*1 755 Smith, 187, 129 Iowa 106 N.W. Y. Conclusion (1906) (“the jury giving 190 instruction duty district court had a to inquire in has no basis the evidence is re- which potential into a breakdown in communica- error”). bar, the case at versible Unlike Tejeda tion between and his trial counsel. however, Mays and were decided Smith preserve the We issue of whether there on direct in ineffective- a complete breakdown in communica- In assistance-of-counsel context. the inef- for postconviction proceedings. We context, fective-assistance-of-counsel affirm the district evidentiary court’s rul- appeal the facial defendant’s ar- [the ing. The court did not abuse its discretion in most situations gument] diminished excluding Tejeda’s ex-girlfriend’s testi- practical where considerations make mony about another man’s confession to unlikely particular that the inclusion of a hearsay. the crime as unreliable Lastly, marshaling element instruction reject Tejeda’s we ineffective-assistance- produced any would have difference in claim, of-counsel because he fails show jury. the verdict of the prejudiced attorney he was his trial object a jury did not instruction which Broughton, v. State N.W.2d evidentiary support lacked in the record. (Iowa 1990) (quoting Propps, v. State In respect, this we also affirm. (Iowa 1985)). 619, 623 In this case superfluous jury of this in- submission AFFIRMED. did not
struction raise issue which
“give[s] probability rise reasonable proceeding
outcome of the would have
been different had counsel not erred.” See
Spies,
Jury
tions must be considered as
here another made that it instruction clear jury’s duty was the to decide the facts of FIRE UNITED & CASUALTY Kyar, the case. Noland v. 228 Iowa Cf. COMPANY, Appellant, (1940). N.W. facts, jury, as arbiter of the should have
disregarded suggestion the court’s that FIRE ST. PAUL AND MARINE prosecution had offered evidence to show COMPANY, INSURANCE admission, Tejeda had made an and we Appellee.
think that such is the inevitable conclusion No. 03-0602. jury to be drawn about the in this case. suggestion
There is no the instruction Supreme Court of Iowa. tradicts another instruction or misstates April law; Tejeda only alleges submission of Rehearing April Denied superfluous confusing. instruction was jury His claims about the effect on the are and, think,
speculative, we without merit.
The prosecution presented overwhelming Tejeda
evidence to show was Heman’s as- Tejeda preju-
sailant. has failed to show
dice, reject and for this reason we his
ineffective-assistance-of-eounsel claim.
Maureen Roach Tobin Whitfield & P.L.C., Moines, Eddy, appellant. for Des Peter M. Anita L. Sand and Dhar of P.L.C., Sidney, Moines, Grefe Des appellee.
WIGGINS, Justice.
In this must decide we whether agreement approved by a settlement pur- (1999)1 to Iowa suant Code section 85.35 commonly Practitioners to a settle- as a refer section 85.35 subsequent employ- claim ment. Dr. barred Nelson determined that sig- no er and its insurer for indemnification un- aggravation nificant prior her back der section The district court dition had occurred and her released concluded the and its insurer care. Dr. opined, Nelson “[H]er low back *3 could seek indemnification from the other discomfort likely is most related to the following compro- insurer of a degenerative disc I disease. do not feel special mise case settlement. dis-We that work restrictions are related in re- agree, the decision of the district reverse gards to her injury.” [1998] work Akers court, entry and remand case for of never filed a claim for workers’ compensa- judgment Casualty for United Fire & tion benefits Coon River Bar & (United Fire). Company 19, Grill or United Fire for February 1998, injury. Background I. Facts and Proceed- 2, 1998, On November Akers sought
