United States Ex Rel. Garbe v. Kmart Corp.United States Ex Rel. Garbe v. Kmart Corp.
Case Information
*1 Before W OOD , Chief Judge , and E ASTERBROOK and H AMILTON , Circuit Judges .
W OOD , Chief Judge . James Garbe, an experienced pharma- cist, began working at Kmart pharmacy in Ohio in 2007. One day, Garbe picked up a personal prescription at a competitor pharmacy. When he reviewed his receipt, Garbe got a sur- prise: the competitor pharmacy had charged his Medicare Part D insurer far less than Kmart ordinarily charged it for the same prescription. Curious to see whether his discovery was *2 a one-off, he started inspecting Kmart’s pharmacy reimburse- ment claims. His amateur detective work revealed that Kmart routinely charged customers with insurance—whether public or private—higher prices than customers who paid out of pocket. Not all cash customers were charged the same price: people in Kmart’s “discount programs” paid much less. But the ensuing investigation revealed that nearly all cash cus- tomers received the lower “discount program” prices. Mean- while, those “discount program” sales were ignored when Kmart calculated its “usual and customary” prices for its ge- neric drugs for purposes of Medicare reimbursement. Garbe shared his discovery with the government and filed a qui tam suit on July 12, 2008. The government has not intervened.
According to the accepted definition of “usual and cus- tomary,” Garbe says, Kmart’s “usual and customary” prices should be based on the prices Kmart charged the majority of its cash customers, meaning those participating in its generic drug “discount programs”—not the higher prices it imposed on a small fraction of those buyers or those with third-party insurance. After a flurry of motions, the district court granted partial summary judgment in Garbe’s favor on some issues and denied it to Kmart on others.
We accepted an interlocutory appeal from these rulings
under
I
A Garbe’s allegations cover Kmart programs that stretch back 12 years. In 2004, Kmart introduced a program meant to compete with online, mail-order pharmacies: the “Kmart Maintenance Program” (KMP). The KMP offered specified generic drugs to customers with 90-day prescriptions at a dis- count price of $15 per prescription.
Congress added the Part D prescription benefit to Medi- care, a federally funded health insurance program, in 2006. Part D allows beneficiaries to opt in to prescription drug ben- efits by enrolling in a private insurance plan. The program provides insurance coverage, up to a certain amount, for ben- eficiaries’ prescription drug costs. Above that amount, benefi- ciaries are responsible for additional costs up to another set dollar value, where Part D’s “catastrophic coverage” kicks in. (This coverage gap is known as the “donut hole.”)
The Part D program is overseen by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS does not ad- minister the program; instead, it uses Plan Sponsors, which are private entities that compete for the opportunity to man- age Part D beneficiaries’ claim submissions and payment pro- *4 cesses. Most Plan Sponsors subcontract with Pharmacy Bene- fit Managers, which are other private entities that work di- rectly with retail pharmacies to provide prescriptions to Part D beneficiaries. CMS pays Plan Sponsors fixed monthly payments according to certain benchmarks. At the end of each year, it conducts “reconciliation” with the sponsors. The rec- onciliation process determines, based on Plan Sponsor rec- ords and a complex subsidy system, whether individual Plan Sponsors should receive additional funds.
CMS thus does not directly pay or reimburse any individ-
ual prescriptions through the program. It does control prices,
however, insofar as it requires retail pharmacies to charge
Medicare Part D beneficiaries the “usual and customary”
price, an administratively defined term, for each prescription.
See
B
Kmart saw the Part D program as an attractive potential source for new revenue. But Kmart had a problem: the pro- gram was leading to increased competition among retail pharmacies, which were developing their own discount ge- neric-drug programs. This competition, Kmart feared, would drive down the prices for prescriptions reimbursed by third- party payers, and therefore revenue.
In late 2005, as the Part D program was rolling out, Kmart revamped the KMP. The key reform was a new pricing sys- tem. According to Kmart internal documents (from which we take all of the following quotes), Kmart recognized that it was “financially beneficial to maintain the Usual and Customary *5 price higher than reimbursement rates.” Kmart set out to ac- complish this goal by instituting a policy of setting low “dis- count” prices for cash customers who signed up for one of its programs, while charging higher “usual and customary” prices to non-program cash customers, “to drive as much profit as possible out of [third-party] programs.” Kmart’s sec- ond step was simple: it changed the program’s name. In order to put it at as “long a[s] possible arms length from [Kmart’s] U&C pricing,” the KMP was relabeled as the “Retail Mainte- nance Program,” or “RMP.”
