No. 27,471 | D.C. | Feb 7, 1887
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
I announce the opinion of the court in the case of Strasburger vs. Commissioners of the District of Columbia.
The petition prays “ that a writ of mandamus be issued by the court commanding the defendants, the said Commissioners of the District of Columbia, to show cause why they should not issue to the plaintiff a permit to repair and reconstruct the building hereinbefore mentioned, and also transfer his license for a theater from the corner of Ninth and D streets, northwest, to the said skating rink.”
It sets forth that the petitioner had a license to carry on a theatrical business- at the corner of Ninth and D streets, in the city of Washington \ that this place of business was-destroyed by fire, and in seeking for a place to pursue his avocation, he had found a building which had been used a skating rink on E between Sixth and Seventh streets-, which he conceived tó be suitable; and he thereupon applied to the inspector of buildings for a permit to alter the rink to make it suitable for theatrical performances; and he also applied to have his license transferred, so that he could operate under it in the new place for the unexpired time; that on the 20th of December, 1886, the inspector of buildings issued the desired permit, which authorized him to make the alteration and stating expressly that the building, when altered, might be used for the purposes of a theater.
The petition further states that on the same day the Commissioners undertook to cancel that permit and withdrew it; that he then applied to them to review their action ; and that on or about the 29th day of that month he received from the Commissioners a communication stating that they declined to order the permit to issue, unless he should com
The commissioners, in their answer, admit that these several statements are substantially correct; but they say that the regulation of the 29th of December was made by them as well in virtue of their general powers, as of an act of Congress passed in 1878, referred to as part of their return, which gave them, as they allege, full power to make’and enforce building regulations; and they insist that the regulation of the 29th of December was within their competency under that law.
An objection was made in argument on the part of the defendant to the form of this application, which it is not necessary to consider; but it is proper that we should notice a substantial error in the procedure which would prevent us, in any event, from granting this application in its present form.
By the regulations and laws governing this District, there is no question that the only person authorized to issue a building permit is the inspector of buildings; and he was the official to whom the application was made by the petitioner in the first instance. The Commissioners have no function of that sort. It is equally clear that the only officer authorized to issue a license is the register. Here, then, is an application, hy a proceeding for a mandamus, which (except where it has been changed by statute, and there has been no change here) is one regulated with great strictness at the common law, calling on this court to order the Commissioners of the District to perform two distinct acts, neither of which they have legally the power to perform.
It is not necessary to cite further authority as to the law upon this point than the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Ex parte Howland, 104 U.S., 604" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1882-01-23" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/ex-parte-rowland-90508?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="90508">104 U. S., 604.
“ Whatever it is within the power of the creditor to compel the tax collector to do without the intervention of the court of commissioners, the commissioners are not required by the writ against them to do. Their whole duty in respect to the collection of the tax is performed when they have so far set the machinery of collection in motion that others are required to keep it going. Their obligations in this respect end where those of another public officer begin. They cannot be required by mandamus to compel another officer to do his duty, if, without their intervention, the moving party can himself accomplish the same result. It is true that under section 12 general powers are conferred, on the commissioners to carry out the provisions of the bonding act; but this does not change the rule of their liability to the bondholder in the particular now under consideration. The general principle whicli governs proceedings by mandamus is that whatever can be done without the employment of that extraordinary remedy may not be done with it. It only lies when there is practically no other remedy. As a necessary consequence, the writ must issue directly against him whose duty it is to do the thing which the parties seek to have done ; for, as was said in Reg. vs. Mayor of Derby, 2 Salk., 436; ‘It is absurd that the writ should be directed to one person to command another.’ ”
It is plain, therefore, that as this petition now stands we should be obliged to refuse the relief prayed.
We have been unwilling to confine ourselves to this objection, but have preferred to examine the important question, which has been fully argued before us, as though the application were made for relief against officials properly amendable to the process invoked.
Is this contention correct?
