111 F. 590 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Colorado | 1901
It is alleged in the complaint, and admitted in the answer, that in March, 1898, the defendant McIntyre entered into a contract with the United States of America to furnish material and to perform the work required for the construction of the foundation, superstructure, and roof of the United States Mint building in the city of Denver. The record further shows that stone from the Cotapaxi quarries had been selected to be used in the superstructure of the building. In April, 1898, McIntyre furnished his bond to the government, with the defendant the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company as surety. The bond is set out at length in the complaint, and it is unnecessary to be stated here. It is sufficient to say that it is in the usual form of such surety bonds. In July, 1898, McIntyre entered into a contract with one John IL. Routt, under which Routt was to furnish McIntyre stone from the Cotapaxi quarry for the superstructure of the mint building. The testimony tends to show that, at the time Routt made the contract with McIntyre to furnish the stone, he did not have sufficient means, to carry on the work of opening the quarry. He applied to Sclm-' macker, the present plaintiff, for a loan of $1,500. The loan was made; Bchumacker taking Routt's note for the amount, and Routt. assigning to Schttmacker, as security, his interest in the contract with McIntyre. At that time a tripartite agreement between Routt, McIntyre, and Schumacher was entered into in respect to the repayment to Schmnackcr of the $1,500 loaned by him to Routt. The $1,500 proving insufficient to open and operate the quarry, Routt applied to Sclimnacker for an additional loan of $1,000, which was made, and a new note for 82,750 was given by Routt to Schumacher, dated September 30, 1898. This note was secured by Routt’s reassignment 01 the contract between Routt and McIntyre, and a new tripartite agreement was entered into between these parties with respect to the repayment of this sum of $2,750, including the interest due upon the original loan. The stone from the Cotapaxi quarries proving not satisfactory, the government, as it had a right to do under its contract with McIntyre, changed the stone from the Cota‘paxi to Arkins stone, and a new contract, dated October 15, 1898. was entered into between Routt and McIntyre with respect to furnishing the stone from the Arkins quarry, whereby McIntyre agreed to pay Routt 55 cents per cubic foot for all stone delivered and accepted, f. o. b. the cars at Arkins; payments to be made on the measured stone in the building, monthly, from estimates given by the proper government officers, less 10 per cent., which 10 per cent, was to be paid upon the final estimate. Routt’s interest in this
“It is agreed by all of the parties hereto that the said contract of July 6, 1898, and'the said tripartite agreement of September 80, 1898, shall not be considered abrogated, annulled, or superseded, so far as the said Schumacker is concerned, or the rights or claims of ¡.lie said Schumacher thereunder waived, surrendered, canceled, or satisfied, until said contract of October 15. 1898, between the said Routt and McIntyre, shall by its terms go into full force and effect, and not until the said McIntyre shall have furnished to the said Routt the full sum of fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500) in cash or available and marketable credit, as Is In said contract provided, or such part rhereof as may be reasonably necessary to open up and operate said quarry in a proper and workmanlike manner.”
Routt entered upon the work under his contract, and had shipped to Denver several cars of stone (my recollection is that the testimony shows eight cars), although it is in evidence that that particular stone did not go into the mint building by reason of some defect in color. Routt for some reason was unable to prosecute ihe work as rapidly as required, and on the 25th day of January, 1899, Routt and Schumacker gave Mc.lntyre the following appointment (plaintiff’s Exhibit G):
“Denver, Colo., Jany. 25, 1809.
“Mr. John A. McIntyre, Denver, Colo.—Dear Sir: You are hereby authorized and empowered by us, for and on our behalf and as representing ns as our agent, but without any expense to us, or either of us, and without incurring any debt for which rve, or either of us, may be liable, and in keeping with the terms and provisions of the certain contract now In force and effect between you and the undersigned John II. Routt, and of the certain contract now in force and effect between you, the said Routt, and the undersigned George P. Schumacker, and for the purpose of opening up, quarrying, and removing granite from said quarry, to be used in the construction of the II. S. Mint now in course of erection at Denver, Colorado, to enter into and take possession of the McIntyre quarries at Arkins, Colo.; and It is expressly understood and agreed that this permission and authority is hereby given without waiver of any of the terms and provioions of said contracts, or 'either of them.
“[Signed] John H. Routt,
“George P. Schumacker.”
And McIntyre thereupon proceeded to get out the stone at a cost to him, as shown by Mr. Tuxton’s testimony, of $46,536.62.
It was contended in the argument, and the same contention was repeated in the brief, that Routt’s inability to prosecute the work was caused by McIntyre’s failure to put up the necessary amount of money to open and operate the quarry as provided in the tripartite agreement, which, it was contended, binds him to furnish funds tor that purpose in an unlimited amount. This contention is based upon the following paragraph in the contract:
“And tlie said McIntyre further covenants and agrees that, until the said note and interest thereon have been fully paid according to its tenor, lie will, at all proper, seasonable, and necessary times, provide and. furnish the said Routt sufficient money or available and marketable credit to enable the said Routt to open up and operate .said Chambers quarry, and remove stone therefrom, and to keep paid the men working at and upon the same; but the amount so furnished and provided shall not exceed the sum of $1,500, prior to November 15, 1898.”
