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United National Maintenance, Inc. v. San Diego Convention Center, Inc.
766 F.3d 1002
9th Cir.
2014
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Docket

*1 (“Use that H & L clearly shown took incon- of certification rests the sound positions court.”). sistent with respect to its knowl- discretion of this did not Clinton edge of Clinton’s assets. H & L process never raise his due argument before the asserted, suggests, case, as Clinton that it district In any has court. portion this “no way knowing idea or appellate what Mr. his brief merely repeats his con- Clinton’s assets” are. H & L’s statement tention that the district court abused its that it knowledge lacks by appointing information to discretion a receiver. We identify “other assets” and already rejected “continues to have argument. this search for possible assets and avenues of

collection” is consistent with its assertion CONCLUSION “proceeded it against known assets The district court’s order appointing but continues to search for ‘other’ assets.” authorizing receiver and copy- the sale of rights is AFFIRMED.

E. Clinton Failed to Raise His Pre- emption, Doctrine, Erie and Due Arguments

Process District

Court. appeal,

On Clinton’s brief suggests a

preemption argument, an argument based

on doctrine, the Eñe alleged an due process observed, violation. As we have UNITED MAINTENANCE, NATIONAL an appellate court generally “will not con- INC., a corporation, Nevada arguments sider not first raised before the Plaintiff-Appellant, district court unless there are exceptional Gieg, circumstances.” 407 F.3d at 1046 n. 10. Clinton argue did not that there are CENTER, SAN DIEGO CONVENTION exceptional circumstances considering INC., corporation, a California issues, in any

these but case we find them Defendant-Appellee. to be without merit. No. 12-56809. Clinton claimed oral argument before United States Court our of Appeals, court that he raised a preemption ar- Ninth Circuit. gument opposition to H & L’s motion for sale of the copyrights. The brief to Argued and Submitted April 2014. which Clinton only refers ‍​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‍general makes a Filed Aug. reference to the U.S. Constitution’s Su- premacy Clause. Clinton conceded аt oral

argument that he did not raise his Eñe

argument in the district court. On appeal,

this part of his brief urges our court to

certify to the Washington supreme state

court the question whether a copyright is

subject to satisfy execution to a judgment,

but he cites no authority implied for the

contention that we obligated are to certify question. this Complaint re

McLinn, (9th Cir.1984) 744 F.2d *2 (argued),

Leonard J. Feldman Jason T. Eidson, Morgan, and J. Will Rives Stoel LLP, Seattle, R. Washington; James Lance, Slania, Jacob M. P. and Micaela Banach, Kirby Hoge Noonan Lance & LLP, CA, Diego, for Plaintiff-Appel- *3 lant.

Joseph Ergastolo (argued), T. H. John Jr., Schouten, L’Estrange, and Andrew E. CA, Wright & L’Estrange, Diego, San for Defendant-Appellee. Foer, Stutz, Randy

Albert A. M. and Vaheesan, Sandeep American Antitrust In- stitute, D.C., Washington, for Amicus Cu- riae the American Antitrust Institute. Kathleen M. O’Sullivan and Eric D. Mil- ler, LLP, Seattle, WA; Perkins Coie Jac- queline LLP, Young, E. Perkins Coie San Francisco, CA, for Amici Curiae Exhibition Associаtion, Services & Contractors Soci- ety Independent Organizers, Show and International Association of Exhibitions & Events.

Sonya Lannin, D. Winner and H. Cortlin Covington LLP, Francisco, Burling San & CA; Garza, Covington Deborah A. & Bur- LLP, ling D.C., Washington, for Amicus Curiae International Association of Venue Managers, Inc. BRIGHT,*

Before: MYRON H. FARRIS, JEROME and ANDREW D. HURWITZ, Judges. Circuit * Circuit, The Myron Bright, Honorable Eighth sitting ‍​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‍by designation. H. Senior Cir- Judge cuit Appeals for the U.S. Court of City gave SDC the Diego San Council The OPINION AND

