Union Processing Corp. v. Atkin Et Al.
465 U.S. 1038
SCOTUS
1984
Check Treatment

*1 Carney v. States. C. A. 5th No. 83-6105. United Cir. denied. Certiorari

No. Yates United States. C. A. 6th 83-6108. Cir. v. Certiorari denied. Rogers et

No. 83-6110. al. United States. C. A. 11th v. Cir. denied. Dudley

No. v. United States. C. A. 83-6112. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. v. United States. 83-6126. Samuelson C. 8th Cir. Bryan No. 83-6133. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Washington

No. 83-6146. Sup. Ohio. Ct. Ohio. Certio- rari denied. Forsberg

No. 83-6153. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Hospital

No. 81-2363. Pennhurst State School and v. Halderman et al. C. A. 3d Cir. of respondents Motion Terri L. Halderman proceed et al. for leave to pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

No. 82-1876. Color, Foremost Pro Inc. v. Eastman Ko- dak Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Black- mun the Robinson-Patman Act issues.

No. 83-466. Russo A. D. Mitchell al. C. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. took no con- sideration or decision of this petition. Group, Continental Inc. Holt. C. A. Cir. of respondent Motion leave to informa

granted. Certiorari

No. 83-723. Union Atkin et al. App. N. Y. Certiorari and whom with White, join, dissenting.

Powell (Union), a scrap- Petitioner, operates Union Morris, Sol, Y. Auburn, Respondents, N. metal business business Rochester. (Atkins), are the same Atkin Samuel process scrap metal and purchase Both and Atkins Union to mills In sell metal steel and foundries. processed then the decided to establish metal- 1974, independently and Atkins Union prefer in Rochester. mills shredded shredding Steel operations separation allows the of ferrous and non- shredding metal because cleaner grade scrap. ferrous a When Union scrap, yielding purchase entered into a contract for a learned that Atkins had shredder, initiated to ensure that there would be negotiations it The shredding operation parties agreed one Rochester. only not raw materials the area to enough support that there were Ultimately, they that Atkins shredding operations. two for the contract to Union in return 2% of assign purchase gross years. years, sales for the next seven Within Union’s the contract. making ceased under payments Union payments Atkins suit in 1978for due under the brought October the was argued contract. contract unenforceable be- Union contract of an oral part cause of the consideration the consisted Atkins a shredder in the Rochester promise by operate not contended, §1 agreement, area. an the Such Union violates Act, 209, amended, 1. Sherman 26 Stat. U. S. C. not to agreement trial court found that oral was indeed a of the It that since the contract. concluded territories, it a horizontal was a constituted division se violation of the Sherman Act. appeal, Supreme On Division of the New York Appellate rejected consti- Union’s contention that since the contract § 1 tuted a under illegal horizontal division of markets it was 332, Sherman Act. 90 N. Y. S. 2d App. Div. (1982). is illegality ap- The court reasoned that the rule of It if the found plicable only geographic entire divided. relevant in this case consisted of geographic market produced entire area in which mills purchase product steel end allocated, only the shredder. was Because the Rochester area the court concluded was analysis appropri- rule-of-reason analysis, ate. of the Using impact agree- the court found operate ment on could competition to be minimal because Atkins anywhere in the relevant geographic shredder market outside of Rochester. memorandum,

In a one-paragraph the New Ap- York (1983). N. Y. 2d peals affirmed. 59 453 N. E. 2d 522 Apparently it realized that the market that was divided was market in purchased, which raw materials were rather than the scrap sold, market which was for it shredded stated: “Addition- ally evidentiary we observe that there is no the record (as any finding scrap that the metals/raw materials market market) distinguished scrap/products from the shredded was limited to the Rochester area to which the agreement of the 2d, related.” at 453 N. E. then for a writ of petitioned certiorari from arguing that state courts misconceived the meaning of our opinions dealing with horizontal division of markets. Such mar- *3 ket divisions, correctly argues, have consistently been per illegal. deemed se

Our cases make clear the error of the New York courts. As we in Associates, Inc., said United (1972): v. Topco States U. S. of the classic examples

“One of a se violation of 1 is an competitors between at the same level of the market structure to allocate in territories order to minimize competition.” have time again We and “rejected notion that naked restraints of trade are to they be tolerated because are well intended or be cause they allegedly are developed increase competition.”

Under the view of the below, courts rule is not to be to cases applied involving horizontal division of markets so long the parties leave some residual zone in they which still compete; is, the rule does not in govern cases which the entire market is not allocated. if Apparently, companies in some national one would not in compete New York and the other California, would not in compete rule would not apply they continued to in the other 48 States. Not surprisingly, the courts cited no decision of this of that position.

I assume that the Court has denied petition this because it has “bigger fry,” fish to rather than because it views the decision However, below as correct. because a substantial federal ques- tion has been decided a manner apparently conflicts with the applicable decisions of this I the petition Indeed, is a writ certiorari. decision candidate for a summary reversal. Times, Inc.,

No. 83-767. El Paso al. United States District of District Court for Western Texas. C. cer- Brennan would grant 5th Cir. Certiorari Justice tiorari. Proctor No. 83-789. Adams & Gamble Manufac-

turing A. 4th Cir. Justice Pow- Co. C. no in the or decision this ell took consideration Texas Mead. Crim. Tex. Motion App. granted. for leave to respondent Stevens, denial certiorari. respecting the Justice Rehnquist believes merits that Justice now concerning review proper Witherspoon review—the standard of by the extensively analyzed Appeals ruling—was Estelle, O’Bryan (CA5 1983), O’Bryan cert. denied sub nom. 714 F. 2d 365 McKaskle, not, however, pre 1013.1 That ante, p. case.2 of Texas in its certiorari sented State Indeed, O’Bryan, post, at and n. 8. discusses cer- BRENNANand Justice MARSHALLdissented from denial of O’Bryan continuing pen the basis of their belief the death tiorari alty punishment. and unusual No other Justice recorded constitutes cruel Moreover, Justice, had The from that denial. dissent Rehnquist, today question warranting O’Connoe, who find *4 case, jurisdiction, voted to in that under our of certiorari an exercise us, question be before and hence there would Rule of Four the would now today’s dissenting opinion. presumably be no need for 2 course, granted, had been this case Of argued in naturally that is Texas’ have briefed argu had to waited until oral presumably Texas would have have finds in this case is to discover that the ment presented. the one it only question raised the certiorari reads follows: CRIMINAL APPEALS COR THE TEXAS COURT OF “WHETHER (1968) ILLINOIS, U. APPLIED V. S. 510 RECTLY WITHERSPOON TEXAS, A (1980), IT 4[4]8 ADAMS V. U. S. 38 WHEN REVERSED AND CAUSE ONE VENIREMAN TRIAL COURT’S EXCLUSION FOR OF THAT HE AUTOMATE STATED WOULD WHO UNAMBIGUOUSLY