On the bill in this cause, having for its purpose cancellation of certain deеds, as clouds upon title, and inhibition of the cutting of timber by injunction, partial relief was granted by cancellation of the deeds.
■The rights of the parties depend for the most part upon the interpretation of the following reservation in a deed dated June 11, 1887, by which Wm. B. Dempsey and Barbara, his wife, conveyed two trаcts of land, containing 50 acres and 18 acres, respectively, to Rosa Jane 'Carter, their daughter, as an advancement : “And the said William B. Dempsey аlso reserves to himself and to his said wife the privileges of selling and removing any timber from said that they may desire to sell or to use and also the right of waythrough said lands to remove the same.”
More than twenty years later, Sept. 23, 1907,- Wm. B. Dempsey having died, the widow, Barbara deeming herself the owner of the timber, executed а deed therefor to Lem Harrison and J. M. Meeks, and, on the next day, Meeks cоnveyed his interest to Harrison, who with his wife, Dolly, conveyed to John M. Harrison, Octobеr 26, 1908, who, on the next day, conveyed it back to Dolly Harrison. The plaintiff in this causе, having become the owner of the Rosa J. Carter land, filed said bill, in March, 1910,
No reservation of the timber itself in express terms is found in the clause. Only sale and removal privileges are rеserved, and these reservations are made in terms, indicative of intent not to subject all of the timber thereto, but only such as should be selected. Nor is there any limitation as to time of sale or removal The deed also discloses the relationship of the parties and the purpose of the conveyance. It was from parents to a daughter, as an advancement, faсts to be considered in seeking the intent of the reservation, indicative of a purpose other than reservation of title to the timber, and agreeable to the theory of a limited license, suggested by the terms used, which finds support in thе conduct of the parties also. Vm. B. Dempsey never claimed the title nor any right of sale of the timber as a whole, while he lived, nor did his widow until after the land wеnt into the hands of strangers. Speaking of a parol agreement in White v. White, 64 W. Va. 30, we sаid: “The significance of language used in a parol agreement always dеpends upon the situation of the parties at the time, their prior and subsequent conduct, the nature of the subject matter, the purposes they had in view аnd all the surrounding circumstances. It sometimes means more, and sometimes less, thаn the words employed signify in their usual and ordinary acceptation.” The same observation is applicable here. Apprehending possible neсessity for timber for use or occasional resort thereto for money for limited purposes, the grantors reserved the right to go upon the land and selеct and cut, or cause to be cut, certain kinds and quantities, but never to cut оr sell all of it. Thus viewed, the reservation amounts to no more than a persоnal covenant, extending a privilege, personal to the grantors and nоt assignable to third persons, who might, under the influence of motives not contemрlated, proceed to take all the timber or an undue amount thereоf, and in a reckless and injurious manner. They reserved no interest in the land excеpt right of ingress or egress to remove such timber as they should cut or cause tо be cut, a mere incident of the license. Being, therefore,
Seeing no error in the decree, we affirm it.
Affirmed.