ORDER market, authority operate, “exclusive ORDER The board of promote and Center.” mayor city by the SDC is chosen 14, 2014, is May filed on Opinion The Diego. Mu- council of San Petition for Appellant’s WITHDRAWN. city including as defines the nicipаl Code MOOT. DENIED AS Rehearing is Panel City wholly owned “Corporations city receives ... such as [SDC].” OPINION year a five annually submits funding and FARRIS, Judge: Circuit Senior rolling budget. Maintenance, a nation- National United license the organizations Companies cleaning ser- trade vendor of show wide period specific the SDC for a Center vices, Diego Convention sued the San general hire to host events. Licensees 1) claims for alleging Corporation, Center *4 to coordinate event-re- decorator services contractual interference with intentional Champion Exposition Ser- services. lated 3) 2) viоlations, and relationship, antitrust Freeman, Experience vices, and Global prospective interference with intentional decorator services for provide Specialists a juryA returned advantage. economic held at the center. majority of events the on of United National favor verdict operates nation- companies of the Each contractual interference with intentional from deco- rent booths Exhibitors wide. not reach a but could relationship claim for other may also contract and rators a re- On on the other claims. verdiсt cleaning. Trade show such as services as a matter judgment motion newed variety a cleaning companies provide SDC, court found the district by law through contracts with cleaning services on all of the center of the convention favor include both These services decorators. company ap- The maintenance claims. cleaning. cleaning and facility booth pealed. a trade is National Maintenance United operates that cleaning company show I has con- UNM throughout country. the statuto- granted has cities California provide Champion tо tracts GES assembly public authority to construct ry cleaning services. trade show nationwide Code halls. Cal. Gov’t or convention since 1989 services provided has UNM may appoint §§ Cities 37500-37506. in the area is of its work Diego. Most use of the facili- manage commission Diego Center. at the San Convention done opera- gained Funds ties. cleaning ser- trade show also offers SDC go to first convention tion of the center convention who use the to decorators vices associated expenses paying the assorted execu- an SDC In the fall center. money any remaining operаtion; with its about Champion and GES approached tive city’s fund. general to the may go then perform hiring personnel SDC them § 37505. Both com- cleaning services. trade show In proposal. declined SDC City panies Council the San Diego cleaning a new instituted July SDC Center the San Convention created mandated policy policy. operations of services manage Corporation provider of would be “exclusive is SDC Center. SDC Diego Convention the San policy staffing.” The cleaning services corporation public benefit nonprofit one pay SDC required that decorators Diеgo. also city of San wholly owned cleaning half of all booth revenue that the and local government immunity. In the per alternative, decorator received as well as a the district $17 court held that wage employees provid- hour for SDC had present UNM failed to sufficient evi- cleaning ed services. UNM continued to dence on specific elements of anti- perform on its contracts with GES claim. Finally, trust the district court dis- using personnel pro- UNM while missed UNM’s claims for interference with cleaning vide the services. The new re- prospective advantage and puni- quirements significantly inсreased the damages tive as well as UNM’s motion for performance costs of for UNM on its con- injunctive timely relief. UNM appealed. Champion tracts with and GES. II 13, 2007,

On November filed a UNM We review de novo a district court’s complaint against alleged SDC. UNM granting order or denying judgment aas contract, claims for interference with inter- matter of law. Byrd Maricopa See prospective ference with economic advan- Cnty. Dep’t, 629 F.3d tage and antitrust violations. The case Sheriffs (9th Cir.2011) (en banc). We review de proceeded to trial. At the end of UNM’s novo whether the district court cоmmitted chief, case-in judg- SDC filed a motion for instructional error in its statements of the ment as matter of law on each of UNM’s law, Cross, Dang v. rejected claims. The district court Cir.2005), as well as the district court’s May 4, 2011, motion. On re- immunity determinations of from antitrust turned a unanimous verdict on UNM’s in- *5 liability, Elec. Grason Co. v. Sacramento tentional interference with contractual re- Dist., 833, (9th Mun. Util. 770 F.2d 835 jury lations claim. The awarded UNM Cir.1985). $668,905. damages of jury The did not reach a verdict on remaining UNM’s III claims. law, Under California the elements SDC then filed a motion for new trial on for the tort of intentional interference with intentional interference with сon- “(1) contractual relations are a valid con tractual relations claim and a renewed mo- tract plaintiff between and a party; third judgment tion for as a matter of law on (2) knowledge contract; defendant’s of this UNM’s other claims. The district court (3) defendant’s intentional designed acts to construed SDC’s motion for new trial as a induce a disruption breach or of the con judgment motion for as a matter of law. (4) relationship; tractual actual breach or granted district court SDC’s motion disruption of the contractual relationship; on each of UNM’s claims. The district (5) resulting damage.” Pac. Gas & court held that UNM could not assert an Co., Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & 50 Cal.3d

