United Services Automobile Association v. William J. Perry, Secretary of United States Department of Defense, and United States of America

DeMOSS, SMITH, Before DUHÉ Judges. Circuit PER CURIAM: impression, In this are case of first interpret meaning called of Con- gress’ 1990 amendment to 10 U.S.C. (Supp.1995). 1095 allows the mili- Section tary to be reimbursed insurance carriers treating for medical incurs soldiers whom the carriers insure. de-We “no-fault insurance termine the term carrier,” statute, appears as it is am- biguous. interpre- defer to the We therefore tation of that term the entitled to administer the (“DOD”), summary reverse the judgment in favor of the United Services (“USAA”), Association Automobile and ren- stipulated that there were no summary judgment government.1 disputed for the der facts and filed cross-motions for

summary judgment. The district court ruled favor, holding USAA’s I. no-fault insurance and USAA is therefore not separate This case arises from twelve a third-party payer auto- government liable to the involving § mobile accidents2 under government members of the 1095. timely The ap- military pealed. who were entitled to receive and did military hospital

receive medical care a weye by who also II. insured USAA. The inju- members were service treated for their government contends that USAA military hospitals ries at at no cost to the a “third-party payer” § under re §§ soldiers. 10 U.S.C. (Supp. quired to government reimburse the for individually- Each soldier had an military provides health care the its insureds. by owned automobile insurance issued We must whether determine USAA is a USAA that coverage, contained unin- “third-party payer” because of the inclusion motorist coverage, coverage sured for dam- Medpay of its coverage in its automobile age to the insured’s vehicle and medical pay- policy. coverage ments (“Medpay”), which covered 1990, § Before 1095 defined “third-party insureds for arising medical costs from payer” entity as “an provides insurance, automobile accidents. medical plan by service or health contract or government USAA, with filed claims agreement.” Congress amended the statute seeking reimbursement for costs incurred in adding “including the words an auto- treating government USAA’s insureds. mobile insurance or no-fault insur- its claim based on 10 U.S.C. government ance carrier.” The and USAA provides “the United States shall have already have litigated the issue of whether right to collect a third-party payer from USAA a third-party payer because of Med- the reasonable costs of health care services pay under 1095 as prior it was to 1990. In incurred States on United behalf Ass’n, United States v. United Services Auto. person through [military such hospi- Cir.1993), 5 F.3d 204 the Seventh Circuit tal]_” 1095(a)(1). Id. at The statute held that USAA was not such a third-party “third-party payer” entity defines a as “an payer. provides service, an medical are, course, We not bound plan by health agreement, contract or Seventh Circuit’s Principles decision. of es

including an insurance or toppel, preclude carrier.” Id. re-litigating against from party the same an 1095(h)(1). issue which another circuit has ruled USAA refused to pay, against and instead government. filed United States v. declaratory judgment against gov- Co., action 165, 171, Chem. Stauffer ernment, seeking a 575, 578-79, determination that it did S.Ct. L.Ed.2d owe Specifically, Thus, reimbursement. USAA if prevail is to in its sought a determination that it was not a view that USAA is now a payer, third-party payer under 1095. it must do so under the 1990 amendments.3 defendants-appellants 1. The dealing injuries arising this action are out of automo- Defense, Perry, Secretary William J. and the appear bile accidents. It would also that these parties United States of America. Both will col- accidents occurred after lectively '‘government.” be referred to as the position 3.We prior take no as to whether the appear It would that all of these accidents against correctly. case USAA was decided We occurred in states which have retained tort theo- that, merely conclude because the and the recovery injuries ries as the basis for same, precluded issues are the adopted automobile accidents have not arguing "third-party pay- that USAAwas a comprehensive scheme of "no-fault insurance” must, therefore, agency’s permis- whether answer is based on a determine We an “automobile insurance or sible construction statute. USAA is carrier.” no-fault insurance (footnotes 842-43, Id. at 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82 omitted). is a no-fault in- We conclude USAA because is a form of

surance carrier Accordingly, our first task is to deter no-fault insurance. DOD is entrusted to ad- If mine whether the statute is minister and has issued spo we determine interpreting the term “no-fault insurance” as done; job precise ken to the then our “give unambiguously we will effect to the compensa- providing an insurance contract expressed Congress.” intent of Id. at tion for health and medical relat- at 2781. we find that S.Ct. injury

