This appeal is from an order of the district court (1) denying the backpay demand of the United Industrial Workers of the Seafarers International Union (Union) and (2) enjoining the Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves (Carrier) from availing itself of a state court injunction against the Union. The case presents a difficult problem of appropriate relief under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and involves the power of a federal court to enjoin state proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
The Carrier and the Union operated under a collective bargaining agreement expiring September 30, 1964. July 31, 1964, the Carrier leased its jurisdictional facilities to the Port Richmond Elevator Company, resulting in the permanent lay
On remand, the district court again relegated the Union to the Railway Adjustment Board for backpay, merely requiring the parties to bargain in good faith. Again, on appeal, we held that “this order did not provide the suitable relief and sanction that this Court found to be not only appropriate but necessary.” United Industrial Workers, etc. v. Board of Trustees, 5 Cir. 1966,
On the second remand, the district court ordered the parties to bargain and enjoined the Carrier from seeking a state injunction against the Union. Eut for the third time, the court refused to grant backpay to the discharged employees.
I.
A. The district court correctly read the object of our prior mandates —“to impose such sanctions as are required to put the employees back in the same position as if the employer had complied with the Act, and to negate any windfall which the employer may have gained by the violation.” The court felt, however, that its order requiring the Carrier to bargain and to reinstate the employees during bargaining constituted sufficient sanctions. We agree that the employer, having violated the Act, must now bargain with the Union and must reinstate the discharged employees during bargaining; we do not agree that these are “sufficient” sanctions.
(1) “The legislative history [of the Railway Labor Act] indicates that when the rail unions and carriers agreed upon these provisions, the unions surrendered their right to strike pending exhaustion of major dispute procedures in exchange for a statutory provision restraining management from disturbing the status quo.”
Under § 6 no change in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions can be made by the carrier from the time notice of an intended change has been given, or conferences with respect thereto have been begun, or the services of the Mediation Board have been requested or offered, until the controversy has finally been acted upon by the NMB, unless ten days elapse after the termination of conferences without a request for or proffer of NMB services. If after the NMB has entered the dispute the parties fail to come to an agreement and arbitration is refused, § 5 First provides that for thirty days after notification by the NMB that its efforts have failed “no change shall be made in rates or pay, rules, or working conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose,” unless during that period the parties agree to arbitration or an emergency board is created. Section 10 provides that from the time an emergency board is created until thirty days after the board makes its report to the President “no change, except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the controversy in the conditions out of which the dispute arose.” (Emphasis added.) Comment, Enjoining Strikes and Maintaining the Status Quo in Railway Labor Disputes, 60 Colum.L.Rev. 381, 388 n. 50 (1960).
Literally, of course, maintenance of the status quo in the instant case would have required a return to operation of the elevator by the Carrier. However, feeling that the employees involved in this major dispute could be adequately protected with less, we suggested that “we need not direct that the lease be unscrambled at this time.”
(2) But for the unilateral change of “working conditions” by the Carrier through the leasing of the elevator facilities, the Carrier-employee relationship would have continued throughout the bargaining period. Thus, maintenance of the status quo requires reinstatement of
rnn _ . . . .. , . ,, . [3] B. The principal dispute in this case focuses on whether the thirty-four employees laid off should receive back-pay for the period between their discharge and commencement of bargaining, The parties have cited, and we have found, no cases dealing with this precise problem. The district court concluded that “the finding by this Court of Appeals that a ‘major’ dispute exists over the leasing of the elevator” does not preclude “there also being a ‘minor’ dispute between the same parties involving different subject matter.” “Plaintiff’s effort to recover back wages and benefits here is clearly a claim to ‘rights accrued’
(1) The court below suggested that “jurisdiction to make the initial determination as to what back wages and benefits are due under the Agreement is vested solely in the Railroad Adjustment Board by the Railway Labor Act.” Moreover, the district court concluded that payment of backpay was not a “sanetion” ordered by this Court on the earlier appeals. As we have noted, however, the purpose of the relevant sections of the Act is maintenance of the status quo pending conference. The employees wrongfully laid off cannot be retroactively reinstated, but they can be retroactively compensated. This does not punish the Carrier. Nor does it constitute a windfall to the employees. It is the price of reconstructing the status quo; it compensates the employees for the losses incurred by their being laid off in violation of the Act.
To this extent, the remedy is similar to that imposed by statute, the National Labor Relations Act, when employees have been discharged following the employer’s refusal to bargain in violation of that Act. Thus, in NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 5 Cir. 1966,
the back pay liability should cease upon the occurrence of any of the following conditions: “(1) reaching mu-trial agreement with the Union relatin£ to the subjects which Respond-ent 1S herein required to bargain about; (2) bargaining to a bona fide impasse; (3) the failure of the Union to commence negotiations within 5 days of the receipt of the Respondent’s notice of its desire to bargain with the Union; (4) the failure of the Union to bargain thereafter in good faith.”361 F.2d at 515 n. 6.