To strengthen Kmart’s “firewall” between RMP and its “usual and customary” prices, Kmart hired Agelity, a third- party processor, to administer RMP. According to Garbe’s ev- idence, however, Agelity’s participation was a sham. In real- ity, Kmart decided which drugs were in the RMP formulary, the prices for those drugs, and which customers were eligible for those prices. In 2008, Kmart expanded RMP to include ad- ditional drugs and expanded its discount programs to many 30- and 60-day prescriptions. Yet Kmart pharmacists rou- tinely overrode official program pricing to match competitor prices. In 2009 Kmart retooled RMP by introducing the “Pre- scription Savings Club,” under which Kmart officially offered its low cash prices on 30-, 60-, and 90-day prescriptions. The programs underwent other modifications along the way. But according to Garbe, each version of Kmart’s “discount pro- grams” was the same old wine, in new bottles: Kmart offered low prices to discount-program cash customers, while sub- mitting higher “usual and customary” prices for prescriptions reimbursed by third-party insurers and some non-program cash customers.
C
As Garbe sees it, Kmart’s real “usual and customary” prices were not the high ones paid by non-program cash cus- tomers or those submitted to third parties for reimbursement, but the low ones it offered to the cash customers participating in one of its “discount programs.” These programs, he charges, were nothing but a sham allowing it to manipulate its “usual and customary” cash price.
Garbe retained a pharmaceutical economist, Dr. Joel Hay, to analyze mountains of reimbursement data. Dr. Hay’s work revealed that Kmart charged nearly all its cash customers “discount program” prices. Garbe also hired an auditor, who testified that, under industry practice and the terms of over 1,000 contracts between Kmart and Medicare Part D Benefit Managers and Plan Sponsors, Kmart should have based its re- imbursement requests to the insurance companies handling Medicare Part D on its “discount program” prices. Dr. Hay’s examination revealed that Kmart instead used significantly higher prices when submitting those requests, and was thus reimbursed at a much higher level.
At the close of discovery, Kmart filed four motions for par- tial summary judgment. Relevant to this appeal, it challenged Garbe’s assertion that Kmart’s “discount programs” were its actual “usual and customary” prices, and therefore that it made a false statement in requesting reimbursement based on allegedly inflated “usual and customary” prices. It also ar- gued that Garbe’s claims failed for lack of presentment and materiality on the theory that the government never actually received or paid any of its reimbursement requests. Related to its second challenge, it argued that FERA, which amended the FCA, applied retroactively only to claims pending on or *7 after June 7, 2008. (Garbe filed his initial complaint on July 16, 2008.) According to Kmart, this meant that the post-FERA FCA applied only to a tiny portion of the payments on which Garbe focused.
The district court rejected all Kmart’s arguments. It found
as a matter of law that transactions under Kmart’s “discount
programs” represented the “usual and customary” price. It
held that the FERA amendments retroactively covered
cases
pending on June 7, 2008, and therefore they applied to all of
transactions Garbe had identified. It also found that Garbe’s
evidence raised at least a genuine dispute of material fact
about Kmart’s liability under
After some adjustments in response to its motion for re-
consideration, Kmart asked the district court to certify its
summary judgment order for interlocutory appeal under
II
We consider de novo the district court’s rulings on partial summary judgment , construing the facts in the light most fa- vorable to the non-moving party—in this case, Garbe. Jaburek *8 8
v. Foxx
,
A
Kmart opens with its retroactivity argument, which if suc-
cessful would knock out almost all of Garbe’s case. It urges
that
Since 2009, the FCA has said that “any person who ...
(1)(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false
or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” or “(B) know-
ingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record
or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim” is liable
under the False Claims Act.
The change occurred because of a Supreme Court deci-
sion. In 2008, the Court held that FCA
Congress responded the next year by enacting FERA.
FERA excised the language requiring that the claim be pre-
sented “to an officer or employee of the United States Govern-
ment or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States.”
It also struck from
FERA also clarified the statutory definitions for “claim”
and “material.” It defined “claim” to mean, in relevant part,
“any request or demand ... for money or property, that ... is
made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient, if the money
or property is to be spent or used on the Government’s behalf
or to advance a Government program or interest” and to
which the government either “provides or has provided any
portion of the money or property” or “will reimburse such
contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the
money or property.”
language underscored Congress’s intent that FCA liability at-
tach to any false claim made to an entity implementing a pro-
gram with government funds, regardless of whether that en-
tity was public or private. FERA defines “material” to mean
“having the natural tendency to influence, or be capable of
influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”
Whether we call the changes made by FERA clarifications or changes, the end result is clear: as amended, the FCA con- tains no presentment requirement. For any transactions to which FERA applies, Garbe is thus not required to show that any statement or record was delivered to any government em- ployee, official, or entity. FCA liability attaches to any false claim to any entity—public or private—implementing a gov- ernment program or a program using government funds.
