whether the submission to the arbitrators was restricted or unrestricted,” and they further agreed that if the submission was determined to be unrestricted, then the arbitration award would stand. The plaintiffs claimed that two clauses in the insurance policies rendered the submission restricted, in which case the trial court was required to conduct a de novo review. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the phrase “legally entitled to recover damages” restricted the arbitrators to making their decision according to the prevailing laws of negligence, and that the clause “local rules of law as to arbitration procedure and evidence will
The trial court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ contentions and concluded that the submission was unrestricted. Specifically, that court reasoned that our decision in Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 20-21, 453 A.2d 1158 (1983), controlled the submission at issue, because in that case we concluded that the phrase “legally entitled to recover damages” did not restrict the submission. The trial court also concluded that the phrase “local rules of law as to arbitration procedure and evidence” was ambiguous, and construed the phrase against the plaintiffs, who were the drafters of the insurance policies. Accordingly, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ application to vacate the arbitration award, granted the defendants’ application to confirm the arbitration award, and awarded interest at the statutory rate. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the parties agree, as they did in the trial court, that, if we determine that the submission is unrestricted, then the award of the arbitrators must be sustained. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly concluded that the submission to the arbitration panel was unrestricted. They contend that the two provisions at issue, namely, the phrases “legally entitled to recover” and “local rules of law as to arbitration procedure and evidence apply,” created a restricted submission based on our case law. The defendants argue, to the contrary, that Carroll is the controlling precedent, thus causing this submission to be unrestricted. We agree with the defendants.
“ ‘Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution.’ ” Saturn Construction Co. v. Premier Roofing Co., 238 Conn. 293, 304, 680 A.2d 1274 (1996). “Under an unrestricted submission, the arbitrators’ decision is considered final and binding; thus the courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for errors of law or fact.” American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178, 186, 530 A.2d 171 (1987); Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 189 Conn. 19. The resulting award can be reviewed, however, to determine if the award conforms to the submission. Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 4. “Such a limited scope of judicial review is warranted given the fact that the parties voluntarily bargained for the decision of the arbitrator and, as such, the parties are presumed
In Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 189 Conn. 19 n.5, the insurance policy provided in relevant part: “ ‘If any person making claim hereunder and the Company do not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages ... or do not agree as to the amount of payment which may be owing under this Coverage, then, upon 'written demand of either, the matter . . . shall be settled by arbitration . . . .’” (Emphasis added.) The insurer in Carroll made the identical argument that the plaintiffs make in the present case, namely, that because the arbitrators were required to decide according to law, the submission was restricted and subject to an enhanced standard of review. Id., 19. We concluded in Carroll that “[t]he language of the submission . . . clearly delegates all disputed issues to binding arbitration, and can therefore only be construed as unrestricted.” Id., 20.
Although they acknowledge that the nearly identical language in Carroll was deemed to have created an unrestricted submission, the plaintiffs assert that our subsequent definition of the phrase “ ‘legally entitled to collect damages’ ” in Williams v. State Farm Mutual
As the plaintiffs correctly note, Williams defines the phrase “legally entitled to collect damages” with respect to an uninsured motorist claim. In Williams, we stated that the phrase “ ‘[l]egally entitled to collect damages from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle,’ means ... (1) that the other motorist was uninsured; (2) that the other motorist was legally liable under the prevailing law; and (3) the amount of liability.” Id., 367-68. The issue in Williams, however, did not involve the question of the scope of judicial review of an arbitration award but, rather, involved a choice of law issue. Id., 365. Thus, it was in the context of determining whether the substantive law of New York or Connecticut controlled that we defined the phrase. Because it was not relevant to the resolution of the appeal, we did not cite to Carroll in that decision.
