270 F. 946 | 9th Cir. | 1921
This is an action by the defendant in error to recover damages for the death of her husband, Samuel Blum, under a policy insuring against accident issued by the plaintiff in error. The policy covers “loss or disability resulting from bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other cause through external, violent and accidental means (excluding suicide, sane or insane, or any attempt thereat).”
At the close of plaintiff’s case a motion for nonsuit on the part of the defendant was denied. At the close of the entire evidence the defendant demurred ore tenus to the sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury and in the alternative moved the court for a directed verdict in its favor. Both were denied by the court. The verdict was for plaintiff.
Thé assignments of error are three:
First, that the court erred in denying defendant’s motion for non-suit.
Second, in overruling the demurrer to the evidence.
Third, in refusing to instruct a verdict for the defendant.
All for reasons: (1) That the complaint fails to state a cause of action; (2) that there was a total failure of proof of death from accidental causes; (3) that there was a total failure of proof of any death effected directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent, and accidental means; and (4) that there was a total failure of proof of death caused in any manner covered by the provisions of the policy of insurance.
There was no demurrer to the complaint; nor were there any exceptions reserved to any instructions given by the court or any-refusal of the court to give requested instructions.
The complaint simply alleges, so far as material here:
That on January 12, 1917, “the said Samuel Blum died in the city of Seattle, county of King, state of Washington. His death was effected through external, violent, and accidental means.”
The answer denies the latter clause, and for an affirmative defense alleges:
*949 “That the policy relied upon by the plaintiff expressly excludes from the risks assured death effected through-suicide, sane or insane, or any attempt thereat, and the death of the said Blum was effected through suicide or an attempt thereat, and not otherwise.”
Thus are presented the particular issues upon which the case was tried and went to the jury.
Nor is the demurrer to the evidence insisted upon. There is therefore but one assignment of error that calls for notice, namely, the one relating to the refusal of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. Thus is presented but the one question whether the testimony adduced at the trial was sufficient to warrant the court in sending the case to the jury. This requires a statement of the salient facts as disclosed by the evidence.
Blum was past 40, had been in business for a number of years, and was prosperous, having acquired an estate rated at $125,000. With this he was satisfied, as it was remunerative, and he was not eager to accumulate greater wealth. He was happy and contented in his domestic relations, and was esteemed and trusted in his social and business relations. On January 1, 1919, certain of his property in Alaska was burned, news of which came to him on the 2d. This greatly depressed and worried him at the time, and he complained of loss of sleep, and that he could not get the Alaska fire out of his mind. His condition of mind improved somewhat, however, prior to January 12th, the date of his death.
As bearing upon this, and as respects his disappearance from his office when last seen therein, Laura Lawson testified, among other things, that she was a public stenographer and had a desk in Blum’s office, but in a room separate from his, with a door communicating, and that she did his stenographic work; that Blum was in the office on the morning of the 12th when the witness came in about half past 9; that he asked hér, as was his habit, how he looked, to which she replied, “You look like you had a good night’s sleep.” He smiled, but remarked, “Well, I slept sound, but I was full of dope,” or something of that order. He was worrying, and his head ached all the time from worry and nervousness. He was told not to worry, that there was nothing to worry about, and he said, “That is all they tell me,” and wished he could see it that way. She further testified that the worry started with the fire at Valdez; that he was like anybody else when there is something on his mind, and walked forth and back, and would talk about it. He received telegrams from time to time about the fire, and when he found one thing to be all right, then he would wonder if something else was all right, and kept saying if he had been up there he would feel differently, but because he was down here naturally he imagined a whole lot was really worse than it was. He manifested his worry by walking forth and back, and putting his hand up to his head, and would say “so much all during the day” that he
The barber, Mr. Hurd, relates that Blum came into his place about 4 o’clock, took off his coat and hat, got a paper from the porter, and walked back and forth across the floor until a chair was ready for him, which was about 20 minutes. While shaving him, witness asked if he had been sick, to which he replied “No,” but said that he had not slept for two weeks. When asked what was the matter, he said, “That fire — I can’t get it off my mind,” and further, “I just feel awful; I never felt this way in my life before; I feel terrible.”
Mrs. Estelle R. Blum, wife of deceased, testified that their married life had always been happy, and that Blum was kindly towards every one; that he had a habit, when engaged in thinking or discussing business or otherwise, of pacing the floor, which he did at home as well as in the office. The news of the fire at Valdez came on January 2d, while they were at breakfast, and Blum went down at once to ascertain if there were further news. Witness could not recall any special time of his being dizzy, but remembered that he did complain of dizziness; that he would often want the fresh air, and when he did he would throw up the window or open the front door, and at times would go outside. He showed a worried condition during the period following the news of the fire. The news came very slowly. He worried about the insurance, or rather as to the responsibility of the companies in which he was insured. When assured of their responsibility, he was very much relieved. Then he was in doubt whether he would be allowed to continue in his mercantile business while
Blum is described as a man 5 feet 7 inches in height and weighing 190 pounds. The stool or window seat of the window from which he escaped was 39% inches above the floor. The window seat is 12% inches in width. From this there is a drop of 1% inches, with the wood sill sloping an inch; then another drop of 2% inches to the surface of a stone sill 17% inches in width, which slopes one inch. There is then a further drop of 4% inches to a stone belt course, which runs around the building and projects an additional 9 inches, with a half-inch slope; the entire width of the coping, including the window sill, being 43 % inches, and the drop on the whole 10 inches. The window opening, when the lower sash is raised to its limit, as it was found after Blum disappeared, comprises a space of 28% inches in width by 33% inches in height. An ordinary office chair was found standing near, with its back to the window.