Kmart’s materiality arguments are similarly mistaken.
Kmart contends that Garbe has not raised a genuine issue of
fact on materiality because he offered no evidence that the al-
leged overcharges were capable of affecting the
government’s
payment decision. But FERA’s materiality rule requires only
that the false record or statement influence the “payment
or receipt
of money or property”—no government decision is re-
quired.
Kmart argues that there must be a “causal chain” between
a false claim and a CMS payment, but it offers no support for
such a rule. FERA had the effect of bringing within the FCA’s
ambit false claims to intermediaries or other private entities
that either implement government programs or use govern-
ment funds. See
Having found that Garbe’s claims satisfy the post-FERA
version of the FCA, we now consider whether that version ap-
plies to them. In FERA § 4(f), Congress said that the amend-
ments were effective “as if [subsection (a)(1)(B) had been] en-
acted on June 7, 2008,” and that they “apply to all claims un-
der the False Claims Act that are pending on or after that
date.”
We have held before that the word “claims” in § 4(f)(1) re-
fers to cases, not to individual requests for payment. See
United States ex rel. Yannacopoulos v. Gen. Dynamics
, 652 F.3d
818, 822 n.2 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[S]ection 3729(a)(1)(B) ... applies
to cases, such as this, that were pending on or after June 7,
2008.”);
United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd.
,
This is the interpretation that best reflects the text and
structure of the statute. Construing “claims” to mean “re-
quests for payment” makes no sense. There is no such thing
as a request or demand for payment under the False Claims
Act. Rather, a claim “under the [FCA]” is a legal action by the
government or a relator to recover fraudulently obtained
funds. See
Construing the FERA amendments as retroactive only for
requests or demands for payment is also in tension with Con-
gress’s stated goal of changing
Allison Engine
’s interpretation
of
Interpreting § 4(f)(1)’s “claims” to mean “cases” accom- plishes this goal. Interpreting it as “any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or prop- erty” does not. Kmart offers no reason why, under its theory, Congress would have chosen June 7, 2008, for the effective date. Worse, Kmart’s reading would render meaningless what is arguably § 4(f)(1)’s most important element—the date of retroactivity—and thus violate the “cardinal principle of stat- utory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” See TRW Inc. v. Andrews , 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); Stone v. I.N.S. , 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it in- tends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”).
Kmart argues that because the FCA provides a statutory
definition of “claim,” that definition should control. It is true
that “[s]tatutory definitions control the meaning of statutory
words ... in the usual case.”
Burgess v. United States
, 553 U.S.
124, 129 (2008). And
Kmart argues that its interpretation is reinforced by other
parts of the FERA. It is true that “[c]ontext, not just literal text,
will often lead a court to Congress’ intent in respect to a par-
ticular statute.”
United States v. Webber
,
But the presumption that “disparate inclusion or exclu-
sion” is purposeful is weakened when, as here, the provisions
were not joined together or considered simultaneously.
Sand-
ers
,
Moreover, the “presumption that identical words used in
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same
*15
meaning ... is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is
such variation in the connection in which the words are used
as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were em-
ployed in different parts of the act with different intent.”
Gen.
Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline
,
Congress’s free use of “claim” (along with “action”) to
mean “civil action” throughout the FCA further supports the
argument that § 4(f)(1) was not meant to incorporate the def-
inition in
Finally, Kmart maintains that three other courts of ap-
peals, albeit in footnotes, have agreed with it. See
Hopper v.
Solvay Pharm., Inc.
, 588 F.3d 1318 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009) (inter-
preting “claim” in § 4(f)(1) to mean “any request or demand
... for money or property”);
Gonzalez v. Fresenius Med. Care N.
Am.
,
All things considered, we have no trouble concluding that the word “claims” does not mean “request[s] or demand[s] for ... money or property.” It means “cases,” and thus § 4(f)(1) applies to FCA cases pending on or after June 7, 2008.
B
With the broader point established, the practical impact of
Kmart’s next point, which relates to its liability under the pre-
FERA version of the Act, is greatly diminished. This issue is
relevant only to the extent that any of the transactions about
which Garbe is complaining are not covered by the amended
version of
Although retroactive application of statutes “is not fa-
vored,” a statute will be construed “to have retroactive effect”
where its “language requires this result.”
Republic of Austria v.
