270 Conn. 261 | Conn. | 2004
Opinion
The plaintiff, United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO, appeals
The record and a joint stipulation the parties submitted to the trial court reveal the following facts and procedural history. The dispute between the parties began on July 7, 1997, when the plaintiff filed a complaint arising from the defendant’s request that the plaintiff leave the Crystal Mall Hometown Fair (Hometown Fair),
Thereafter, on December 28, 2001, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant that some of its members intended to enter the mall on January 9, 2002, “ ‘to distribute literature and talk with people in the mall concerning employee rights under the state and federal laws.’ ” In this letter, the plaintiff represented that its members would “ ‘be peaceful and limit their activity to the common areas of the mall and not the tenant stores.’ ” Additionally, the plaintiff asserted that the distribution of information was “ ‘not an organizational effort.’ ” By letter dated January 2, 2002, the defendant denied the plaintiff permission to enter the mall for the plaintiffs stated purposes.
On appeal, the plaintiff asks us to recognize that the Connecticut constitution requires a lesser showing of state action in order to trigger protection of the rights to free speech and assembly than does the constitution of the United States. In so doing, the plaintiff urges us to adopt a fact-specific, flexible analysis in order to determine whether such a state action requirement has been met. The plaintiff urges us to then conclude that the defendant in the present case is a state actor that has violated the plaintiffs state constitutional rights to free speech and assembly.
I
The following additional facts are important to the disposition of this case. On July 9, 1979, an application was submitted to the Waterford planning and zoning commission seeking permission to construct the mall. The application stated that it was anticipated that “Crystal Mall, with all its amenities, probable connection to public transportation, its interior community spaces, and the comfortable controlled protection from the elements which the mall itself affords, will become the central focus of Waterford.” The application represented that the mall would encompass a large trade area that would include numerous towns, both in Connecticut and Rhode Island, and five military installations. According to the application, “[m]any people will find themselves spending greatly extended periods of time within the complex of stores, malls and department stores.” The application also stated that the mall would employ approximately 2000 to 2500 employees and even more during the holiday season. In addition, the application stated that “great benefits could be realized if the regional transit system . . . would incorpo
The construction of the mall required an extensive permit and approval process. On June 26, 1979, the Waterford conservation commission approved the application regarding construction of the mall, but with certain conditions, including the filing of a $75,000 performance bond. In a letter dated August 10, 1979, the state department of environmental protection addressed various environmental concerns, stated that it wanted to perform a field inspection of the area and informed the mall’s developers that permits would be required for the discharge of sanitary wastewater and stormwater.
The southeastern Connecticut regional planning agency informed the Waterford town planner that, based on its review of the developer’s application for the mall, in order to accommodate the new traffic that would be created by the mall, several specific changes should be made to the mall’s surrounding roads and highways, including Route 85 and Interstate 95. On October 24, 1979, the state traffic commission issued a certificate that would become valid when the mall’s developers completed several conditions, some of which had been suggested by the southeastern Connecticut regional planning agency, including: “(a) widening Route 85 to four lanes, with additional turn lanes and a raised median; (b) the installation of signal lights on Route 85 at the [Interstate 95] southbound ramps and certain driveways; (c) the modification of an existing signal at Dayton Place; (d) the construction of an operational lane on [Interstate 95] . . . to facilitate accelera
The developer’s planning and zoning application requested several modifications of existing regulations, including a reduction in the size of parking spaces, an increase in building height and any aerials or antennas attached thereto, variations on landscaping and the removal of certain construction restrictions. On November 26, 1979, the planning and zoning commission approved the developer’s application for the mall subject to certain conditions. The approval included restriction on building sizes, landscaping, the placement of traffic islands and pedestrian walkways, and several off-site traffic improvements of the type already described in this opinion.
In an interim report, commenting on the impact that the construction of the mall would have on the town of Waterford’s fire services, the chairman of the Waterford board of fire commissioners stated that the impact would be “extensive” and would require “substantial increases” in the fire commission’s budget. The chairman further stated that additional staff and equipment, including a new $250,000 aerial ladder truck, would be required. On May 10, 1984, the fire marshal communicated to the town planner, by letter, regarding certain safety conditions that were required to be in place in time for the proposed early opening of three of the mall’s anchor stores.
Murray J. Pendleton, a sergeant in the support services division of the Waterford police department,
The application to the planning and zoning commission indicated that the Waterford chief of police believed that the mall “would necessitate an increase in the [d]etective [division [staff] due to the resultant increase of bad checks, shoplifting, larceny, and burglaries . . . [and] that there would be an increase in motor vehicle accidents, due to the larger volumes of traffic.”