ing personal arising from the plainly spoken has not to the issue operation in of a motor vehicle which the face, ambiguous and the statute is on its we may compensation premised on who agency’s then will determine whether responsible causing have been such permissible construction of the a statute is injury. per- No-fault insurance includes one. injury protection pay- sonal and medical involving personal in ments benefits eases ambiguous A if statute it is sus injuries resulting operation of a mo- ceptible meaning. to more than one NORMAN tor vehicle. Statutory SingeR, 2a J. Sutherland CON (1995). urges 32 C.F.R. USAA us (5th 1992). 220.12© STRUCTION 45.02 ed. In inter definition, reject arguing this that “no- preting begin a plain with its only fault insurance” refers state- language. Phillips v. Marine Concrete adopted regime of insurance that Structures, Inc., (5th 1035

pays regard without to fault. Cir.1990). glance, At first either USAA’s or government’s interpretation of 1095 interpreta- anWhen has issued an plausible. seems Recourse to dictionaries administer, tion it of statute is entitled to issue, clarify only not does but serves to interpretation our own of the statute is not prove that the term “no-fault insurance carri entirely de novo. The Court has authority er” is One defines no- Chevron, given guidance, us U.S.A v. Nat- indicating system fault as or “[o]f of auto Council, Inc., ural Resources motive insurance in which accident victims S.Ct. 81 L.Ed.2d 694 compensated by compa are their insurance (1984), reviewing agency regulations: such assignment nies without of blame.” Web agency’s When a court reviews an con- University II ster’s New Riverside Dictio struction of the statute it which adminis- nary (1988). supports This definition ters, questions. it is confronted with two position, USAA’s considers “no-fault” as First, always, question is the whether Con- referring system to a of insurance. Another gress directly spoken precise to the supports government’s source view question at If issue. the intent of Con- “of, to, defining relating “no-fault” as or or clear, gress is that is the end of the mat- being a plan motor vehicle insurance under ter; court, for the agency, as well as the compensated which an victim accident ... give unambiguously must effect to the ex- company regardless his own insurance pressed Congress. intent responsible who is for the accident.” Web the court determines has not Collegiate Dictionary ster’s Ninth New precise question addressed the at (1989). simply impose the court does its (and do) Both can claim construction, assistance necessary own as would be reference, from a third which defines “no- interpreta- the absence of administrative fault auto insurance” as the Rather, tion. if the statute is silent or respect specific [t]ype is- automobile insurance sue, question personal injury for the court is whether claims ... are made er” under amendments version of the statute. pre-1990 against own regard the claimant’s insurance com- out to fault. 12A Couoh on Insur- fault) (no (2d pany 1981); §§ matter who was at rather 45:661-678 ed. see also anoe Liability against party Long, than the insurer of R. The Law of InsuRanoe (1994). treatise, fault. Under such state ‘no-fault’ statutes 27.01 at 27-3 Another however, only personal injuries in cases of serious policies refers to insurance paying high may injured regard medical costs without to fault as “nonfault insur- bring against party an action Keeton, the other anee.” Robert E. Basic Text of vary Law, his insurer. No-fault statutes from INsuranCE 4.10 at 246 There- fore, scope state to state terms of of cover- we can see that while “no-fault” is more amounts, age, commonly threshold etc. used in the insurance area to system mean a paying regardless state Dictionary 1979). ed. Blaox’s Law fault, it can also be used to refer to a Still another defines “no-fault” as pays regardless of fault. “designat[ing] a form of motor vehicle insur- English Dictionary (2d ance.” Oxford We therefore conclude that Con examples usage, ed. In its gress “directly has not precise addressed the it leans toward USAA’s definition. Id. at 462 question Chevron, at issue” here.4 (“[A] compensation system being 104 S.Ct. at It remains for us strong discussed- [a] no-fault insurance to determine whether DOD’s construction of bill”). A final source lends credence to the one, that permissible term is a and we have government’s position, defining “no-fault” as difficulty no concluding that it is. DOD’s enabling “a of automobile form insurance construction is consistent language with the policyholder in ease of an accident to collect a statute, dictionaries, and insurance compensation certain basic ... from his own not, course, treatises. It only is per company insurance without determination of statute, missible construction of the but it is College liability.” Random House Dictio- construction, permissible one and that is nary (1982). enough. We are Chevron-bound to conclude Medpay that is a form of no-fault insurance Based on this review of definitions of “no- 1095, within meaning fault,” is USAA we determine that the word com- liable to the (1) for reimbursement monly ways, used both to denote either expenses. of medical (2) policy an state-imposed insurance system pays insurance regardless REVERSED, judgment and sum- Thus, fault. the “Battle of the Dictionaries” mary judgment gov- is RENDERED for the ambiguity. does not resolve the on summary ernment the cross-motion for judgment. Because “no-fault” is an insurance term art, and can be a term of we also consider DeMOSS, Judge, dissenting: Circuit