The act of June 14,1818, seems to have been designed to confer upon the Commissioners a power.with respect to building regulations of the most comprehensive character. It authorizes and directs the Commissioners “ to make and enforce” “such building regulations for the said District as they may deem advisable; ” and declares that “such rules and regulations made as above shall have the same force and effect within the District of Columbia as if enacted by Congress.” There is no limitation as to the character or extent of the regulations thus authorized, but the terms are broad enough to include every form of building regulations that the Commissioners may deem advisable, and which may reasonably be considered as a proper subject of regulation.
It is evident that Congress intended to confer the power to make a complete system; and the words of the act are amply sufficient for that purpose. No such system would be complete that did not embrace the power of regulating the location of buildings with reference to the purpose for which they are to be used, as well as the character of the materials and the size and form of the structures. Such provisions as to location have always existed in Washington, and the public interest requires that they should be found in every municipal government. Unless there were such regulations, any man might establish a tippling shop, a livery stable or a factory, in juxtaposition with the finest private residences or churches or public buildings, and the city government would be powerless to prevent it.
The regulation of the location of buildings is, undoubtedly,
The language of this act is much broader than that of section 79 of the,Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia, which gave specifically to the Board of Public Works the power to make all necessary regulations for the construction of buildings; since the primary sense of the word “construction” was that of edification or piling up, as of a house. And it is not unimportant to observe that this act of the 14th of June, 1878, chap. 194, was passed three days after the passage of the act of Congress, chap. 180, establishing the present form of government and which specially adopted the laws then in forcé, among them this section 79, which had been kept alive by the first act establishing the Board of Commissioners. Laws 1874, chap. 337.
It would thus appear that the act of the 14th of June must have been designed to place the power of regulation of buildings upon a broader foundation than had been expressed in section 79, already in force within the District.
We heard no authority referred to, and have been unable to find any case, showing that such general grant of power to establish building regulations does not also embrace the power to determine the location of the buildings.
It will be instructive to examine the various acts of Congress and of the municipality respecting this subject, since the origin of the city government, and observe the construction they have received. The conveyance by the original proprietors to the Commissioners, Beall and Gantt, declared that the property should be subject to “sirch terms and conditions as shall be thought reasonable by the President, for the time being, for regulating the materials and manner of
Under these provisions President Washington, before the sale of any of the lots, on the 17th of October, 1791, established various building regulations for the city of Washington, under no other grant of power than that contained in the trust deed, and several of his successors in office established further regulations on the subject.
The regulations ordained by these successive Presidents not only described the character of the material to be used, but also limited the size, height and area of all wooden houses, and forbade, under a penalty, their erection within certain localities, or within twenty-four feet of a brick or stone house; and yet they had no other support than the power expressed in the trust deed to “regulate the material and manner of the buildings.”
The circuit court decided, in Miller vs. Elliot, 5 Cranch C. C., 543, that a provision expressed in these regulations, constituted a condition annexed to every house lot in the city.
In 1822 all these regulations of the several Presidents up to that time were expressly adopted by an ordinance of the corporation, which went -on to forbid the erection of a frame blacksmith shop, factory, or livery stable, within fifty feet of a brick or stone house. The power to pass this last regulation was to be found nowhere else in the new •charter of 1820, except in the provision which authorized the corporation, almost in the words of the trust deed, “ to regulate, with the approbation of the President, the manner of erecting and the materials to be used in the erection of houses.” Put the charter was silent as to any express authority to make provision as to the relative location or proximity of wooden houses to other buildings.
In November, 1863 (p. 246 Webb’s Digest), the corporation, by ordinance, declared that no license should be granted
There was no authority for this further legislation beyond the previous provisions of the charter authorizing the regulation of “the manner of erecting and the material to be used,” unless it can be found in the amendment to the charter in 1848 (p. 496), which authorized the corporation “to license, tax, and regulate livery stables;” but in like manner was silent as to the location of buildings or the necessity of obtaining the assent of the neighbors before the license should be granted.