Similarly, in NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 5 Cir. 1965,
Both parties and the district court devote considerable discussion to the M-K-T case, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 1960,
Backpay is a realistic assurance that there will be “an impact on the duty to bargain to prevent the employer from getting a windfall from having violated the Act, while protecting the employees’ benefits against the lapse of time.”
(2) The Carrier’s argument against a court-ordered backpay award is two-pronged: First, so the argument goes, the Railroad Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the backpay award; second, the federal courts are without jurisdiction when such award is involved. We find both assertions erroneous.
The Carrier’s error stems from its premise that “[i]f the members of this Union are entitled to back pay, it is because they were wrongfully discharged.” ' The Carrier cites cases holding that in the absence of diversity of citizenship federal courts have no jurisdiction to order backpay for wrongful
The National Railroad Adjustment Board does not have jurisdiction over the backpay issue. In their contract the parties before us provided for a system board of adjustment in accordance with § 3, Second of the Railway Labor Act.
Admittedly, no case has been found where a federal court has awarded back-pay as part of its enforcement of the status quo in a major dispute. But given our role in such enforcement, and the peculiar necessity for inclusion of back-pay as a sanction under the Act (see part (1) above), we conclude that the Court possesses the power to include a backpay award in its order.
(3) We do not deny the particular competency of the administrative board in such proceedings.
The appellant raises questions regarding employer contributions to the Seafarers Welfare Plan
(4) Judge Friendly has written: “The effect of § 6 is to prolong agreements subject to its provisions regardless of what they say as to termination.” Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 2 Cir. 1964,
Galveston contests this interpretation of Manning. In Manning there was a separate contract for the check-off of union dues of engineers who signed a prescribed authorization form. This check-off agreement was to continue in full force through April 30, 1963, “subject to renewal thereafter only by mutual agreement of the parties thereto.” The Union gave notice that it desired the check-off dues on May 1. The district court ordered American to resume the check-off.
On appeal American argued that since the check-off agreement had a fixed termination date without self-renewal provisions, Section 6 was inapplicable. The Court replied:
If the basic agreement of 1958 had no automatic renewal clause, § 6 would
The objective of the Railway Labor Act is continuance of the status quo until the statutory procedures of the Act have been exhausted.
The Carrier argues: “What the Court has said we did wrong was not bargaining with the Union with reference to leasing the Elevator. There can be no contention that we refused to bargain with the Union with reference to the expiration of the contract or the extension or rewriting of the contract.” However, as we observed earlier, when the Union served notice requesting negotiation on the shut-down or leasing of the elevator, “The Carrier declined, replying that ‘It is not possible to reopen the contract under the present conditions.’ ”
NLRB v. George E. Light Boat Storage, Inc., 5 Cir. 1967,
We recognize the analogy between the Light Boat case and this case in that in both there was only a slight likelihood that the bargaining that the employer refused to engage in would have resulted in continuance of the obligations that the Courts were later to enforce.
In every case where such notice of intended change has been given, or conferences are being held with reference thereto, or the services of the .Mediation Board have been requested by either party, or said Board has proffered its services, rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon, as required by section 155 of this title, by the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten days has elapsed after termination of conferences without request for or proffer of the services of the Mediation Board. 45 U.S.C. § 156.
The Act, therefore, provides explicitly for extension of the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions regardless of the termination date of the contract until after conference bargaining between the parties. None has yet occurred by the parties before us. The rates of pay, rules, and working conditions under the original contract thus still stand in theory. In actuality, they do not, since we have deemed it unnecessary to unscramble the lease that brought about the changes, backpay being a sufficient substitute; the backpay obligation of the Carrier must extend to when bargaining begins.
II.
The district court enjoined the defendants from “enforcing, giving continued effect to or availing themselves in any manner whatsoever of the benefits of the state court injunction that was entered in the District Court of Galveston County, Texas, to enjoin the picketing by the members of the Union.” The state court injunction was sought on the basis that the Union picketing would violate article 5154c of the Vernon’s Ann. Texas Revised Civil Statutes, which makes illegal picketing to induce employees of a city or other political subdivision of the State of Texas to engage in strikes or organized work stoppages.
The ultimate issue, then, is the applicability of the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which provides:
A Court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State Court as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
There is no Act of Congress authorizing the injunction in this case; nor is an injunction needed to aid federal court ju-risdietion here. But we conclude that the injunction issued by the district court was proper to carry out that court’s bargaining order.
Economic action after exhaustion of Section 6 procedures is an integral part of the collective bargaining scheme Congress prescribed when it enacted the Railway Labor Act. The effect of the state court injunction against a possible Union strike is perhaps to render impotent the duty to bargain imposed by this Court.