how the word is used in the insurance field. leading A agree majority insurance treatise uses “no-fault” I with the that the control- system to refer to a state ling of insurance with- issue this case is “whether USAA legisla- "legislative history” 4. The dissent concludes upon by that the statute’s relied history tive renders the term "no-fault all, insur- really legislative history dissent is not but a unambiguous, although ance" it concedes that general background history of the statute drawn the text of the statute is It is a rare non-legislative from sources. This is an even less legislative history case indeed in which alone will legislative history reliable basis than from which permit “Congress directly us to find that has ... face, to conclude that a on its precise question addressed the at issue.” Chev- Indeed, unambiguous in fact. we conclude ron, 843, 467 U.S. at 104 S.Ct. at 2782. This is general background history from the acknowledges not such a case. The dissent purpose prevent of the statute is reports the committee of the House and Senate happen windfall to insurers who to be liable to merely restate the text of the amendment. See forces, purpose members of the armed and that Sess., Cong., H.Rep. reprinted 101st 2d No. interpretation is furthered DOD's of the stat- 3110; at 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. H.Rep. No. event, any respectfully ute. In do not believe Sess., Cong., reprinted 101st 2d at 1990 adequate 2931; that the dissent's sources are to allow Cong., S.Rep. U.S.C.C.A.N. No. 101st Sess., "Congress Cong. us to find that has addressed 2d U.S.Code & Admin.News p. precise question 3283-3. at issue.” providing compen- an ‘automobile insurance1 or no-fault insurance contract [A]n ” Majority Opinion sation for health and medical insurance carrier.’ I, however, lating personal injury arising from come to a different conclu- by majority. operation of a motor vehicle in which the sion than that reached compensation premised may is not on who I read 10 influenced U.S.C. responsible causing have been such history, clearly unambigu- legislative injury. per- No-fault insurance includes payment plans ously state that medical such injury protection pay- sonal and medical Medpay are not no-fault insurance. The involving personal ments benefits cases legislative makes clear injuries resulting operation of a mo- phrase insurance” to refer used the “no-fault tor vehicle. adopted systems of automobile insur- to state 220.12(i). argues 32 C.F.R. pay regardless of fault. USAA ance that any are incorrect. USAA contends did not use the term to describe automo- that no-fault aspect insurance 1095 refers to a bile that contains one insurance adopted regime regard. state of automobile coverage pays without clearly pays regard without It spoken has is the fault. Because regulation of this “give effect to the second sentence which is we must the critical in this unambiguously expressed intent issue case. of Con- Chevron, gress.” U.S.A. v. Natural Re- Supreme given guidance Court us Council, 837, 843, sources reviewing agency regulations which inter 2778, 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 Chevron, pret statutes. would hold that S.Ct. 2778. “[T]he Court estab insurance and is not a USAA two-step judicial lished method for review payer Accordingly, respect- under agency’s interpretation of an of a statute that fully majority’s opinion. dissent from the Ass’n, Mississippi Poultry administers.” 293, Madigan, Inc. v. 31 F.3d 299 Cir.