ings. McGuire, care Dr. Daniel who recom- 14, 1995, September On Patricia Akers spinal mended surgery. fusion Dr. (Akers) injured employed her back while performed McGuire January the fusion on injury for Woodmarc. Akers’ occurred 21, July In a letter to wiping while she was wood stain from a attorney, Akers’ Dr. McGuire character- insured cabinet. USF&G Woodmarc. ized “probably the 1995 as the main time, Since that St. Paul Fire and Marine stated, causing event” her He “It (St. Paul) Company acquired Insurance would appear complaints that her low back treating physician, USF&G. Akers’ Dr. fairly you have been consistent as have Bahls, diagnosed Donna low Akers with documented since the work incident at joint strain degenerative back and disease years ago.” Woodmarc almost four He spine. of the lumbar Dr. Bahls recom- percent cluded Akers had a two impair- May mended conservative treatment. On ment after the fusion surgery. He also 10, 1996, opined, Dr. “I Bahls feel that she lifting, restricted her bending, sitting, and improvement is at maximum medical as far twisting. At Dr. deposi- McGuire’s first concerned, as her lumbar strain is I and do 20, 1999, September tion on he confirmed permanent not feel that there is a impair- 28, 1999, opinions gave July he in his rating rendered.” quit be Akers letter. Woodmarc, employment her with because pain. she could not handle her Akers filed September On St. Paul filed an a claim for workers’ benefits application for an order under Iowa Code against Woodmarc and St. Paul for the pursue section 85.21 to United Fire for September 14,1995, injury. indemnification or The Iowa contribution. February Compensation On Akers suffered a Act Workers’ allows an em- new of pain ployer onset in the same area as her or carrier to seek an order from the injury, employed while Coon Riv- workers’ al- Grill, Bar er which was lowing proceed- insured Unit- to file contested case ed Fire. This ing against occurred when she another employer or carrier lifted a syrup. responsible box cola United Fire who be part for all or Lynn her to paid sent Dr. Nelson for treat- an employee benefits 26-3, (2004). Lawyer Compensation § case settlement. 15 James R. Workers’ at 271 Higgs, & Judith Ann Graves Iowa Practice: compensa- the workers’ United Fire with or carrier. requesting indemni- sought al- commission. St. application Paul’s St Fire for the entire disability fication from United that “claimant’s leged compro- under the expenses paid are due amount it Akers medical majority work- In connec- February while mise case settlement. action, ... Dr. Bar & Grill tion with the section 85.21 ing for Coon deposition reimburse- in Octo- gave McGuire a second Paul] intendfs] [St. from Coon River attorney Paul’s conducted ment of the benefits ber of 2001. St. pursuant to Fire] [United Bar & Grill and On direct exami- the direct examination. commissioner is- deputy nation, this Order.” Dr. stated Akers’ 1998 McGuire *4 request on approving’ this an Order “aggravation” sued. of the 27,1999. September both the 1995 injury. He also conceded injuries represented significant and 1998 action its section 85.21 filing Instead of why surgery on performed reasons he Fire, pursued Paul a St. against United by United Akers. On cross-examination On October with Akers. settlement however, Dr. attorney, Fire’s McGuire Paul, Woodmarc, and Akers filed St. precipitating event for the identified the injury. Dr. McGuire surgery as the 1995 compensation with the workers’ agreement reiterated he would not have recom- also to Iowa Code sec- pursuant commissioner surgery five-year absent a four to mended alleged dispute fide tion 85.35. The bona relating to the 1995 history problems the claimed was whether agreement in the course of injury arose out of or The with Woodmarc. employment Akers’ summary judg- United Fire moved agree- settlement special case compromise ment, denied. which the commissioner agreement stated specifically ment hearing on De- proceeded The matter 14, 1995,’ injury September covered the 6, 2002, February cember 2001. On' special case settle- compromise The date. com- deputy workers’ following clause: included the deputy his decision. The missioner filed and concluded a interpreted section 85.35 all agree payments that parties The compromise special case settlement $39,972.42 are in the amount of made a final section 85.35 did not constitute already filed order pursuant made right to indemnification bar to St. Paul’s It understood § of the Code. per 85.21 or contribution under that the insurance parties these between injury at deputy The found both the 1995 proceed pur- will carrier of the and the 1998 at Coon Woodmarc a'claim section with suant to that code significant Bar to be & Grill Casualty and Fire and United disability. deputy The causes of Akers’ payments Grill for Coon River Bár and Ak- the commuted value of further found injury date arising from an of benefits weekly ers’ benefits' for [of] 2/19/98. injuries disability by caused both exceed- The Paul ed the cash to Akers St. special case set- approved compromise under the case settle- 6,1999.
