delivered the opinion-of the court.
This was an action upon a bond executed by Thomas E.
“In the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
~In Equity. No. 20225, Docket 46.
Mattie Mc.C. Hine vs. Robert Edward Hiñe et ¿1.
“Know all men by these,presents, that we, Thomas E. Waggaman, principal, and Daniel B. Clarke, surety, all of. the District of "Columbia, acknowledge ourselves indebted to the United States, of America in the penal" sum of 'eighteen thousand dollars, for the payment of which we bind ourselves and every of our heirs, executors and administrators, jointly and severally,, for and in the whole. Sealed with our seаls, and dated this 7th day of July A..D. 1899. . -
“Whereas the said Thomas E. Waggaman has been duly appointed trustee to . make sale of the real estate in the proceedings in this cause, mentioned.
“Now the condition of the above.obligation is such, that if. the above bounden Thomas E. Waggaman shall well and truly discharge the duties devolving upon him 'as such trustee and..shallin all things obey such order and decree as this‘court shall make in-the premises, then the above obligation to be void аnd of no. effect; else to be in.full force and virtue.”
The bond, as shown by- its recitals, was executed in a pending equity cause in the Supreme Court of the District, wherein- the parties for whose use this suit is brought, were parties, either plaintiff or defendant:
The declaration, in substance, averred a. breach of the bond, in this: That Waggaman had assumed the duty and function of trustee for the sale directed by the decree, had sold and’ conveyed the property as directed, but had hot accounted for the proceeds, having unfaithfully vio
The defenses with which - we are concerned upon this-writ are those made by the surety, who, by a plea'which the court below sustained, challenged the obligation of the bond. The insistence is'that the Supreme Court of the District exceeded its authority in decreeing a sale of the land which was sold by Waggaman, and his appointment to make such a sale was a nullity, and the bond executed by him with the defendant Clarke as surety mere waste paper.
The proceeding in the Supreme Court in which this bond was executed was a bill in equity to sell lot No.-1912 I street N. W., Washington, D. C., as the property of a minor for purpose of reinvestment under like trusts-. The titlé was held under the will of Robert B. Hine, who diéd in 1895. So. much of the will as concerns the .title to the premises of which a sale was decreed was in these words:
“I give and bequeath to my dear wife, Mattie McC. Hiñe, a life interest in all my real estate. As executrix she will collect the income arising from said real’ estate, and after paying all- necessary expenses of collection, fire insurance and repairs, shall retain thе remainder of the income for her own use. After the death of- my said wife, I give and bequeath my real estate to my son, Robert Edward, and any other children that may hereafter be born to me: If my said wife should'marry- again, she will from the date of such remarriage, be entitled to retain for her own use, one-half of the net income-of 'my estate, and will pay the remainder to. a trustee for my son, and any other children who may hereafter be borne to me. Provided, further, that should my wifе mariyagain, and should no child of mine by hér, be then surviving, the whole net income from my estate shall be retained by her, during her- life, and after her death, my real estate shall be sold, and of the proceeds, one-third shall be paid to my father, the Rev. Henry Hine now of Boston Spa. Yorkshire England, if he then be living, he not being then living to my mother Amelia Burnett Hine, neither of them being then living to my sister, Amelia Burnett Hine, and the residue, shall, be equally divided between my brothers and sisters share and share alike. If neither рarent, nor my sister Ameliá Burnett Hine outlives my said wife, then the whole net proceeds of the sale of my real estate, shall be equally divided, between my brothers and sisters. Should any of these have died, before this distribution takes place, their surviving children shall receivé the share of thé deceased parent, share'and share alike.’-’ ■
The complainant in the suit was Mattie McC. Hine, the widow of the testator, who averred that she had never remarried. The defendants were the only issue of her marriage with testator, her son Robert E. Hine, then an infant of nine years of age, and the persons who, under the will, were given contingent interests. The minor Robert E. Hine was duly-served-and answered by guardian
ad. litem.
The other defendants were made parties by publication, as persons not to be found in the District. The bill alleged that the dwelling-house was deteriorating in value, that it was often unrented,' that repairs, insurance and taxes left an inconsiderable net income, which wоuld go on diminishing. That she believed she could obtain $8,500 for the premises, a sum much larger than the value of the property to the remain-dermen when her estate should fall in,' and that the proceeds could be so invested as to much improve her income arid better “enable her to provide for the remainderman during his minority.” The bill alleged that the will did not
Uрon the pleadings and proof the court directed a sale of the said lot, and in the same decree appointed Thomas E. Waggaman “trustee to make the sale,” requiring him to execute a bond with surety “conditioned for the faithful performance of the trust reposed in him by this decree, or which may be reposed in him by any future order or decree in the premises.” By the same decree he was required “to bring into court the money arising on such sale . . . to bе disposed of under the direction of the court,” etc.