intentional interference with contractual 1118, 1, Cal.Rptr. 587, 791 P.2d 589-90 relationship against claim SDC as SDC (1990). had an economic interest in the contracts. alternative, In the district court held After the returned its verdict that SDC was entitled a UNM, to new trial as the favor of the district court a issued district court had previously erred in judgment not as matter of law on the basis giving legal interpretation a of UNM’s con- that the tort of intentional interference with tracts the decorators. The district only applies to parties any “legiti- that lаck court also held that UNM’s antitrust claim mate interest ... in the underlying con- was barred based on SDC’s state-action tract.” heavily The district court relied on (1994) (rejecting this court P.2d 459-63 an at- prior opinion a dictum from recog tort long liability to create under a theo- tempt that “California law has stated conspiracy interfer for to the con- ry parties the core intentional nized that an relationship). parties is interference with ence torts tractual To shield business third-party relationship by a contract economic with an economic interest in the that an relationship, so stranger potential liability would create an from involvement a direct interest or entity with lacuna between the undesirable the law for relationship usually is not liable in that contract. respective domains of tort and by pursuit interests.” harm caused of its an in a party A with economic interest Pe Barge, Westport Inc. v. Tug Marin & could interfere relationship contractual Inc., troleum, Cir. facing risk of tort or con- without either liability. particularly This is tract result 2001). perverse it is with some parties as those Ma reading of The district court’s in a contract type of economic interest requirement rin to add an additional Tug have incentive greatest whom would intentional with tort of interference it. to interfere with Such a result would relationship justified contractual hardly goal pro- serve the established First, in Ma plaintiff reasons. several formally re- tecting “a cemented economic rin under the of “intentional Tug sued tort ... lationship interference ad prospective economic interference Pen- stranger agreement.” to the Della specifically stated vantage,” and we na, Cal.Rptr.2d 902 P.2d at 750. “intentional interference with tort of relations” was “not at issue contractual Third, Tug a hesi represented Marin That tort is Id. 828 n. 3. appeal.” [the] attempt clarify the unresolved tant distinct, “draw[s] and California law “precise type wrongful of the question sharpened be distinction” enforce[s] necessary liability for in trigger ness Toyota Della tween the two. Penna prospective tentional interference with U.S.A., Sales, Inc., 11 Cal.4th Motor advantage.” Tug, Marin 436, 902 Cal.Rptr.2d P.2d proceeded it (noting F.3d at 831-32 (1995). Tug statements in Marin do Our *6 trepidation into this area of “with some in not at issue directly apply the tort law”). to Marin Subsequent California this appeal. repeatedly Tug, California courts have Second, law, California, settled under that “in the law is California held stranger may the one to a be liable pertinent relationship that ‘a contract with contracting intentionally interfering exists between two in tort ” e.g., They are the that have a of the contract.’ See parties. performance ones Hanlon, 1140, 17 Cal. or in that re v. 33 Cal.4th “direct interest involvement Reeves (.2004) 289, 513, (quot Liability at 832. for this 95 P.3d 517 lationship.” Rptr.3d Id. Gas, 1, P.2d 270 791 protect ing ‍​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‍Cal.Rptr. tort parties exists Pacific 589). discussion, a the Cali relationship from at In a detailed “interference Appeal Pen that Marin agreement.” tо the Della fornia Court held stranger na, 436, immunity not irom Cal.Rptr.2d Tug extending P.2d at “was 45 902 even liability, turn, in interference claims to an protects Contractual contract broader, per actions of more attenuated class contracting parties Inc., Sub., partners. Applied Woods Fox Broad. their contractual See sons.” 463, Ltd., 344, Cal.Rptr.3d Cal.App.4th 28 Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia 129 Equip. (2005). Ap- 503, 475, Court of 7 28 869 Other California Cal.Rptr.2d Cal.4th 472 1008 have reached the

