United States ex rel. Anniston Pipe & Foundry Co. v. National Surety Co.

92 F. 549 | 8th Cir. | 1899

THAYER, Circuit Judge,

after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

It is a familiar rule of law that the contract of a surety must be strictly construed, and that it cannot be enlarged by construction, and that when a bond, with sureties, has been given to secure the performance of a contract, and the principal in the bond and the person for whose benefit it "was given make a material change in the contract without the consent of the surety, the latter is thereby discharged. For present purposes, it may be conceded that the finding of the lower court in the case at bar discloses such a modification of the original contract between Prosser and the United States as would fall within the rule last stated, and release the defendant company from its liability, if the United States was suing for its own benefit for a breach of some provision of the contract, the due performance of which the bond was intended to secure.' Such, however, is not the case. The suit is not brought by the United States to recover any damage which it has sustained; neither is.it brought to enforce any provision of the contract which was entered into between the United States and the principal in the bond. On the contrary, the action is one to enforce a stipulation found in the bond, and only in the bond, which was intended solely for the protection of laborers and material men who might furnish labor and materials while the contract was being executed by Prosser. The United States is merely a nominal plaintiff, and as such, under-the provisions of the act of congress, it cannot be held liable even for- costs. The real plaintiff is the corporation for whose use the suit was brought, and it sues to enforce an obligation which congress required to be inserted in the bond for its protec-lion and for the protection of others who might furnish labor or materials while the work was in progress.

The real question to be considered, therefore, is whether the act of congress under which the bend in suit was taken constituted the United States the agent cr representative of tilt persons who supplied labor and materials after the contract and bond were executed, in such a sense that its action in consenting to a modification of the contract with Prosser must be imputed to the laborers and material men, and held to deprive them, as well as the government, of all recourse against the surety.

The act of congress of August 13, 1891, does not authorize the United States to bring suits of its own motion against the obligors in such bonds as are therein provided for, to recover what is due to laborers and material men. It is not empowered to act in their behalf in that respect, but such actions can only be brought at the instance of persons who furnish labor and materials, who are authorized, without previous leave being obtained from any executive department, to sue in the name of the United States, and control the litigation precisely as they might control it if the suits were brought in their own name. It is also noticeable that in its title the act professes to be one for the bent fit “of persons furnishing materials .and labor,” and that in the body of the act the form of the condition to be inserted in the bond for the benefit of the United States is not in terms prescribed, the only provision in that regard being that the bond shall be “the usual penal bond”; moaning, evidently, such an obligation for the government’s own protection as it had long been in the habit of exacting from those with whom contracts were made for the doing of public work. On the other hand, the condition for the benefit of persons who might furnish materials or labor is carefully prescribed. Obviously, therefore, congress intended to afford full protection to all pel-sons who supplied materials or labor in the construction of public buildings or other public works, inasmuch as such persons could claim no lien thereon, whatever the local law might be, for the labor and materials so supplied. There was no occasion for legislation on the subject to which tiie act relates, except for (he protection of those who might furnish materials or labor to persons having contracts with the government. The bond which is provided for by the act was intended to perform a double function, — in the first place, to secure to the government, as before, the faithful perform anee of all obligations which a contractor might assume towards it; and, in the second place, to protect third persons from whom the contractor obtained materials or labor. Viewed in its latter aspect., the bond, by virtue of the operation of the statute, contains an agreement between the obligors therein and such third parties that they shall be paid for "whatever labor or materials they may supply to enable the principal in the bond to execute his contract with the United States^ The two agreements which the bond contains, the one for the benefit of the government, and the one for the benefit of third persons, are as distinct as if they were contained in separate instruments, the government’s name being used as obligee in the latter agreement merely as a matter of convenience.

In view of these considerations, we are of opinion that the sureties in a bond, executed under the act now in question, cannot claim exemption from liability tó persons who have supplied labor or material to their principal to enable him to execute his contract with the United States, simply because the government and the contractor, without the surety’s knowledge, have made some changes in the contract, subsequent to the execution of the bond given to secure its performance, which do not alter the general character of the work contemplated by the contract or the general character of the materials which are necessary for its execution. When the government has executed the contract and taken and approved the bond, it ceases to foe the agent of third parties whom the contractor employs in the execution of the work or from whom he obtains materials, and the rights of such persons under the bond are unaffected by subsequent transactions between the government and the contractor. If such were not the case, it would be possible for the contractor and some officer of the United States, by making some change in the contract or speci fications, to deprive laborers and material men of all recourse against the sureties in the bond after they had supplied materials and labor of great value in reliance upon its provisions. It is not probable that such a result was contemplated by the lawmaker. On the contrary, the act bears every evidence that it was intended to provide a security for laborers and material men on which they could rely confidently for protection, unless they saw fit, by their own dealings with the contractor, to relinquish the benefit of the security. We are confirmed in these views by the following authorities: Dewey v. State, 91 Ind. 173; Conn v. State, 125 Ind. 514, 25 N. E. 443; Doll v. Crume,41 Neb. 655, 59 N. W. 806; Kaufmann v. Cooper, 46 Neb. 644, 65 N. W. 796; Steffes v. Lemke, 40 Minn. 27, 41 N. W. 302. The first two of these cases are very much in point. Bonds were given to the state of Indiana as obligee for the doitíg of public work, in pursuance of a statute of that state, which bonds contained conditions requiring — First, the faithful performance and execution of the work undertaken by the contractor; and, second, the prompt payment by the contractor of all debts incurred.by him in the prosecution of the work for labor and materials supplied by third parties. It was held, in substance, that for any breach of the second condition of the bond by the contractor the right of action was in the laborer or the material man, and that such right of action could not be defeated or prejudiced by any act done by the obligee in the bond after the bond had been taken and approved. It was accordingly ruled that changes made in the contract by the parties thereto, to wit, the contractor and the public authorities, after the bonds had been executed and accepted, would not deprive material men of their right to recover against the sureties in the bond. It results from what has been said that the judgment of the circuit court was- erroneous upon the facts found by that court, and should be reversed. It is so ordered, and that the case be remanded for a new trial.