I. 1994) (en banc). The court first must use the that, government argues statutory under the “traditional tools of construction” regulations, a no-fault Congress USAA is insurance to determine “whether has respect Medpay. spoken carrier with precise question to No-fault to the at issue.” insurance, Chevron, maintains, any 9, the is 467 U.S. at 842-43 n.& policy pays regardless so, insurance which of at 2781-82 & n. 9 If the court and Department of give unambig the “must effect to the uously expressed Congress.” define “no-fault insurance” as: intent of Id. at insurance, Finding imposes § is no-fault the contends that 1095 majority liability any does not address the of whether company issue for reimbursement on third-party payer USAA is a because it is "an provides liability automobile liability automobile insurance ... carrier.” regardless policy question of whether the that, purposes, § would hold for 10 U.S.C. 1095 liability undisputed automobile insurance. It is liability USAA is not an automobile insurance provides liability that USAA ance, automobile insur- and, thus, third-party payer. carrier not a considered, general and thus could be in a sense, liability an automobile insurance carrier. According regula- to of Defense expansively tions, gov- I do not read 1095 as as the liability “automobile insurance” is "insur- imposing ernment. I do not read 1095 as against legal liability ance for health and medical duty to reimburse on either a insurance expenses resulting injuries personal arising from simply carrier or a no-fault operation insurance carrier a motor vehicle.” 32 CFR 220.12(a) (1993). types policies because the issues insurer those coverage pro- This insureds; rather, to other I read the injuries statute as tects the insured from sus- applying particular to the carrier who has tained third issued in automobile accidents specific policy involving operator to an the individual who is both an insured as of the insured’s hand, policy Medpay, “insured” under such and is automobile. on the is cov- also simulta- other erage provides neously beneficiaiy” “a covered medical benefits for the in- entitled to medi- injured military facility contemplated by sured when she is in an cal care in a accident. It is Therefore, reimbursement, against legal liability. right any, not insurance 1095. The if Medpay coverage dependent upon the in the USAA's favor of the provisions particular policy. insurance. terms and of a

301 However, 842-43,104 at 2781. amendment, or, “[i]f S.Ct. reason behind the as the ambiguous” partic- on the statute is silent it, explained Second Circuit has the “mis- issue, the court must determine “wheth- ular Congress sought remedy chief’ with the agency’s permis- Clemente, er answer is based on a amendment. United States v. 608 848, (2d of the statute.” Id. at Cir.1979) (“The sible construction F.2d 79 amendment 104 at 2782. S.Ct. interpreted must be in terms of the mischief (citing rectify.”) it was intended In re determining Congress “In whether has di Rogatory, Letters (2d 385 F.2d 1020 issue, rectly may spoken to the the court Cir.1967)); 2a SUTHERLANDSTATUTORYCON- only plain meaning consider not of the STRUCTION A 45.09. review of the any pertinent legislative but also his military’s attempts to collect from Shalala, tory.” Doyle v. 745 third-parties general, and of (5th Cir.1995) Chevron, (citing 467 U.S. at particular, Congress’ clarifies intent. After 2783). at S.Ct. Court review, apparent such a it is problem judiciary has made clear retains its trying remedy was was the is,’ is, right say “to Vhat the law thwarting military’s collection efforts interpret Mississippi Poultry, statutes.” passage caused of no-fault automobile Chevron, (quoting F.3d 467 U.S. at systems many states. 9, 104 n. S.Ct. at 2781-82 n. Members of the United military States Accordingly, our first task is to determine dependents their are entitled to free medical If whether statute is we care in military hospitals. 10 U.S.C. spoken determine has §§ Occasionally a service mem- done; job “give then our we will injured ber will be due to the fault of another unambiguously expressed effect to the intent (often accident) in an automobile and the Chevron, Congress.” military soldier will be hospital. treated S.Ct. at 2781. we find that During World II military began War clearly spoken to the issue seeking reimbursement from tort-feasors for face, and the statute is on its treating injured the cost of soldiers. The legislative history clarify then will look to Army Regula- for these actions was purpose. legislative history ambigu- If Capt. tion Dominique Dillenseg- 25-220. See ous, agency’s interpreta- we will defer to the Capt. Hawley, er and Milo H. Sources of permissible tion if it is on a “based construc- Recovery Medical Care in Automobile Acci- 843, tion of the statute.” Id. at 104 S.Ct. at Army (October 1991) Cases, 50, dent 51 Law. 2782. (hereinafter, ”). Recovery “Medical Care military bring The continued to such claims II. until 1947when the Court held that agree majority I with the government that the statute the federal impose could not lia- susceptible bility to more than one injure reasonable on tort-feasors who soldiers be- and, thus, meaning on its face. passed legislation cause had not Therefore, legislative we must authorizing government consider the to do so. United history of the 1990 amendment. The com- California, States v. Standard Oil 332 of reports 301, 315-16, pro- 1604, 1611-12, mittee of the House and Senate guidance, they merely vide no additional L.Ed. 2067 restate the of text the amendment. See years Congress For 15 declined the H.Rep. 923, Sess., Cong., No. 101st 2d re- invitation to Court’s create for tort- H.Rep. printed 3110; at 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1960, however, injuring feasors soldiers. In Sess., Cong., reprinted No. 101st 2d Comptroller report General revealed that S.Rep. 2931; 1990 U.S.C.C.AN. No. losing significant the United States was sums Sess., Cong., Cong. 101st 2d U.S.Code & money of due to healthcare unreimbursed 1990,p.