peal contracting party agent.” decisions same con “either a or its Motorsports 1594, 422, Powerhouse Cal.App.4th clusion. See 172 92 Cal.Rptr.3d (2009). Corp., Yamаha Motor 221 Grp., Inc. v. 430 n. suggestion 3 There is no 867, 811, Cal.App.4th Cal.Rptr.3d 824- agent here that SDC was the of either (2013). Tug spe Marin did not Champion Group, Since or In PM GES. Inc. v. Stewart, cifically address the tort of intentional in Appeal the California Court of contract, scope terference with of that contracting party reiterated that a could question tort remains an in cir open this not tortiously interfering be liable for with cuit. contract; thus, We “must follow the state intermedi performance of its own appellate ate court by extension, unless contracting party decision[s] [we] could convincing evidence that the state’s find[ ] be held liable for interfering per with the likely supreme court would not follow it.” formance of if subcontracts that claim Sears, Co., Ryman v. Roebuck & hinged on the per defendant’s failure to (9th Cir.2007). points SDC to no form on original contract. 154 Cal. convincing evidence the California Su App.4th 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 235-36 (2007). preme change long Court would its held theory liability in this position potential liability on the tort case is not based on failure per SDC’s Reeves, strangers e.g., to a contract. See form on a contract Champion or GES. Cal.Rptr.3d 95 P.3d at 517. We therefore reverse the district court Fourth, California courts have re holding law, that under California SDC peatedly parties held that with an econom cannot be held liable for the tort of inten- ic interest in a contractual relationship tional interference with contractual rela- may be for intentional liable interference tionship. granted The JMOL on that with that contract. Applied Equip See ground is also reversed.

ment, Cal.Rptr.2d 869 P.2d at 455- 56; Woods, (com Cal.Rptr.3d at 465-67 IV pany potentially liable for interference partially-owned trial, contract between a During subsid the district court re iary and employees); jected sevеral Power request legal for a interpre Motorsports, Cal.Rptr.3d house potential tation of precedent conditions (manufacturer may 824-26 be liable for UNM’s contracts with the decorators. interference with a sales contract between The district court held that the model a franchise operator potential and a new instructions on an intentional interference owner). argues that there are sever with contractual relationship claim were al party cases where a with an economic sufficient: the two elements at issue were prevented interest a contract was from “1. That there was a contract between *7 bringing an intentional plaintiff interference claim. and defendant” and “4. That de Those cases are distinguishable.1 prevented fendant’s conduct performance California, Mintz v. Blue Cross the or performance made more expensive or of California Court of Appeal found that a Jury difficult.” California Civil Instruc claim could not arise as the defendant was tions 257, distinguishable