The contention is that the Supreme Court of the District has no inherent or general power as a court of equity to decree the sale of an infant’s property for the purpose of reinvestment, and that its jurisdiction was wholly dependent upon statutory power conferred by §§ 969 et seq,, Rev. Stat. D. C., taken from the act of Congress of August 18, 1856. Section 969 reads as follows:
“Where real estate is limited by deed or will to onе or more for life or lives, with a contingent limitation over to such issue of one or more of the tenants for life, as shall be living at the death of their parent or parents, and the deed or will does not prohibit a sale, the Supreme Court of the District may, upon the application of the tenants for life, and if the court shall be of the opinion that it is expedient to do so, order a sale of. such estate, and decree to the purchaser an absolute and complete title in fee simple.”
The contention is that the only jurisdiction conferred by this statute is confined to real estate which is by deed or will “limited to one or more lives, with a contingent limitation over to such issue of one or more of the tenants for life as shall be living at the death of-either parent,” and that under the will of Robert B. Hine the devise to Robert Edward Hine is a vested and not a contingent
Clearly under the will there was a life tenant and a remainder over at the death of the life tenant to Robert E. Hine, who was the issue of the testator and of the life tenant. The remainder was not absolute, for if the remainderman should die, and his mother, the life tenant, remarry, this lot was to be sold and the proceeds paid over to certain collaterals named. Technically the interest was a vested remainder, subject to open and let in the testator’s brothers and sisters and to be divested upon the death of Robert E. Hine and remarriage of the life tenant. The contention now is that if the court erred in the construction of the will, or in the interpretation and application of the statute, and decrеed a sale for reinvestment, not strictly authorized by the statute, that its action and decree is to be regarded as a nullity, that the sale is void, and that the appointment of Waggaman as trustee and the execution of his bond are absolute nullities.
But if we assume that upon a critical construction of the will and of the statute the bill seeking a sale of this property for reinvestment did not state a case clearly within the statutory authority of the court, it does not necessarily follow that the decree of sale and all else that occurred áre to be treated as mere nullities, subject to collateral attacks such as this is.
The Supreme Court of the District is one of general jurisdiction. It possesses all of the powers which by statute are conferred upon the Circuit and District Courts of the United States. Sections 760 and 765, Rev. Stat.
The inherent power of a court of equity over the persons and estates of infants is very wide. For the purpose of maintenance, the power over real estate is undoubtedly more comprehensive than it is over the sale of real estate for purposes of reinvestment, though manifestly for the interest of the minor. The weight of аuthority seems to be that it does not extend to sales merely because it shall appear to be for the interest.of the infant (Bispham’s Equity, §549; Story’s Equity, § 1357; 3 Pomeroy Equity, §§ 1304, 1309), though there is not lacking very respectable authority for the power to sell real estate when shown to be for the manifest interest of the minor. 2 Kent’s Comm., 11th ed., * 230;
In the leading case of
Ex parte Tobias Watkins,
“An imprisonment under a judgment, cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is.not a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject; although it should be erroneous. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia is a court of record, having general jurisdiction over criminal cases. An offense cognizable in any court, is cognizable in that court. If the offense be punishable by law, that court is competent to inflict the punishment. . The judgment of such a tribunal has all the obligation which the judgment of any tribunal can have. To determine whether the offense charged in the indictment be legally punishable or not, is among the most unquestionable of its powеrs and duties. The decision- of this question is the exercise of jurisdiction, whether the judgment be for or against the prisoner. The judgment is equally binding in the one case and in the other; and must remain in full force unless reversed regularly by a superior court capable of reversing it.”
After referring to and commenting upon
Kempe’s Lessee
v.
Kennedy,
“Had any offense against the laws of the United States been in fact committed, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia could take cognizance of it. The questionwhether any offense was or was not committed, that is, whether the indictment did or did not show that an offense had been committed, was a question which that court was competent to decide. If its judgment was erroneous, a point which this court does not determine, still it is a judgment, and, until reversed, cannot be disregarded.”
This case was followed in
Ex parte Parks,
“It may be said that this language is too broad in asserting that, because every court must pass upon its own jurisdiction, such decision is itself the exercise of a jurisdiction which belongs to it, and cannot, therefore, be questioned in any other court. But we do not so understand the meaning of the court. It certainly was not intended to say that because a Federal court tries a prisoner for an ordinary common law offense, as burglary, assault and battery, or larceny, with no averment or proof of any offense against the United States, or any connection with a statute of the United States, and punishes him by imprisonmеnt, he cannot be released by habeas corpus because the court which tried him had assumed jurisdiction.
“In all such cases, when the question of jurisdiction is raised, the point to. be decided is, whether the court has jurisdiction of that class of offenses. If the statute has invested thé court which tried the prisoner with jurisdiction to punish a well-defined class of offenses, as forgery of its bonds or perjury in its courts, its judgment as to what acts were necessary under these statutes to constitute the crime is not reviewable on a writ of habeas corpus.”
The principle has been applied in many cases, notably in cases in which want of jurisdiction as a court of the
In
McNitt
v.
Turner,
“But there is a comprehensive and more conclusive answer to all the objections to the sale which have been considered, and to others suggested which have not been adverted to.