Admin.News 3283-3. expenditures provided injured to soldiers. Comptroller construing In an amendment to a General of United Rights important it to understand the States, Review Government’s GA1.13:NSlAXM0-49 Improved, RECOVERY OF THE Can Be

AND PRACTICES CONCERNING 1990) (hereinafter, (April report”). “GAO Hospital Medical Services Cost (1960) (cited Negligent report passage The GAO noted that since the Party Third Cases Recovery Respond- Medical Care of the FMCRA: ing report, Congress passed [Sjome passed states have ... in- Recovery the Federal Medical Care Act generally surance laws that allow for re- (“FMCRA”), seq. et U.S.C. covery by individuals from their own insur- government FMCRA allows the to recover companies irrespective ance pro- from tort-feasors for medical it Since no-fault laws definition do not al- vides service members. FMCRA an party, establish at-fault or liable [the recovery injury when the occurs “under lows government’s] legal ability to conduct re- creating circumstances tort coveries under [the FMCRA] varies ac- 2651(a). person.” some third U.S.C. cording to the no-fault statutes these injury The law of the state where the takes states. place determines whether a tort has oc- report at 4. Recovery report curred. Medical Care at 51.2 GAO The GAO recom- mended “that legislation enact required Because tort for recovery by to enable recovery, FMCRA could not states with no-fault automobile insurance adopted recover in states which no-fault au- laws.”6 Id. In tomobile insurance laws.- states where no- fault automobile insurance laws have been (“DOD”), of Defense adopted,3 injuries there is no tort promulgated when its Instead, sustained in automobile accidents. recognized amended the GAO all pays individuals have insurance report prompted Congress was what gardless of who is at fault. 12A Couch on amend 1095 to include no-fault insurance (2d 45:661, 1981).4 Insurance 245^16 ed. .at (1992) (“based Fed.Reg. carriers. 57