1. Also spective advantage," is a case that SDC does id. at 45 Kasparian Cnty. Ange 90, not cite. See v. Los Cal.Rptr.2d a different tort from the "in- оf les, 242, Cal.App.4th Cal.Rptr.2d 38 45 90 tentional interference with contract” at issue (1995). Tug, Like Kasparian only Marin ad here. pro- dressed "intentional interference with 1009 487, tronic, White, 526 F.3d 493 Inc. v. whether examines fourth element The Cir.2008). ar- provided has no or UNM disruption “a has suffered plaintiff jury “would have rights.” why for the gument contractual their of breach prop- had it been 473. After the same verdict Woods, reached Cal.Rptr.3d 28 verdict, court v. (quoting the district Id. Galdamez erly instructed.” returned its jury (9th Cir.2005)) Potter, 1015, be- warranted 1025 new was that a trial held omitted). (internal legally interpreted It has quotation have marks he should cause Champion and of presumption preju- with GES contracts failed to rebut UNM’s jury to determine to allow the order dice. conditions relevant they contained whether affirm the district court’s therefore We and Cham- ability of GES to the precedent instructional er- it committed holding that cleaning hire trade show UNM for pion terms of the interpreting the by ror not rights contractual If UNM’s services. and that this error constituted contract usage policies conditioned on were a new trial. error that warrants prejudicial SDC, change policy deter- then SDC’s rights instead contractual UNM’s mined V con- of the performаnce disrupting UNM’s immunity po receive States for clarification “ jury’s request The tract. ‘nothing liability as tential antitrust importance point indicates this on Act or its of the Sherman language issue. this in Congress history’ suggested ... con a contract with a argues that UNM capacity sovereign tended restrict valid, en may be a still precedent dition their econo regulate the States ” fo argument UNM’s contract. forceable Putney Health v. Phoebe mies .... FTC — claim—the one of the on element 1003, cuses Inc., —, 133 S.Ct. U.S. Sys., the contracts between UNM validity of (2013) Par 1010, (quoting 43 185 L.Ed.2d this law on California the decorators. 350, Brown, 341, 63 S.Ct. 317 U.S. ker v. Compare murky. somewhat topic is (1943)). actors 307, 315 Nonstate 87 L.Ed. 289, 519- Reeves, 95 P.3d at Cal.Rptr.3d fed “immunity from the may also receive (no claim intentional interference “carrying they if laws” are eral antitrust contracts) SCE- employment at—will Id. regulatory program.” out the State’s Court, Cal.App.4th corp Superior at 1010. (1992) (potential Cal.Rptr.2d has articulated Court The Supreme on was conditioned for contract that claim determine non- test whether two-part proposed regulatory approval). immunity: to this are entitled state actors however, instructions, on the focus jury must be “First, challenged restrаint disruption. For element separate affirmatively articulated clearly one per whether to understand second, poli- policy; as state expressed dis disrupted required the was formance by the actively supervised cy must be what contractual court to determine trict Dealers Liquor Retail Cal. State itself.” re This thus possessed. UNM rights Inc., Aluminum, 445 U.S. Ass’n v. Midcal of the con interpretation legal quired L.Ed.2d 233 S.Ct. correctly conclud trial court and the tract omitted). (1980) (internal quotation marks doing case it this erred in ed supervision, of active requirement *8 so. activities however, “to the apply does entities,” “they as error, governmental of local In of instructional cases their pursue of an incentive have less Med- prejudice. of presumption is a there guise imple- own self-interest under the of delegation zoning authority Carolina’s of policies.” Putney, menting state Phoebe city over local to a very billboards as “[t]he at 1011. 133 S.Ct. purpose zoning regulation of is to displace unfettered business freedom in a manner pass In order to the clear-articulation regularly preventing has the effect of test, “anticompetitive dispute the effect” in ” Omni, normal competition.... acts of should be the “foreseeable result of what 373, at U.S. S.Ct. 1344. The (internal “clear quota the State authorized.” Id. requires articulation” test thus omitted). spe- both a It necessary, tion marks is not delegation authority cific of however, by the state legislature for a state to “ex and some indication that the state pressly state in a statute or has legislative its “affirmatively contemplated history legislature displace- that the for the intends the delegated competition.” action to ment of anticompetitive Putney, have Phoebe City effects.” Town Hallie v. at Eau S.Ct. 1006. The indicatiоn must be more of of Claire, 34, 43, 471 U.S. 105 S.Ct. 85 than neutrality mere but need not rise to (1985). L.Ed.2d We review each chal explicit the level of authorization. See id. lenged anticompetitive act to determine at 1007.

whether it was the result foreseeable of

what the state authorized. Phoebe Put delegation California’s authority of 1012; ney, City 133 S.Ct. at Columbia v. satisfies both of these elements with rela of Adver., Inc., Omni Outdoor 499 U.S. tion to SDC’s decision to cleaning hire 111 S.Ct. 113 L.Ed.2d 382 staff internally. California Government (1991). applying the “clear-articulation Code “by 37506 states that ordinance test,” Supreme Court has distin the legislative body may appoint a commis guished general between grаnts of either sion to select the site for building, authority local corporate power or construction, supervise its manage ‍​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‍specific delegations of an authority to act ordinance, By use. legislative body regulate or displacement where “the of shall prescribe powers and duties of ... competition is the foreseeable result of grant commission.” This authority Omni, what the statute authorizes.” just give does not San Diego permission to (internal 372-73, U.S. at 111 S.Ct. 1344 play in by the market building a conven omitted). quotation Only marks the latter Rather, tion center. legislature au qualifies immunity. example, For thorized San to create a commission Court that Georgia’s grant has found “manage would the use” of the con general corporate powers hospital to a au vention type center. This of managerial thority did not also entail an authorization authorization is distinct from a general to use powers anticompetitive those in an grant corporate authority that simply fashion. Putney, Phoebe 133 S.Ct. 1014. allows a state subdivision to act. contrast, By the “clear-articulation” test There is also substantial

