169 P. 114 | Or. | 1917
delivered the opinion of the court.
Mr. F. T. Stone, employed by the United Brokers Company, testified to the effect that he examined the car in which the goods were shipped and found them
“The amount of any loss or damage for which this company is liable shall be computed on the basis of the value of the property (being the bona fide invoice price, if any, to the consignee, including the freight charges, if prepaid) at the place and time of shipment under this contract, unless a lower value has been agreed upon or is determined by the classification or tariff upon which the rate is based, in either of which events such lower value shall be the maximum amount to govern such computation, whether or not such loss or damage occurs from negligence.”
The bill of lading shows that the shipment was made from Dania, Florida, to II. C. Schroeder & Co., Way-cross, Georgia, and that the goods were received for
“Portland, Ore., Mar. 14, 1914.
“Following is list of damaged and partly damaged crates of Tomatoes in car F. Gr. E. 21645 which arrived East Portland, March 12th, 1914, distributed as follows:
Pearson Page Co................. 31 er partly damaged.
P. P. & P. Co................... 65 “ completely smashed.
Page & Son..................... 24 “ partly damaged.
Bell & Co....................... 19 “ “ “
Glafke & Co.................... 13 “ “ “
Dryer Bollam.................. 12 “ “ “
Levy & Spiggl.................. 2 “ “ “
166
“Southern Pacieic Oo.
“By M. F. Criger.”
Mr. F. T. Stone also stated in substance that when he called the inspector of the Southern Pacific Company they together examined the contents; that “we made out the report”; that Mr. Criger wrote the statement, and “I. figured that was writing enough.” Though the document is somewhat crude it appears therefrom that it is headed “Report of Inspection of
A stipulation as to notice of a claim for injury to goods while being transported by a common carrier should be given a reasonable construction, and a substantial compliance therewith on tbe part of those for whom tbe shipment is made is all that is required, having in view the object and purpose of the requirement of notice: 4 R. C. L., p. 796, § 254; Atchison, Topeka & S. F. R. Co. v. Temple, 47 Kan. 7 (27 Pac. 98, 13 L. R. A. 362); Hoye v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 14 Ann. Cas. 414, 417, note. It has been held that formal written notice of the loss sustained is not required, because tbe purpose of tbe written notice is fully accomplished when tbe condition of the shipment is clearly brought to tbe attention of tbe representatives of tbe company. When a shipper on receiving goods in a damaged condition signs a receipt under protest it has been held that that constitutes sufficient notice to the carrier that the shipper intends to enforce his rights: 4 R. C. L., p. 796, § 254; Hinkle v. Southern Ry. Co., 126 N. C. 932 (36 S. E. 348, 78 Am. St. Rep. 685).
In Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish Mill. Co., 241 U. S. 190 (60 L. Ed. 948, 86 Sup. Ct. Rep. 541), after some correspondence in regard to a shipment of
“We will make claim against railroad for entire contents of car at invoice price. Must refuse shipment as we cannot handle.”
It was held that the message fulfilled the requirement of the stipulation in the bill of lading that the claim should be made in writing. Mr. Justice Hughes said at page 198 of the opinion in that case:
“In the preceding telegrams, which passed between the parties and are detailed by the state court in stating the facts, the shipment had been adequately identified, so that this final telegram taken with the others established beyond question the particular shipment to which the claim referred and was in substance the making of a claim within the meaning of the stipulation, the object of which was to secure reasonable notice. We think that it sufficiently apprised the carrier of the character of the claim, for while it stated that the claim was for the entire contents of the car ‘ at invoice price ’ this did not constitute such a variance from the claim for the value of the flour as to be misleading; and it is plain that no prejudice resulted. Granting that the stipulation is applicable and valid, it does not require documents in a particular form. It is addressed to a practical exigency and it is to be construed in a practical way.”
The writing in the case at bar is more in detail than the quoted telegram in the case last mentioned and is a substantial compliance with the stipulation in either of the bills of lading referred to in the answer: 10 C. J., pp. 328-336 (§489); Jenkins v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 83 S. C. 473 (65 S. E. 636). In our judgment the diversion of the goods in question while in transit does not materially change this case in view of the fact that the defendant pleaded a contract or bill
Reversed and Remanded for New Trial.