35 Ga. App. 326 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1926
Lead Opinion
1. “Where an application for an award of damages is made to the industrial commission of Georgia, questions not raised when the case is heard by one of the commissioners, or on appeal to the full commission, can not be raised for the first time on appeal to the superior court.” Integrity Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hankins, 33 Ga. App. 339 (126 S. E. 554). Accordingly, where the commissioner has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and the question as to the venue in which he heard the ease is for the first time raised in the superior court, on appeal of the parties raising the question, this court will treat the question as having been waived by them, and will not pass upon it. The same rule applies as to the character of employment, where liability for the accident was admitted before the commission and the court, and the sole contention made was whether death resulted therefrom.
2. The objection that the appeal to the full commission was not taken within the time prescribed by law is not sustained by the record.
3. “ ‘Upon a review of an award made by the industrial commission under the provisions of the Georgia workmen’s compensation act, the commission’s findings of fact are, in the absence of fraud, conclusive, providing there is any evidence to support the award. Ga. L. 1920, p. 199. With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to support it, such an award stands in this court upon the same footing as the verdict of a jury approved by the trial judge in other cases.’ ” Integrity Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hankins, supra; Maryland Casualty Co. v. England, 160 Ga. 810 (129 S. E. 75). The evidence submitted in each of the hearings fully authorized a finding that the death of the plaintiff’s
Judgment affirmed.
Rehearing
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
The plaintiff in error filed a motion for rehearing in this case, contending that this court overlooked the fact that the award of the full commission, complained of by the movant, fails to make a definite finding of fact that the decedent died as a result of an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, covered by -the insurance. The award of the full commission is as follows:' “This case came before the full commission on appeal from the award of Commissioner Paulk, made on April 14, 1935. F. A. Christian, the employee, was injured on December 9, 1934, from which he was disabled for several days. The insurance carrier paid compensation in the sum of $39.35, covering the period of disability. Mr. Christian then returned to work for a short while, and died on January 14, 1935. Commissioner Paulk stated in his award that the medical testimony was very indefinite as to showing that the death was the result of the accident, and found that the death was not the result of the accident. The commission can not agree with his findings. A review of the evidence shows that F. A. Christian died from intestinal trouble, and, from the evidence in the case, there is no question in the mind of the commission but that the injury re
As was suggested in the Edmondson case, it would not seem necessary to set forth findings upon questions of undisputed facts. It will be observed that the finding of the commission distinctly set forth that the accidental injury met with by the deceased employee was the occasion of his death. This, under the solemn admission in judicio by the movant, was the only issue involved. The record shows the statement by the movant in judicio that “we admit liability for the accident, but deny that the death was the result of the accident.” It follows from what has been said that the finding of the commission was full and complete upon the only issue of fact involved; and it can not be attacked for failing to include a finding upon a question that the movant itself concedes involved no issue of fact.
Upon the other question, which seems to some extent contemplated by the contentions set forth in the motion, to wit, “It does not appear from the record in the ease that Commissioner Paulk, the single commissioner who heard the case' and who rendered an award, had jurisdiction to render an award in said case, for the reason that it does not appear that his hearing of the ease was
Rehearing denied.