Even if this paragraph of the contract should be construed as contended by the plaintiff, the conclusion does not necessarily follow that this was the'cause of Routt’s'inability to comply with the terms of his contract. It is not at all clear, however, that this provision of the contract is entitled to the construction contended for, and was so understood by the parties at the time the contract was entered into. In the closing paragraph on the same page of the; contract, we find this provision;
“It is .agreed by all of the parties hereto that the said contract of July (I, 1898, and the said tripartite agreement of September 30, 1898, shall not lie considered abrogated, annulled, or superseded, so far as the said Solmmticker is concerned, or the rights or claims of the said Schumacker thereunder waived, surrendered, canceled, or satisfied, until said contract of ■October 15, 1898, between the said Routt and McIntyre shall by its terms go into full force and effect, and not until tlie said McIntyre shall hare furnished to the said Routt the full sum of fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500) in cash or available and marketable credit, as is in said contract provided, or such part thereof as may be reasonably necessary to open up and operate said quarry in a proper and workmanlike manner.”
This last paragraph would indicate that it was the intent and understanding of the parties, by these several clauses in the contracts referring to the advancements to be made by McIntyre, that they should not exceed the sum of $1,500, or so much thereof as might be nccesssary to properly open up and develop the quarry mentioned therein; and this view is strengthened by the fact, clearly established by the testimony, that McIntyre was under no obligation whatever to Schumacker in the premises, further than the agreement, on his part, to pa}>- over to Schumacker any moneys in his •hands which might become due to Routt, together with his volun
Here we have a new element in determining the rights of parties, namely, that of agency. This appointment authorized McIntyre, as the agent of Routt and Schumacker, to carry out the provisions of the contract between Routt and McIntyre and the tripartite agreement, so that, ia ascertaining the true relation of the parties after McIntyre entered upon the work, we must look, not only to the contracts, but also to the new relation—that of an agent—which, by acceptance of the appointment, McIntyre sustained to the other two paities. McIntyre’s acceptance is not in writing, but he acted upon the appointment, and is bound to all intents and purposes by its provisions. lie undertook, as their agent, to get out the granite in question without contracting any indebtedness for which they should be held liable, and without calling upon them for any cash to cany 011 the work. The effect of this (and which was undoubtedly the purpose of the parties in making it) was to relieve, Routt and Schumacker from the liability imposed on them by that clause of the Routt-AIcIntyre contract which provides that, in case AIcintyre should take possession of the quarry to complete the contract, lie should charge the entire expense thereof against the contraed L’y acceptance, of the appointment, he did bind himself to procure the granite without calling upon the others to make up any deficiency; but it does not necessarily follow that, because the effect of this appointment and its acceptance relieves Routt and Schumacher from being called upon to make up any deficiency, Mclnlyre was to turn over to them the entire proceeds of the granite secured, without any repayment to himself for moneys which he, as their agent, was obliged to advance for the purpose of procuring
Under the testimony, Routfi not only has nothing coming to him, but, if a specific performance of his contract had been enforced, he would have had a liability of approximately $28,000 over and above the contract price, from which liability, fortunately for him, McIntyre relieved him by accepting the contract or appointment of January 25, 1899. There being nothing due Routt under his contract, Schumacher is not entitled to recover upon his note against the defendant McIntyre. The view tahen of the case, so far as the principal (McIntyre) is concerned, relieves the surety company, the other defendant, from liability, and renders it unnecessary t'o comment at any length upon the defenses insisted upon by the surety, company at the hearing. I will observe, in passing, however, that
“He who would, charge a surety for his principal’s breach of contractual duty must travel without deviation the way pointed out in the contract, however iron-bound it may be; for there is for ihe surety, in the enforcement of his bond, no equity nor latitude beyond its strict terms.”
At the hearing application was made by the defendant to amend its answer, setting up certain matters with which counsel are familiar, by way of affirmative defense. The court is of the opinion, however, that that is unnecessary, as we cannot assent to the proposition that the burden of the proof is on the -surety to show that the alterations in the contract were made without its consent. However, if counsel deems it advisable to so amend the surety’s answer, they have the permission of the court to do so.
In order that the rights of all parties may be preserved, I call attention to some objections to testimony, which was received subject to the objections; the ruling to be announced at the time the case was disposed of. The last question on page 25 of the stenographer’s transcript was objected to on the grounds there stated. The objection is now overruled, and an exception allowed. The objection to the last question on page 36 of the stenographer’s transcript is overruled, and an exception allowed, The motion to strike out certain answers, preceding the motion, on page 38 of the stenographer’s transcript, is overruled, and an exception allowed, if the parties desire it. The objection to the first ami second questions on page 46 of the stenographer’s transcript is overruled, and an exception allowed. The last three questions on page 48 of the stenographer’s transcript may stand, to which the plaintiff may object, if he desires to note exceptions thereto. As to the last two questions on page 50 of the stenographer’s transcript, objected to on page 51, the objection is overruled, and an exception allowed.
Let a judgment be entered in favor of both of the defendants.