This is a mortgage foreclosure action. Defendants appeal from a decree of foreclosure fоr the full amount of the balance due, interest, and costs. The questions raised concern the effect of the acceleration clause in the mortgage and the necessity of proof that no action at law was pending to collect the mortgage indebtedness.
The defendants executed the note and mortgage in question on Lot 6, Block 6, Woodsdale, an Addition to Lincoln, Nebraska, on September 19, 1955, in the sum of $16,200. Payments were made and acceptеd until October 1962. The defendants were in default of the October and November 1962 payments of $136.95 each. On December 4, 1962, thе plaintiff owner of the mortgage, by certified mail, notified the defendants that in accordance with the terms of the mortgage, the plaintiff United Benefit Life Insurance Company was thereby exercising its right to declare the entire loan duе and payable and further gave notice that no payments would be accepted except payment of the loan in full. Subsequent tenders of payment of the delinquent monthly installments, or the aggregates thereof, were rejеcted by the plaintiff. On October 18,1963, decree was entered by the court in the sum of $12,810.11, the balance due on the whole mоrtgage indebtedness, together with interest, and costs.
Defendants argue that the letter of December 4, 1962, was ineffectivе to exercise the rights of the plaintiff under the acceleration clause of the mortgage. This letter stated: “In accordance4 with the terms of the mortgage covering your property,
we are exercising our right to hereby
declare the entire loan due аnd payable. We will not accept any payments except payment of your loan in full.” (Emphasis supplied.) Defendants argue that the only effective method of exercise of the option
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is by bringing suit thereon, citing McCarthy v. Benedict,
The. validity and enforceability of an acceleration clause in a mortgage, such as this, are not questiоned. It is difficult to see what further action than that taken in this case cOuld be reasonably required of a mortgagee tо ripen his option into an established right.
The letter of December 4, 1962, was clear and unequivocal and left no doubt аs to the mortgagee’s intentions. It was effectivé affirmative action establishing plaintiff’s right to collect the full amount due. Thеre is no merit to-this contention.
Defendants argue, that they tendered the amount of monthly payments in arrears beforе the action was filed and this should defeat the foreclosure. After valid ' exercise of the ■ right to" accelerаte the Maturity of the
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whole debt, the amount in default was the full amount due on the mortgage, and such tender is ineffective. If а default exists, and the option to accelerate is exercised by the mortgagee, the effect thereоf cannot be defeated by the mortgagor without the concurrence of the holder of the mortgage. Gasper v. Mazur,
Defendants argue a waiver of the right to foreclose because the plaintiff, over a period of years, aсcepted late payments. The defendants did not plead either estoppel or waiver, and the record is devoid of any evidence in this respect, except for the mortgagee’s tolerance of or acquiescence in the late payments over a period of years. Defendants argue that the court should relieve against a forfeiture. Acceleration of the maturity date of a mortgage is not a forfeiture, not forbidden by statutе, not contrary to public policy, and may be enforced. Matthews v. Guenther,
Plaintiff alleged, pursuant to the requiremеnts of section 25-2142, R. R. S. 1943, that no proceedings at law had been had for the recovery of said mortgage indebtedness. The defendants denied this allegation. We have carefully examined the bill of exceptions in this case and there is аn entire failure of proof in this respect. The witness for the plaintiff offered no testimony to support this allegation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that the allegation, although a negative one, unless admitted, must be provеd in order to entitle the plaintiff to a decree of foreclosure. Beebe v. Bahr,
This has long been the rule in this statе. We cannot speculate as to compliance therewith. It is required by statute and the Legislature, over the years, has not seen fit to alter it. For this reason, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.