On October 22, 1984, the planning and zoning commission met and voted to extend the mall’s temporary certificate of zoning compliance and to require one of the mall’s anchor stores to provide a $10,000 forfeiture bond to cover certain work that had not been completed. At this same meeting, the fire marshal reported that the replacement of the main fire panel needed to be completed in one of the anchor stores and that a final inspection had to be made by the fire marshal, the zoning enforcement officer, the town planner and the police department before that store’s opening. In addition, the planning and zoning commission approved the defendant’s request to amend a zoning regulation that concerned the sale of alcoholic beverages, in order to exempt liquor sales outlets from the distance requirement when they are located in an approved regional shopping center such as the mall. A few days later, on October 24, 1984, the planning and zoning commission wrote a letter detailing a number of items that needed
Since the mall opened, there has been further state and municipal agency “involvement” with the mall. For example, the town planner notified mall management that the permit issued by the conservation commission required that a contact person be designated to whom the commission could address problems. Also, at the police department’s request, the mall was to contain a room or office to be used for detention purposes and first aid practices. Since July 19, 2001, police officers have had access to a room at the mall for “writing reports affiliated with activity at the mall, such as shoplifting, juvenile referral or locating a lost child or car and for interviewing people or suspects.” The police chief has directed the assignment of police officers to the mall “as often as schedules and manpower and other departmental responsibilities allowed.”
Currently, the mall is an enclosed shopping center that includes four anchor stores as well as 130 specialty
II
As a threshold matter, we address our standard of review. The issue of whether the conduct of a private actor constitutes state action is a question of law. See State v. Lasaga, 269 Conn. 454, 463-64, 848 A.2d 1149 (2004). Consequently, our review of the trial court’s determination of that issue is plenary. Id., 463.
Our analysis begins with a brief review of this court’s decision in Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, supra, 192 Conn. 48. In Cologne, the plaintiffs, the Connecticut National Organization for Women and one of its members, sought permission to solicit shoppers at the West-farms Mall, which is located partly in the town of Farmington and partly in the town of West Hartford, to sign petitions in support of the proposed equal rights amendment to the federal constitution. Id., 51. As in the present
It is well settled that there is no right under the first amendment to the United States constitution for a person to use a privately owned shopping center as a forum to communicate without the permission of the property owner. Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569, 92 S. Ct. 2219, 33 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1972). A state, however, may adopt greater protection for free expression on private property, so long as such protection does not
Since the decision in Cologne, courts in other jurisdictions that have considered this issue overwhelmingly have chosen not to interpret their state constitutions as requiring private property owners, such as those who own large shopping malls, to permit certain types of speech, even political speech, on their premises. See Citizens for Ethical Government, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Associates, L.P., 260 Ga. 245, 245-46, 392 S.E.2d 8 (1990) (recognizing that shopping malls “represent a fertile potential source of signatures,” but stating that such convenient access to large number of shoppers
In contrast, only five states—California, Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Washington—currently hold that a state may require private shopping mall owners to permit some form of political activity in common areas of the mall.
In Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 56 (Colo. 1991), the Colorado Supreme Court held that its state constitution protected political leafletting in a large shopping mall. In so concluding, the court viewed the mall, which enjoyed a “prominent location in the City [of Westminster (city)] across the street from the City Hall” as being so entangled with the government that there was sufficient state action to trigger the protection of Colorado’s constitutional free speech provision.
Noting that its finding of governmental involvement in the case was not predicated on any single factor, the court in Bock found significant the city’s $2 million purchase, financed through the sale of municipal bonds, of the street and sewer improvements that initially had been paid for by the mail’s developer. Id., 61. The court also was persuaded by the fact that the city operated a police “substation” in the mall. Id. From the substation, the police responded to complaints throughout the city. The court reasoned that, because the mall provided the space free of rent, the mall was providing a municipal service. In addition, the court noted the presence of two to four city police officers routinely patrolling the common areas of the mall. Id. The court further identified a “highly visible governmental presence” in the mall, consisting of Army, Navy and Marine Corps recruiting offices, as well as voter registration drives conducted by the county clerk. Id., 62. Finally, the court expressed its belief that the mall functioned “as the equivalent of a downtown business district” and thus concluded that the mall constituted a public forum. Id.
