128 F.2d 843 | 5th Cir. | 1942
By statute the State of Florida has regulated the practice of beauty culture within its bounds.
The question of federal jurisdiction is reached first, and we think it must be decided in favor of appellant. The complaint alleges that the yearly profits of the corporation from its business in Florida amounted to $4,800, and that, if appellees continued to regulate its employees and its business under the statute, it would be forced thereby to discontinue its business in the state as carried on by means of the demonstrations, and, as a consequence thereof, it would sustain damages in, excess of $3,000. There is no claim that this allegation was not made in good faith, nor that the appellant’s right to do business in Florida is not worth more than $3,000. The value to appellant of the right to transact its business freed from the restraint of the statute is determinative of the amount in controversy, which value is fixed by the ad damnum, clause of the complaint, asserted in good faith, at a sum sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court below.
Conceding without deciding that the demonstrations formed a part of an interstate transaction, that fact alone did not preclude the state from enforcing regulatory laws, enacted pursuant to the police power of the state for the purpose of promoting the welfare and happiness of its citizens. A state, by legislation under its police power, may provide for the protection of the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, unless Congress has preempted the particular field in question or unless the state transcends its legitimate authority and undertakes the regulation of interstate commerce by imposing burdens upon it.
The Legislature of Florida plainly intended by this statute to prevent the spread of contagious diseases, to induce cleanliness and sanitation, and to insure the adoption of healthful standards throughout the beauty culture industry, in the interests of the public welfare. The regulatory provisions of the statute are appropriate to the attainment of the legislative object, and are not arbitrary or unreasonable. From its very nature, the practice of beauty culture is essentially an intrastate business as localized in character as any exclusively personal-service enterprise. The fact that a regulatory statute of a state, otherwise valid under rigorous scrutiny, is, in an isolated instance, effective incidentally to burden interstate commerce, does not destroy its constitutionality.
The motion to dismiss was properly sustained on the merits, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Chapter 16800, Florida Acts of 1935, as amended by Chapters 20333 and 20860; Acts of 1941.
Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 17 S.Ct. 262, 41 L.Ed. 648; Hunt v. New York Cotton Exchange, 205 U.S. 322,
Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 49 S.Ct. 57, 73 L.Ed. 204; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 62 S.Ct. 491, 86 L.Ed. — .
California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 26 S.Ct. 100, 50 L.Ed. 204; House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270, 31 S.Ct. 234, 55 L.Ed. 213; Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society v. City of Bristol, D.C., 24 F.Supp. 57, 305 U.S. 572, 59 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed. 361.
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 520, 6 S.Ct. 110, 29 L.Ed. 463; Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 30 S.Ct. 644, 54 L.Ed. 987; Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439, 59 S.Ct. 609, 83 L.Ed. 858; In re Wilshire, C.C., 103 F. 620.
J. Bacon & Sons v. Martin, 305 U.S. 380, 59 S.Ct. 257, 83 L.Ed. 233; Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.S. 346, 59 S.Ct. 528, 83 L.Ed. 752; Texas Co. v. City of Tampa, 5 Cir., 100 F.2d 347; Gillett et al. v. Florida University of Dermatology, 144 Fla. 236, 197 So. 852; Luzier Laboratories v. Minnesota State Board, 189 Minn. 151, 248 N.W. 664; Gillett v. Colson, 144 Fla. 377, 198 So. 109.