Two witnesses observed the deceased while falling to the sidewalk —one when he was a few feet above the walk, and the other apparently just as he left the window ledge. He encountered a guy wire of the electric lighting system in his fall, and the globe of the arc light was broken. They describe him as falling limp, with his arms hanging
At the trial, when it was shown that death- had ensued from external and violent means, it was agreed between counsel that plaintiff had made out a prima facie case. Thereupon the defendant proceeded with its case. A question has arisen as to which of the parties had the burden of proof.
Suicide is the antithesis of death by accidental means, and, of course, if it appears that Blum took his own life, plaintiff cannot recover under the policy. But this does not shift the burden. The clause in the policy requiring that death shall result through accidental means independent of all other causes devolves the burden upon plaintiff that she substantiate this also before recovery can be had. Travelers' Insurance Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661, 666, 8 Sup. Ct. 1360, 32 L. Ed. 308; National Masonic Act. Ass’n v. Shryock, 73 Fed. 774, 20 C. C. A. 3.
The deceased came to his death by one of three means. He either died through natural causes (that is, by sudden demise) and fell from the window, or he voluntarily threw himself therefrom, or he fell from the window or the coping outside through accidental means.
It is obvious from these observations that the circumstances and conditions present as shown by the evidence do not repel all reasonable hypotheses of accidental death or death by accidental means.
Such is not the case at bar, for it is fully apparent that death might have occurred through other causes, or by other means. The question, then, whether death was suicidal was one among others to be submitted to the jury.
Counsel for plaintiff in error suggests a hypothesis which supposes that the- deceased, not having been affected with dizziness, had voluntarily placed himself head foremost at the outer ledge of the window, and so near the outer edge as to be within the danger zone and beyond the point where the laws of gravity and friction would tend to hold him; that is, in a position where the laws of gravity would tend to pull him over the ledge to the sidewalk beneath. If such were the case, it is argued that, although the fall might have been involuntary, the means which he selected would be voluntary, and the injury following could not be held to have been occasioned by external, violent, and accidental means. Another hypothesis of a similar nature is stated, but the one noted is sufficient for intelligent discussion of the legal proposition invoked.
Another case (Martin v. Interstate Business Men’s Acc. Ass’n [Iowa] 174 N. W. 577), is where the insured ate oranges, engendering gastritis which caused death. It was held that the act of selecting the oranges was voluntary, and that the consequences, although unexpected or unintentional, could not be said to have resulted through “accidental means.”
In further illustration of the distinction, the Supreme Court has apparently approved an instruction:
“That, if a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual occurs which produces the-injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means.”
This instruction was given in a case arising from the circumstance of the injured person jumping from a platform. Two other persons jumped from the platform at the same time and sustained no injury, and the case turned upon whether there was anything accidental, unforeseen, involuntary, or unexpected in the act of jumping from the time the deceased left the platform until he alighted upon the ground. A verdict for the beneficiary was upheld. Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 121, 9 Sup. Ct. 755, 33 L. Ed. 60.
Now, extending the doctrine of this latter case to what might have-happened with Blum, if he deliberately placed himself in a position where he would fall, realizing that such would be the result of his act, then it could not be said that his injury came about through external, violent, and accidental means within the terms of the policy; this because the act would be voluntary and deliberate, and the result could not have been unforeseen. But if he voluntarily placed himself in a position of danger, even recklessly though it may have been, and through accident, by misstep or miscalculation, or through the force of gravity not anticipated or foreseen, and was precipitated from the window ledge, the cause of the injury would have been through accidental means within the meaning of the policy.
After all, however, these are hypotheses that went to the jury under the evidence, and we must assume under proper and applicable instructions, as no exceptions are here to any instructions given or to any requested and not given.
Again, there is brought into the controversy the supposition that Blum’s condition of health may have contributed directly or indirectly to his injury; it being argued that, where disease or physical infirmity concurs in producing death, the risk is not covered, because, while
Another feature of the controversy is that Blum might have jumped from the window while in a condition of mental irresponsibility; that is, while in a state of melancholy, when his impulse was to take his own life.
Upon this, question medical experts were called, with the result of a divided and discordant opinion. Thus it became a matter for the jury to determine, and their finding respecting it was comprised by the general verdict.
Within the range and scope of the testimony, certain experts in physics gave evidence touching the possibility of the deceased’s falling out of the window, supposing him to have been in certain defined positions in relation to it, and including also the chair that was found by the window immediately after his disappearance.