In New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 138 N.J. 326, 333, 650 A.2d 757 (1994), cert. denied sub nom. Short Hill Associates v. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East, 516 U.S. 812, 116 S. Ct. 62, 133 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1995), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that regional and community shopping centers must permit leafletting
The New Jersey Supreme Court also took note of the fact that, in addition to the implicit invitation that was communicated by the design and use of the shopping centers, some of the malls in question explicitly authorized certain kinds of speech, such as that which occurred at community desks or booths, as well as political speech at voter registration drives and candidate appearances. Id., 358-60. In its opinion, the court documented the rise of the large privately owned shopping mall and the converse decline of the downtown business districts; id., 344-47; and finally concluded that any harm to the business interests of the mall that came from leaf letting could be mitigated by the proper adoption of rules and regulations concerning the time, place and manner of such leafletting. Id., 361-62.
Ill
The plaintiff in the present case does not request that we overturn our ruling in Cologne that the Connecticut constitution requires state action, but instead urges us to decide a question not addressed by that decision: whether the provisions of our constitution are satisfied by a showing of less state action than what generally has been required under their federal counterparts.
Specifically, the plaintiff calls our attention to State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345, 379-81, 655 A.2d 737 (1995), in which we adopted a “fact-specific, flexible” approach
The plaintiff nonetheless ar gues that the true precedential value of Linares is this court’s rejection of a categorical bright-line test in favor of a fact-specific balancing approach,
Similarly, the plaintiff also directs our attention to Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School
According to the plaintiff, regardless of whether the analysis is characterized as one of the aforementioned bright-line federal standards, Brentwood Academy’s “entwinement” test, a “meta-analysis” as in Janusaitis, or simply a “fact-specific” approach, such as that used in Colorado and New Jersey, the result is the same: a review of the totality of the circumstances that, in the present case, ultimately demonstrates that the defendant is a state actor for purposes of our constitution and, therefore, unconstitutionally refused the plaintiff access to the mall. Even if we were to conclude, however, that our state action requirement is more expan
IV
Under Cologne, as in the overwhelming majority of our sister jurisdictions, the size of the mall, the number of patrons it serves, and the fact that the general public is invited to enter the mall free of charge do not, even when considered together, advance the plaintiffs cause in converting private action into government action. “[Property [does not] lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes. . . . The essentially private character of a store and its privately owned abutting property does not change by virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modem shopping center. ... If the furnishing of building permits, police protection and public transportation were deemed to constitute sufficient government involvement to transform the actions of the defendants in refusing the plaintiffs’ requests into those of public officials . . . almost every improved property would be subject to the same burden the plaintiffs seek to impose upon the [m]ail.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cologne v. Westfamns Associates, supra, 192 Conn. 66.
The plaintiff argues, however, that our state constitution permits a finding of state action based upon the contacts between the government and the private business owner present in this case, even though such contacts would not be sufficient to establish state action under the first amendment. For example, the plaintiff contends that the town of Waterford and the state were “closely involved in the constmction and development of the mall,” including the alteration of Route 85, the
As our recitation of the facts indicates, a number of town and state officers, departments and agencies were consulted in connection with the construction and opening of the mall, including: the state traffic commission, the state department of transportation, the state department of environmental protection, the state department of public health, the Waterford town planner, the Waterford department of public works, the Waterford board of police commissioners, and the Waterford fire commission. There is nothing in the record before us, however, to suggest that such involvement on the part of these agencies was unusual or extensive, particularly for a large commercial property. As the International Council of Shopping Centers, Inc., explains in its amicus brief, submitted in support of the defendant, any commercial development anywhere in this country has to comply with similar regulations.
The plaintiff points to the five jurisdictions that currently conclude that a state may require private shop
Even taking into account those factors that the plaintiff propounds, we fail to see how the defendant in the present case could be deemed a state actor. To conclude that the minimal state involvement present in this case was sufficient to constitute state action, we would have to disregard much of the reasoning in Cologne that differentiated between state and private action, essentially eviscerate Cologne’s conclusion that the public use of a private shopping mall did not transform the mall owners’ refusal to allow political speech within the mall into state action, and depart drastically from the case law, relying in part on Cologne, in the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions. See footnote 14 of this opinion. We do not, however, foreclose the possibility that a proper interpretation of the Connecticut constitution could lead to the conclusion that our state action requirement is more expansive than its federal counterpart. After all, “[w]e have . . . determined in some instances that the protections afforded to the citizens of this state by our own constitution go beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 112, 547 A.2d 10 (1988); State v Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 166, 537 A.2d 446 (1988); State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 235-36, 496 A.2d 498 (1985).” State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 160, 579 A.2d 58 (1990). Thus, should an appropriate case present itself, we may reconsider the issue; see, e.g., State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 331-32, n.27, 630 A.2d 593 (1993); State v. Avis, 209 Conn. 290,
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court. On January 28, 2003, the parties, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2, requested that the appeal be transferred to this court. On March 18, 2003, we granted the joint motion to transfer the appeal.
