92 Neb. 813 | Neb. | 1913
Lead Opinion
The relief sought is an injunction against the treasurer of Merrick county to prevent him from collecting unpaid taxes levied in 191.1 for township purposes on plaintiff’s property in four townships. The revenue law authorizes a township at a town meeting to determine the amount of
One of the points argued is stated thus: “The purpose for which the tax is levied has not been fixed and determined by the township at its annual meeting as required by law.” The only proofs offered to establish
Authority to certify to the county clerk “the amount of money necessary to be levied for each fund for town purposes” is found in the following statutory provisions: “The proper authorities of cities, villages, townships, and districts authorized by law to vote bonds or assess taxes, except such cities as are authorized by law to levy and collect their own taxes for municipal and school purposes, shall annually, on or before the first Monday in June, certify to the county clerk the several amounts which they severally require to be raised by taxation, including all amounts due upon legal and valid bonds outstanding against such corporation; provided, that school district taxes shall be certified to the county clerk on or before the first Monday in July.” Comp. St. 1911, ch. 77, art. I, sec. 138. The power of the county board to make the necessary levy for township purposes is granted by the revenue law in the following language: “On the last day of sitting as a board of equalization the county board shall levy the necessary taxes for the current year, including all county, township, city, school district, precinct, village, road district, and other taxes required by law to be
The statutes make it plain that the sovereign power to determine what proportion of the property in a township shall he taken from the owners in the form of taxes for township purposes has been committed by the legislature to the electors at the town meeting. What the town clerk is authorized to do is to make and keep a proper record of the proceedings and to properly certify to the county clerk the result in regard to taxation. The action of the town meeting, and not the certificate of the town clerk, is the foundation of the levy. Any error, irregularity or informality in the certificate should not deprive the township of revenue essential to township government, if the county board in fact levied taxes in conformity with legal proceedings of the town meeting. If its record is considered to be the evidence of what Avas done, instead of the clerk’s certificate, plaintiff adduced no proof to show that the electors did not determine the specific sums required for each purpose for which taxes are leviable. The statute declares that a 14-mill levy is the limit of taxation for township purposes and the record shows that an estimate of 8 mills was the highest i*ate fixed in any of the townships named. If the township and the taxing-officers exercised their powers laAvfully, the levies are valid. In absence of proof to the contrary the validity of the taxes will be presumed. Plaintiff has the burden of proving they are illegal. On this’ subject the supreme court of Illinois ruled: “One objecting to the enforcement of a tax has the burden of shoAving its invalidity, since the presumption is that the tax is just and that all officers Avho have had any official connection with it have properly discharged their duties.” People v. Keener, 194 Ill. 16.
With the exception of the certificate of the town clerk, plaintiff offered no proof to show the proceedings of the town meeting. Had the town clerk certified, and the county board levied, a tax in excess of" the amount de
In the early history of this court the same principle was stated in this form: “By section forty-four of the school law, the director is required to keep a record of all the ‘proceedings of the district in a book to be kept for that purpose,’ and it is to this, and this alone, that resort must be had to ascertain what the district-has done, what taxes have been voted, and for what particular purposes they were levied.” Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Lancaster County, 4 Neb. 293.
Plaintiff has proved nothing to show that the taxes, if collected, will not be lawfully expended pursuant to the directions of the town meeting for the specific purposes enumerated in the statutes. The levies being within the statutory limit, the presumption being that they are valid, the foundation of the taxes being the proceedings of the town meeting and the statute requiring a public record thereof, the burden was on plaintiff to show that the levies did not conform to the action of the town meeting, and, for the purpose of proving that fact, informal and irregular certificates of the town clerk are insufficient. For plaintiff’s failure to maintain the burden of proof, the injunction was properly denied.
A decision based on the sufficiency of the certificates of the town clerks must also be adverse to plaintiff. The statutes have conferred on the people of a township the power to impose upon themselves taxes for local purposes. It is understood that such power will often be exercised
The certificates were obviously intended to indicate the number of mills leviable for all township purposes, and the county board apparently so understood them. An interpretation in harmony Avith the views of Judge Cooley leads to a holding that the failure of the town clerk to enumerate the several purposes for which the taxes were needed and to state the amount required in each fund did not invalidate the levy, since the limitation prescribed by Iuav was not exceeded. Weston Lumber Co. v. Township of Munising, 123 Mich. 138. Referring to the report of taxes voted by a school district, it was said in Burlington, & M. R. R. Co. v. Lancaster County, 4 Neb. 293: “We do not think it was intended, nor would it be reasonable to require that an itemized statement be given of the purposes for which the funds were intended. It certainly could be of no practical use whatever, and the omission to do so could work no possible injury to any one.”
The fact that the town clerk reported the necessary number of mills, as the basis of a levy, instead of stating the gross sum required for each purpose, did not invali
For the reasons given, an injunction to prevent the collection of township taxes was properly denied.
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
To mv mind there was scarcely a semblance of compliance with the law by either the voters or the clerk.