was evidence that satisfied when expressly Wisconsin al legislature lowed California contemplated cities to limit the municipal provi sion sewage the Convention neighboring services to un Center need not hire incorporated outside contractors to consequently gave building. areas and clean its those authority legislature’s grant cities the The California pro make the of statu- vision sewage tory contingent authority services on stated that funds from the annexation of unincorporated convention areas. center would be used first Hallie, pay U.S. at 105 S.Ct. 1713. for the convention center and second Similarly the test was fulfilled South for the benеfit of the municipality. Cal. *9 Reno, Servs., Inc., Inc. v. Nev. Ambulance specification This Code 37505. Gov’t Cir.1987) (emphasiz F.2d contemplates that the convention 819 naturally gener- super in order to board of health operated ing that the district center will be municipality. A con- profits corporation ate vised the services of fi- represents substantial center of the rights equipment vention retained municipality. by a nancial investment corporate event of a corporation that invest- the success of default). order to ensure relationship with Die SDC’s San of ment, operator that аn it is foreseeable that acts as the instru go also shows SDC exclusively pro- may center the convention (1) Diego: Diego appoints San ment of San of to ensure the success cleaning staff vide (2) members, upon all of board dis SDC’s ensuing The that financial commitment. solution, SDC’s asserts revert back to San challenged actions here profit-generating (3) account for Diego; publicly SDC must “ordinary result of the exercise were Overall, acts as an operations. SDC legisla- the state authority delegated of agent operates that the convention center at 1013. Putney, 133 S.Ct. ture.” Phoеbe city of principal, for the benefit of its It an extension of the mu Diego. San is requirement supervision The active of and thus does not nicipality San evidentiary function: essentially an “serves by the state in require supervision active ensuring that the actor way it is one of immunity to retain its from antitrust order challenged pursu- conduct engaging in the liability. Hallie, at 471 U.S. policy.” to state ant 46-47, private It prevents S.Ct. Furthermore, specific facts indicate anticompetitive in an engaging actors from evidentiary func no for the there is need further own inter- activity solely “[their] Although supervision. of active tion ests, inter- governmental rather than the pursuit of may actions reflect 105 S.Ct. of the State.” Id. ests interests, is no evidence parochial there concerns, however, do 1713. Those same any private of that it entered into kind “there is municipality, to a as apply con arrangement with other price-fixing in a it is involved danger little or no fact distin operators. center This vention Id. arrangement.”