Altmann
,
There are
several problems with
interpreting
Garbe argues that even if the amendments are not retroac-
tive and the presentment requirement applies to some claims,
the intermediaries that actually reimbursed Kmart’s allegedly
fraudulent claims should be considered to be “officer[s] or
employee[s] of the United States Government” under
C
Finally, we address Kmart’s contention that the term “gen- eral public,” as found in the definition of “usual and custom- ary” pricing, excludes persons participating in its “discount programs.”
Unless state regulations provide otherwise, the “usual and customary” price is defined as the “cash price offered to the general public.” Garbe alleges that Kmart’s actual “usual and customary” prices are the prices it charges through several ge- neric-drug discount programs. If he is correct, Kmart misrep- resented its “usual and customary” prices by charging Medi- care Part D participants far in excess of those prices—some- times as much as 30 times more. Kmart argues that because the participants in its discount programs were not the “gen- eral public,” those prices were not its “usual and customary” charges. Although the district court decided that the defini- tion of “usual and customary” raised a question of law, it nonetheless took expert evidence on the industry definition of the term. It resolved the meaning of “general public” without taking evidence.
Kmart argues that the ordinary meaning of “general pub- lic” excludes customers who join a discount program. It points to two definitions of “general public” from online dic- tionaries: first, “ordinary people in society, rather than people who are considered to be important or who belong to a par- ticular group,” Macmillan Dictionary Online , http://www.mac- millandictionary.com/dictionary/british/the-general-public (visited May 18, 2016); and second, “ordinary people, espe- cially all the people who are not members of a particular or- ganization or who do not have any special type of knowledge.” Cambridge Dictionaries Online , http://diction- ary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/the-general-pub- lic?q=general+public (visited May 18, 2016). It argues that be- cause members of its discount programs “belong to a partic- ular group” or “organization” that represents a subset of its customer base, they are not members of the general public and the price they were charged is not the usual and custom- ary price.
Saying that someone is a member of a “particular” organ- ization, however, does not make it so. We are given no reason to think that there was any meaningful selectivity for the peo- ple who joined Kmart’s programs, and thus that they could be distinguished in any way from the “general public.” Few of Kmart’s customers would consider themselves as “be- long[ing] to a particular group” or “members of a particular organization” just because they accepted Kmart’s offer of a discount. Even if the prices were offered only to members of its “discount programs”—and it is disputed whether this was the case—the programs themselves were offered to the gen- *20 eral public. Kmart’s programs typically offered its “dis- counts” in return for nothing more than assent, demographic data the pharmacy already needed to fill a prescription, and a nominal fee.
The evidence submitted shows that the barriers to joining the Kmart “programs” were almost nonexistent, to the extent they were enforced at all. Cash customers walking into Kmart do not cease to be members of the general public the minute they are offered—or pushed into—“membership” in Kmart’s “discount program.” The program’s most robust version al- lowed customers to obtain its “benefits” immediately for ten dollars. (For those people, the program fee is part of the cash price: for example, if the fee was $10 and the program drug price was $15, the customer paid $25 for her first prescription. For people who fill more than one prescription, the $10 fee would need to be allocated in some sensible way.) Garbe’s ex- pert indicated that most of Kmart’s cash customers received its “discount” prices.
Our reading of “general public” is consistent with the reg-
ulatory structure that gave rise to the “usual and customary”
price term. Under
Medicare, Medicaid, and their corresponding regulations
mandate that state plans ensure that “payments for services
be consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care.”
Taken together, “[t]he purpose of these regulations is clear:
state agencies are not to pay more for prescribed drugs than
the prevailing retail market price.”
United States v. Bruno’s,
Inc.
,
22
An agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is given
“controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or incon-
sistent with the regulation.”
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala
,
512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (quoting
Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co.,
Allowing Kmart to insulate high “usual and customary” prices by artificially dividing its customer base would under- mine a central purpose of the statutory and regulatory struc- ture. The “usual and customary” price requirement should not be frustrated by so flimsy a device as Kmart’s “discount programs.” Because Kmart offered the terms of its “discount programs” to the general public and made them the lowest prices for which its drugs were widely and consistently avail- able, the Kmart “discount” prices at issue represented the “usual and customary” charges for the drugs.
Kmart argues that even if it is not entitled to summary
judgment on whether its discount prices were its “usual and
customary” charges, the issue is one of fact and appropriate
*23
for a jury. But the interpretation of contractual and regulatory
terms is generally a question of law. See
Hanover Ins. Co. v. N.
Bldg. Co.
,
III
FERA § 4(f) made