In Accounting 1990 the General report, Congress supplemented Office on the GAO (GAO) provided report Congress.5 legal authority current to collect tort liabil- GAO, ity eases new to also collect Military ReCOvery Health Care: carriers”).7 from no-fault insurance Medical from Liable Costs Third Parties recognize In some majority circumstances, can I does not consider also legitimate recover under state law as a discussion of the GAO to be my report e.g., legislative the insurance contract. See, beneficiary because it is not a committee Co., United. States v. Allstate Ins. 910 F.2d congressman. or a statement from a Ma- report (5th Cir.1990). 1283-84 jority This is at 299 n. 4. separate do not share the Opinion the FMCRA and 1095. United States v. State majority's legislative narrow view of history. Mutual Co., Farm Automobile Ins. consider instructive quite report (5th Cir.1991). Neither raises this agree, party all which, provided impetus issue, so I not address do it. leading to act. A treatise on statutory non-legislative 3. In suggesting states, the District of committees or Columbia and commissions particular legislation Puerto Rico had some version of no-fault insur- "are considered valuable aids." Suth- Statutory injuries. ance to § collision Construction automobile 48.11 at applicable 347. I erland suggesting legis- consider the of the GAO report lation to be (such coverages similarly helpful. 4. Medpay) Medical as payment differ from under no-fault insurance policies sys- tems in two First, key respects. Medpay 7. It that the DOD misinter- appears, statute; it is a add-on. required by voluntary the GAO The DOD described the preted report. Second, does not alter tort it liability; "recommending] expanding GAO as [the report the insured medical merely compensates any government's] to cover auto- no-fault he has incurred due to an automobile Fed.Reg. mobile insurance ....” policies accident. added). (emphasis The GAO did report not refer to insurance instead but rec- policies, 5. the "Congress legislation was addressed to the ommended that Specifically, report enact to Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Commit- enable the in states with recovery by tee Services, on Armed House of automobile insurance laws." GAO re- Representa- no-fault added). tives. (emphasis at 4 port (1) Thus, Congress given that we see was mobile or no insurance carrier fault (Em 'report detailing problems collecting governed by shall be the [FMCRA].” added). in phasis imbursements states with no-fault insur- Congress quickly realized (2) systems; given ance was a recommenda- that language “or no fault insurance” was changed tion that the law be to allow the place out of in a concerning section tort to obtain in reimbursements liability, phrase so the was deleted. Pub.L. systems; 102-190, states with no-fault insurance § 714. The Report House makes (3) passed providing then a law that change clear that this ais “technical amend government can collect from “no fault insur- ment” and that no change substantive in facts, ance carriers.” Based on these it is H.Rep. § tended. No. reprinted in phrase clear that fault “no insurance 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. Section carriers,” Congress compa- meant insurance 1095(i)(2) concerns states which have re providing coverage in nies states with no- tained liability.8 traditional tort If the term systems fault of automobile insurance. Con- “no fault particu insurance carrier” to refers gress referring compa- was not to insurance policies, lar it properly then would be includ providing liability policies nies 1095(i)(2), §in ed can there be no-fault coverages pay regardless which contain that coverages in policies auto when there nothing legislative found liability.9 is tort “no fault insur “medpay” to which refers cover- systems, ance carrier” refers to then it is out age policies involved this case. place discussing liability. a section tort passing In the 1990 amendments foregoing, Based on the apparent it is that § Congress provided that “[i]n cases Congress sought the harm remedy with its which tort is created some govern- amendments 1095 was the person, third collection from a inability get ment’s reimbursement payer is an automobile insur- payments in medical states with no-fault in- governed by provi- ance carrier shall be systems. Considering legislative surance [the FMCRA].” sions of 10 U.S.C. history amendments, and the 1991technical 1095(i)(2). differently, Stated when a ambiguous. Congress find 1095 is not third-party tortiously injures a service mem- clearly intended “no fault insurance carrier” in a ber state which uses traditional tort systems to refer to state that have eliminated liability, must recover theory recovery as a tort and substituted FMCRA, through than rather requirements pay insurance without re- provision Congress This shows that was con- gard Congress clearly spoken to fault. systems cerned with state of fault or no-fault we, as well the executive insurance, based rather than with individual branch, Congress. must Mississip- defer to plans. fact was (“core pi Poultry, 31 F.3d at 299 democratic systems concerned with state insurance principle of congressional primacy” requires 1095(i)(2) is further evidence Congress’ clearly that we defer to expressed referring systems was to state of insurance intent). Therefore, I would not follow the it when used the term “no fault insurance Department regulation defining of Defense 1095(h)(1). §in carrier” 220.12(i), 32 C.F.R. be- contrary Congress’ clearly it cause ex- Additional evidence that re was pressed intent. ferring systems to no-fault when amended § 1095 is found in a 1991 technical amend III. 1095(i)(2)origi ment to the statute. Section nally provided “[i]n cases which tort is not no-fault insurance. There- fore, person, “third-party payer” created some third USAA is not a un- and, thus, required collection from a that is an auto der above, example, As discussed state with a no-fault 9. For could have insuffi- tort-feasor system liability, there is no tort so the situation cient so the no-fault would be 1095(i)(2) (the described in creation of tort expenses. needed to cover the medical liability upon party) a third will not occur. government for the medical reimburse government incurred.

expenses that the grant court’s affirm the district

would and,

summary judgment favor of USAA

therefore, respectfully dissent. America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. WILD, Defendant-Appellant. L.

James

No. 95-10857. Appeals,

United States Court of

Fifth Circuit.

Aug. construction notes reports

Case Details

Case Name: United Services Automobile Association v. William J. Perry, Secretary of United States Department of Defense, and United States of America

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Date Published: Aug 9, 1996

Citation: 92 F.3d 295

Docket Number: 95-50512

Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.