“Upon the filing of the notice with the proof of publicatiоn, and the subsequent filing of the petition of the administrator for authority to sell, the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the case. No presumption on that subject is necessary. Jurisdiction is authority to hear- and determine. It is an .axiomatic proposition that when jurisdiction has attached, whatever errors may subsequently occur in its exercise, the proceeding being coram judice, can be impeached collaterally only for fraud. In all other respects it is as conclusive as if -it werе irreversible in a proceeding for error. The order of sale before us is Within this rule. Grignon’s Lessee v. Astor et al.,2 How. 341 , was, like this, a case of a sale by an administrator. In that case, this court said: 'The purchaser under it is not bound to look beyond the decree. If there is error in it of the most palpable kind, if the court which rendered it have, in the exercise of jurisdiction,, disregarded, misconstrued, or disobeyed the plain provisions of the law which gave them the power to hear and determine the case before them, the title of the purchaser is as much protected as if the adjudication would stand the test of a writ of error;, and so where an appeal is given, but not taken, in the time allowed by law.’ This case and the case of Voorhees v. The Bank of the United States,10 Pet. 449 , are the leading authorities, in this court upon the subject. Other vand later cases have followed and been controlled by them. Stow v. Kimball affirms the same doctrine.”
The line between a judgment which- is a plain usurpation of jurisdiction and one which is merely erroneous and reviewáble only by seasonаble appeal, is a plain one. The case in hand falls, in our judgment, within those which are merely reversible upon appellate proceedings, and the judgment decreeing the sale and appointing Waggaman as trustee to make the sale was not a nullity.
In
Voorhees
v.
Bank,
“The line which separates error in judgmént from the. usurpation of power is very definite; and is precisely that which denotes the' cases where a judgment or decree is reversible only by an appellate court, or may be declared a nullity collaterally when it is offered in evidence in an action concerning the matter adjudicated, or purporting to have been so. In the one case, it is a record importing absolute verity; in the other, mere waste paper. There can be no middle character assigned to judicial proceedings which are irreversible for error. Such is their effect between the parties t.o the suit; and such áre the immunities which the law affords to a plaintiff who has obtained an erroneous judgment or execution. It would be a well-merited reproach to bur jurisprudence if an innocent purchaser, no party to the suit, who had paid his money on the faith of an order of a= courts should not have the same protection under an erroneous proceeding as the party who derived the benefit accruing from it.”
In
Fauntleroy
v.
Lum,
But aside from the view we have expressed as to the validity of the proceedings when collaterally attacked, we aré of opinion that the question of the validity of the decree of sale, the order appointing Waggaman trustee to make the sale, and the validity of the bond in suit is
This rule of estoppel has been applied in many cases. It was applied in respect to the bond of an Indian agent. The surety upon the bond denied liability because the Government did not produce the commission showing the appointment of his principal. The court said: “The bond upon which the suit was brought recites that he was appointed Indian agent and the obligors in the bond are therefore estoppеd from denying it.”
Bruce
v.
United States,
The principle was applied to a distiller’s bond where one'of the defenses was that the bond was invalid. The court said:
“But we prefer to place our judgment upon the broader ground marked out by the adjudications of this court, to which we have referred. Every one is presumed to know the law. Ignorance standing alone can never be the basis of a legal right. If a bond is fiable to the objection taken in this case and the parties are dissatisfied, the objection should be made when the bond is presented for execution, If executed under constraint, the constraint will destroy it. But where it is voluntarily entered into and the principal enjoys the benefits which it is intended to secure and a breach occurs, it is then too late to raise the question of its validity. The parties are estopped from availing themselves of such a defense. In such cases there is neither injustice nor hardship in holding that the contract as mаde is the measure of the rights of the government and of the liability of the obligors.” United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall. 395 , 409.
It was applied in respect of a stay bond executed under a void act of legislation. “Not to apply the principle of estoppel to the bond in this case would,” said the court, “it seems to us, involve a mockery in judicial administration and a violation of the plainest principles of reason and justice.”
Daniels
v.
Tearney,
The opinions of the highest courts of the States are full of aрplications of the rule of estoppel. In Plowman v. Henderson, 59 Alabama, 559, the sureties upon the bond of an administrator were not permitted to show the illegality of his appointment. To the same effect is White v. Weatherbee, 126 Massachusetts, 450.
The sureties upon the bond of .a sheriff were held estopped to deny validity of his appointment or the regularity of his bond. Jones v. Gallatin County, 78 Kentucky, 491.
In
People
v.
Norton,
In
State
v.
Anderson,
16 Lea (Tenn.), 321, 335, and
United States
v.
Maurice,
The questions which we have considered arose upon
So much of the plea as sought to defend the action in whole or in part in consequence of the alleged agreement between the principal in the bond and Mrs. Hine without the consent of the surety remains at issue undisposed of, and is accordingly not considered by us.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals so far as it determined the validity of the plea aforesaid was erroneous, and the case'is reversed and remanded with, direction to sustain the demurrer and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.