private price-fixing cases where from other guishes SDC “purely paro- may that it seek danger actors, entrusted with groups private expense interests at the public chial authority prоfes over a regulatory state goals” state is satisfactori- overriding more further sion, taken actions to may have test. by the clear-articulation ly addressed e.g., N.C. interests. See private their own Id. FTC, Bd. Dental Exam’rs State active argues supervision that the UNM — (4th Cir.2013), granted, cert. F.3d applied should be to SDC’s requirement U.S. —, 188 L.Ed.2d 134 S.Ct. heavily emphasizes actions. UNM (2014) (need supervision the active to fulfill corporation public, non-profit is a association, pri a state dental test where municipality. Diego’s rather than a dentists, prevented marily composed of however, code, city defines the municipal whitening offering teeth from non-dentists case, including In a similar itself as SDC. services). corporation in- found that a charitable we holding court’s affirm the district We county board of health corporated by immunity possessed state action that SDC exclusive ambulance services provided Thus, it’s claim. antitrust county served as an instrument for the the district court’s unnecessary to address municipality. Ambulance Serv. *10 on the holding comfortably alternative merits of the UNM’s antitrust claims also ground claim. rests on another antitrust identified judge: reasonably district No could engaged monopoli- find SDC either VI attеmpt monopolize by zation or an court dismissed The district UNM’s mandating employees its own clean its claim pro- for intentional interference with Prods., building. See Computer Cal. Inc. spective advantage. This tort v. Int’l Bus. Corp., Machs. 613 F.2d requires “that UNM establish [SDC’s] (9th Cir.1979) (“[A] directed verdict is wrongful by interference was some meas- case, proper, even in an antitrust when beyond ure the fact of the interference support ‘there is no substantial evidence to Penna, Cal.Rptr.2d itself.” Della (quoting Valley the claim.’” Santa Clara 751(internal quotation 902 P.2d at marks Co., Distrib. Co. v. Pabst Brewing 556 F.2d omitted). UNM’s assertion of independent (9th Cir.1977))). 942, 945 n. 1 wrongfulness is based on the antitrust To succeed on its monopo Sherman Act claims. That claim’s failure dooms this claims, lization UNM had the burden of claim. proving that possessed SDC monopoly appeals UNM the district court’s order power a specific product over in a specific denying permanent injunctive it relief. No geographic 2;§ market. 15 U.S.C. Allied permanent injunction should issue as we Orthopedic Appliances Inc. Tyco Health hold that a trial new is warranted on LP, Grp. Care 592 F.3d UNM’s claim for intentional interference Cir.2010). The district court concluded with contractual relationship. was, that the relevant downstream market best, trade show cleaning services for appeals UNM also from the dis meeting spaces exhibition and in the San trict any court’s order that excluded liabili Diego Despite area. the testimony of ty for SDC from punitive damages. expert, no reasonable finder of fact California, a public entity is not liable for could conclude that the relevant geograph punitive damages. § Cal. Gov’t Code ic for cleaning market services consisted public entity SDC is a wholly as it is a only of the San Convention Center. subsidiary owned and instrumentality of beggars It rеason to define the relevant San Diego governmental formed for pur single market as a customer who decides poses and governmental vested with pow to use employees perform its own rou ers. Cal. Gov’t Code 811.2. Under Cali services, tine cleaning rather than hire law, fornia it cannot be liable for punitive others do so. See Grp. Brooke Ltd. v. damages. Brown & Williamson Corp., Tobacco 209, 242, U.S. judgment of the 113 S.Ct. 125 L.Ed.2d district court is (1993) (“Expert testimony AFFIRMED IN is useful as PART AND RE- guide facts, interpreting it market but VERSED IN PART. Each party shall them”). is not a substitute for UNM em bear its own appeal. costs on ployees perform tyрical cleaning ser —who vices, vacuuming such as wiping down by Judge Concurrence HURWITZ. plainly exhibition could clean oth booths— HURWITZ, Judge, Circuit concurring: meeting spaces er and convention facilities I concur in Judge thorough opin- Farris’ Diego. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., ion. I (2d write separately only Cir.2001) (Sotoma to emphasize J.) (“A that the judgment as a matter of yor, law as to greater availability of substi- quantum a smaller buyers indicates tute buyers part of on the power

market

question”). the clean only 43% of represents for convention market

ing services Diego area. in the San facilities

meeting *11 mo to establish actual enough

That City Sportservice, See Twin

nopolization. Co., 512 F.2d Finley & Charles O. v.

Inc. Cir.1975). (9th Although

1264, suffice connection might share

market claim, attempted monopolization ‍​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‍an Co., 51 Atl. Rebel Oil Co. v.

see Richfield (9th Cir.1995), such 1421, 1438

F.3d or anticom- requires “predatory also

claim Homes, conduct,” Supermarket

petitive Valley Bd. v. San Fernando Inc.

Realtors, Cir.

1986). no correctly held that The district conclude could finder fact

rational without anticompetitively and acted by using purpose business

legitimate building. clean its own employees

own III, II; I; Doe John Doe John DOE

John proposed

individually on behalf Exchange, members; Global

class

Plaintiffs-Appellants, INC.; USA, Daniels Archer

NESTLE Cargill Incorpo- Company;

Midland Cocoa, Cargill Company; Defen-

rated

dants-Appellees. 10-56739.

No. Appeals, Court

United States Circuit.

Ninth Dec.

Argued Submitted 4, 2014. Sept.

Filed

Case Details

Case Name: United National Maintenance, Inc. v. San Diego Convention Center, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Aug 15, 2014
Citation: 766 F.3d 1002
Docket Number: 12-56809
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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