Moreover, the fact that we gave the phrase further substantive content in Williams does not convert the submission in the present case into a restricted submission to arbitration for purposes of defining the scope of judicial review, as the plaintiffs suggest. In Williams, we simply gave more detailed meaning to the phrase “legally entitled to collect damages.” That more detailed articulation of the arbitrators’ task in deciding the case submitted to them, however, neither expanded nor contracted the fundamental meaning of that phrase. Instead, we articulated what that language had always meant. The meaning of that phrase had not changed since our decision in Carroll, when we concluded that “[t]he language of the submission . . . clearly delegates all disputed issues to binding arbitration . . . .” Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 189 Conn. 20. Finally, we do not agree that Carroll was
Next, we must determine whether the phrase “local rules of law as to arbitration procedure and evidence will apply,” creates a restricted submission for purposes of judicial review. We conclude that it does not. Since approximately 1990, this phrase has been standard in automobile insurance policies dealing with uninsured motorist coverage in Connecticut. 2 A. Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance (2d Ed. 1992), appendix A, p. 116.
The trial court found that the phrase was ambiguous because the plaintiffs could have identified specifically
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
The remaining claims raised by the plaintiffs, which are not relevant to this appeal, are that: (1) the trial court improperly refused to review the arbitration award for errors of fact and law; (2) the accident reconstruction expert was improperly allowed to testify as to the speed of the car; (3) the expert testimony regarding lost earning capacity was improperly admitted because it was without evidential foundation; and (4) there was no substantial evidence of proximate cause between the injury and the act. Because the plaintiffs have conceded, however, that if the submission was deemed to be unrestricted, then the remainder of their claims must fail, we need not address any specific evidentiary claims raised by the plaintiffs.
General Statutes § 52-418 provides in relevant part: “Vacating award, (a) Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for
General Statutes § 52-417providesinrelevantpart: “Application for order confirming award. At any time within one year after an award has been rendered and the parties to the arbitration notified thereof, any party to the arbitration may make application to the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides ... to any judge thereof, for an order confirming the award. The court or judge shall grant such an order confirming the award unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed in sections 52^418 and 52-419.”
The three insurance policies consisted of an individual automobile liability policy identifying John C. Hutchinson and Katherine Y. Hutchinson as named insureds, an individual automobile liability policy identifying Leigh Ann Hutchinson as the named insured, and a business automobile liability policy identifying John C. Hutchinson as the named insured. The insureds named in these policies were all members of the decedent’s family.
Two of the insurance policies contained arbitration clauses, which provided in relevant part:
“If we and an ‘insured’ do not agree:
“1. Whether that person is legally entitled to recover damages under Part C; or
“2. As to the amount of damages;
“the ‘insured’ may make a written demand for arbitration. . . .
“If the amount of damages the ‘insured’ demands exceeds $40,000 each party will select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a third. If they cannot agree within 30 days, either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. In this event, each party will:
“1. Pay the expenses it incurs; and
“2. Bear the expenses of the third arbitrator equally.
“Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take place in the county in which the ‘insured’ lives. Local rules of law as to procedure and evidence will apply. Any decision agreed to by the arbitrators) will be binding as to:
“1. Whether the ‘insured’ is legally entitled to recover damages; and
“2. The amount of damages. This applies only if the amount does not exceed the minimum limit for bodily iqjury liability specified by the financial responsibility law of the state in which ‘your covered auto’ is principally garaged. If the amount exceeds that limit, either party may demand the right to a trial. This demand must be made within 60 days of the arbitrator(s) decision. If this demand is not made, the amount of damages agreed to by the arbitrators) will be binding.” (Emphasis added.)
The arbitration clause contained in the third insurance policy provided:
“a. If we and an ‘insured’ disagree whether the ‘insured’ is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or driver of an ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ or do not agree as to the amount of damages, either party may make a written demand for arbitration. In this event, each party will select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a third. If they cannot agree within 30 days, either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. Each party will pay the expenses it incurs and bear the expenses of the third arbitrator equally.
“b. Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take place in the county in which the ‘insured’ lives. Local rules of law as to arbitration procedure and evidence will apply. A decision agreed to by two of the arbitrators will be binding.” (Emphasis added.)
This language is present in one of the insurance policies. In the other two insurance policies, however, the word “arbitration” is omitted. This omission does not affect our analysis of this provision.
The language in the arbitration provision of the defendants’ insurance policies is substantially equivalent to the standard form contract. 2 A. Widiss, supra, appendix A, p. 116.