This testimony is interesting and highly instructive, as bearing upon the hypotheses concerning which their opinions were desired. But there is an obvious infirfnity attending it, in that it did not cover other reasonable hypotheses respecting positions in which the deceased might have been immediately prior to his falling from the window or from the ledge outside.
Coming again to the one question involved, whether the evidence was sufficient to carry the case to the jury, we will give attention to some of the different phases of the evidence and the inferences that the jury was at liberty to draw therefrom.
As we have seen, the presumption is that he did not commit suicide, and, further, the testimony in the case is not of such a nature as to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of death through accidental means. So the question of suicide, sane or insane, was properly one for the
There being testimony in the record sufficient for the jury’s consideration as to whether death resulted from suicide, we- may proceed to another phase of the inquiry; that is, whether death might have resulted from natural cause, as by apoplexy, heart failure, or the like.
It is possible that he may have gotten out of the window while in an effort to get the air, and then have been stricken and life become practically extinct before he fell to the sidewalk. There is some indication that such might have been the case. An eyewitness saw the body almost at the instant it left the window ledge, and he says it appeared to be limp with the arms hanging downward. But this is only one of the many circumstances to be taken into account. While such a thing was possible, it was within the province of the jury to inquire whether it was a probable inference to be drawn, under all the circumstances surrounding his death. required the exercise of physical effort to get out of the window. This he was fully able to put forth when he was last seen, but a minute or two before he disappeared. So the postulate that he dropped dead after getting on to the window ledge is attended with questionable probability.
“That the courts will presume,” says the court in Jenkin v. Pacific Hut. Life Ins. Co., 131 Cal. 121, 124, 63 Pac. 180, 181, “that the death was the result of an accident, when nothing more is shown than that it was brought about by a violent injury, and the character of such injury is consistent with the theory of accident, seems to be a rule upheld by the great weight of authority.”
Again the court says, in Nichols v. Commercial Travelers’ Eastern Accident Ass’n, 221 Mass. 540, 543, 109 N. E. 449, 450, a case in which the deceased was ejected from a sleeping car berth while the car was in motion, either through his own volition or involuntarily, through a screen in the window comprising a space of from 24 to 25 inches in width by 18 inches in height, and was found dead under circumstances indicating that death was caused by a fall from the car:
“When a man is found dead under such circumstances, when the marks on the body show the cause of death and all the circumstances exclude the theory of disease or injuries intentionally inflicted by a third person, it may be inferred that the death was accidental and was not the resttlt of intention or design.”
The principle involved is concretely stated in 1 C. J. 495, as follows :
*957 “The fact of death does not of itself create any presumption that it was the reunir. of an aceident; and where, in order to make out plaintiff’s ease, it is necessary to base a presumption that death resulted from an injury on a presumption that the insured sustained an accidental injury, no recovery can be had. Where, however, it is apparent that the injury to or death of the insured was the result of external and violent means, and the issue is as to whether it was due to an accident, within the meaning of the policy, or to some cause excepted by the policy, the presumption is in favor of accident and against the existence of facts bringing the case within any of the exceptions of the policy, such as insanity of the insured, intentional injury inflicted by a third person, lack of due care and diligence, self-inflicted injuries, and suicide. These presumptions may, however, be overcome by facts and circumstances establishing the contrary.”
The authorities are generally to the same purpose. See Buckley, Adm’x, v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. (Wash.) 192 Pac. 924, where a number are reviewed.
“A sick man,” says the court in Bohaker v. Travelers’ Insurance Co., 215 Mass. 32, 34, 102 N. E. 342, 314 (40 L. R. A. [N. S.] 543), “may be the subject of an accident, wlilc-h but for his sickness would not have befallen him. One may meet his death by falling into imminent danger in a faint or in an attack of epilepsy. But such an event commonly has been held to be the result of accident rather than of disease.”
In the same case it is observed that:
“The language of this contract to the effect that the ‘accidental means’ must have operated ‘independently of all oilier causes’ to produce the death does not change the general rule of lavs that the proximate, and not a remote,.cause is the. one to which the law looks.”
Our attention has not been called to any clause in the policy that precludes recovery on the ground that disease has operated concurrently with “accidental means” to produce injury or death. The coprt is not required to search beyond the active, efficient procuring causé, to the cause of a cause, so that, as the court further observes:
“When one single predominant agency is disclosed, directly producing as a* natural and probable result the injury, which is accidental, and which operates independently of other like causes, then the effectual means required by the policy have been found.”
The language of Judge Taft in Manufacturers’ Accident Indemnity Co. v. Dorgan, 58 Fed. 945, 954, 7 C. C. A. 581, 590 (22 L. R. A. 620), is illustrative and highly instructive. He says:
“if the deceased suffered death by drowning, no matter what was the cause of his falling into the water, whether disease or a slipping, the drowning, in such ease, would be the proximate and sole cause of the disability or death, unless it appeared that death would have been the result, even had there been no water at hand to fall into. The disease would be but the condition; the drowning would be the moving', sole, and proximate cause.”
We find no error in denying the motion for a directed verdict for the defendant.
Affirmed.