tlement on October the full deputy respon- ment. The noted to situations when sibility' applies rule Paul filed its On November St. injuries with two action there are two different section 85.21 contested case employers.2 different He then found that Scope III. of Review. disability caused the 1995 Our review of a district court’s decision ascertainable; thus,
was not un- he was judicial on review of an agency decision is apportion disability able to between to correct interpretations erroneous of law. injuries. reasons, the two For these 17A.19(8)(6) (2001).3 § Iowa Code deputy ordered United Fire to reimburse commissioner’s findings factual binding are St. the entire amount Paul paid St. on this court if supported by substantial to Akers evidence. See 17.- special case settlement. A.19(10)(/)(l) (defining substantial evi- appealed United Fire within agency dence as “the quantity quality of evi- and on October the workers’ com- dence that would be deemed sufficient pensation appeal commissioner issued its neutral, detached, and reasonable person, decision affirming adopting the arbi- to establish the fact at issue when the tration decision as the final agency action. consequences resulting from the establish- appeal decision stated: ment of that fact are understood to be It preferable would have been for St. serious and great importance”). “The *5 brought to have its action for reim- burden of demonstrating required the by asserting bursement a date of prejudice invalidity and the agency of ac- of February Sep- rather than party tion is on the asserting 14,1995. invalidity.” tember United Fire and Casu- 17A.19(8)(a). § Iowa Code alty prejudiced, was not deceived or however, because the nature theory of St. Paul’s claim was concisely stated. Statutory Interpretation. IV. error, error,
That if it was an does not goal Our in interpreting the require a different outcome. Compensation Workers’ Act “is to deter judicial review, On the district court af- mine and effectuate the intent of the legis agency firmed the decision. United Fire Aluminum, lature.” Qui Co. Am. v. of appeals. nones, (Iowa 1994). 522 N.W.2d object “We look to the accomplished, to be II.Issues. remedied, the mischief to be or pur the We must determine whether served, pose to be place on the statute compromise special the case settlement a reasonable or liberal construction which barred right St. Paul’s to indemnification contribution, effect, defeat, will best rather than the 85.21(3). or under section If legislature’s purpose.” Beier Glass Co. v. barred, that right is not we must next (Iowa Brundige, 329 N.W.2d determine whether there was substantial 1983). Moreover, the interprets court support agency’s evidence to findings that the 1998 incident caused according Akers’ indus- law to disability trial expense. or medical the language legislature has chosen. IBP, Inc., Venegas 2. See 638 N.W.2d Our review of this case is controlled (Iowa 2002) (stating employer "the liable chapter 1998 amendments made to 17A. All any for current is also liable for chapter citations to 17A are to the 2001 Iowa preexisting disability caused a Dep’t Inspections Code. See Mosher v. disability work-related that com- (Iowa Appeals, 671 N.W.2d 507 n. 1 disability bines with industrial caused a 2003). injury”). later Farms, Inc., par- at Once the party. third Id. 182-83. v. West Zomer (Iowa 2003). into a ties enter 130,133 settlement, free to employee wheth must determine Finally, we party a third without the a claim agency’s to the deference give er we will reimbursing requirement 85.35. Code of section interpretation employer’s and its and its insurer. 17A.19(11). legislature that § Given right to of their relinquishment insurer’s agency to with the not vest discretion did part of the consideration indemnification is section, we must determine interpret parties when the en- employee receives interpreta agency’s to the if we will defer at case settlement. Id. ter into 17A.19(11)(&).We to section agency’s to the we will not defer conclude 85.21(3) right creates the Section clear, the statute is because interpretation, payor for a indemnification or contribution expertness detailed, “special not need does employer or its of benefits another and is comprehension,” adequate for employee be liable to the insurer who