In State of California v. Taylor, 1957,
Under the Railway Labor Act, not only would the employees of the Belt Railroad have a federally protected right to bargain collectively with their employer, but the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement that they have negotiated with the Belt Railroad would take precedence over conflicting provisions of the state civil service laws.353 U.S. at 561 ,77 S.Ct. at 1042 ,1 L.Ed.2d at 1039 .
The Court squarely held that the Railway Labor Act applied to state-owned carriers. Said the Court: “The fact that, under state law the employees of the Belt Railroad may have no legal right to strike reduces, but does not eliminate, the possibility of a work stoppage. It was to meet such a possibility that the act’s ‘reign of law’ was established.”.
Galveston relies upon Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 1955,
More in point is Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 1954,
In NLRB v. Schertzer, 2 Cir. 1966,
The state court injunction, issued August 11, 1964, enjoined the Union from “picketing the properties of the Galveston Wharves at Galveston,” excluding the situs of the Elevator (which apparently was closed anyway). This was at a time when the Carrier itself v/as in violation of the Railway Labor Act. The cases
After discussing the history of and procedures set up in the Railway Labor Act, the Supreme Court, in Elgin, Joliet & E. R.R. v. Burley, 1945,
After a review of the case history and the Act, the court observed that
whereas in the case of minor disputes strikes are illegal per se because the processes of the Act are final, binding and conclusive throughout and therefore can be enjoined despite Norris-La-Guardia, in the case of a major dispute a strike is not illegal per se and cannot be enjoined if the processes of the Railway Labor Act have been complied with and exhausted.169 F.Supp. at 787 .
The court concluded that “the parties may not, in the course of a major dispute under the Railway Labor Act, have resort to either the strike or the lockout before the proceedings provided by the Act have been exhausted”,
In American Airlines the parties had completed proceedings under the Act; here the parties have not begun them. But in both cases the Union did all it could to exhaust the procedures of the Act, and that is all that is necessary. One commentator has urged an even broader reading of the statute, suggesting that under the literal provisions of the Act the Union may strike even without having exhausted the procedures under the Act. For American Airlines “did not consider the fact that § 6 applies only to carriers and the sections that could be applied to unions only operate after the conciliatory and media-tory proceedings have failed and the procedures for bringing public opinion to bear on the problem have been initiated. Furthermore, it seems to strain the language of the act to say that the prohibition against changing ‘working conditions or established practices,’ in § 6, and ‘conditions out of which the dispute arose,’ in § 10, have reference to strikes.”
While the other cases dealing with the issue of the propriety of strikes during a major dispute under the Railway Labor Act suggests no clear solution, they appear consistent with American Airlines. Railroad Yardmasters v. Pennsylvania R.R., 3 Cir. 1955,
It must be kept in mind that
[tjhere is no compulsion on the parties to agree at any stage of the procedure. They are not compelled to reach an agreement by collective bargaining, to follow the recommendations of the Mediation Board, to submit to arbitration or to follow any recommendations which a Presidential Emergency Board may make.
American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, supra,
Similarly, the parties may not want the services of the National Mediation Board, and the Board may not proffer its services. If the carrier refuses to follow the procedures of the Act, or if those procedures are followed to an impasse, the Union may strike. The Union’s right to bargain, guaranteed by the Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth, and presently enforced by this Court, would be illusory without a right to strike when bargaining has run its course if the Carrier continues to refuse to bargain. The Railway Labor Act, and the cases interpreting it, only forbid Union striking during the course of exhaustion of the Act’s procedures (and during the statutory cooling-off periods after initiation of the proceedings, for 30 days after mediatory efforts have failed, and after creation of an Emergency Board and thirty days thereafter). The right to strike is adjunct to the Union’s statutory rights and implicit in our order. This national labor policy cannot be frustrated by a state court injunction. To effectuate the judgment of the federal court, the district court properly enjoined the Carrier from availing itself of the state court injunction. If the Union is to be enjoined from picketing in the future, it must be enjoined under the Railway Labor Act, not under article 5154c of the Texas statutes; and it is to be enjoined in federal, not state, court.
The district court’s judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. The complete facts are set out in this Court’s opinion, United Indus. Workers, etc. v. Board of Trustees, 5 Cir. 1965,
. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Seventh reads: No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 156 of this title.
The relevant portion of 45 U.S.C. § 156 is set out in our opinion below in part IB (4).
.