The charter of 1820 (p. 492), in like manner had given to the corporation the power “to provide for licensing hotels;” but nothing was there said as to their location or as to the necessity of the assent of the neighbors. Nevertheless the corporation, by an ordinance (Webb, Digest, 222), passed in 1864, declared that no hotel or restaurant should be kept without a license being first had and obtained, and that the person applying for the license should first produce to the mayor a certificate signed by the commissioner of improvements and six respectable freeholders residing in the same square, etc.; and similar and more stringent provisions were made with respect to restaurants and tippling shops.
In like manner the charter was silent as to the necessity of the assent of the neighbors to the establishment of a retail establishment. But this was made a prerequisite by the ordinance of March, 1861 (Webb, Digest, 93), to the location of a coal, wood, or. lumber yard, in these words:
*397 “It shall not be lawful for any person or persons to establish or locate any coal yard, lumber yard or wood yard upon any new site or any site not used as such for the period of six months, within fifty feet of any dwelling house in the city, unless the person or persons desiring to establish or locate any such coal yard, lumber yard or wood yard, shall first file with the register of the city the written consent of the owner or owners, occupant or occupants, of each and every house within said fifty feet of the ground, etc., contemplated to be occupied.”
We have searched in vain through these charters, from beginning to end, for any authority to justify this requirement as a prerequisite to issuing such licenses, unless it be found in the same general power “to regulate the manner of erecting and the materials to be used in the erection of houses,” given by the charter.
In 1871 the corporations of Washington and Georgetown were abolished. The charters were continued in existence by section 95 of the Eevised Statutes only for certain specified purposes; but the laws and ordinances of the cities and of the levy court, except where modified by Congress or inconsistent with those laws, were declared to remain in full force by. section 91, E. S. D. C.
By section 2 of this organic law, as we call it, it was declared that this District was created a government by the name of the District of Columbia, by which name it was constituted a body corporate for municipal purposes; and then followed the general statement of the several important powers vested in the corporation, viz.: by that name it may “contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, have a seal and exercise all other powers of a municipal corporation, not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the provisions of this act.”
By section 79, E. S. D. C., the Board of Public Works was given the authority, already cited, to “make all necessary regulations respecting the construction of private buildings
These being the only grants of power on this subject committed to the new corporation, let us examine how in fact it did construe these powers. In section 9, chapter 69, session 1, of the laws of the legislative assembly of the District, we find this re-enactment, in what might be called an aggravated form of the previous regulations as to coal and wood merchants, including also lumber men and livery stable keepers:
“ That the keeper of every livery stable, wood, coal or lumber yard, shall, before engaging in such business, obtain the consent, in writing, of a majority of the persons owning real estate, and a majority of the residents keeping house on the same side of the square on which is the principal front of the stable or yard about to be built or kept, and the side of the square fronting immediately opposite, for him to enter upon and engage in such business, the register to determine which is the principal front; and without such permit being first obtained, it shall be unlawful to grant such license.”
Now, what was the authority for this legislation? The most direct grant of power was that in section Í9, authorizing the Board of Public Works to make regulations concerning the construction of private buildings. But this direct grant was accompanied by the further grant of the general authority to exercise all other powers of a municipal corporation, and by the residuum of inherited power from all the antecedent laws and ordinances of the previous corporations not then repealed. In the same direction we find, in section 10 of the same act, provisions similar in substance, with reference to licenses for hotels and drinking houses, declaring that unless a majority of the residents in the neighborhood signify their consent, in writing, no license shall be given. And yet nobody questioned all this legislation, and it has been acted upon again and again, and acquiesced in by the courts as valid.
What are the powers of the present District govern
On the 11th day of June, 18*78, chapter 180, which is the present organic act, was passed, entitled, “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia.” That declares that the District, and the property and persons that may be therein, shall be subject to any existing laws applicable thereto, not thereby repealed or inconsistent with the provisions of the Aet; that the District shall remain and continue a municipal corporation, as provided in section 2 of the Bevised Statutes, “ and the Commissioners herein provided for shall be deemed and taken as officers of said corporation; and all laws now in force, relating to the District of Columbia, not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, shall remain in full force and effect.”