Mosher, at 671 N.W.2d technical.” “highly by the part all or of the benefits 510-11. St Paul payor. holding in attempts distinguish our Analysis. Y. Standard, par the two Bankers because decided we have never Although case settle ties to on the effect of case are not the same present insurer’s and its employer’s 85.21(3) action. This to the section parties under Iowa or contribution indemnification meaning. without is a distinction 85.21, we have examined *6 it clear that a Bankers Standard makes under section to indemnification right their compromise special case settlement bars Ins. Co. v. Stan Bankers Standard 85.22. under section right the to indemnification 2003). (Iowa Under ley, 661 N.W.2d 85.22(1). Standard, Bankers 661 N.W.2d 85.22(1), employee if an recovers section extinguishment of the at 182-83. The injury, an party a third damages from any right includes right to indemnification received workers’ employee the for which and its insured have employer the benefits, the is re employee Id. Bankers Stan- against parties. third employer and its insur quired repay to the applicable to reasoning equally dard’s is equal to recovery an amount er from the or con- right Paul’s to indemnification St. compensation benefits the workers’ 85.21(3). Under tribution under section received, attorney fees. less employee 85.35, the plain language of section 85.22(1). compromise spe A case settlement “con- compromise special settlement, however, indem bars cial case any rights a final to further bar stitute[s] insurer employer and its nity claims 85, including arising chapter under” St. 85.22(1). Bankers Standard under section or contribu- right Paul’s to indemnification Co., compro at 183. A 661 N.W.2d Ins. tion under section only pre not case settlement special mise argues and its Paul also Banker’s Standard employer of the St. right cludes the case, distinguishable present is from the employee insurer to be indemnified compromise in the language a because the receives funds from employee when the agreement pre- right special of case settlement precludes party, third also right proceed against to any served St. Paul’s and its insurer to section 85.21. We do Fire under United legal right to indemnification CARTER, argument persuasive. (concurring specially). find this The Justice not special approval compromise of the case I concur in the result because Iowa the workers’ com- settlement terminated section only play 85.22 comes into jurisdiction over pensation commissioner’s “compensation payable under this any arising ap- out of a properly claims chapter.” respect With case proved compromise special case settle- settlement, Iowa Code section pro- 85.35 ment. v. Northwestern Bell White Tel. vides that payment “[s]uch shall not be (Iowa 1994). Co., a payment weekly compen- construed as of language compromise special of the case Consequently, sation.” I do believe settlement cannot revive the commission- payment such constitutes compensation jurisdiction er’s for the 1995 Id. at payable chapter only attempted right St. to join I cannot the majority opinion be- reserve I cause am convinced that Bankers Stan- right settlement was its under section dard Insurance Stanley, Co. v. 661 N.W.2d “proceed to that 85.21 code (Iowa 2003), relies, on which the court with a claim section United Fire wrongly decided. River Bar Casualty and Coon and payments arising Grill for benefits Despite date [of] 2/19/98.”
language agreement, in case settlement
the workers’
extinguished right to St. Paul’s indemnifi-
cation and contribution .under Thus, give any
85.21. we cannot force and language effect Iowa, ex rel. MIL STATE Thomas J. agreement that at- LER, Attorney Iowa, General of in- tempted to reserve St. Paul’s Craig Goettsch, Superinten A. demnification or contribution. *7 Securities, Appellees, dent of analysis dispositive Because this we do reach the substantial evidence issue. PACE, Individual, Appellant. Edwin Disposition. VI. No. 02-1726. conclude a
We Supreme Court of Iowa. settlement under section 85.35 bars em- ployer’s statutory or its insurer’s April indemnification and contribution under judgment We reverse the of the district court and remand the case entry judgment for United Fire. AND REMAND-
REVERSED CASE
ED. CARTER, J., justices
All except concur specially.
who concurs