At the time of the incident giving rise to this action, Crystal Mall Associates, L.P., owned and controlled the mall, whereas Crystal Mall Development and Management Company, Inc., operated, managed, controlled and maintained the mall. Both entities were named as defendants in this case. On December 31, 1997, Crystal Mall Development and Management Company, Inc., was dissolved, and responsibility for the management and operation of the mall shifted to Simon Property Group, L.P. On February 11, 2002, the plaintiff moved that Simon Property Group, L.P., be made a party defendant. That motion was granted on March 11, 2002. For the purpose of clarity, and because Crystal Mall Associates, L.P., and Simon Property Group, L.P., are represented by the same counsel and did not submit separate briefs to this court, we refer to the defendants throughout this opinion in the singular form.
Article first, § 4, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: “Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”
Article first, § 5, of the constitution of Connecticut provides in relevant part: “No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech . . . .”
Article first, § 14, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: “The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.”
Testimony provided to the trial court, Stengel, J., established that the plaintiff initially had responded to an advertisement for the Hometown Fair, which provided in part: “At Crystal Mall we have set aside Saturday, March 1, from 9:30 am-6 pm for our Hometown Fair. [It is] a day to take pride in our community with neighbors and experience the activities available in our own backyard. Your civic group or non-profit organization can sell crafts, baked goods, sign up new members, or simply distribute information right inside Crystal Mall at your designated location!”
At the time the plaintiff was asked to leave, mall staff told the plaintiff that its presence was not in accordance with the purpose of the Hometown Fair as advertised and expressed their opinion that the plaintiff had not provided accurate or complete information on the “exhibitor entry form” submitted to the defendant.
On February 11, 2002, the plaintiff filed a request to amend its complaint to reflect the defendant’s written refusal to allow the plaintiffs members access to the mall.
On May 7,2003, we granted the motion of the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation to file an amicus curiae brief on this issue. On October 28, 2003, we granted the motion of the International Council of Shopping Centers, Inc., to file an amicus curiae brief on this issue.
The plaintiff claims that, because the facts support a determination that the defendant is a state actor, the next inquiry is whether the plaintiffs speech was compatible with the operation of the mall pursuant to our
The town planner approved a request to open the mall in phases rather than on one specific dale, subject to certain conditions.
According to the parties’ stipulation, a police officer was assigned to the mall approximately 75 percent of the time, between noon and closing.
In Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 232, 635 P.2d 108 (1981), the Washington Supreme Court reversed an injunction that had been issued prohibiting signature collection for a political initiative at a shopping mall. In that decision, a plurality of the court held that the state constitution’s free speech clause did not require state action. Id., 243. In Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Committee, supra, 113 Wash. 2d 427-29, the court rejected the position of the plurality in Alderwood Associates and instead held that shopping malls must provide access for political activity under the state’s free speech clause only if state action is present. Currently, the narrow holding in Alderwood Associates that Washington’s constitutional initiative provision protects petitioners seeking to collect signatures in a shopping mall is still valid.
We note that, almost without exception, these courts, which all have inteipreted their state constitutions as allowing private property owners, such as those who own large shopping malls, to regulate speech on their premises, cite with approval this court’s decision in Cologne.
See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, supra, 23 Cal. 3d 899; Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991); Batchelder v. Allied Stores International, Inc., supra, 388 Mass. 83; New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 138 N.J. 326, 650 A.2d 757 (1994), cert. denied sub nom. Short Hill Associates v. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East, 516 U.S. 812, 116 S. Ct. 62, 133 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1995); Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981); see also Jamestown v. Beneda, 477 N.W.2d 830, 835 (N.D. 1991) (finding state action when city owned mall, but leased it to private developer).
As we previously noted, the Washington Supreme Court explicitly has confined its holding in Alderwood Associates. See footnote 13 of this opinion.
The court in Bock also recognized that the free speech provision of the state constitution extended “beyond the negative command of its first clause to make an affirmative declaration in the second clause.” Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., supra, 819 P.2d 58. Article II, § 10, of the Colorado constitution provides in relevant part: “No law should be passed impairing the freedom of speech; every person shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject . . . .”