Whatever powers, therefore, were exercised by either of the previous governments, over the subject of buildings, by virtue of existing statutes, ordinances or regulations, belong to the present government; and in addition to these powers, there now exists the special and further power given by the Act of June 14, 18*78, under which the regulation of 29th December, 1886, was passed.
We see nothing in this long continued construction and exercise of power by the previous governments, which should induce us to decide in favor of one citizen to the annoyance of so many of his fellow-citizens, that the regulation in question is in excess of the powers thus accumulated and vested in the present Commissioners.
We consider it safer to rely upon the analogies to be deduced from our own laws than to wander into foreign juris
Our own reports furnish several decisions in which the courts of the District have shown their purpose not to be astute to construe away the chartered rights of the municipality in favor of those who seels to evade the law.
Thus, in Corporation of Washington vs. Casanave, 5 Cranch C. C., 500, it was decided that, under the charter which declared that retailers might be .licensed, a license might be exacted of a coal and wood merchant, although if was argued that he was not necessarily a retailer.
Again,.in Corporation of Washington, vs. Eaton, 4 Cranch C. C., 352, it appeared that Eaton was in the habit of practicing pistol shooting within his own grounds. There was-an ordinance forbidding persons from discharging firearms within the city limits, “idly and for sport and amusement.” When charged with its violation, he denied the authority of the corporation to pass the ordinance, insisting that the powers of the municipality should be strictly construed1.. But the court held that the authority might be-found in the grant of power to prevent nuisances, as the firing of pistols under one’s widow might become a nuisance; and that it might, he further justified under the power to prevent fires; and they enforced the ordinance.
There are similar decisions to which it is mot necessary to refer, evincing that our courts have been disposed to support the rights of the public, within proper limitations, by a reasonable construction! of the powers- of the city government.
The regulation of December 29', 1886, is perfectly ira sympathy with the legislation of the corporation respecting: livery stables, wood and coal yards, hotel and drinking, houses, and kindred enterprises. The- power claimed is also in the direction of that which had' been given in the charter of 1820 (ip. 492, Webb); and also of section 3 of the Act of 1863 '(p. 136), which expressly provided that the mayor,.
It is evident that the present regulation of the Commissioners is in the direction of this settled policy, and it is not to be forgotten that we are dealing here with a case where an application is made for an affirmative act to be done by the officers of a great city, who, it can scarcely be supposed, were intended by Congress to be reduced to mere automata, while the officers of every other municipality are endowed with such a measure of discretion in the premises as may enable them to protect their fellow-citizens from such unreasonable demands, which may be made without regard for, and in opposition to the wishes and the good of the great majority.
This case has been the subject of careful examination, and, after full reflection, we are all of the opinion that it was within the competency of the Commissioners to pass such a regulation as that of the 29th December, 1866.
It remains to inquire whether the particular provisions of the regulation are “reasonable,” within the signification properly attached to that expression by the courts. It would not be sufficient, of course, that the members of the court might think that they themselves would not have voted for the measure, or that, in their judgment, it is not altogether wise. Within recognized limits, these questions are left for the decision of those who are empowered to make the regulations.
If a corporation should undertake to raise the license for a trader from three to five dollars, it would not be for a court to pronounce the ordinance an unreasonable one'; while if the corporation were to tax a man doing a business of a thousand dollars a year, to the amount of nine hundred dollars, a court might well say that was unreasonable. In
We have been unable to discover anything in the regulation under examination unreasonable in the sense of the principle referred to. On the contrary, we consider it an eminently wise and proper provision.