. The major-minor terminology was evolved in Elgin, Joliet & E. By. v. Burley, 1945,
. We further stated: The District Court apparently mistook the breadth of the discretion afforded it for the existence of discretion, for the discretion granted the District Court was not whether to restore the status quo but only hou) to restore it. There must be an impact on the duty to bargain to prevent the employer from getting a windfall for having violated the Act, while protecting the employees’ benefits against the lapse of time. While we did not foreclose the possibility that the lease might have to be unscrambled — a literal restoration of the status quo — we felt that something less could be substituted, so long as the employees were put substantially in the same position as if Galveston Wharves had complied with the Act.
. In a Memorandum and Order of March 20, 1967, the district judge required bargaining, ordered reinstatement of the laid-off employees, ordered back-pay to be paid to those employees, and denied the Union’s request for an injunction. Both parties filed various motions with the district court, and a supplemental hearing was granted. May 3, 1967, the district judge handed down the Memorandum and Order from which this appeal is taken.
. The district court recognized that the mandate of this Court required “im
. On reinstatement during bargaining pursuant to an order arising under the National Labor Relations Act see M. Forkoseh, A Treatise on Labor Law § 522 (1965); 31 Am.Jur., Labor § 306 (1958).
. The term “rights accrued” originated in this context in Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 1945,
The Court characterized “major” disputes as relating “to disputes over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them,” and “minor” disputes as being “founded upon some incident of the employment relation, or asserted one, independent of those covered by the collective agreement * * *. [T]he claim is to rights accrued, not merely to have new ones created for the future.”
. The object of Section 6 is to maintain the status quo, pending the expiration of the period provided by the section for allowing the process of negotiation, mediation and conciliation to have play. It is to prevent changes being made until these processes have been exhausted or the prescribed waiting period has expired without bringing them into effect. Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 1946,
On the maintenance of the status quo pending Adjustment Board resolution of minor disputes see Westchester Lodge 2186 v. Railway Express Agency, 2 Cir. 1964,
. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Switchmen’s Union, 2 Cir. 1961,
. 67 Cong.Rec. 4648, 4650.
. Of course, this Court has the power to require that the lease be unscrambled and that the terminated operations be resumed. See the cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act, discussed in Forkosch, A Treatise on Labor Law §§ 435, 525 (1905).
. As stated in Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 1937,
Accord, Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 1965,
. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R., 5 Cir. 1959,
.
. E. g. Walker v. Southern Ry., 1966,
. Walker v. Southern Ry., 1966,
. See Article X of the contract, providing for a system board pursuant to authority granted in 45 U.S.C. § 153.
. On system boards in general see Kroner, Minor Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act: A Critical Appraisal, 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 41, 72-74 (1962).
. “The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions * * * may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board * ' * 45 U.Sj.C. § 153, first (i).
. See Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 1965,
. See part (4) below.
. This Court, following the lead of six other circuits, has approved the inclusion of interest on backpay awards. See NLRB v. George E. Light Boat Storage, Inc., 5 Cir. 1967,
. The district court did suggest that such contributions were not to be included as sanctions, but in light of our decision on the backpay issue this observation must be reconsidered.
. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 102.52, suggesting that the amount of backpay due pursuant to a court decree or Board order under the National Labor Relations Act should “be resolved without a formal proceeding,” that is, through settlement.
. See Part IA above.
. But note that the items in controversy-in Light Boat were welfare and overtime payments, not backpay. The two employees discharged in violation of §§ 8(a) (1) and (3) were ordered reinstated with complete backpay.
. We recognize that the national interest in operation of a grain elevator may be different from the interest in continuance of rail or air service, but the Act makes no such distinction.
. NLRB v. Cosmopolitan Studio, Inc., 2 Cir. 1961,
. Article 5154c provides: It is against state public policy for its officials or those of its political subdivisions to bargain on contract with a labor organization concerning terms and conditions of employment of its employees. Public employees are prohibited from participating in an organized work stoppage or strike under penalty of losing civil service and other rights acquired as a result of their public employment. Employees may individually work without penalty and may present their grievances through a representative that does not claim the right to strike. No person shall be denied public employment because of membership or non-membership in
. The district court, citing City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 1884,
. Although not here applicable, the Norris-LaGuardia Act evidences Congressional belief in the freedom of either party to use self help after bargaining has failed.
. For example, in the field of grievances —of minor disputes — neither a state nor a federal court has jurisdiction to determine matters of contract interpretation. Order of Ry. Conductors v. Southern Ry., 1950,
. See Butte, Anaconda & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 9 Cir. 1959,
. See Wisehart, The Airlines’ Recent Experience Under the Railway Labor Act, 25 Law & Contemp.Probs. 22, 28 (1960); Comment, Enjoining Strikes and Maintaining the Status Quo in Railway Labor Disputes, 60 Colum.L. R.ev. 381, 386-89 (I960)..
. But see U.S. Emergency Board No. 97, Report to the President 138 (1952), asserting that a work stoppage is prohibited “for a period of 30 days following the date when * * * [an emergency board] is appointed.”