“This standard must take into account (1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private property, generally, its ‘normal’ use, (2) the extent and nature of the public’s invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both the private and public use of the property.” State v. Schmid, supra, 84 N.J. 563.
The New Jersey Supreme Court took note of the expansive size of the malls in question in that case and the large populations that they served, as well as the fact that some of those malls were patrolled by police officers and that at least one of those malls housed a municipal police substation. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., supra, 138 N.J. 338-40. Such facts, however, did not play an important role in the court’s analysis.
As explained by one commentator, there are at least three prominent bright-line federal tests used to determine whether a court can treat a private defendant as a state actor. Those tests are identified as the “[ejxclusive [government] [fjunction” (or “public function”) test, the “[s]ymbiotic [Relationship” test and the “nexus” test. R. Krotoszynski, “Back to the Briaipateli: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations,” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 302, 318-20 (1995); see, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-61, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1978) (explaining that state action arises when private actor engages in “an exclusively public function” [emphasis added]); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S. Ct. 449, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1974) (“the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of 1he State itself’ [emphasis added]); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725, 81 S. Ct. 856, 6 L. Ed.
As the plaintiff points out, federalism concerns that may inhibit the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the United States constitution aré not implicated when this court interprets the constitution of Connecticut. “In part, at least, the state action requirement is designed to address the demands of federalism, to create space for state regulation. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, pp. 1149-50 (1978). Because there is no ‘federalism’ component to state action under state constitutions, any state standard for government involvement should be more flexible, and should require less definitive government action than is required under federal law.” Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, supra, 192 Conn. 82 (Peters, J., dissenting).
Under such a fact-specific, flexible approach, a court’s first amendment analysis relies on whether the particular speech at issue is consistent with the uses of the specific public property involved. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972).
The plaintiff also calls our attention to State v. Morales, 232 Conn. 707, 719-27, 657 A.2d 585 (1995), in which we rejected a single factor federal approach in favor of a balancing test under a due process analysis pursuant to article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut.
We note 1 hat in its amicus brief in support of the plaintiff, the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation refers us to even more jurisprudential possibilities of federal precedents we could revive in order to create a new state action litmus test. See Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1973) (“live factors . . . are particularly important to a determination of ‘state action’: [1] the degree to which the ‘private’ organization is dependent on governmental aid; [2] the extent and intrusiveness of the governmental regulatory scheme; [3] whether that scheme connotes government approval of the activity or whether the assistance is merely provided to all without such connotation; [4] the extent to which the organization serves a public function or acts as a surrogate for the [s]tate; [5] whether the organization has legitimate claims to recognition as a ‘private’ organization in associational or other constitutional terms”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927, 95 S. Ct. 1124, 43 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1975).
The defendant argues that the plaintiffs proposed approach involving a balancing test, wherein the court would weigh the right of free speech against the interests of operating private property for business purposes, would interfere with the role of the legislature, and therefore presents a separation of powers dilemma. The defendant also contends that, should this court go so far as to recognize a state constitutional right of access for “expressive” activity on private property, like shopping malls, we then may be obligated to expand constitutional guarantees in other contexts that do not involve state action. Because we are affirming the trial court’s judgment, we need not address these concerns.
The plaintiff also argues that the defendant has failed to present any basis for a finding that it would be harmed by a decision in the plaintiffs favor. Such a determination, however, is not required for our conclusion.
Although the plaintiff makes much of the fact that, during the planning stages of the mall, the town of Waterford had contemplated the need to obtain additional fire and police staff and additional fire equipment, there is no evidence that those departments actually have acquired them. Furthermore, there is no factual support for the assertion that such increases would be above and beyond what otherwise might have been required during the normal course of further development in Waterford.
According to the parties’ stipulation, the certificate issued by the state traffic commission would become valid only upon “the developer’s completion of a number of conditions . . . .” (Emphasis added.) These conditions included major changes to Route 85 and Interstate 95 and the installation of
We note that the plaintiff, in its brief, engaged in a detailed Geisler analysis of article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the constitution of Connecticut to support its conclusion that the state action requirement of the state constitution differs from the United States constitution. See State v. Geisler, supra, 222 Conn. 684-85 (“[i]n order to construe the contours of our state constitution and reach reasoned and principled results, the following tools of analysis should be considered to the extent applicable: [1] the textual approach ... [2] holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court ... [3] federal precedent ... [4] sister state decisions or sibling approach ... [5] the historical approach, including the historical constitutional setting and the debates of the framers . . . and [6] economic/sociological considerations” [citations omitted]).