All people know that, however carefully a theatrical performance may be conducted, it involves late hours; and considerable noise during the day and far into the night, frequently accompanied by the music of bands outside as a means of advertising; and that this must constitute a serious disturbance to the inmates of dwellings, to the young and' old, the well and the sick, in the immediate neighborhood. It is for these reasons that theaters almost always are located in parts of the city devoted rather to business jmrposes than to dwellings exclusively. It is also well known that such structures are considered a hazardous risk bf the insurance companies ; and when placed in a thickly built-up square, containing stables with their combustible contents, they may well constitute a source of apprehension.
It appears in this instance that the neighborhood is entirely devoted to dwellings; that tbe rink is opposite a church where services are held in- the week days as well as on Sunday; that combustible stables are numerous in the square; and that if such an establishment were to be located there, it would be in opposition to tbe sentiment of nearly, if not all, the neighboring citizens.
It would be an extraordinary spectacle if the government of a great .city should be powerless to prevent the location of such an establishment as would work a serious impairment, if not the destruction of the-comfort of a large mass of its citizens who may have passed their lives in obedience to the law, at the mere demand of a single person who is indifferent to the injury he is thus inflicting upon others, for his personal advantage. For, after the theater had thus been allowed to be erected, the injured parties would be without any other chance of redress or remedy, except to hazard the difficult attempt, in the courts, to abate what would have become an established institution; incurring all the expense, abuse and obloquy usually accompanying such litigation where any are rash enough to undertake it.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in 108 U. S., 333, B. & P. R. R. Co. vs. Fifth Baptist Church, used this language in condemnation of a claim that a grant to a railroad company to construct a depot would authorize its establishment anywhere about the city, “ even in front of the President’s House or the Capitol, or in the most densely populated locality,” as Mr. Justice Field said. The court says:
“Whatever the extent of the authority conferred, it was accompanied with this implied qualification: that the works should not be so placed as by their use to unreasonably interfere with and disturb the peaceful and comfortable enjoyment of others in their property. * * * The great*404 principle of the common law, which is equally the teaching of Christian morality, so to use one’s property as not to injure others, forbids any other application or use of the rights or powers conferred.”
For the reasons given, we are all of the opinion that this application should be overruled in whatever form it is presented, and it is so ordered.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
At the suggestion of my colleague, I add a word of concurrence.
One of the original building regulations, under which the building of the city was begun, provided that no house should be built on any of the avenues of less height than thirty-five feet. From this it appears that the power given to the President was construed broadly, and was understood to include more than the regulation of materials and methods of construction with reference to mere safety. The plain purpose of this particular provision was to secure a general effect, a city of agreeable appearance. It was conceived then that a building had relations quite beyond the separate interests of its owner and of concern to the whole community.
When a similar power was vested by Congress in the corporation of Washington, to be exercised under the approval and consent of the President, so as to conform to the condition of the original grant of these lands to the government commissioners, there was no intention, I think, to restrict its people to narrower limits. In the absence of any legislative interference in that direction, we have a right to suppose that it was intended that the power should still be construed broadly, and there is still better reason to understand that the powers given to the present government of the District are to be so construed. The act of 1878 provides that this District shall be a corporation as provided by the second section of what is commonly called the organic act, by which a governor and legislative assembly were provided, and that section gave to the corporation, then estab
It may not be necessary to lay down that rule broadly in this, case but we are fully justified in giving a broad construction to tbe power granted as one of the municipal powers given to this corporation. When the power is so considered, it seems to me clearly competent in making building regulations, to provide that certain kinds of buildings, shall not be erected in certain neighborhoods, and to have reference, in making this discrimination, to the uses to which they must be put. If a regulation may have reference to the safety of neighbors it is just as competent to determine tbe question of neighborhood safety by the test of the use to which a building is to be necessarily applied as by thetest of material of which it is to be constructed. The Commissioners have a right to withhold a permit on the ground that a theater necessarily adds a new danger which is not to he thrust into a neighborhood without the consent of the neighbors just as they have a right to forbid the erection of wooden houses within certain limits. They have authority to provide that buildings wbicb must bring dangers shall not be erected at all unless certain conditions are satisfied.
It may he added that, by requiring the consent of the neighbors, tbe Commissioners have not turned over to those